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Nakano Seigō and the Politics of Democracy,  
Empire and Fascism in Prewar and Wartime Japan 
 
Abstract 
 
 The subject of this dissertation is the life and career of Nakano Seigō, a Japanese 
journalist and politician born in Fukuoka-city on the southwestern island of Kyūshū in 1886. 
Initially a liberal and a democrat, Nakano became enamored with European-style fascist 
movements in the 1930s and tried to start a similar political mass movement in Japan. Advocating 
a hard-line vis-à-vis America and England, Nakano supported Japan’s entry into WW2. As early 
as mid-1942, however, he understood that Japan could not win the war and demanded that the 
government sue for peace – a position that put him into direct opposition with Japan’s military. 
After being imprisoned briefly for his attempt to bring down the Tōjō cabinet in the summer of 
1943, Nakano committed ritual suicide in October of the same year.  
 The dissertation focuses on Nakano’s enchantment with European fascist movements – 
Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in particular - and his attempts to launch a similar movement in 
Japan. Nakano’s attraction to fascism was, in part, a reaction to the international economic and 
political trends following the Great Depression but also reflected his life-long admiration for 
charismatic political leaders. His fascist leanings were also the result of a complex political 
calculation that aimed to exploit the appearance of the masses on Japan’s political stage. The 
thesis argues that Nakano’s attempt to launch a popular mass movement modeled on the 
European fascist movements failed both because Nakano’s parties (first the Kokumin Dōmei, 
1931-6 and then the Tōhōkai, 1937 – 1943) lacked ideological cohesion as well as truly 
totalitarian scope and because Nakano refused to resort to political violence as a means to achieve 
his political ends. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 The subject of this dissertation is the life and career of Nakano Seigō, a Japanese 
journalist and politician who was born in Fukuoka-city on the southwestern island of Kyūshū, 
Japan in 1886, but lived most of his adult life in Tokyo. Initially a liberal and democrat, Nakano 
became enamored with European-style fascist movements in the 1930s and actually tried to bring 
about a similar political mass movement in Japan. Advocating a hard-line vis-à-vis America and 
England, Nakano supported Japan’s entry into the war. As soon as mid-1942, however, he 
understood that Japan could not win the war and demanded that it sue for peace, a position that 
put him into direct opposition with Japan’s military. After having briefly been imprisoned for his 
attempt to bring down the Tōjō cabinet, Nakano committed ritual suicide in the fall of 1943.  
 Three possible answers come to mind to the question of why one would write a 
biography. First, because the life of the person in question was extraordinary. Second, because 
the life was important. Third, because the life was typical of a whole group or generation of 
people. To varying degrees, all three of these reasons apply in Nakano’s case.  
Nakano Seigō’s life was certainly extraordinary. One would be hard-pressed to find among 
the Japanese party politicians of his generation someone who traveled more widely and met more 
statesmen than Nakano Seigō. His biography reads like the Who’s Who of prewar Japan, and his 
travels also brought him into contact with many other Asian leaders such as Sun Yat-sen and 
Chiang Kai-shek, as well as European fascist leaders such as Hitler and Mussolini. Nor would it 
be easy to find another Japanese politician whose career was so full of zigs and zags. Who else 
was called a “Soviet Spy,” “Japan’s Hitler” and “anti-militarist,” all while he was still alive? A 
search for examples of Japanese politicians who, already in 1942-3, demanded that Japan should 
surrender and were willing to give their life for that cause, one person appears on the list, and it is 
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Nakano Seigō. Finally, on the short roster of 20
th
-century Japanese politicians who committed 
ritual suicide, Nakano’s name appears yet again. 
Was Nakano important? Here the answer is less clear. He never held a position in the 
executive branch of government for any extended period of time; his two short stints included 
two months as parliamentary councilor [複紳巫] in the ministry of Finance in early 1927 and 
nine months as vice-minister [膕鳩饅巫] in the Communications Ministry within the Hamaguchi 
cabinet in 1929. As a member of parliament (which he was almost continuously from 1920 to his 
death in 1943), as the leader of a proto-fascist party in the 1930s, and also as a widely-published 
journalist and author of books on contemporary political affairs, he did, however, influence 
public opinion and political debate, and, through that, political decisions. Finally, Nakano may be 
said to be important in his legacy, for he – and, to a lesser degree, his contemporary Nagai 
Ryūtarō - was among the first politicians to introduce Japan to mass-based forms of political 
activism.  
Was Nakano representative or typical of a group or generation of people? Here, one is 
tempted to lean toward the negative, for types tend toward the statistical mean Nakano tended 
toward the extreme. Yet, in more than one respect he was typical. His political career up to 1930 -
with journalism as an entry point, a jiban powerbase in his electoral district, a seat in parliament, 
and membership in a party leading to a position in a ministry - was typical for liberal party 
politicians of his age. The challenges Nakano faced - including winning votes in an age of 
expanding suffrage, financing his political activities and election campaigns, and fighting and 
winning political power struggles - were also faced by most of his peers. It is in devising 
solutions to these problems that Nakano often broke out of the mold. Nakano’s political views 
may also be said to have been typical: His liberalism, with its strong anti-genrō and anti-
hambatsu slant, can be seen as an extension of one possible trajectory radiating out from the 
Meiji Popular Rights Movement and was typical of the liberal strand among the young 
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progressive reformers who populated the late Taishō and early Shōwa era political landscape. The 
same may be said about the evolution of Nakano’s pan-Asianist views. Starting from a strong 
opposition to Western colonialism, Nakano, like many of his contemporaries, had little difficulty 
adjusting his interpretation of pan-Asianism to view Japan’s colonial empire in a positive light - 
with all the contradictions that this ideological progression entailed. Anyone seeking an answer to 
the question of how one could simultaneously oppose Western colonialism and justify Japanese 
colonialism will find Nakano’s intellectual development illuminating.  
One might also ask why a scholar would undertake to write another biography of Nakano 
Seigō, given that one already exists in English and several exist in Japanese.
1
 The answer lies in 
the fact that I seek to approach Nakano with different questions in mind. Initially, my interest was 
in studying relations between Japan and Germany, especially those before and during WW2. In 
so doing, I sought answers to questions such as: What was Japan’s attraction to Nazi Germany 
and Fascist Italy? What did Japanese citizens at the time think about Hitler and Mussolini? What 
did they know about concentration camps, the Gestapo, the Arbeitsdienst? With what motives did 
Japan enter an alliance with these powers – a regrettable decision that, to this day, causes Japan to 
be lumped together with and counted among the fascist powers, a categorization I believe is 
incorrect. Compared, for instance, to Oates’ work, this biography therefore takes a closer and 
more detailed look at Nakano’s so-called fascist period. While Nakano’s life does not provide a 
                                                           
1
 The English biography is by Leslie Russell Oates, Populist Nationalism in Prewar Japan: a biography of 
Nakano Seigō, (Sydney: Allen Unwin, 1985). In order of  chronological appearance, the most important 
Japanese biographies on Nakano Seigō include: Satō Morio [双I嶂赶], Nakano Seigō; [腎ǒ驟悩], 
(Tokyo, Kasumigaseki-shobō; 1951), Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁驥啌], Why did Nakano Seigō commit 
suicide? [腎ǒ驟悩購奏膣60鈍浩紅拘], (Tokyo, 1953), Nakano Yasuo [腎ǒ┘渣], Biography of my 
father Nakano Seigō [債債腎ǒ驟悩然], (Tokyo, 1958), Inomata Keitarō [㊝退舁啣ア], The life of 
Nakano Seigō [腎ǒ驟悩貢﨟㌧] (Nagoya, 1964); Nakano, Yasuo [腎ǒ┘渣]; Nakano Seigō: The 
Politician [腎ǒ驟悩膕齠广], 2 vols. (Tokyo, 1971), Tatamiya Eitarō [譓譓幟ラ啣ア], Nakano Seigō [腎
ǒ驟悩], (Tokyo: Shinjimbutsu Orai-sha, 1975),  Hinoshita Tōgo [荳真I捧], The way of lion: Nakano 
Seigō [㍎岌貢ぐ腎ǒ驟悩], (Tokyo, 1986) and Ogata Taketora [I苜wよ], Nakano Seigō the Man [斥侮
腎ǒ驟悩], (Tokyo, 1988). 
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conclusive answer to all of the above questions, it certainly gives us insight into some of the more 
important ones, for during this period Nakano was able to influence and lead public opinion.   
Once I began studying Nakano in the 1930s and Japan’s slippery road into the Pacific War, 
new questions arose - and one of the most important relates to the astonishing continuity in 
Japan’s history in the years 1930-53. I say “astonishing” because, given the stress to which 
Japanese society was exposed (mobilization for war, defeat in war and occupation by a foreign 
power), the country during this period displays more continuities than say that of Germany, with 
which it is rightly or wrongly often compared. While the question of how continuities survived 
Japan’s defeat and subsequent occupation has been extensively researched, the question of how 
Japan’s government succeeded in mobilizing society for total war while making only a few 
alterations to the political system has received less attention.
2
  
In simple terms, the question is the following: Mobilizing a society for war creates the 
opportunity to renegotiate the relationship between rulers and ruled, government and people, state 
and society
3
. In mobilizing for war, the state (government, rulers) must approach the people 
(often represented by parliament) to finance armaments. Depending on the kind of weaponry, 
army, navy, etc. used in the war, the state may also need the people’s physical support (in the 
                                                           
2
 A comprehensive account of Japan’s defeat and the history under US occupation can be found in John 
W. Dower’s “Embracing Defeat – Japan in the wake of World War II”, (New York, 1999). The question 
how the process of mobilization impacted Japan’s political system has been treated by Gordon M. Berger; 
“Parties out of Power in Japan, 1931-1941”, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Yamanouchi 
Yasushi, Koshmann, J. Victor, and Narita Ryūichi, eds. “Total War and Mobilization” (Ithaca, NY, 1998), 
and Lousie Young, “Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism” (Berkeley, 
Ca. 1998).  
3
 The literature on this complex process of negotiation is vast. Good overviews are Bruce Porter, “War 
and the Rise of the State”, (New York, 1995); Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 
990-1990, (Oxford, England, 1990), Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making” 
in Tilly, Charles ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe, (Princeton, 1975); and Brian 
Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early 
Modern Europe, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).  
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form of soldiers, nurses, overtime work, etc.)
4
. In a time of total war – and the Pacific War was 
waged as total war – the state needs the totality of its citizens. In exchange, the state offers 
protection from a foreign aggressor. When such protection is not enough, the state may 
sometimes be forced to offer even more: new rights (e.g. suffrage), more powers (to parliament), 
or titles to land and wealth (usually taken from the conquered people). Depending on the 
accompanying (preceding) negotiation process, mobilization can lead either to a state having 
more power over its people or to the opposite – to the people wielding more power over the state. 
War can have emancipatory effects on a society or on group within society, even if such effects 
become apparent only after the war’s end.  
There is little doubt that, in the case of Japan preparing for WW2, these emancipatory 
effects did not materialize, for it was the state that was able to expand its power over the people, 
rather than vice versa. Among the nations participating in WW2, perhaps only Soviet Russia was 
able exact sacrifices from its people that compare to those demanded of the Japanese. Yet unlike 
Soviet Russia, Japan entered the 1930s as a democracy. How then was such a speedy and total 
reversal of the Japanese state’s relationship to its citizens possible?  
While the process certainly had more than one cause, the outcome of the negotiation 
process over how Japan was to mobilize - from above and not from below – does provide an 
important part of the explanation. Nakano was only one of the negotiators in this process, 
representing the interest of the people in parliament and advocating mobilization from below. If 
the people got such a raw deal, than among other reasons it is because Nakano – for reasons to be 
described below - failed miserably as a negotiator.  
 
                                                           
4
 Various approaches to identify the determinant factors in this negotiation process (of which weaponry is 
just one) can be found in works of Stanislav Andreski especially his Military Organization and Society; 
(Berkeley, 1971), but also his Wars, Revolutions, Dictatorships: Studies of Historical and Contemporary 
Problems from a Comparative Viewpoint, (London, 1992).  
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Some Comments on Technicalities 
A few comments on translations, transcriptions, quotes, and references: First, whenever 
Japanese terms were transcribed into roman letters, the Hepburn method of Romanization was 
used. The only exceptions are words and names so familiar to the Western reader (e.g. Tokyo, 
Kyoto, Osaka, etc.), that adhering to the Hepburn system might have been a source of 
misunderstanding.  
Second, following common Japanese practice, personal names of Japanese people are 
written with the family name first, followed by the given name.  
Third, often no transcription into roman letters is provided. The reader instead will find the 
original Japanese script. Thus, instead of writing: “Social Nationalism [shakai kokka-shugi],” the 
text reads: “Social Nationalism [だ善楼广厨コ].”  
Forth, when translating from Japanese into English, I have on occasion also provided the 
Japanese original in square brackets following the translation. I did so in cases where I believe 
the translation did not do justice to the Japanese and I felt the need to provide the reader who is 
fluent in Japanese with a taste of the original.  
Fifth, quotes are always in double quotation marks (e.g. “quote”), while quotes within 
quotes are in single quotation marks (e.g. “quote ‘quote within’ quote”). Comments by this author 
within a quote are always in square brackets (e.g. “quote [comment by the author] quote”).  
Sixth, references:  In the course of his life, Nakano Seigō met many people. Some of these 
personalities are so famous that I felt no need to explain who they were (e.g. Hitler, Mussolini, 
Itō Hirobumi, etc.). Many others were only secondary figures who may or may not be known to 
the reader – for these, I usually give some basic information in the footnotes and a more 
comprehensive in the biographic appendix at the end. Finally, there are many characters about 
whom nothing is known except their names and, accordingly, this is all I mention.  
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Seventh, for the main thread of the narrative, I relied heavily on four biographies. 
Accordingly, I have shortened the references in the footnotes as follows: 
 
• “Oates” stands for “Oates, Leslie Russell; Populist Nationalism in prewar Japan: 
a biography of Nakano Seigō” (Sydney, 1985),  
• “Ogata” stands for “Ogata, Taketora, “Nakano Seigō the Man” [斥侮腎ǒ驟悩], 
(Tokyo: Chūkō Bunko, 1988)”  
• “Inomata” stands for “Inomata, Keitarō, “The life of Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩貢
﨟㌧], (Nagoya, 1964)” and 
• “Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1” stands for “Nakano, Yasuo, “Nakano Seigō: The 
Politician” [腎ǒ驟悩膕齠广] (Tokyo, 1971) vol. 1”.  
   
Eighth, much of what Nakano wrote was published more than once – the usual pattern was 
publication in newspaper or magazine followed by publication in a book. Whenever possible, I 
have tried to mention both the original publication as well as the book published afterward. 
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Chapter 1: Nakano’s Youth and Education 
 
Fukuoka: Cradle of the Genyōsha 
On the twelfth day of February, in the 19th year of Meiji (i.e.,1886),  Nakano Taijirō and 
his wife Tora, who lived together at Nishiminato-chō 58 in Fukuoka-city on the southwestern 
island of Kyūshū, had the first of what eventually would be five children. They named their son 
Jintarō [蕓啣ア]. Later in life, he took on the name Seigō [驟悩], by which he is known to 
posterity. Born in an age when Japan, recently opened to the world, was striving feverishly to 
catch up with the West, young Jintarō’s generation fixed its gaze on the future and a hazy vision 
of modernity that was only slowly taking shape. At the same time, the world in which Jintarō 
grew up was still governed by forces, ideas and traditions that had their roots in Japan’s past. 
Kyushu’s heritage of radicalism was perhaps the most important of many historic influences on 
Nakano Seigō’s political development. In telling the story of that heritage, it is perhaps best to 
start with the lives of Takaba Masayama [㔾凅驟愾] and his daughter Osamu.   
 Takaba, a samurai and oculist physician in the service of the Kuroda-han of Fukuoka in 
the early 19th century, had long hoped for a son who could continue the family line. One after 
another, however, the children birthed by his wife were daughters. When in 1831 she gave birth 
to yet another girl, Masayama decided that, even so, he would make this child heir of the family 
line. Thus, his last daughter was given a boy’s name, Yōrei [掃棒], dressed in boy’s clothing and 
raised in every respect like a son. Like other boys, she celebrated her coming of age in a 
ceremony at twelve - she then changed her name to Osamu [頗].1 The domain’s authorities played 
                                                     
1 Takaba Osamu [㔾凅頗] (1831 – 1891), educator. For a brief account of Takaba Osamu’s life see the 
Fukuoka-ken Encyclopedia [┗慟0̋┿征怒], edited by Nishi-Nihon Shimbun-sha [O荳袿范ⓥだ],  
1982 or the longer popularized account in Nagahata Michiko [鵑鉎ぐ岌], “Rin – Outstanding Women of  
Modern Japan-Takaba Osamu” [特―デ千荳袿貢嚊罐―㔾凅頗] (Tokyo, 1997). 
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along and, eventually, Tabaka’s daughter was even given the right to carry two swords, a privilege 
usually limited to the male samurai.2  
A gifted student, Takaba Osamu was sent to the Kamei-juku [੉੗Ⴖ] led by Kamei Shōyō 
[੉੗ᤘ㓁]. The school’s motto was “freedom” [⥄↱] and it stood out from other schools in that 
it offered not only an orthodox Confucian curriculum but also Dutch learning. Unusually, the 
school also accepted both male and female pupils. Talent combined with hard work made Takaba 
stand out among the school’s students and, to this day, she is remembered as one of the “Four 
Kings of the Kamei School” [੉㐷ߩ྾ᄤ₺]. After completing her studies, she continued her 
father’s work, practicing medicine in Fukuoka.  
In 1853, the arrival of Commodore Perry’s Black ships in Edo bay and the ensuing threat 
that Japan could suffer domination at the hands of a foreign power threw the country’s political 
world into crisis. As officials at every level of government discussed how to deal with the foreign 
threat, Takaba Osamu determined that she too had to make a contribution to Japan’s political 
survival. Being barred from entry into politics on account of her gender, she decided to open a 
school and educate young men who would act in her place. To this end, she founded the Kōshi-
juku [⥝ᔒႶ], colloquially known as the “Ginseng Field School” [ੱෳ⇌Ⴖ] because it was 
built on a piece of ground formerly used to grow Korean ginseng.  
Within Fukuoka domain and later Fukuoka prefecture, the Ginseng Field School came to 
play the role of incubator of radical political activists, much like that played by Yoshida Shōin’s 
school in the Chōshū domain. Perhaps this was so because Takaba Osamu, in spite of her own 
delicate build, accepted hooligans and roughneck students whom she intended to civilize. 3 
                                                     
2 Though extremely rare, raising a daughter in this fashion had some precedent. In the Akitsuki branch 
domain of the Kuroda domain, Hara Saihin [ේ⩿⯅] had also been raised like a boy.    
3 In her chosen name the character “Ran” [ੂ] means “war, rebellion” but her reading of it namely 
“Osamu”, means “to calm” or “to pacify.”      
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Students who, on account of their unruly behavior, had been turned away elsewhere found an 
open door at the Ginseng Field School. Accordingly, the school may have schooled a high 
proportion of young men to whom violence was an acceptable means of attaining a given goal.  
Or perhaps the school was an incubator for radicalism  because Takaba Osamu’s teachings 
placed great weight on the ideas of Wang Yang-ming, which underpinned a heterodox strand of 
neo-Confucianism known in Japan as Yōmeigaku [ 蔽 蕚 嶌 ]. 4  Unlike the orthodox 
interpretations of Confucianism, with their rational approach and strong emphasis on respect for 
socio-political hierarchies, Wang Yang-ming’s approach was intuitive. He presupposed that, by 
nature, man had innate knowledge of good and evil. Accordingly, he believed that moral 
understanding could not be achieved through rational study of the outside world, but rather 
through meditative introspection and following one’s intuition.5 Furthermore, Wang rejected that 
moral understanding could exist without action. His concept of the unity of knowledge and action 
[öネ遍慎 also öネ慎68] affirmed that knowledge is the beginning of action, and action is the 
completion of knowledge.  
It is not difficult to see that Wang’s teachings contained the seeds of rebellion - perhaps 
even revolution. His axiomatic statement of man’s moral autonomy could free the individual from 
outside authorities. The unity of knowledge and action implied not only the right, but even the 
duty, to act upon one’s intuition - if necessary also against worldly powers. In Japan, these 
revolutionary seeds, which had lain dormant on Chinese soil, bore fruit. Among the rebels of the 
                                                     
4 Wang Yang-ming [侒蔽蕚] (1472 - 1529), known in Japan as Ōyōmei was a scholar, bureaucrat, 
educator and general of Ming China. For a concise introduction to his life and thought see Siu-chi Huang, 
“Essentials of Neo-Confucianism – eight major philosophers of the Song and Ming periods” (Westport, 
Conn., 1999), pp. 191 – 212.   
5 One is tempted to translate Wang’s concept ‘intuition’ with the word ‘conscience’, if only the latter did 
not carry such a heavily religious meaning deeply rooted in the western tradition. Perhaps one should 
follow the example of Nakae Tōju who introduced Wang Yang-ming’s philosophy into Japan and called 
this moral intuition the “divine light from heaven.” See Theodore de Bary et al. editor, “Sources of East 
Asian Tradition” (New York, 2008), p. 160.  
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Tokugawa and early Meiji period we find many followers of Wang’s philosophy, most famously 
Saigō Takamori, Yoshida Shōin and, to a lesser degree, Ōshio Heihachirō.6   
We do not know whether Takaba’s students were radicalized by Wang Yang-ming’s 
philosophy, or whether they had been radical to start with and used his teachings as means of 
legitimizing their views and subsequent actions. A combination of both seems plausible. What we 
do know is that the Ginseng Field School produced an unusually large number of political 
activists and Yōmeigaku followers who played important roles in the affairs of Fukuoka domain 
(later prefecture) and, in some instances, even in national politics.  
The most famous – or depending on one’s point of view, most infamous – of Takaba’s 
students was Tōyama Mitsuru, who eventually came to be known as the doyen of the Japanese 
right wing.7 Born into a family of low-ranking samurai in Fukuoka, Tōyama entered the Ginseng 
Field School in 1871. Four years later, inspired by Itagaki Taisuke’s “Risshisha,” he joined some 
of his fellow students  - notably Hakoda Rokusuke, Shintō Kiheita, Hiraoka Kōtarō, Narahara 
Itaru, Miyagawa Ta’ichirō, Takebe Koshirō, and Ōchi Hikoshirō8 - in founding the “Rectifying 
Aims Society” [é沒だ].   
The motives that united and drove these young samurai – generally, the preservation of 
their historic place in society - were not unique to them, their school, or Fukuoka, but were shared 
by many samurai throughout Japan. Having toppled the Tokugawa bakufu and restored imperial 
rule in 1867-8, the new leaders of Japan - mostly young samurai from the four domains of 
                                                     
6 On Wang Yang-ming’s philosophy and its reception in Japan by Nakae Tōju and Kumazawa Banzan, see 
W. Theodore de Bary et al. editor, “Sources of East Asian Tradition” (New York, 2008), p. 160.     
7 Tōyama Mitsuru [姿愾噌] (1855-1944) Right-wing political leader, advocate of Japanese expansion on 
the Asian continent, and a founder of a number of ultra-nationalist groups such as the Genyōsha, 
Kokuryūkai etc, Tōyama was to become one of Nakano’s most influential mentors.  
8 Hakoda Rokusuke [è譓 砥ず] (1850 – 1888); Shintō Kiheita [〕I友霸啣] (1850-1925); Hiraoka 
Kōtarō [霸慟⑥啣ア] (1851 – 1906); Narahara Itaru [啼Y譜67] (1857-1917); Miyagawa Ta’ichirō [幟擺
啣慎ア] (1847 - 1909); Takebe Koshirō [驥グ恠裂ア] (1846 - 1877); Ochi Hikoshirō [〈虧檢裂ア] (1849 
– 1877).  
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Chōshū, Satsuma, Tosa, and Hizen - set out on a program of reform and modernization aimed 
nominally at shaking up the old social order. But what to the new Meiji government was meant to 
be a modernizing drive was, in the eyes much of Japan’s warrior class, a threat to the samurai’s 
traditional economic, social and political status. 
In 1869, the government reduced the many ranks of the samurai class to just two, the 
higher-ranking shizoku and the lower-ranking sotsu. Then, in August of 1871, the Meiji leaders 
abolished the ancient domains and created prefectures in their place; these prefectures were no 
longer ruled by their former daimyō but by centrally-appointed governors. At the same time, the 
Meiji government also reduced the stipends of the domains’ samurai. In 1872, the government 
reclassified a good part of the lower-ranking sotsu as commoners. The following year, the Meiji 
rulers went a step further, taxing the remaining samurais’ stipends and introducing a program 
under which stipends could be converted into bonds (usually at a loss, which explains why only 
few samurai accepted the offer). The outcome of the debate over the Korean question - that is, 
whether or not to send a punitive expedition to Korea - crushed any hope that the new 
government would employ the samurai in their traditional role as warriors. It became clear to the 
more far-sighted among the samurai that the new Meiji polity had no use, no place and no money 
for them. 
The samurais’ discontent over the gradual erosion of their status was lent additional acidity 
by the fact that the new government, in its recruitment practices, displayed a marked preference 
for men from the four restoration domains of Chōshū, Satsuma, Hizen, and Tosa (though 
especially the former two). This favoritism took such extreme forms that samurai from across 
Japan feared the new government – despite its rhetoric of imperial restoration, modernization and 
meritocracy – was in fact re-establishing a sort of bakufu, with all its vices and problems. The 
only difference, in this case, was that instead of being a Tokugawa bakufu, it would be a Satchō 
bakufu.  
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Because of Fukuoka’s role in the bakumatsu years, the domain (later prefecture) did not 
belong to the restorationist camp. Although not vassals of the Tokugawa, the house of Kuroda had 
fought on Tokugawa side at Sekigahara and subsequently been rewarded with one of the larger 
domains in Japan. 9  Though one might expect that the domain would therefore have been 
predisposed to side with the Tokugawa bakufu, there had been in Fukuoka –as in  many other 
domains – a vociferous restoration faction in the bakumatsu years. Takaba Osamu, incidentally, 
had sided with that faction. The struggle between the restoration and pro-Tokugawa factions 
remained unsettled until 1865, when the former was bloodily suppressed. The restoration leader, 
senior councilor Katō Shisho10, was forced to commit suicide with six other members, while 14 
more were executed and another 15 exiled. The Tokugawa loyalists prevailed and when, three 
years later, the restoration forces emerged victorious from the struggles against the Tokugawa 
shogunate, the Kuroda domain found itself on the losing side. 
Fukuoka domain had entered modernity on the wrong foot, so to speak. The neighboring 
domains of Chikugo11 and Buzen,12 which together with the Kuroda domain’s Chikuzen13 were 
                                                     
9  By productive capacity, the Kuroda domain was ranked 7th (smaller than Satsuma but larger than 
Chōshū) with an officially listed productive capacity (omote-daka) of 520,000 koku of rice. See Albert M. 
Craig, “Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration” ( Cambridge Ma., 1961), p. 11 (Table 1). 
10 Katō Tokunari [秤I毫癩] usually known as Katō Shisho [秤I変蟷] (1830-1865), was a samurai of 
the Fukuoka-han and at the center of Sonnō Jōi activism within the administration of the same domain. He 
advanced to the position of Karō [广67] in 1865. When the Tokugawa-loyalists got the upper hand, he was 
forced to resign and commit ritual suicide [seppuku].  
11 The land of Chikugo [º歙] compromised the domains of Kurume [睡鉧̶M] (with its branch domain 
Matsuzaki [觚扣M]) Yanagawa [踴齊M], and Miike [申鷭M].   
12 The land of Buzen [ϕ撚] was compromised of the Nakatsu domain[腎┭M], the Kogura domain [恠琢
M] (later renamed Kawara domain [藤蒟M] and then again renamed Toyotsu domain [ϕ┭M]), and its 
branch domain Chizuka [桧襦M].  
13 The land of Chikuzen [º撚] was ruled over by the Kuroda domain [桛譓M], and its two branch 
domains, namely the Tōrenji domain [覩水徇M] and the Akizuki domain [┽蠻M].  
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soon to be incorporated into Fukuoka prefecture, had not fared any better.14 Nor did Fukuoka’s 
standing in the Meiji polity improve when it was found the Kuroda domain had been involved in 
counterfeiting the new government’s bank notes. During the early years of the Meiji period, the 
samurai of Fukuoka prefecture therefore found themselves in the uncomfortable position of 
having to watch helplessly as their traditional role within society was being undone, while the 
new government offered them no rewarding alternative.  
It was to rectify these real or perceived injustices that the students of the Ginseng Field 
School founded the “Rectifying Aims Society” [é沒だ] in 1875. When, in the following year, 
the government set out to finalize the dismantling of the samurai’s privileged position through 
abolishing Japan’s classes [ﬀ┐橡薙], converting all samurai stipends into bonds and prohibiting 
sword-carrying [栫鈍占], samurai unrest erupted in a series of rebellions concentrated in the 
southwest that culminated in the Satsuma rebellion of 1877. Whenever possible, the members of 
the Rectifying Aims Society participated in these rebellions. 
Hakoda, Tōyama, Shintō, and several others fought in the Hagi rebellion [P貢頗] of 
October 1876 and were subsequently imprisoned. This imprisonment likely saved their lives, for 
in the following year they were unable to join - and perhaps die in - the larger Satsuma rebellion 
under Saigō Takamori’s leadership. Less fortunate were Takebe and Ōchi who, inspired by the 
rebellion in nearby Satsuma, raised and led a force of 850 samurai in what came to be known as 
the Fukuoka disturbance [┗慟貢哇]. They survived the fighting and tried to join the Satsuma 
rebels, but were captured on the way and executed. Hiraoka, who accompanied them, survived by 
luck and in the chaos following the disturbance’s suppression made his way into the camp of the 
                                                     
14 Kurume domain and its branch Matsuzaki domain had participated in both punitive expeditions against 
Chōshū. Among the domains which later were incorporated in Fukuoka prefecture, only Yanagawa domain 
fought on the side of the Restoration forces.  
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Satsuma rebels. There he served as staff officer under Saigō Takamori, survived the bloody 
suppression of that rebellion and, after a year of prison, returned to Fukuoka.  
After this last and largest samurai rising was suppressed, even the most thick-headed 
resisters understood that the Meiji government could not be overthrown by open rebellion. This, 
however, did not mean the end of samurai discontent – or, for that matter, of samurai violence. 
Pushed out of their traditional profession and unable to find employment in the new 
administration, the majority of samurai was forced to seek alternative sources of income in trade, 
commerce, industry, farming, education, or elsewhere - and not all were successful in their new 
careers. The loss of privilege, status and economic livelihood caused resentment against the new 
state to fester in the hearts of many. The fact that the new government maintained its preference 
for men from Satsuma and Chōshū in its appointments, a practice that persisted even after the 
introduction of civil service examinations in 1887, continued to enrage those kept outside 
government. 
With open rebellion no longer an option, political activism in Japan took more peaceful 
forms – though violence continued to feature prominently. The period after 1877, in particular 
1879-81, saw the establishment of various political societies that sought to attain their political 
aims by holding rallies, mobilizing the common people and submitting petitions (sometimes 
signed by thousands of citizens) to the central government demanding the establishment of a 
representative parliament and a constitution, as well as the revision of the unequal treaties 
concluded with the Western Powers. Many of the discontented former samurai, who until 1877 
had sought to retain and then regain their lost privileges and in that sense may be called 
reactionary, now turned progressive (however superficial this may have been), incorporated 
liberal democratic and constitutional ideals into their rhetoric, and tried to ride the wave of what 
soon came to be known as the Freedom and People's Rights Movement.  
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Again, the surviving members of the Rectifying Aims Society were no exception to these 
wider trends. In 1879, Tōyama Mitsuru, Hakoda Rokusuke, Shintō Kiheita, and Hiraoka Kōtarō 
founded a political society called Kōyōsha. 15  Renamed Genyōsha 16  in 1881, the society’s 
members were bound by its program to honor the imperial household, protect the country and 
guard the people’s rights.  
Over the course of its long existence – the Genyōsha was not dissolved until 1946, under 
orders of the US occupation forces - the society’s members engaged in activities that went well 
beyond its original program. Domestically, the Genyōsha soon moved away from the liberal 
rhetoric of the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement even as the society maintained its hostile 
stance toward the Meiji leaders’ monopoly on power, often referring to the authorities 
disparagingly as Satchō cliques [Satchō batsuzoku 100憎淚茘 or Satchō hambatsu 100憎M淚]. The 
society also became notorious for its brutality, as it interfered bloodily in the general election of 
1892 on behalf of the pro-government party, suppressed violently the Fukuoka labor movement 
(the society financed its activities with the profits derived from coal mines near Fukuoka) and 
was involved in the attempted assassination of Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu in 1889.17  
In international affairs, the Genyōsha advocated a militant pan-Asianism and supported 
anti-colonial independence movements throughout Asia.18  After 1901, the society’s overseas 
                                                     
15 Oates translates Kōyōsha [圃蔽だ] literally as “Sun-Facing Society.”  See Oates, p. 3.  
16 The name Genyōsha [仼┠だ] may loosely be translated as “Dark Sea Society” but is probably a 
reference from the Japanese name for the straits between Kyūshū and Honshū, which is locally known as 
Genkai-nada [仼⑬穿]. Hence Oates’ translation as “Genkai Sea Society” gets pretty close to its meaning 
(see p. 3). Throughout this text I have simply maintained the Japanese “Genyōsha” for this is how the 
society is best known, even in the English literature.  
17 The assassin, Kurushima Tsuneki [襷戡溪友] (1859-1889), had come into contact with the Genyōsha 
radicals at Takaba’s Ginseng-Field School. He killed himself immediately after carrying out his attempted 
assassination of Ōkuma.  
18 Like many political societies founded at the time, the Genyōsha opposed Western imperialism in 
general and Japan’s unequal treaties in particular. The society advocated that Japan strengthen herself 
militarily in order to regain and maintain full sovereignty but also to support independence fighters in other 
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activities were channeled through the affiliated Kokuryūkai.19 The Genyōsha’s longevity and 
influence in Japanese politics is partly explained by its financial muscle, which in turn was a 
function of Fukuoka’s growing economic importance within Meiji Japan. On account of 
Fukuoka’s proximity to the Asian mainland – the Korean port of Pusan lies just across the straits 
of Korea – trade, which had been dormant under the Tokugawa’s seclusion policy, flourished 
again. The coal extracted from the mines nearby – Japan’s largest - fuelled the steam engines that 
drove ships, trains and factory machines during the early stages of Japan’s industrial development.  
While Tōyama concentrated from the outset on politics, Hiraoka Kōtarō, the Genyōsha’s 
first president, was instrumental in leveraging Fukuoka’s wealth on the society’s behalf. Hiraoka 
had entered the coal business and made a fortune operating the Chikuhō [ºϕ] coal mines of 
northern Fukuoka prefecture. He used those profits to finance the Genyōsha’s activities, most 
notably its operations on the Asian mainland but also its newspaper, the Fukuryō Shimpō, which 
was founded in 1887 and presided over by Tōyama.20 
With the deaths of the more liberal–minded Hakoda in 1888 and Hiraoka in 1906, the 
society fell increasingly under the sway of Tōyama Mitsuru, who gave the group its radically 
conservative, right-wing direction, so much so that among historians, the Genyōsha is known as 
the mother of all pre-war right-wing societies in Japan. Even though Tōyama never held an 
official position in government or parliament, his reliance on semi-legal and often outright illegal 
methods - which gave rise to a plethora of rumors surrounding both his person and the society - 
                                                                                                                                                              
Asian nations (e.g. China’s Sun Yat-sen, India’s Rash Behari Bose, or Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy from the 
Philippines). This took various forms, ranging from providing shelter and financial support to exiles living 
in Japan, all the way to actually supplying arms to the militant anti-colonial movements overseas. 
19 The Kokuryūkai [桛a善], alternatively translated as “Amur River Society” or “Black Dragon Society” 
was founded in 1901 by Genyōsha member, Uchida Ryōhei [塔譓Y霸] (1874-1937). After 1901, the 
Kokuryūkai served as a vehicle to support independence movements overseas, notably the Chinese 
republicans under Sun Yat-sen in the 1911 Chinese revolution.  
20 The Fukuryō Shimpō [┗葺范况] was renamed Kyūshū Nippō [枢攀荳况] in 1898 and West Japan 
Journal [O荳袿范ⓥ] after merging with the Fukuoka Daily News  [┗慟荳荳范ⓥ] in 1942.  
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made Tōyama a powerful and much-feared behind-the-scenes player in pre-war Japanese politics. 
Thus, long after his official retirement, Tōyama was able to influence Japan’s foreign and 
domestic politics and maintain his standing as the grand old man of Japanese nationalism, 
reigning over right-wing groups and societies he had helped bring into existence. 
 
Nakano Seigō 
It was into this world, - a world populated by once-proud samurai, now demoted and trying 
to recover lost status and power21; a world inhabited by coal barons, Genyōsha-led Pan-Asian 
activists, Yōmeigaku-inspired rebels, and anti-government terrorists; a world in which national 
holidays were noticed but only the anniversary of the Satsuma rebellion was celebrated22 - that 
Nakano Seigō was born on February 12, 1886. Nakano was the first-born son, followed by two 
sisters - Mura, [冴碕] and Teru [塞作] - and three brothers, Yasusuke [┘赤], Takeo [驥渣], and 
Hideto [┵斥]. Takeo died as a young child, leaving the family with five children.     
 
Father 
Twenty-eight at the time of Nakano Seigō’s birth, Nakano Taijirō23 was descended from a 
                                                     
21 At times, the status consciousness of the Fukuoka samurai took embarrassingly vain forms. When 
following the Meiji reforms a town meeting was held to decide on a new name for their city, it looked for a 
moment as if city would take the name of the Hakata, that part of the city formerly inhabited by merchants 
and craftsmen. Had it not been for a band of angry samurai crashing the meeting and intimidating the 
attendees , the merchants would have had their way. In the end, and much to the satisfaction of the Fukuoka 
samurai, the city kept the name of the castle-town, Fukuoka.    
22  While it would be mistaken to speak of Fukuoka prefecture as a particularly rebellious one (in terms of 
numbers of uprisings during Meiji times, Fukuoka prefecture did not even rank among the top ten 
prefectures. See Roger W. Bowen, “Rebellion and Democracy in Meiji Japan” (Berkeley, 1980), p. 76-77, 
Table 2.), there was a culture of folkloristic support for the rebels of the 1870s. Thus, those who had fallen 
fighting on the side of the government were commemorated in a lukewarm fashion on a national holiday 
May 10, but popular participation was much more enthusiastic on April 27, when those who had given their 
lives fighting in the rebellions of the 1870s were commemorated. See Inomata, p. 27-8.  
23 Nakano’s father, Nakano Taijirō [腎ǒ┘饅ア] had been born in 1858 and died in 1928. His first name 
can alternatively also be pronounced Yasujirō. The reading Taijirō has been used in Oates’ biography of 
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low-ranking samurai family of the Kuroda-han. Before the Meiji reforms of the 1870s, the 
Nakano family had held the office of o-funa-kata [殤u苜], which made them responsible for the 
maintenance of the domain’s ships and boats in Fukuoka harbor. The position carried a meager 
stipend of 7 koku 1 totsu and 5 masu of rice per year. Though of low rank, the Nakanos were 
proud of their lineage.24 But by the time Nakano Seigō was born, the Meiji reforms had stripped 
Taijirō of both his status and his stipend, and instead of overseeing Fukuoka’s harbor, he worked 
in his brother’s pawnshop.25 Initially, the shop earned so little that the family was forced to live 
under one roof with Nakano’s uncle, but three years later business picked up and Nakano’s 
immediate family moved to 46 banchi in the Nishimachi district of Fukuoka. There, they opened 
their own pawnshop under the name “Iribune-ya” [渡u悋]. This business supported the family 
well enough during Nakano’s youth so that the family was “by no means poor.”26 It was not until 
Nakano’s teens that the family business grew weaker, before failing altogether after he moved to 
Tokyo to study at university.  
Nakano’s father does not seem to have been an impressive or strong personality. After the 
family business failed, the entire family moved to Tokyo, where they were supported by Nakano. 
His father never worked again. Only seldom is he mentioned in Nakano’s writings and, 
accordingly, we know little about him. What is recorded is mostly trivial, such as the fact that 
because of his former occupation in Fukuoka’s harbor he was good at swimming (his grandson 
                                                                                                                                                              
Nakano and for the sake of consistency it has been maintained.   
24 Neither in terms of rank nor in terms of stipend, can Nakano’s family be considered to have been high-
ranking. In all likelihood, his forefathers probably never met face-to-face with Lord Kuroda and they were 
certainly never involved in political decision-making processes.  See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 131. 
25 Nakano’s uncle, Nakano Washirō [腎ǒ北裂ア] (1849-1909), seems to have been somewhat more 
successful as a business man than Nakano’s father. A member of the Hataka Chamber of Commerce, he 
also served as a member of the Fukuoka city council.   
26 See Nakano Yasuo, volume 1.  p. 45. 
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remembers him for being able to write with a brush while swimming27) or that he liked to reenact 
famous battles using clay soldiers and landscapes made of sand. The few anecdotes that stand out 
from this triviality cast Nakano’s father in a mixed light. On at least two occasions he purposely 
broke musical instruments that Nakano was playing – once by actually hitting Nakano over the 
head with a flute until it broke.28 How this influenced Nakano’s relationship toward his father is 
not known. What is clear is that this incident put an end to Nakano’s musical education. Many 
years later, Nakano would write: “My inability to understand music is so complete that even my 
own children call me tone deaf [肩K].”29  
 
Mother 
Nakano’s mother, Tora30, 20 when Nakano was born, invariably claimed to hail from a 
sake-brewing family, though her father, Tō Matakurō [妬弗枢ア], had diversified into soy-sauce-
brewing. Like Nakano, she had been the first-born child in the family and, like him, she was 
outspoken and strong-willed. The similarity of character may explain why Nakano loved his 
mother so dearly. Throughout his life, she was the center of his affection and worries. When away 
from home for the first time as a student in Tokyo, he spent sleepless nights fretting about her 
poor health – concerns that proved groundless, as she outlived him by a couple of years.31 The 
same fears later followed Nakano whenever he traveled abroad. When he spent a year studying in 
                                                     
27 Ibid. vol. 1, p. 461.  
28 The other instrument was a biwa, a Japanese lute, which Nakano bought before graduating from school. 
See Ibid. vol. 1, p. 47 and p. 61.  
29 Nakano Seigō, “Hold on, Father” [査再混鷺査咋刷債債] in Nakano Seigō, “Expressions of the Soul” 
[网惚鋪晃] (Tokyo, 1938), p. 333.  
30 Nakano’s mother Tora [宰碕] had been born in 1866 and died grief-struck two years after Nakano’s 
death in late August 1945.  
31 See Ogata, p. 9-10.  
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England, only a few of the letters that he wrote home lack some expression of concern for his 
mother’s health.32 Even on the evening before his suicide, one of his greatest worries was that the 
death of his mother’s eldest son would cause her great grief.  
By comparison, Nakano’s relationship with his father was weak, shallow, colorless, and 
characterized by indifference. Taijirō was neither a source of pride nor an object of great respect. 
Nakano turned for role models to the legends and tales of Japan’s past. Foremost among these 
was the already-mentioned Saigō Takamori, leader of the Meiji Restoration and the ill-fated 
Satsuma rebellion. A close second was Ōshio Heihachirō, leader of an equally ill-fated uprising in 
Osaka during the Tempo famines of the 1830s.    
 
Siblings 
Being the first-born son – a fact that in Japan as in many other cultures carries special 
privileges and responsibilities – meant Nakano enjoyed a paramount position among his siblings. 
This position was never challenged, neither by Nakano’s sisters nor by his brothers, who were 
born seven and twelve years after him and hence were much too young to pose any competitive 
threat. If initially Nakano enjoyed this position (which meant, among other things, being served 
first and most at table) thanks to luck, in later years he earned and maintained it through hard 
work. When his father’s business failed, young Nakano – then still a student at Waseda University 
– moved the family to Tokyo and from then onward took charge of the family’s finances. Though 
probably as gifted as Nakano, it took time for his siblings to develop their own independent lives 
and step out of the long shadow cast by their eldest brother.     
Compared with Nakano’s career, those of his siblings pale. Mura, the oldest daughter, 
entered a teacher’s school in 1909, married a middle-school teacher called Yoshimura Yatarō [便
                                                     
32 While studying in England, Nakano wrote regularly to his family. Sometimes he would give medical 
advice and once after having received word that his mother was fine, he replied that “this is the happiest 
day in a long time.” See Nakano Yasuo, volume 1, p. 187-205; the quote can be found on p. 198.  
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襁寨啣ア] and thereafter led the life of a housewife. When the Nakano family moved to Tokyo in 
1908, she was the only one to stay behind in Fukuoka. Nakano’s second sister, Teru, married an 
army officer called Takeda Takayoshi [w譓吏便] in 1912 and, like her elder sister, became a 
housewife.33 When her husband died of disease, their son, Takeda Toshiyuki [w譓膾ネ], then a 
middle-school student, came to live with Nakano in Tokyo. Nakano’s brother Yasusuke graduated 
from Waseda University in 1912, later worked for the Kyūshū Daily [枢攀荳况] and from 1933 
on served in the Fukuoka City assembly. For many years while Nakano served as an MP in Tokyo, 
Yasusuke also cultivated Nakano’s electoral base in Fukuoka. Hideto, the youngest, and the 
bohemian artist in the family, first followed in Seigō’s footsteps by studying political science at 
Waseda University, but quit before graduating and eventually became a published poet and 
novelist and after the war started to paint.34     
 
Character as a Child 
Not everything we know of Nakano as a child is flattering. He ate a lot and ate fast - 
whenever food went missing in the household he was the first to be suspected of having stolen it.  
He was unwilling (or unable) to restrain his appetite when eating with others. Perhaps because of 
his dominant position among his siblings, Nakano never learned what it meant to share a meal. 
Those who dined with him even as an adult noticed that eating shabu-shabu – which, along with 
sukiyaki, was among his favorite dishes - with Nakano meant choosing between wolfing down 
raw meat (as he did) or risking not getting any meat at all.35   
                                                     
33 For information on the lives of Nakano’s two sisters see Nakano Yasuo, vol.1, p. 129 and 459.  
34 Nakano Hideto [腎ǒ┵斥] (1898-1966) poet and painter. 
35  Mitamura Takeo, who subsequently became a member of Nakano’s Tōhōkai political party, later 
recalled: “Nakano really liked beef Sukiyaki. He often invited me. Nakano would eat his sukiyaki almost 
raw. … Nakano would boil the meat only very briefly, and then eat it. Moreover he would eat a lot. While 
the two of us [Mitamura and Sugiura] were still waiting for our meat to boil, he would clean the plate all 
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The only surprising thing about Nakano’s eating habits was that they never caused him to 
gain weight. Fragile as a child, Nakano would maintain a delicate build throughout his life. 
Described as neither handsome nor ugly, as an adult Nakano stood about 1.7 meters tall and 
weighed only 60 kilograms.36 No matter how much he ate or how much he practiced jūdō, his 
muscles got stronger but never increased in volume. His thinness often made him a target of jokes, 
but he knew how to defend himself. When a dorm-mate made fun of Nakano’s slim build, 
Nakano retorted quickly with a poem:  
 
“Slender the crane flies in the sky,  
while fat pigs wallow in the mud.”37  
 
On a different occasion, Nakano countered a taunt by saying: “I don’t like really fat people. 
It is the skinny ones, with sharp eyes and talents, who will work for the good of the country.”38 
Not everyone agreed, however, and Nakano’s slender build continued to invite insults. When he 
appeared for the first time in the Diet in 1920, Okamoto Ippei from the Asahi News drew a 
caricature with the subtitle: “The under-nourished fox” [豐掃秦ぅ貢°].39   
As a child, Nakano is also said to have been a “kikanbō” [攻拘骨亞]40- that is, a child who 
                                                                                                                                                              
alone. We did not have enough time to eat. And when he was stuffed he would say: ‘Well shall we go 
then??’ ” Mitamura, Takeo [申譓襁驥啌], “Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?” [腎ǒ驟悩購奏膣60
鈍浩紅拘] (Tokyo, 1953), p. 131. 
36 As an adult Nakano weighed 16 kan [⎤ ≈ 3.75 kg] corresponding to about 60 kg and stood 5 shaku [恙 
≈ 30.3 cm] 6 sun [徑 ≈ 3.03 cm] tall corresponding to 1.70 meters or roughly 5 feet 7 inches. See Inomata p. 
37. 
37 Nakano Seigō “Spit and Rubble”[訪茂劯ゎ] in Shūyūkan Alumni Magazine [弁5善癲グスーム], March 1908, 
quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 71.  
38 Quoted in Inomata, p. 37. 
39 Quoted Ibid. 
40 Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 45. 
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does not listen to, let alone obey, what he is told. Toward his father he is said to have been 
especially rebellious, perhaps encouraged partly by the example of his mother, who was not the 
obedient wife valued so highly by Confucian morals. Rebelliousness was a character trait that 
would stay with Nakano throughout his life, as was bellicosity. Put simply, young Jintarō liked a 
good fight and took particular joy in its physical intensity. The practice of jūdō channeled, 
contained and, so to speak, civilized Nakano’s aggressiveness in later years but did not keep him 
from participating in the many brawls that were a recurrent feature of parliamentary debate in 
pre-war Japan.  
Overwhelmingly remembered as a bad loser41, Nakano did not enjoy games such shōgi or 
igo, or sports such as tennis or baseball.42 As a child, he liked either to play war games with 
neighborhood children – usually acting as commander-in-chief – or simply to pick a fight. On 
occasion, the pleasure he derived from fighting took cruder forms: Nakano’s son Yasuo described 
his father as someone who liked animals – he kept goldfish in a pond he dug in the family garden 
and loved horses all his life – but adds that, as a child, his favorite animals were dogs and cocks 
because they could be made to fight against one another.43 Well into his forties, Nakano would set 
his dogs to fight against others and lose all interest in and affection for them if they lost.44 In fact, 
Nakano’s love of a good fight was even stronger than his appetite for meat. More than once, on 
his return from the butcher where he had been sent to fetch some meat, Nakano would throw the 
meat into a pack of dogs just to watch them fight over it. Likewise, the dogs Nakano kept as a 
                                                     
41 Inomata describes Nakano as a “bad loser by birth”[ 﨟合黒考攻⎞杭甲孛広]. See Inomata, p. 18. 
42 The middle school that Nakano frequented between the age of 14 and 20 offered tennis, baseball and 
other sports, but Nakano only participated in martial art activities, mostly jūdō and sometimes kendō. For 
sports offered at Nakano’s middle school see Nagahama Shigamo [憎╈ĩ杶 ] “Remembering the 
Shūyūkan” [黛㌢丹貢淞広頓] in The two hundred year history of the Shūyūkan [黛㌢丹性̋朮別]; ed. 
Haraoka Tetsuji [譜慟”性] et al. (Fukuoka, 1985), p. 522-23. 
43 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 47.  
44 See Ibid, vol. 2, p. 101. 
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child had been selected on account of their strength; he often ordered them to “bite” [控合皇鵠] 
other dogs. It is hardly surprising, then, that Nakano had a reputation as a neighborhood “bad 
boy” [瀑稿康荒滲岌].45  
 
Schooling 
Nakano’s unruly behavior got him sent to school at the age of five, one year earlier than 
normal. His parents hoped that school would straighten him out, but the result is unclear. All we 
are told about Nakano’s four years at the local primary school was that he slept during classes and 
woke up only when the bell announced the break.46 Nakano’s scholastic performance, however, 
does not seem to have suffered and he graduated on time.  
In April 1895, he advanced to the higher course at the Fukuoka Teacher Training Primary 
School [┗慟0U杳õ設慍恠嶌貊], where his interest in learning was first aroused thanks to his 
Chinese teacher, Shibata Fumishirō,47 one of the few people for whom Nakano felt life-long 
admiration and respect. Shibata, a patriot and nephew of Tōyama Mitsuru, gained his pupils’ 
affection by taking them on frequent outings. As a Chinese teacher, Shibata laid the groundwork 
for Nakano’s life-long interest in the Chinese classics and introduced him to Confucianism, in 
particular the ideas of Wang Yang-ming.48 Shibata earned Nakano’s admiration because rather 
                                                     
45 For Nakano’s childhood “belligerence” (taste for violence) see Nakano Yasuo, vol.1, p. 47 ff. as well as 
Hinoshita Tōgo [荳真I捧], “Nakano Seigō and the Way of the Lion” [㍎岌貢ぐ腎ǒ驟悩] (Tokyo 1986), 
p. 254.  
46 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 48. 
47 Shibata Fumishiro [讒譓艙傚] (1868 - 1953), scholar of Chinese classics and Nakano’s teacher. 
48 One of the poems that Nakano left to his sons on the night he committed suicide, he had actually 
learned from Shibata during one of the frequent school outings. Climbing a mountain, young Nakano had 
run ahead of the others, turning around every now and then to ask: “How much further are we going to 
climb?” to which Shibata responded with a Chinese poem by Wang Zhi huan [侒翠翫] (688-742 A.D.) 
titled “Climbing the Guan Que pagoda” (扖氈鉉行̈鵠). The poem translates (loosely) “If you want to see 
farther, climb one store higher.” (馘B桧ı̊ò琄蠍疹慎愀閧). Following Nakano’s suicide, his surviving 
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than trying to suppress so-called bad behavior in students, he aimed to see the good in it and 
develop it into strength.49 Nakano – known as a rascal – recalled how one day after class, Shibata 
asked him to stay and told him:  
 
“Nakano! I hear you are strong and good at fighting. A strong man must not pick on the 
weak. In light of your strength, I would like to ask a favor of you. Your classmate, such-
and-such, is being bullied by his friends and therefore says that he does not want to 
come to school anymore. I think you would be able to protect him. Can you do it?”50 
 
The anecdote is mentioned here not as evidence of Nakano’s moral integrity (although, 
unable to refuse the request, he did act as bodyguard to that student from then on) but rather 
because it reflects the values to which Nakano claimed to aspire: He saw strength, including 
physical strength, as a talent that came with certain responsibilities. Nakano’s early susceptibility 
to protective impulses is a prototype of his populist pose in later years.       
After graduating in 1899 at age 14, Nakano entered the Shūyūkan Middle School [ୃ₉㙚
ਛቇᩞ], the school where Kuroda-han samurai had long been educated and which, then as now, 
enjoyed the highest prestige and best reputation in Fukuoka prefecture.51 Tanaka Kōtarō,52  who 
attended the school around roughly the same time as Nakano, recalled the institution’s ethos:  
                                                                                                                                                              
sons took this to mean that they should not give up after the death of their father but continue to struggle 
through life. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 49.    
49 Nakano did not respect all his teachers. Nakano’s jūdō instructor in middle school boasted that a master 
of jūdō could not be ambushed and cut down by a swordsman, for he would anticipate the blow and know 
how to dodge it. Wanting to put the teacher to the test, Nakano ambushed the teacher one night with a 
bamboo sword and succeeded in hitting him on the head. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1,  p. 134.  
50 Quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 50. 
51 Retaining its name, the school today the school is called: “Fukuoka Prefecture Shūyūkan High School” 
[⑔ጟ⋵┙ୃ₉㙚㜞╬ቇᩞ]. Its graduates include Ogata Taketora [✜ᣇ], president of the Asahi News; 
Hirota Kōki [ᐢ↰ᒄᲞ], Prime Minister 1936-7; and Tanaka Kōtarō [↰ਛ⠹ᄥ㇢], Minister of Education 
in the first Yoshida Shigeru cabinet, as well as Yamasaki Hiraku [ጊፒᜏ], former president of the LDP. 
52 Tanaka Kōtarō [↰ਛ ⠹ᄥ㇢] (1890-1974), legal scholar and high-ranking judge.  
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“The tendency among the students was clearly to devote themselves to the martial arts. 
They dreamed about becoming ministers, generals or ambassadors. … From looking at 
the famous people the school produced, the academic atmosphere of the Shūyūkan was 
one that leaned toward the political, bureaucratic and business world. … Most were 
interested in practical matters, and there was a great lack of students interested in 
philosophy, art or religion.”53  
 
If this description is appropriate, Nakano was a typical student of that academic tradition.   
At the Shūyūkan, however, Nakano got off to a bad start. During jūdō practice in his first 
year he sustained a blow to the leg that re-inflamed a former injury and eventually led to caries in 
his left thigh bone. Although he took off school for a year, and underwent painful surgery three 
times at the Kyūshū Imperial University Hospital and once again at home, the injury never quite 
healed and Nakano continued to suffer discomfort until a final operation in 1926 miscarried and 
necessitated the amputation of the entire leg. Until then – that is, throughout the formative years 
of his youth and early adulthood – Nakano was left with an ugly scar and a slight limp.  
The injury had far-reaching consequences for Nakano. Besides the physical handicap and 
the fact that he missed a full year of school, his battered leg also kept him from entering the 
military, thus precluding the career as a professional soldier that had been his original intent.  
Given Nakano’s tender age, the injury could also have dealt his self-confidence a serious 
blow, but rather than crumbling under the blow he grew through it. While in the hospital, he not 
only enjoyed what was perhaps his first romantic infatuation (with one of the nurses) but also 
developed a thirst for knowledge and learning, using his free time to read avidly.54 In addition, he 
learned to endure physical pain, undergoing three surgical operations without developing a 
                                                     
53 Tanaka Kōtarō quoted in Watanabe, Yukio [喰グネ赶], “The Enigma of Nakano Seigō’s Suicide” [腎ǒ
驟悩貢60麑貢デカ] (Fukuoka, 1996), p. 19. 
54 Though probably platonic, the relationship with the nurse, Noguchi Yukiko [ǒ塀聶岌], was to last well 
beyond Nakano’s stay at Kyūshū Imperial Hospital and produced a number of letters which allow a 
glimpse at Nakano’s private life during those years.   
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dependence on opiates – the only known painkiller at the time.55 When Nakano returned to school 
the following year, he was changed: more determined, more disciplined and more ambitious. He 
even took up jūdō again and continued to practice it with at least as much, if not more, zeal and 
success.  
 
Curriculum at Shūyūkan 
In 1902, the Shūyūkan counted 29 instructors and 591 students. The school’s motto, 
“Simplicity and Vigor” [⇄Ⅳ悩筑], was reflected in its demanding curriculum, which aimed to 
cultivate not only knowledge and physical health but also virtue [öに刷毫に刷喪に]. At the 
time of Nakano’s attendance, the Shūyūkan’s five-year curriculum included instruction in ethics, 
Chinese, Japanese [楼テラ ], English, history (Japanese, Asian and Western), geography, 
mathematics (algebra, arithmetic, geometry, and trigonometry), natural sciences (physics and 
chemistry), calligraphy, and physical education, which was split between normal sports and 
military drills. Students attended school for 31 full hours a week; Sundays, public holidays, a six-
week summer, and a two-week winter vacation were the only days off. In addition to obligatory 
classes, from 1895 on the school also offered one hour of voluntary afternoon instruction in either 
kendō or jūdō. Students’ attrition rate was high; up to a quarter of any given class was forced to 
repeat the year.56    
Nakano’s ambitions as a student took various forms. Unlike many of his peers, who were 
content to excel in either the literary or the martial arts, Nakano strove to follow the samurai ideal 
                                                     
55 His son Nakano Yasuo writes that after the 3rd operation (out of a total of 4 undergone during his teens), 
Nakano himself reopened the wound with a short sword in order to clean it, creating a complete mess. See 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 51. 
56 See Haraoka Tetsuji [譜慟”性] et al., eds. , “The Two Hundred Year History of the Shūyūkan” [黛㌢
丹性̋朮別] (Fukuoka, 1985), p. 124 and following as well as p. 522. 
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of bunpu-ryōdō [艙驥仁ぐ] - that is, mastery of both literary and martial arts. According to 
Nakano’s classmate and friend Ogata Taketora,57   
 
“Those who chose jūdō belonged to the martial faction [budan-ha驥苳╀], while those 
who chose kendō belonged to the civil faction [bunchi-ha 艙齠╀]. Nakano was the 
boss of the jūdō circle, yet … he could also write like no other in the school and was 
obviously talented. In that sense he was different from all the other members of the jūdō 
faction and more similar to the members of the kendō faction.”58  
 
Driven by ambition, Nakano was not content with the Shūyūkan’s training and sought 
ways to supplement his education during his free time. In addition to taking the Shūyūkan’s 
classical Chinese courses, Nakano also attended a private school for Chinese studies led by Mune 
Moritoshi in the afternoons. 59 The intense instruction – which consisted not only of translating 
and interpreting but also of memorizing and reciting ancient Chinese works – informed Nakano’s 
later writing, which is filled with allusions to and quotations from the classics. According to 
Nakano, it also shaped his outlook on life, giving it a somewhat “worried” [珱濘] tenor.60   
Nakano’s literary talent combined with his diligent study did not fail to catch the attention 
of both his peers and his teachers. Ogata frequently mentions Nakano’s early promise as a writer. 
Masuda Hiroyuki, 61  instructor of Chinese studies at the Shūyūkan, soon invited Nakano to 
                                                     
57 Ogata Taketora [I苜wよ] (1888-1956), journalist and statesman as well as Nakano’s life-long friend 
and biographer.  
58 The two terms budan and bunchi refer to two opposing views on how government should be conducted. 
While the budan adherents advocated government through the use of armed force, the bunchi faction 
argued that government should be conducted through just laws and decrees. For lack of a better term I have 
translated these two terms as “martial” and “civil” faction respectively. The quote is taken from Ogata, p. 
33.   
59 Mune Moritoshi [巛ã朮] (1824-1904), scholar and collector of books.  
60 Nakano quoted in Inomata p. 21. 
61 Little is known of Masuda Hiroyuki [×譓ぼ翠] except that he taught at the Shūyūkan and that his 
father had participated and fallen in the Akitsuki rebellion [┽蠻貢頗] of 1876.   
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contribute articles to the school’s Alumni Magazine [弁5善癲グスーム],62 a practice that continued 
well beyond graduation and afforded Nakano some additional income during his university 
days.63 The encouragement and praise Nakano received from Masuda sparked Nakano’s interest 
in a journalism career.64  
In terms of content, Nakano’s early writing already contained some of the elements that 
characterized his later works. Social, political and - to a lesser degree- economic topics were 
either tackled head on65 or via character studies of historical personalities.66 Only rarely did he 
write of personal experiences; some notable exceptions were a number of reports from Waseda 
University, in which he described university life to students at the Shūyūkan.67       
                                                     
62 The magazine was issued 3 times a year, starting December 1902 and ending with the last edition in 
January 1922. See Haraoka Tetsuji [譜慟”性] et al., eds., “The Two Hundred Year History of the 
Shūyūkan” [黛㌢丹性̋朮別] (Fukuoka, 1985), p. 124 and following.  
63 Altogether, Nakano contributed 13 articles to the Shūyūkan Alumni Magazine over the years.   
64 In 1935, Nakano reminisced how he had first been invited to write for the magazine and how this had 
built his confidence in his own writing: “When I finished school, I did not want to become a bureaucrat and 
I did not want to become a merchant either. In order to earn my living, I reckoned that I should pick up 
writing. The confidence to show myself to the world through my writing I got thanks to the praise of 
Master Masuda.” Nakano Seigō, “Remembering the Alumni Magazine” [嶌仏善癲グスーム貢淞広頓] quoted in 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 51-54. 
65 Examples of the more political essays include “A Dream on a Southern Branch”[評譴貢慎哽](June 
1904), in which Nakano described how in a dream he had been in China and discussed Asia’s position vis-
à-vis the West with a Chinese student. The essay is one of Nakano’s earliest expressions of Pan-Asian 
thinking, and of his opposition to colonialism and his ambitions on the Asian mainland. Other examples 
include “Lessons and Opportunities to be gained from the Russo-Japanese War” [欟顳皚勢行茉広肱男哢
荒鵠臙抅膏囂蕁雍] (February 1905), in which Nakano argues that Japan’s victory over Russia had proven 
the superiority of Japan’s bushidō, a concept he then proceeds to define. A third example is: “On Human 
Capital” [斥褫ルクス] (February 1906).  
66 Examples for character studies leading to a discussion of social or political questions include Nakano’s 
first submission to the magazine titled “Lord Kikuchi (Taketoki)” [95鷭廝植鍍] (1902), “On Education” 
[黛掃ルクス] (June 1903), “A Sketch of Saigō” [Oシ評攀貢㏈檬] (December 1903), and “The Rulers of 19th  
Western Century Europe”[O饑慎枢身7/10貢腑ョ70] (November 1905).  
67 Examples of these reports kept in a very journalistic style are “From my Waseda Home” [莨I̊譓貢ı̊
国酷] (summer 1905), describing student life at Waseda University or a description of his first summer 
back home from university entitled: “Miscellaneous Notes on my Trip Home” [昜シ癲ヒ] (November 
1906). Also in this category belongs the more melancholic “Spit and Rubble” [訪茂劯ゎ] (March 1908). 
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Unsatisfied with the martial arts training offered at the Shūyūkan, Nakano in his fourth 
year also built and maintained a private dōjō [ぐ凅], where students could practice in their free 
time. He himself raised the money necessary to buy the grounds and pay for the hall’s 
construction from Hiraoka Kōtarō, the local coal baron and Genyōsha member. The dōjō, called 
the Shimbu-kan [竭驥丹], was not owned by anyone but was administered and maintained by the 
students who used it for jūdō practice. 
Nakano’s combination of curricular and extra-curricular activities made for a strict daily 
schedule. In a piece called “Burning the midnight candle” [僊篇惚ち浩拷高攻], written in 1931, 
Nakano recalled his student days:  
 
“When I was young, my study was in a shed that my family had cleaned up … After 
dinner, I would go to jūdō practice. And even though I had decided that as a rule I 
would come home around 8:30 p.m., in order to read by the candle until late, I often got 
caught in idle talk after practice and it was after nine, sometimes even ten, before I got 
back to my study. Feeling remorse that I had not adhered to my original intention, I 
stayed up until late reading by candle and losing sleep. While reading I thought about 
myself, my environment and the world, and in thinking that I must become an important 
man [昆碕婚斥行荒穀講郊荒穀衡], I burned the midnight candle. ‘Hey, man, are you 
still doing your silly studies?’ my friends would call as they passed by my window after 
having stayed late at the jūdō practice, and having played around on the way home.”68  
 
It is possible that in retrospect Nakano embellished his memory, making himself more 
disciplined than he actually was, but his successes both as a writer and jūdō practitioner suggest 
he was a dedicated and determined student of both.  
Though we do not have a complete list of the works Nakano read during his youth, some 
impressed him enough to merit mention. Besides contemporary works such as Tokutomi Sohō’s 
“Silent Thoughts” 69  and a then-popular self-improvement book, Matsumura Kaiseki’s “The 
                                                     
68 Nakano Seigō in the Kyūshū Daily [枢攀荳况], October, 1st 1931, quoted in Inomata, p. 25. 
69 Tokutomi Sohō [毫廬え戍], “Silent Thoughts” [餌淞匝┐] (Tokyo: Minyūsha [鴈仏だ], 1893). 
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Foundation of Determination,”70 Nakano focused his reading on the philosophy of Wang Yang-
ming (the same Chinese philosopher who influenced the students of Takaba’s Ginseng Field 
School). Nakano read not only Wang’s “Record of Transmitted Learning” [然40H], but also 
books by and about people Wang influenced, namely Satō Issai’s “Genshi shiroku” [ク沒H] 71 
and Ōshio Heihachirō’s “Senshin dōsatsuki”[┧氛┫×ヒ]. Nakano also read everything about 
Saigō Takamori that he could find. Once the ideas of Wang Yang-ming entered Nakano’s mind 
through these works, they found fertile ground on which to grow.   
 
Social Life 
Nakano’s busy schedule left little time for socializing and cultivating friendships, but this 
may just have suited Nakano’s approach to social relations. One of his fellow students at the 
Shūyūkan, Umezawa Shinroku [蹌鼈獺砥], later recalled that  
 
“as a student, Nakano certainly cultivated an air of proud aloofness. He would not 
socialize with just anyone, but only with a restricted number of students. Probably, he 
felt there was no point in socializing with worthless fellows [晃紘穀荒広ヾ腎]. It is not 
as if he did not cherish friendship. In fact, he even went out of his way for his friends, 
doing this and that. However, he was very clear about whom he liked and whom he 
disliked.”72  
 
As far as we know, Nakano had only two close friends: first, Ogata Taketora, who became 
Nakano’s best friend and life-long companion and who wrote Nakano’s most intimate biography. 
Originally intent on a career in commerce (Ogata often joked that he would support Nakano’s 
                                                     
70 Matsumura Kaiseki [觚襁赤0] “Foundation of Determination” [U沒翠む] (Tokyo, 1889) was but one 
of many self-improvement books published at the time and is said to have left a lasting impression on 
Nakano. See Inomata, p. 26. 
71 Satō Issai (1772 - 1859) was a Confucian scholar of the later Tokugawa period, whose teachings were 
influenced by Chu-tzū and Wang Yang-ming. 
72 Umezawa Shinroku quoted in Inomata, p. 94. 
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political career with the fortunes he earned in the China trade73), Ogata first enrolled at the Tokyo 
Higher Commercial School, the precursor of today’s Hitotsubashi University. Nakano, however, 
persuaded him to switch to Waseda University and after graduating to take a job with the Asahi 
News. Though Nakano always hoped that Ogata would follow him not only into journalism but 
also into politics, it was not to happen during Nakano’s lifetime. Ogata stayed with the Asahi 
News, eventually rising to become the paper’s president and it was only after the end of WW2 
that he entered politics.  
Nakano’s second friend was Yasukawa Daigorō, who later founded Yasukawa Electric 
Corporation and pioneered the use of nuclear power in Japan.74 The friendship between Nakano 
and Yasukawa was never as close as Nakano’s relationship with Ogata, but the camaraderie lasted 
until Nakano’s death and Yasukawa supported Nakano’s political career financially from start to 
finish.  
Within the school’s social landscape, all three men were considered hardliners who studied 
and followed their jūdō practice diligently. They despised so-called soft-liners - dandyish students 
who wore perfume and talked to girls. 75 In 1903, Nakano organized the school’s hardliners into a 
society, of which he became the first president. Known as the Gennan-sha [仼評だ], the society’s 
aim was to practice “speechmaking, writing and training the member’s heroic spirits” (it is not 
clear what was meant by the latter).76 Besides Nakano’s friends Ogata and Yasukawa, the society 
included many of those who practiced jūdō at the Shimbu-kan. After Nakano left Fukuoka to 
study at Waseda, the society’s presidency passed into the hands of Yasukawa, although Nakano 
                                                     
73 See Ogata, p. 34. 
74  Yasukawa Daigorō [嶢擺¶晴ア] (1886 - 1976), business man and life-long financial backer of 
Nakano’s.  
75 The Japanese term is kōha [ﾐ╀] lit. ‘hard wave’  as opposed to nanpa [ゝ╀], meaning ‘soft wave’.  
76 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 57. 
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remained in touch with members. The society over time became more militant, to the point where 
members actually beat up soft-liners. It is not clear whether this happened with Nakano’s 
knowledge, consent or approval.     
The fact that there was little time for friendships or socializing free of ulterior purpose does 
not mean there was no time for rivalry. One of Nakano’s rivals, Miyagawa Ikkan,77 the son of 
Miyagawa Ta’ichirō, featured in Nakano’s life repeatedly, beating him at jūdō during the 
Shūyūkan graduation tournament, later following him to Waseda, and eventually running for 
election in the same electoral district as Nakano  - this time losing against his longtime rival.  
 
  Graduation and University 
Thanks to his talents and efforts, Nakano was one of the better students – graduating 3rd in 
his class of fifty-seven. 78  He was particularly good at Chinese and essay composition, and 
reasonably good in English. The only subject that seems to have caused him difficulties was 
mathematics, so much so that even many years later he claimed to be haunted by nightmares 
involving trigonometry exams. Inomata has shown, however, that even if Nakano had difficulties 
with the subject, his math grades were no worse than those in other subjects, 79 suggesting that 
Nakano’s dislike for the subject was due less to lack of ability than to a deliberate choice to 
neglect a discipline that had always been looked down on by samurais as the skill of greedy and 
penny-pinching merchants.  
                                                     
77  Miyagawa Ikkan [ችᎹ৻⽾ ] (1884 - 1944), Fukuoka politician and business man. For more 
information see Hinoshita Tōgo [ᣣਅ⮮๋], Nakano Seigō and the Way of the Lion [ₑሶߩ㆏ਛ㊁ᱜ೰] 
(Tokyo, 1986), p. 269. 
78 In his first, second, third, fourth, and fifth year at the Shūyūkan, Nakano had been respectively 6th, 4th, 
22nd, 12th, and 3rd from the top. See Inomata, p. 28. 
79  According to Nakano’s score card, Nakano had 80/100 points in geometry, 82/100 points in 
trigonometry, 85/100 points in history, and 83/100 points in classics (i.e. classical Chinese studies). See 
Inomata p. 28. 
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As graduation from middle school drew nearer, it became time to decide what to do next. 
Nakano’s original plan had been to enter the military academy, but his leg injury precluded this 
venue and thus he decided to go to university. 
 
Waseda or Tōdai 
Nakano’s talents, aptitude and grades would have enabled him to enter even the most 
prestigious of Japan’s public universities: Tokyo Imperial University, preferably its faculty of law, 
which then as today was Japan’s safest springboard toward a career in government. Nakano’s 
choice not to follow this path but instead to enter the less prestigious Waseda University does not 
seem to have met any opposition from his parents, teachers or mentors, but it must have caused 
puzzlement and surprise; most of his biographers felt the need to explain it. Ogata writes: 
 
“In middle school Nakano was always 2nd or 3rd from the top, and even though he 
graduated as one of the brains of his class, he refused to aim at entering one of the 
public universities. Instead he already then had chosen to enter Waseda. At the time, it 
was still believed that a private university would only attract students whose grades 
were either too poor to enter a public university or who had failed the entrance exam. 
Therefore his decision to go to Waseda in spite of his excellent grades was viewed by 
many with suspicion and as the act of a rebellious child.”80  
 
Various explanations have been put forward to account for Nakano’s unorthodox choice. 
Fear of failing the entrance exam – especially the mathematics section – may have been one 
factor. Nakano entered Waseda without taking that university’s entrance exam, opting instead to 
take the one-year preparatory course [㔾̌制┿] before proceeding to the 3-year university 
course proper. However, even if he disliked mathematics, he was still good at it and it is unlikely 
that fear of exam alone would have stopped him from applying to Tokyo Imperial University. 
More important was the fact that following the well-trodden path from middle school into 
                                                     
80 Ogata, p. 24. 
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one of the Imperial Universities and from there into one of Japan’s bureaucracies did not appeal 
to Nakano’s taste. According to Ogata, Nakano’s later dislike for bureaucrats found an early 
expression in his disdain for the students of the imperial universities, whom he considered 
“unhatched eggs of bureaucrats” and “exponents of careerism” [頓身厨コ ]. 81  Nakano was 
definitely more drawn toward a different career path, one modeled on the lives of the veterans of 
constitutional politics such as Inukai Tsuyoshi, Ozaki Yukio, and many others who had entered 
politics via a private university and a career in journalism.   
Financial concerns were a final and decisive factor – one mentioned by Nakano himself. 
The course at Tokyo Imperial University lasted six years, as opposed to only four at Waseda, 
meaning Nakano would enter the work force earlier and not forego two years of income. When 
writing about his experiences at Waseda in a Shūyūkan Alumni Magazine article, Nakano made 
clear that these considerations had played a role in his mind: “To those who can neither afford 
high tuition fees nor waste much time, I recommend entering Waseda.”82   
Nakano was aware that, in the public eye, education at Waseda was considered inferior and 
that by implication he too might be considered inferior. In an essay entitled “From My Waseda 
Home” addressing Shūyūkan students, he dealt with the issue directly, first quoting a student 
from an imperial university:   
 
“What are the students of Waseda so boastful about瑱It is known to be a university 
without [entrance] exams. Waseda is really a gathering point for trash [悴]. It is a 
meeting point for weak students who cannot surmount the difficult hurdle posed by the 
selective entrance exams.”83  
                                                     
81 Ogata, p. 25. 
82 Nakano Seigō, “From my Waseda Home” [莨I̊譓貢ı̊国酷] Shūyūkan Alumni Magazine [弁5善癲
グスーム] , summer 1905. 
83 Both quotes taken from Nakano Seigō, “From my Waseda Home” [莨I̊譓貢ı̊国酷] Shūyūkan Alumni 
Magazine [弁5善癲グスーム], summer 1905. 
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Nakano conceded that at private universities, one could indeed observe many students who 
were “complete trash,” but rejoined that one could also find “genius.” He advised younger 
Shūyūkan students who considered following his example that “… in order to match the students 
of the Imperial University, you simply have to make more effort. If [you do] so, you should be 
able to compare with them.”  Nakano concluded: “If I were to point out the shortcomings of the 
Waseda students [I would say that] at Waseda they grow an early-ripening kind of rice. 
Accordingly, the yield is small.”84 
Nakano, unsurprisingly, counted himself among those in this small yield. At least in the 
early years at Waseda, he heeded his own advice about making more effort to compare with the 
imperial universities’ students. Ogata, who came to Tokyo a year after Nakano and who from the 
fall of 1906 shared a room and desk with him, later recalled that Nakano  
 
“at Waseda would compete with students from the imperial universities eagerly, trying 
not to lose a single contest. For that reason he studied very hard. … In middle school I 
had known him as a talented student who did not have to study much. When I came to 
Tokyo, I lived with him for the first time … and was surprised to find out how hard he 
studied.”85  
 
Whatever others may have thought about Waseda University and Nakano’s decision to 
enroll there, his self-confidence suggests he himself was content with his choice. In his essay 
“From My Home in Waseda,” Nakano addressed a perennial student worry - namely how well 
studies prepare students for their future lives. After noting that “law students do not have a 
market, students of literature find it hard to find a teaching position in the countryside, graduates 
                                                     
84 Nakano made a play on words for ‘Waseda’ [莨I̊譓] literally means ‘field used for growing early rice’. 
See Nakano Seigō, “From my Waseda Home” [莨I̊譓貢ı̊国酷] Shūyūkan Alumni Magazine [弁5善癲
グスーム], summer 1905. 
85 Ogata, p. 25. 
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from engineering and commercial schools have the easiest time to find employment, but for how 
long is anybody’s guess,” Nakano asked: “What kind of person has the right stuff to enter student 
life given all these worries?” He answered himself: “A youth with a certain something in their 
heart [㋚腎左冴査策些惚衄溝鵠⻗朮]. … I have chosen this path to study because I do have 
[that certain] something and I do not pay heed to the mistaken talk of my vulgar seniors, nor to 
whether or not I will be marketable in the future.”86  A rare reported instance where Nakano’s 
Waseda credentials were put into question was when he asked for his future wife’s hand and her 
mother wondered whether a Waseda man would be good enough for her daughter.   
 
Financial Matters 
The typical trials of university life were not the only difficulties Nakano had to confront as 
a student. Problems of a completely different and worldlier nature soon pushed themselves into 
the center of Nakano’s focus.   
Amid the economic depression following the Russo-Japanese War, his parents’ business in 
Fukuoka started to deteriorate. During his first summer vacation, Nakano went to Fukuoka to 
help his family put the business in order and move into a smaller house. When he returned to 
Tokyo in the fall to resume his studies, the financial support he received from home decreased 
each month. In retrospect, Nakano’s decision to attend Waseda – the cheaper option compared to 
the imperial universities – seemed increasingly appropriate. Then, during Nakano’s second year 
at Waseda (1906-7), his parents’ business failed altogether after a relative failed to repay a loan. 
The already meager trickle of money that Nakano received from his parents dried up completely.  
                                                     
86 All quotes taken from Nakano Seigō, “The Student’s Worries of the Road ahead’ [嶌﨟撚ヸ貢游獵]” 
which is a subsection of “From my Waseda Home” [莨I̊譓貢ı̊国酷], Shūyūkan Alumni Magazine [弁5
善癲グスーム] , summer 1905, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol.1, p. 68.  
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Nakano dealt with this financial problem in several ways. He tried to keep expenses down, 
for one, embracing frugality and disdaining fancy clothing and money-consuming social activities. 
Those who recall Nakano during his university days seldom fail to mention that he was one of the 
few students to wear tattered kokura cotton clothes instead of more expensive wool or western 
clothing, even in winter.87 
 Sometimes, Nakano’s cost-cutting took more extreme forms. When he moved into a 
Chinese-student dorm called Hōrai Shinsho [火D溢橡], he told the landlords on his first day that 
eventually he was “going to become the most important man of Japan,” and as such they should 
be happy to let him live at their place. Luckily for Nakano, the owners of the dorm were friendly 
and swayed by his arrogance.88 He paid rent once but never thereafter. 
Nakano also sought new sources of income and was, as Ogata recalls, “good at making 
money.”89 Nakano took lecture notes for wealthy Chinese exchange students, continued writing 
articles for the Shūyūkan Alumni Magazine and also started contributing articles regularly to 
Miyake Setsurei’s90 Japan and the Japanese [荳袿沸砿荳袿斥]. This last job alone earned him a 
                                                     
87 Kazami Akira, a class mate of Nakano’s at Waseda, recalled that Nakano “almost never wore new shoes. 
He would buy used shoes for 50 sen, wear them until they could no longer be worn and then sell them for 
30 sen, then add another twenty sen from his money and buy another used pair. This he would repeat over 
and over.” Kazami Akira quoted in Mitamura, [申譓襁驥啌]; “Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?” 
[腎ǒ驟悩購奏膣60鈍浩紅拘] (Tokyo, 1953),  p. 124-25. 
88 The son of the dormitory’s landlord later recalled: “Nakano arrived at our place with one piece of 
luggage and immediately demanded: ‘Let me stay at your place!’ At that time, it was almost impossible to 
get students to pay their rent and so my mother asked him: ‘Do you have a guarantor?’ to which Nakano 
replied: ‘I don’t need a guarantor. I am going to become the most important man of Japan [荳袿慎男広斥
侮]. How could you not offer me a place?’ and with this arrogant snort he moved in. This made us think 
that he might be an interesting person and in the end we decided to let him stay. He paid the full rent only 
for the first month, but never again after that. And it did not stop there - he demanded that we give him beef 
and Sashimi to eat and would invite one friend after another. … He certainly was a pleasant character who 
did not attach too much importance to worldly things….” Quoted in Mitamura, Takeo [申譓襁驥啌]; “Why 
did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?” [腎ǒ驟悩購奏膣60鈍浩紅拘] (Tokyo, 1953), p. 127. 
89 Ogata, p. 38. 
90 Miyake Setsurei [申嵶聶擅] (1860-1945), journalist, philosopher and historian. 
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monthly income of 30 Yen.91 When in spite of these efforts he still did not have enough money, 
Nakano would repeatedly “borrow” from Tōyama Mitsuru.92  
Rather than crumbling under the weight of studying and making a living simultaneously, 
Nakano seems to have been emboldened by the experience. In the winter of 1908, he moved his 
entire family to Tokyo so that he could take care of them. In a letter to his sweetheart - Noguchi 
Yukiko, his former nurse at Kyūshū University Hospital - Nakano described this decision in 
dramatic terms:  
 
“From now on, I am responsible for the rise and fall of my family, and I believe that my 
first loyalty will be to making a living. … Parents and siblings are a gift of heaven and 
one should not avoid looking after them. … Rather than trying to fit my parents into a 
narrow house, we have rented a somewhat larger one and it will be up to me to earn the 
rent with my bare hands [恠﨟貢㊊慎袿] - that is, by writing articles or borrowing 
money. … I believe that …unless you are stupid or handicapped you will not starve.”93  
  
For all its bluster, Nakano’s prediction is not far from the truth. Rather than simply 
accepting the ever-smaller sums his parents sent to pay for his studies, Nakano reversed the flow 
and paid not only for his own tuition and housing but also for his brother, who arrived in Tokyo in 
March 1909, and the rest of his family, which – with the exception of his oldest sister, Mura who 
was already married in Fukuoka – followed by mid-year. The Nakanos moved into a house large 
enough to accommodate the whole family as well as a Chinese boarding student. The boarding 
fee was so large that it enabled Nakano not only to pay rent for the house but also wages for a 
                                                     
91 Thirty Yen a month was a very generous pay for what must have been a part-time position, especially if 
we consider that the starting salary for a university graduate was 30 Yen and a police officer earned a mere 
12 Yen per month. See Iwasaki Jirō [憖扣㎟ア], “Price Conditions over 100 Years” [☞卒貢身ù琨琤琤
朮] (Tokyo, 1982), p. 286-300.   
92 We know that Nakano repeatedly borrowed money form Tōyama, but not how much, under what 
conditions, whether the loans were ever repaid at least in part, or what sort of strings Tōyama attached to 
granting the loans. At the very least, these loans must have created an emotional obligation on the side of 
Nakano.  
93 Letter from Nakano Seigō to Yukiko Noguchi quoted in Inomata, p. 40-41. 
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maid – in fact, it leaves one wondering whether Nakano might not have overcharged the 
boarder.94 Incidentally, long after he graduated from university and became a well-to-do journalist 
and politician, Nakano continued sharing his house with his parents and some boarding students, 
suggesting that while money may have been the initial motivation for the living arrangement, 
genuine interest in education and the desire to provide a home for family and acquaintances 
became equally important.  
Nakano’s dual life as student and wage-earner limited his free time but did not keep him 
from the extracurricular activities he prized. In university and throughout his life, Nakano took no 
interest in team sports such as baseball. When Waseda played against the Keiō University, he 
preferred studying in the library to supporting the team. He continued practicing jūdō, however, 
advancing to 1st degree black belt (shodan) in 1906 and 2nd degree black belt (nidan) in 1911. 
He also won titles at various tournaments. Whether Nakano began practicing speechmaking - his 
forte in later years - as a student and whether he joined the university’s debating society is a 
matter of controversy. According to his classmate Kazami Akira,95 who followed Nakano into 
journalism and politics, Nakano, Ogata and Kazami became friends through Waseda’s debating 
society. According to others, Nakano as a student dismissed speechmaking as a futile exercise, 
saying: “Do you hope to actually gain power over the realm through speeches? Look at Inukai! 
Look at Ozaki!”96  
 
Intellectual Influences at Waseda 
Two of Nakano’s many professors seem to have influenced his thinking in particular. 
                                                     
94 This boarding student obviously paid a very generous fee to the family and that was not all. Hashimoto 
Tetsuba [隱袿氈㮈], a friend of Nakano’s, served as rickshaw driver for the same student - earning enough 
money with that job to pay his way through university.   
95 Kazami Akira [城Wd] (1886– 1961), journalist and politician. 
96 Umezawa Shinroku [蹌鼈獺砥] quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 462. 
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Shiozawa Masasada, 97  who taught economics, introduced Nakano to English liberal and 
utilitarian economic thought. Shiozawa’s influence is reflected in one of Nakano’s essays entitled 
“The Joy of Progressing in One’s Activity,”98 in which Nakano made the utilitarian argument that 
the pursuit of progress in one’s own endeavors was the only happiness one could hope for in this 
world and the best way to contribute to the welfare of society as a whole. While Nakano’s grasp 
of economic thought as reflected in this essay may still have been weak and his knowledge 
shallow, Shiozawa’s foundation informed Nakano’s liberal thinking for years afterward. Even 
during the 1930s, when Nakano advocated active state intervention in economic affairs, his 
liberal roots remained visible. Nakano stayed in contact with Shiozawa after university, as 
Shiozawa frequently contributed articles to magazines Nakano edited.  
The political philosophy Nakano studied under the guidance of Waseda professor Ukita 
Kazutami99 was similarly influential. Baptized Christian and raised by Western teachers, Ukita 
taught at his alma mater, Dōshisha, before studying for two years at Yale and then taking a 
position at Waseda. A strong advocate of liberal democracy, parliamentary party politics, 
universal suffrage, and gender equality, Ukita taught political science and European history, 
specializing in the age of Napoleon. Ukita introduced Nakano to republican ideas of political 
philosophy, including people’s rights. At this stage, however, young Nakano was more impressed 
with Napoleon’s heroic career and military achievements than with political philosophy.100  
                                                     
97 Shiozawa Masasada [ 剽鼈萪⎠ or 萪┖] (1870 – 1945) economist and advisor to Ōkuma Shigenobu.  
98 Nakano Seigō “The Joy of Progressing in one’s Activities” [┽罰〕焚貢泛] in Shūyūkan Alumni 
Magazine [弁5善癲グスーム] February 1907.  
99 Ukita Kazutami [⑨譓 北鴈]珙1860 - 1946), Christian, political scientist and pioneer of democratic 
thought in Japan.  
100  Ukita’s influence on Nakano is evident in one of his essays published in the Shūyūkan Alumni 
Magazine under the title “The Ruler of 19th Western Century Europe”, who, according to Nakano, was none 
other than Napoleon. Starting from the premise that 19th century Europe lacked truly great figures such as 
Jesus, Socrates, Buddha, or Confucius, who managed to influence the way people think for eternity, 
Nakano stated that short of a truly great man, the 19th century was “honored to have Napoleon as a 
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Intellectual Influences outside University 
Exposure to Western liberal economics and political science were crucial to Nakano’s later 
thinking, but an account of his student days that fails to mention influences outside the lecture 
halls would be incomplete.  
Through his contributions to the magazine Japan and the Japanese, Nakano came 
into contact with its editor, the journalist, philosopher and historian Miyake Setsurei. Born 
in Kanazawa-city of Kaga-han (present-day Ishikawa prefecture), Miyake graduated from the 
Department of Philosophy of Tokyo University in 1883 and initially worked for the Ministry of 
Education. He later married the novelist and poet Tanabe Kaho. Together with Shiga Shigetaka,101 
Inoue Enryō [੗਄౞ੌ] and Sugiura Jūgō,102  Miyake founded the Seikyōsha (᡽ᢎ␠ , lit. 
Society for Political Education) in 1888. The group opposed the government's drive toward 
Westernization and advocated a pure nationalism [࿖☴ਥ⟵], seeking to educate the Japanese 
public about - and thus preserve the uniqueness of - Japanese culture and identity. In 1907, 
the society's organ, The Japanese [ᣣᧄੱ], took over the failing newspaper Japan [ᣣᧄ]. The 
resulting publication was renamed Japan and the Japanese [ ᣣ ᧄ ෸ ߮ ᣣ ᧄ ੱ ] and 
Miyake became its chief editor. It must have been around that time that Nakano, still a student, 
started writing for the magazine.  
                                                                                                                                                              
substitute.” The difference between Napoleon and mere conquerors such as Attila the Hun was that 
Napoleon was not only a great military leader and destroyer of the old but also an able legislator and state 
builder. Hence it is thanks to Napoleon that the revolutionary republican idea could spread in the world like 
a fire. See Nakano Seigō, “The rulers of 19th Western Century Europe”[⷏᰷৻਻਎♿ߩᡰ㈩⠪] in 
Shūyūkan Alumni Magazine [ห⓹ળ㔀⹹] November 1905.  
101 Shiga Shigetaka [瀰緂紞霆] (1863 - 1927), intellectual, geographer and politician.  
102 Sugiura Jūgō [᧖ᶆ ㊀೰] (1855 - 1924), educator and politician.  
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The relationship between the two men became close. Over the years, Nakano took on an 
increasingly important role in the running of the magazine - which was renamed Our View [癪
に] in 1923 and Eastern Continent [覩哢憤] in 1936, when it began serving as the organ of 
Nakano's proto-fascist party. Nakano also married Miyake's daughter in 1912, thus adding 
familial to professional ties.103     
Tetsuo Najita notes that Nakano's writings at Waseda “most certainly reflect an early 
acceptance of the major assumptions of Miyake ... Like Miyake, he attacked the ‘Europe-centric’ 
view of the modern world and defended Japan's unique historical development within the Asian 
cultural community.” This is probably true, but Najita exaggerates Miyake’s influence when 
casting Nakano, like Miyake, as one of the “principal spokesmen on the political scene of a 
‘popular nationalism’ or ‘national peopleism’ … according to which a distinctive spiritual 
national legacy was crucial in providing a nation with coherence and inner strength.”104  While 
both Miyake and Nakano would have described Japan's mission in Asia - especially its role in 
overcoming Western imperialism in Asia - in terms that echoed one another, Nakano would do so 
without relying on Japan's spiritual, cultural or aesthetic uniqueness.105  Unlike Miyake, who 
opposed the wholesale introduction of Western culture into Japan, Nakano eventually took a more 
open-minded universalistic – or, at least, progressive internationalist - stance, which enabled him 
to adopt and incorporate Western ideas (such as fascism) much more easily into his thinking than 
                                                     
103 Strangely, in his autobiography, Miyake Setsurei does not write about Nakano in any detail. Their 
professional ties are not mentioned at all and their familial ties are mentioned only in passing. See Miyake 
Setsurei “Autobiography: Talking about Myself” [60然 / 60薙惚テラ鵠] (Tokyo, 1997), p. 74-5. 
104 All quotations taken from Najita, Tetsuo “Nakano Seigō and the Spirit of the Meiji Restoration in 
Twentieth-Century Japan” in Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan; ed. James Morely, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1971) p. 377-79. 
105 When Miyake and Nakano’s son revived Nakano’s magazine after Nakano's death in 1944, they did so 
under the motto “True, Good and Beautiful” [*薬五], and rightly so, for these themes were central to 
Miyake's thought and his concept of Japanese identity. By comparison, Nakano’s thinking was more about 
practical themes such as power and justice and much less concerned defining the particularities of the 
Japanese identity through philosophical abstractions such as truth, goodness or beauty.  
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Miyake would have liked. It also opened him to the attacks from the pure nationalist camp for 
being a “mongrel between Japan and the West.”106 
Less a mentor than either Tōyama or Miyake and more a guiding role model for Nakano 
was Inukai Tsuyoshi107, whose acquaintance Nakano also made during his student years.108 Inukai, 
also known by his pen name Bokudō [袍兔], had been born in Bitchū domain (present-day 
Okayama prefecture) and later studied at Keiō University. After working as a journalist for 
several newspapers, Inukai entered politics in 1882, serving as a member of parliament for a total 
of 41 years. It is not clear when Nakano first met Inukai, nor by whom they were introduced, 
but the first mention of Inukai's presence in Nakano's life is around 1908-9, when Inukai 
introduced Nakano to the Chinese student whom the Nakano family later took on as a 
boarder. Over the next two decades, Nakano came to admire Inukai greatly and made the latter's 
career a blueprint for his own. Writing for the Asahi News, Nakano supported Inukai's political 
activities, such as his role during the the first movement to protect the constitution - a role that 
earned Inukai and Ozaki Yukio the nicknames “gods of the constitution.” In the early 1920s, after 
winning election to the Lower House himself, Nakano drew even closer to Inukai, joining the 
Reform Club [卸范胆鉤グ] under Inukai’s leadership. Their relationship foundered in 1924, 
when Inukai - recognizing the limitations of being a member of a minor party - joined the Rikken 
Seiyūkai and Nakano joined the opposing Kenseikai. Though they subsequently found 
themselves in different political camps and their relationship chilled, it never turned openly 
hostile. Inukai became the sixth president of the Seiyūkai in 1929, and, following the fall of the 
Wakatsuki cabinet in 1931, the 29th Prime Minister of Japan.  
                                                     
106 Aochi Shin [⻗丱藹], “Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩] in Chisei [ö淤], February 1955, p. 153. 
107 Inukai Tsuyoshi [╯掃 鯢] (1855 – 1932), journalist, politician and Prime Minister.  
108 See Ogata, p. 22. 
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A third important extra-curricular influence on Nakano’s intellectual life was his 
encounters with Chinese expatriates living in Tokyo. In the first decade of the 20th century, 
Tokyo was home to a lively Chinese community of intellectuals, students and political exiles, 
many of whom had come to Japan to study how their Asian neighbor had succeeded in 
modernizing and dealing with the Western imperialist threat. They hoped, upon their return to 
China, to apply this knowledge in the service of China’s own development.109  
One of Nakano’s ports of entry into the Chinese community was Chinese students at 
Waseda. The university accepted Chinese students starting around the turn of the century, and by 
the time Nakano arrived there were about 2 or 3 in every class. To earn money, Nakano offered to 
take lecture notes for some of them; in some cases, the practice led to long-lasting friendships.110 
Noteworthy were the Lin brothers from Fujian. Lin Chang-min111 was a classmate of Nakano’s 
who later occupied various positions within the Chinese republican government. He also 
introduced Nakano to his younger brother Lin Yin-min, whom Nakano taught Japanese and who 
died in the 1911 Chinese revolution.112 An even closer friendship grew between Nakano and his 
                                                     
109 Marius Jansen gives a comprehensive account of the Chinese community in Tokyo during that time. 
See Marius Jansen, “Japan and Sun Yat-sen” (Stanford, 1970). 
110 When Nakano wrote about his relationship to with Chinese students in the Shūyūkan Alumni Magazine, 
he did not mention the financial dimension. While stating that many of them had come to Japan to acquire 
modern Western knowledge at prices lower than those it would have cost in either the US or Europe, he 
described his role as that of a teacher. See Nakano Seigō: “Chinese Exchange Students in Japan” [荳袿鉧
嶌腑り嶌﨟], which is a subsection of “From my Waseda Home” [莨I̊譓貢ı̊国酷] Shūyūkan Alumni 
Magazine [弁5善癲グスーム] , summer 1905, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol.1,  p. 68.  
111 Lin Chang-min [詒憎鴈] (1876-1925) politician of late imperial and early Republican China.  
112 The little we know about the younger of the two brother, Lin Yin-min [詒恫鴈], we know from 
Nakano who in an article entitled “Remembering my passed-away Friend Lin Yin-min” [畫西仏詒甫鴈] 
recalled with much pathos how he met Lin Yin-min while still a student at Waseda, how the latter had 
studied Japanese under Nakano and eventually entered Seijō Gakkō [癩傚嶌貊]. The younger Lin had 
returned to China in 1910 to cure typhus. Once there, he joined the fighting and was one of the youngest 
members of the revolutionary army when he fell in 1911. Extracts from the article originally published on 
December 14, 1911 in the Asahi News can be found in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 111. 
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Chinese classmate Ting Chien-hsiu113 from Manchuria, who when serving years later as Minister 
of Transport of the Japanese puppet state in Manshūkoku, said: “I was not much of a scholar. If I 
graduated, it was only thanks to Nakano’s help.”114 It was with Ting Chien-hsiu that Nakano 
made his first trip to China and Manchuria during the summer of 1908. In Dalian he met pan-
Asianist thinker and activist Kaneko Sessai, whom Nakano came to greatly admire and respect.  
A native of Fukui province, Kaneko had worked as a journalist, then moved to Taiwan and 
later to the Asian mainland before settling in Dalian, where he ran the “Rescue-the-East School” 
[竭覩嶌だ] and published the Far Eastern Daily [┘覩荳况], both aimed at furthering Sino-
Japanese relations. 115 Through his work, Kaneko had earned the respect of both Japanese Pan-
Asian activists such as Inukai and Tōyama as well as the Chinese community in Dalian.116 
Kaneko came to play a special role in Nakano’s life in that he was one of the few people 
from whom Nakano would take criticism - and perhaps the only one whom he would pay respect 
for criticism received.117 Often, when Nakano got carried away by his emotions and lofty dreams, 
it was Kaneko who would let the air out of his inflated ego and clip his wings. Their first 
encounter during that summer set the tone: Although still students, Nakano and Ting were staying 
at an expensive hotel (the room being paid for by a Waseda graduate they had happened to meet 
                                                     
113 Ting Chien-hsiu (Ding Jian Xiu) [振褐黛] (1886 – 1944), politician and educator.  
114 Ting quoted in Komai Tokuzō [畔棲毫申];  “A look behind the scenes of political fund raising” [膕齠
∇ů貢鉤悋33]; part of a special feature “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩惚畫康], in Japan and 
the Japanese [荳袿沸砿荳袿斥], January 1956, p. 20. 
115 Most of what we know about Kaneko Sessai [ů岌聶艤] we know through Nakano. See Nakano Seigō, 
“Expressions of the Soul” [网惚鋪晃] (Tokyo: May, 1938), p. 294-96.    
116 Kazami Akira went as far as saying: “I don’t think there is any other Japanese national who earned so 
much respect among the Chinese.” Kazami quoted in Inomata p. 33. For a positive sketch of Kaneko see 
also Kojima Kazuo [幣戡慎渣], “Memories of an Old Politician” [慎67膕齠广貢憐熾] (Tokyo, 1951), p. 
131.  
117 Ogata Taketora adds that Kaneko was unique among Nakano’s mentors in that Nakano remained loyal 
to him until the end of his life. See Ogata, p. 30.  
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by chance). When Kaneko learned about this, he kicked them out of his house for engaging in 
frivolous extravagance. Similarly, when in later years, Nakano objected to granting independence 
to Korea, it was Kaneko who told him: “There is no way that one man can tell another human 
being that he cannot be independent.”118 And when in 1921-2 Nakano’s friends wanted to collect 
funds for Nakano – then already a member of the Lower House – because his magazine was 
running at a loss, it was again Kaneko who reminded them: “Since the inception of the Imperial 
Diet, we have not had one case of an MP starving to death. If Nakano were to be the first, we 
should welcome this, for it would show that he was willing to die for politics.” (No fundraising 
took place that evening.) This sort of moral strictness earned Kaneko Nakano’s life-long respect. 
Nakano later wrote: “From my youth onward I have had the bad habit of not taking people 
seriously, but in front of master Kaneko I have always lowered my head.”119 When in later years 
Nakano opened his own private academy he named it “Rescue-the-East Academy” [竭覩辧] in 
memory of Kaneko’s school. 
Once his interest in China had been sparked, Nakano actively sought ways to deepen his 
understanding of Chinese affairs and multiply his contacts with Chinese people. Having shared a 
house with a couple of friends from Fukuoka in his first year at Waseda, he decided to move into 
the Horai Shinsho, a dorm for Chinese students where “no Japanese was spoken.” There Nakano 
could practice Chinese and “eat pork legs, meat dumpling and oily food [i.e., stereotypical 
Chinese dishes].”120 He lived there until mid-1909, when he left to live with his family. Even then, 
he maintained a Chinese element in his living arrangement by offering lodging to a Chinese 
                                                     
118 Nakano Seigō, “Reflections in the Mirror of Manchuria and Korea” [噌靜貢2行萵浩肱] (Tokyo: 
Tōhōjiron-sha, 1921), p. 145. 
119 For the quote and a description of their first meeting and the quote see Nakano Seigō, “Expressions of 
the Soul” [网惚鋪晃] (Tokyo, May, 1938), p. 295-96. 
120 Nakano in a letter to Yukiko Noguchi quoted in Inomata, p. 28. 
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exchange student. Shin Tê-kuang, 121  son of the Chinese politician Shin Ch’un-ken, 122  had 
previously stayed with the Konoe family and was introduced to Nakano by Inukai Tsuyoshi and 
Nakano’s classmate Lin Chang-min. Within the Nakano family, Tê-kuang was soon called 
“Tokuhiro” or simply “Shin-chan,” and accepted as an additional sibling.  
 
Contact with Chinese Revolutionaries 
Nakano’s contacts to the Chinese community living in Japan were not limited to students. 
He also established contacts with Chinese political activists in Tokyo, many of whom were living 
in exile and subsequently played prominent roles in the Chinese revolution of 1911. Whether the 
initiative in seeking these contacts came from Nakano or whether, as in the case of his Chinese 
boarding student, it came from Tōyama and Inukai, is unclear, but in either case these two 
mentors likely lent a helping hand. The place where Nakano first met these young Chinese 
activists was the office of the Mimpō-sha (Min Bao She) [鴈况だ] near his home. Officially, the 
rooms housed the editorial bureau of Mimpō (Min Bao), the organ of the Chinese League [腎楼
弁ç善]. Simultaneously, they also served as meeting place of Chinese exiles, including such 
important figures as Sun-Yat-sen, Huang Xing and Song Jiaoren.123  
The harmonious relations between the Japanese Pan-Asian activists and their Chinese 
counterparts that Nakano experienced at the offices of the Mimpō-sha were important to him in 
                                                     
121 Shin Tê-kuang (Cen De Guang) [慚毫杰] (1897 - 1945?) later served in Japan’s puppet regime in 
China.  
122 Shin Ch’un-ken (Cen chun Xuan) [慚蒟爛] had served as governor Sichuan province in China before 
coming to Tokyo.  See Hinoshita Tōgo [荳真I捧], “Nakano Seigō and the Way of the Lion” [㍎岌貢ぐ腎
ǒ驟悩] (Tokyo 1986), p. 277. 
123 Sun Yat-sen [崕艙 or 崕5窃]  (1866-1925). Leading figure of the Chinese republican revolution and 
first provisional president of the Chinese republic. Known as the father of modern China. Huang Xing 
(Huang Hsing) [杻85] (1874-1916) Chinese revolutionary leader. Song Jiaoren (Song Jiao Ren) [嶬臙析] 
(1882-1913) Chinese republican revolutionary, leader and founder of the Kuomintang.  
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more than one way. Nakano was stimulated by the “spiritual electricity flowing between the 
youth of modern Japan and the revolutionary pioneers of China,” by the possibility of “mingling 
with the future heroes of the Chinese revolution” and by talking to them from “the bottom of our 
hearts.” 124 Although the list of Chinese revolutionaries whom Nakano met and befriended during 
this time is rather short (it includes the magazine’s chief editor Zhang Bing-lin,125 as well as 
Huang Xing126), these encounters were just the beginning. In later years, Nakano cultivated and 
expanded his relations with Chinese leaders, eventually coming into contact with “higher-ups” of 
China’s political world such as Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, etc. This, combined with his 
frequent trips to China, helped him develop into something of a China expert.  
There is, however, more to it, for in retrospect, these encounters with Chinese 
revolutionaries during his university years were defining. When writing or talking about Sino-
Japanese relations (or relations between Japan and other Asian nations, for that matter), Nakano 
would invariably invoke the memory of this brief moment of harmony between the two countries, 
when they had cooperated in the struggle against colonialism. The following reminiscence is one 
of many examples:  
 
“At the time, there were [some] among Japan’s politicians … who gave great support to 
the Chinese revolutionaries, with the results that the youth of the two countries were 
filled with Asian thinking and the relations between the two nations were for a couple of 
years friendly.”127  
                                                     
124 All quotes taken from Nakano Seigō; “The Revival of Stagnant Japan” [黏牌荳袿貢蠍﨟] (Tokyo: 
Senkura Shobō [桧琢蟷蘯], 1931), p. 88-89.  
125 Zhang Bing-lin (Zhang Bing-lin) [d⇧敧] (1869-1936), thinker and politician of the late imperial and 
early republican China. About his meeting with Zhang, Nakano would write in 1932: “…the person who 
led the Mimpō magazine, rousing the hearts of an entire generation of Chinese, is China’s foremost scholar 
of Confucianism, the Kant of the Far East, who was introduced to me as ‘Master Chang Ping-lin’.” Nakano 
Seigō, “Outline Plan for National Reconstruction” [楼广膃△セ逸ⅻ今], (Tokyo, October 1933), p.120-23. 
126 Nakano described his encounter with Huang in a piece published in 1911 and quoted in Inomata, p. 31. 
127 Nakano Seigō, in appendix entitled “The Direction of our Global Policy” [癪身鈐膕ø貢窩ə] found 
in “Outline Plan for National Reconstruction” [楼广膃△セ逸ⅻ今] (Tokyo, October 1933), p. 120-23. 
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This, according to Nakano, was not only how things had been in the years after 1905 but 
also how Sino-Japanese relations should be in future. Nakano’s experience became an ideal and 
in this sense was not only a starting point but also a point to which he repeatedly tried to return in 
future years. Nakano would invoke this moment again and again as the two countries grew apart. 
At the nadir of Sino-Japanese relations in the summer of 1939 – two years into the war between 
Japan and China – Nakano demanded that both countries lay their differences aside and return to 
the Tōyama-ism and Sun Yat-sen-ism of the period following 1905.128 Nakano, however, was not 
aware that his ideal for relations between Japan and China contained an element of inequality, 
with Japan always leading China (and other Asian nations). Thus, Nakano pointed out how 
“Inukai, Tōyama and other senior [Japanese political] figures would take care of the young 
Chinese revolutionaries as if they were their own sons.”129 Describing his personal relations with 
Chinese students, Nakano wrote, similarly, that his role was to “…lead them, wake them up, tell 
them that China needs to be developed. … I would like to help those pitiful Chinese exchange 
students by extending our power westward … This is our mandate from heaven.”130 This element 
of implied inequality, which made Japan the senior party in the relationship and relegated China 
to junior status, continued to define Nakano’s views on Japan’s relations with other Asian 
neighbors.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Another example of Nakano describing his first meetings with the Chinese revolutionaries in Tokyo can be 
found in Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, March 1939, p. 14 and following. 
128 See Nakano Seigō, Nakano Seigō, speech held June 2, 1939 at Seinen Kaikan, reprinted in “Decide 
Japan’s Direction” [荳袿貢罰圃惚麑巵皇国], in Tōtairiku, July 1939, p. 71 and 72-73.  
129 Nakano Seigō; “The Revival of Stagnant Japan” [黏牌荳袿貢蠍﨟] (Tokyo: Senkura Shobō [桧琢蟷
蘯], 1931), p. 88-89.  
130 All quotes taken from Nakano Seigō: “Chinese Exchange Students in Japan” [荳袿鉧嶌腑り嶌﨟] 
which is a subsection of “From my Waseda Home” [莨I̊譓貢ı̊国酷] Shūyūkan Alumni Magazine [弁5
善癲グスーム] , summer 1905, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol.1,  p. 68. 
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In the more immediate short-term, exposure to Chinese expatriates afforded Nakano the 
opportunity to practice Chinese and familiarize himself with the Chinese way of thinking. Pan-
Asianism, to which Nakano had been exposed in Fukuoka but which for lack of opportunity had 
remained a theoretical exercise, now for the first time became a live experience. His interest in 
Chinese affairs was stimulated through these contacts, and Nakano made China the topic of his 
graduation thesis, entitled “Chinese Affairs” [腎楼ルクス]. Although the work’s contents remain 
unknown, it left an impression on Nakano’s professor Ukita Kazutami, who praised its style and 
argument, and attested to Nakano’s “uncommon talent” [延独貢啀₅].  
 
Construction of Identity 
Nakano’s shift from relatively passive recipient of outside influences to creator of his own 
identity is best symbolized by his name change at age 17. Changing one’s name and using 
different pen names was not uncommon at the time and the new chosen name was often telling. 
In the summer of 1903, Nakano decided to drop his given name, Jintarō, and henceforth to use 
the name Masataka [驟悩] instead. The two characters of his chosen name mean ‘just’ or ‘right’ 
[驟] and ‘strength’ [悩]. Apart from his mother and himself, however, no one ever called him 
Masataka.131  Most instead called him “Seigō,” which is another reading of the same two Chinese 
characters. Nakano did not object to being called “Seigō” and, indeed, probably even enjoyed it, 
for Seigō was similar to the name of his life-long idol Saigō Takamori. The fact that the first time 
he used this new name was to sign an article about the life of Saigō was surely no accident.132  
The character Gō [悩 = strength], which makes up the second half of Seigō, reappeared in 
                                                     
131 When in Europe he used the signature “M. Nakano”, the “M.” presumably standing for “Masataka.” 
See Nakano Yasuo, vol.1, p. 199. 
132 The article in question was “A Sketch of Saigō” [Oシ評攀貢㏈檬] in the Shūyūkan Alumni Magazine, 
December 1903.  
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many of the names Nakano gave his pet dogs.133 Recall that Nakano put such a high value on a 
dog’s fighting strength that he gave them away if they lost; the anecdotes give a glimpse of the 
kind of strength he aspired to when he used the character in his own name.  
Nakano took up the strength theme, this time combined with unruly wildness, again in the 
pen name “Jūbanba” [癨15㮈], which Nakano used as a young journalist at the Asahi News. The 
name literally means “barbarian horse” or “wild horse.” By contrast, a desire to be similar to 
people he admired motivated the choice of some of his later pen names. The most frequently used 
of these, Kōdō [85兔], was a play on pen names used by Inukai Tsuyoshi (pen name Bokudō [袍
兔]) and Ozaki Yukio (pen name Gōdō [偏兔]) as it used the second character Dō [兔].134  
Nakano’s search for his own identity took own a much deeper and more significant form in 
his insistence on holding – indeed, clinging - to his samurai background. Like his mother, who 
insisted that she hailed from a family of sake brewers while omitting the fact that they also made 
soy sauce, Nakano dwelled long on the fact that his forefathers had been samurai, conveniently 
forgetting that by the time he was born his family ran a pawn shop. That Nakano’s claim to 
samurai status had always been tenuous and was irrelevant by the time he was born is less 
important than the tenacity with which he held onto it.135 Asked about his family background, his 
                                                     
133 In the course of his life, Nakano almost always had one or more dogs that he would let fight against 
other dogs. Many of the names he gave them stress martial qualities and contained the character Gō [悩]. 
One of his dogs was called “Mars” after the Roman god of war. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 624-25. His 
like for dog fights waned only in his late 40s, but even thereafter he would continue to call his dogs Gō 
[悩]. By contrast the names he gave to his horses (he took up horse-back riding around the same time) were 
much more peaceful, e.g. Nukiyama [磔愾] taken from a poem, Shingetsu or New Moon [范蠻], Kinsei [紺
策詐婚], Great Dipper or Hokuto [疲舮] and Goblet or Taihaku [啣¸]. Only once did he use the character 
Gō in a horse name ( “Kingō” [ů悩]). See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 715.  
134  Another penname used by Nakano while a student at Waseda and writing for Miyake Setsurei’s 
magazine, Japan and the Japanese [荳袿沸砿荳袿斥], was Kōdō [⑥┫], homonym with his later 
penname. The second character of it was intended to mimic the sound of the second character of Inukai’s 
and Ozaki’s penname’s second character. Both 兔 and ┫ are pronounced Dō.   
135 According to Nakano Yasuo, the family’s rank was only passed to the first-born son in line, which 
meant that Nakano’s father, being the second-born, was left out. Nakano’s father had bought the title of the 
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standard reply was: “I come from a samurai family.” In one of his most private (i.e., apolitical) 
pieces, he described himself as a “son from Kyūshū who has been greatly exposed to the feudal 
way of the warrior.”136 Whenever his sons jokingly wondered whether their forefathers had not 
actually been mere foot soldiers in the samurai hierarchy, Nakano stressed that they had been full-
fledged samurai. He even tried to raise his sons as samurai: During the February 1936 uprising, 
he took them to see the bloodstained barricades on the grounds that “a revolution has broken out. 
As sons of a samurai, you must get used to the sight of fires and battles.”137 Given that the 
government had abolished the samurai status and all privileges that went with it, and that the term 
had been rendered – at least officially – meaningless, Nakano’s upholding of samurai values (or 
the external trappings thereof) was clearly a deliberate choice to go against the grain of the time. 
Some have decried Nakano as a pretentious “stylist” [瑳座婚鷺瑳宰]138 for his choice. Nakano’s 
decision to salvage a samurai ethos in the 20th century, in turn, informed many subsequent 
choices: his taste for martial arts, horseback riding, the Chinese classics, taken together with his 
dislike for mathematics and money-making (i.e., skills and activities associated with the merchant 
class); the choice of a career in politics (after he had been barred from a career in the military due 
                                                                                                                                                              
samurai [吩茘貢1購伍吩茘貢貘惚―耕肱殀紅], making talk about the family’s samurai status an “empty 
lie” [ん囀]. Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 131. In the census of 1873, when two million of the 33 million 
Japanese people were still counted as samurai, Nakano’s father was probably not among them and even if 
he was, he surely lost the samurai status with the abolition of the four classes carried out in the course of 
the Meiji reforms. 
136 Nakano Seigō, “Hold on, Father” [査再混鷺査咋刷債債] in Nakano Seigō, “Expressions of the Soul” 
[网惚鋪晃] (Tokyo, 1938), p. 317. 
137 The quote can be found in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p.130. Exposing their sons to the sight of executions, 
torture and ritual suicides with the aim of hardening their character seems to have been common practice 
among samurai. Ozaki Yukio writes how as a child his father made him watch “torture, beheadings and 
ritual suicides.” Ozaki Yukio, “The Autobiography of Ozaki Yukio: the Struggle for Constitutional 
Government in Japan”, trans. Fujiko Hara, (Princeton, 2001), p. 12-14.  
138 Yoneda Ryūji [̶譓瀹性]; “Exemplary Biographies of the Diet, No.9, Nakano Seigō, the crazy Stylist” 
[共同組合善難然瑋腎ǒ驟悩瑍╱チ貢瑳座婚鷺瑳宰] in Gekkan Jiyū-Minshu (Jimintō) [蠻捺60譿鴈厨珙60鴈
妬珩] Nr. 462 September 1991, p. 190.   
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to his leg injury); the manner of his suicide (traditional seppuku), as well as many other decisions 
in Nakano’s life may be simply expressions of his character, talents and circumstance. They may 
also, however, be seen – and, according to this author,  must be seen - as an attempt to live his life 
as a modern samurai.  
The word “samurai” can mean many different things and, in the course of his life, Nakano 
gave it a particular and ever more precise meaning through both words and actions. The direction 
and the spectrum within which he moved was set during his formative years, for among the many 
former samurai of his youth in Fukuoka - relatives, friends and those who were simply brought to 
his attention through various accounts or random encounters - he clearly felt closer to those 
discontent with the political order than to those who reconciled themselves with the situation and 
tried to make the best of it (on occasion with success). Stories of Fukuoka samurai successfully 
making a career in the Meiji society – examples of whom include Kaneko Kentarō139, Dan 
Takuma 140 , Kurino Shin’ichirō 141 , Akashi Motojirō 142 , and even Nakano’s cousin, Nakano 
Tasaburō143  – may have caught Nakano’s attention but not his imagination. His heart, thoughts 
and loyalty stayed with the discontented, those who opposed the political establishment and, 
especially, the rebels who fought it.  
The ideal that governed, perhaps even dominated, Nakano’s chosen identity was that of the 
                                                     
139 Kaneko Kentarō [ů岌↙啣ア] (1853-1942), bureaucrat and politician who contributed to the drafting 
of the Meiji Constitution.  
140 Dan Takuma [歪惞そ] (1858 – 1932), Japanese businessman and director of the Mitsui Zaibatsu.  
141 Kurino Shin’ichirō [豸ǒ獺慎ア] (1851 - 1937), career diplomat who in his earlier years on account of 
his promise he was given a grant by the Han authorities to study at Harvard University.  
142 Akashi Motojirō [蕚0 填性ア] (1864 – 1919), career army officer who eventually became governor 
of Taiwan.  
143 Nakano’s cousin Tasaburō [腎ǒ啣申ア] (1879 - 1941) was a graduate of the faculty of law of Tokyo 
Imperial University and later served as secretary to Itō Hirobumi in Korea before becoming provincial 
governor of Pyongan province in northern Korea.  
 56 
“Satsuma hayato.” The “idealized personality,” Testsuo Najita noted, is “specific to Satsuma, but 
revered by all in Kyūshū” and epitomized by the famed Saigō Takamori. This romantic hero was 
a bushi (or samurai) of a unique type. He was loyal and full of love for the common folk, but he 
was also a rebel.”144 If a samurai is what Nakano was, then a Satsuma hayato such as Saigō is 
what he wanted to become.  
Once Nakano chose this rebel identity, the decision was reflected in subsequent actions and 
informed many choices and attitudes. This is most obviously so in his lifelong adoration for two 
historical rebels, Saigō Takamori and Ōshio Heihachirō. As a youth, Nakano read books by or 
about the two rebels and throughout his life these two names reappear often in speeches and 
writings.145 If Nakano had any idol, it was Saigō Takamori followed – with some distance - by 
Ōshio Heihachirō. According to Nakano, their lives were ideals to be emulated, their thoughts 
contained truths to be remembered and their actions were standards to be used in judging others 
and oneself.  
Likewise, Nakano’s interest in the teachings of Wang-Yang-ming, a philosophy espoused 
by many of Japan’s rebels, can also be seen as just another aspect of Nakano’s rebelliousness. 
Though less evident in Nakano’s writing than his admiration for Saigō and Ōshio, the influence 
of Wang’s philosophy was probably more important simply because it addressed more 
fundamental and universal problems.  
Nakano’s populism – so salient a feature of his life that Oates titled his biography of 
Nakano “A Populist in Modern Japan” – was Nakano’s rendition of what Najita calls “love for the 
                                                     
144 See Najita, Tetsuo “Nakano Seigō and the Spirit of the Meiji Restoration in Twentieth-Century Japan” 
in “Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan”, ed. James Morely (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 
p. 376-77. 
145  The already mentioned “A Sketch of Saigō” [Oシ評攀貢㏈檬 ], Shūyūkan Alumni Magazine, 
December 1903 is but the earliest written expression of Nakano’s adoration. Later works include 
“Remembering Ōshio Heihachirō” [哢剽霸都ア惚畫閤] and “Saigō Nanshū” [Oシ評攀], both in Nakano 
Seigō, “Expressions of the Soul” [网惚鋪晃] (Tokyo, May, 1938).  
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common folk.” In his early years, this love translated into Nakano’s glorification of the 
participants in the various samurai uprisings of the early Meiji years, followed by his sympathy 
for activists of the Meiji Freedom and People’s Rights Movement. In later years, Nakano’s 
populism led him to support the champions of constitutional government, party politics and 
universal suffrage. Finally, the impulse found expression in his fascination with the populist 
elements of the European fascist movements. The rebel element of the Satsuma hayato identity 
led him to vilify the genrō, the Satsuma-Chōshū cliques and finally the Japanese civil and 
military bureaucracies. For all the twists and turns of Nakano’s life, the one continuity was his 
opposition to the status quo - an opposition that derived its legitimacy from his professed love for 
and understanding of the people.  
One is tempted to add to Najita by noting that through his idolization of and identification 
with rebels such as Saigō Takamori and Ōshio Heihachirō, Nakano also identified with the 
“nobility of failure.”146 Among the many people Nakano admired during his life, only the failures 
earned his continued admiration. One does not find a single example of a success among 
Nakano’s heroes, and the few that eventually did succeed – such as Inukai Tsuyoshi – did so only 
after Nakano had broken with them. Just as the needle of a compass always points north, 
Nakano’s sympathy was reliably directed toward the vanquished and downtrodden. Therein lies 
one key to understanding his own failure. 
 
 
Conclusions 
Of the many influences and experiences that shaped Nakano’s formative period, some were 
to prove particularly significant. First and foremost was his identification with the political 
radicalism of Southwest Japan, which was perhaps a reflection of his rebellious and bellicose 
                                                     
146 Ivan Morris, “Nobility of Failure: Tragic Heroes in the History of Japan” (New York, 1975).  
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character. Nakano not only sought the patronage of radical Genyōsha activists such as Tōyama, 
but also adopted their philosophy. He embraced their radical interpretations of Wang Yang-ming’s 
ideas and their adoration for rebels and revolutionaries, especially Saigō Takamori. Tōyama also 
brought Nakano into contact with Pan-Asian thought, which became an important dimension of 
his life and thought.  
Nakano’s samurai heritage gave direction to his future life, which can be seen as the 
struggle of a former insider (member of the ruling class) struggling to regain entry into 
government circles. His leg injury and strong literary talents pushed Nakano to enter politics not 
via a career in the army, as he had originally hoped, but through journalism. Writing for his 
school’s Alumni Magazine and Miyake’s Japan and the Japanese gave him the confidence that he 
could make a living by writing.  
Nakano’s formal training in Western political and economic thought, as well as in the 
Chinese classics, provided him with the intellectual instruments he would need in the days to 
come. His future works would be a rich blend of Chinese philosophy, Asian history and Western 
social thought, lending his words both the legitimacy of Asian tradition and the authority of 
modern science. Combined with Nakano’s sharp mind, these were to become powerful weapons.  
In spite of his many extracurricular commitments and the very brief answers in his final 
exams at university, Nakano graduated third in his class in the summer of 1909. On the day of his 
graduation, Nakano had more than one reason to be proud. Not only had he graduated near the 
top of his university class and gained exposure to Western political philosophy and economic 
thought, he had also cultivated knowledge of China, practiced jūdō and shouldered financial 
responsibility for his entire family. No mean achievement for a 23-year old.  
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Chapter 2: Writing for a Living 
 
Introduction 
A year before entering politics in 1920, Nakano wrote: “I have two professions: writing 
and politics [艙d42楼]. Politics is the aim; writing is the means.”1 Perhaps this sort of reasoning 
led him, after graduating from university, to embark on a career in journalism and use it as a 
stepping stone toward politics. Literary talent and Nakano’s student experience as a professional 
writer facilitated the choice. Moreover, in this era it was common for an aspiring politician to 
start off as a journalist. The high road for a politician ran through a career in the civilian or 
military bureaucracy, but journalism was a well-trod alternative path followed by people such as 
Hara Kei, Ozaki Yukio and Nakano’s mentor Inukai Tsuyoshi. Writing offered Nakano a chance 
to make himself known to a wide audience as a sharp-tongued political commentator while he 
deepened his understanding of social, economic and political issues. As Japan’s electorate 
gradually expanded, bringing the masses onto the country’s political stage, Nakano’s thorough 
understanding of the workings of mass media (which, in his lifetime was mainly newspapers) 
proved an invaluable asset.   
The eleven years during which Nakano worked as a journalist (1909-20) were turbulent 
globally (one World War, as well as the Chinese and Russian revolutions), domestically (the 
Movements to Protect the Constitution, scandals, rice riots, and economic booms and busts) and 
personally. Nakano’s path was checkered and unpredictable. He first worked for the Tokyo Daily 
News, then switched after less than a year to the Tokyo Asahi News, traveled to China, was sent to 
work at the Asahi News’ Osaka office, married, was posted to Korea as the paper’s overseas 
                                                     
1 Nakano Seigō, “From the Site of Global Reconstruction” [身鈐膃△貢敍国酷], (Tokyo: Tōhōjirion-sha, 
April 1919), p. 1.  
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correspondent, had a son, returned to Tokyo, traveled the world with a stop in England to study, 
returned to Japan, quit the Asahi News, started working for a magazine, ran for election (and lost), 
had another son, and then traveled to Europe to cover the Peace Conference in Paris. On top of all 
that, he somehow managed to write half a dozen books.  
 Two political developments serve as dominant orientation points during this colorful and 
messy chapter in Nakano’s life. The first is the trend toward “constitutional government,” that is 
the replacement of “transcendental cabinets” composed of genrō, hambatsu cliques, or 
bureaucrats by “party cabinets” staffed by party politicians who were Diet members. The struggle 
for constitutional government predated Nakano’s entry into journalism but reached an apex in his 
newspaperman years, especially with Japan’s first lasting party cabinet in 1918.  
The second dominant political issue for Nakano was Japan’s role in the world. After 
victory in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5, Japan had been seen by many young Asians as the 
great hope of the East against the imperialist West - a model to be emulated, even a leader to be 
followed. Nakano socialized and sympathized with students from China and other Asian nations 
who had flocked to Japan to study its example, but much to his and their disappointment, 
Japanese governments in the years 1905-20 did not share that vision. The state response to the 
Chinese revolution of 1911, the presentation of the notorious 21 Demands during WW1 and 
Japan’s rule in Korea showed this only too clearly. At the end of the 1910s, Nakano wrote with 
disappointment that Japan had chosen to be the “last among the strong rather than the first among 
the weak.”2  
This chapter’s first portion offers a detailed chronological account of Nakano’s life from 
1909 to 1920. The second part examines Nakano’s intellectual reaction to the political 
                                                     
2 Nakano Seigō “Editorial: Advice to Japanese and Chinese Statesmen” [蕁ルクス瑍荳腑膕帛行㌯康], in 
Tōhōjiron, May 1918, p. 6. 
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developments of his day; the section is organized thematically to provide a point of reference or 
orientation against which later developments in Nakano’s thinking can be judged.  
 
First Job  
In July 1909, together with his classmate Kazami Akira, Nakano landed a job with the 
Tokyo Daily News [覩静荳荳范ⓥ], the precursor of today’s Mainichi Shimbun [鯱荳范ⓥ]. At 
the time, the paper was not the top name in journalism. Circulation was roughly 130,000 copies3 
and the paper was continuously in the red. Staff fluctuations were high and talented people were 
leaving the paper faster than they could be replaced. At 30 Yen a month, the pay Nakano and 
Kazami received was modest, obliging Nakano to continue borrowing money from Tōyama in 
order to support his family.4  
Kazami was so unhappy with the work and the pay that he soon left the paper. Nakano 
stayed on, explaining his motivation to his sweetheart and former nurse, Yukiko Noguchi:  
 
“Every day I play at the Daily News. During the mornings I have lots of free time, but 
from one to three in the afternoon I write … While here, I will earnestly and without 
distraction dedicate myself to studying and writing articles on politics. Today, I am 
lying low and biding my time, but I believe that this is only a means to nurture the skills 
that will allow me to stand up on another day.”5  
 
His patience was rewarded. Nakano’s first assignment brought him to Northeastern Japan, 
where he traveled as part of a group of journalists invited by the local government to write about 
developments in these traditionally backward and impoverished areas. While his fellow 
                                                     
3 In 1909 circulation was 134,123 copies according to the Tokyo Daily News eds., “Seventy Year History 
of the Tokyo Daily” [覩荳晋筆朮別] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daily News, 1941). 
4 In 1910, the starting salary of a university graduate was 35 Yen. See Iwasaki Jirō [憖扣㎟ア], “Price 
Conditions over 100 Years” [☞卒貢身ù琨琤琤朮], (Tokyo, 1982), p. 286-300.  
5 Nakano Seigō in a letter to Yukiko Noguchi, quoted in Inomata, p. 43. 
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journalists enjoyed the many welcome parties involving rich food and heavy drinking, Nakano 
concentrated on writing reports of what he saw and heard. His positive and optimistic dispatches 
to Tokyo were greatly appreciated by readers (especially by those in the Northeast). The reports 
also caught the attention of the Tokyo Daily’s editor-in-chief, Ōmachi Keigetsu,6 who told Nakano 
upon his return that his writing was good. Ōmachi said, in fact, that Nakano was too talented to 
rot away in a place such as the Tokyo Daily.7   
 
The Tokyo Asahi 
This high opinion of Nakano’s talents was shared by Ikebe Sanzan,8 editor-in-chief of the 
Asahi News, who went out of his way to entice Nakano to work for him. Less than half a year 
after joining the Tokyo Daily, Nakano gladly quit his job and joined the more prestigious Tokyo 
Asahi News, doubling his pay to 60 Yen a month.9 With a circulation of almost 260,000 copies, 
the Asahi also offered Nakano the opportunity to reach a far–larger audience than he did at the 
Tokyo Daily News.10 Relieved and content, Nakano told Noguchi: “I have so far hidden the fact 
that I have lived my life with my back against the wall, depending on borrowed money. … The 
                                                     
6 Ōmachi Keigetsu [哢﨤贅蠻] (1869 – 1925), journalist, poet, essayist and critic. 
7 See Inomata p. 44.  
8 Ikebe Sanzan (鷭シ申愾) (1864 - 1912) is counted together with Tokutomi Sohō and Kuga Katsunan 
among the three great journalists of Meiji Japan. 
9 Generally speaking, graduates from private universities earned 25 Yen a month at the Asahi, while those 
from the imperial universities started with 30 Yen a month. Nakano’s starting salary of 60 Yen per month 
was thus very generous and justified on the grounds that he brought some previous work experience to the 
job.   
10 Circulation of the Asahi News during Nakano’s stay at the company was as follows:  257,472 copies in 
1909, 277,392 copies in 1910, 303,322 copies in 1911, and 316,430 copies in 1912. (source: letter from the 
Asahi News Company to the author dated July 22, 2009).  
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Tokyo Asahi is the top newspaper in Japan and … using it as my base, I will be able to make a 
contribution to Japan’s political world.”11  
As it happened, Nakano’s contribution to Japan’s political world had to wait a while. His 
accomplishments during his first year or two at the Asahi are clouded in darkness. Whatever 
articles he wrote may or may not have been published; if they were, they did not carry his name, 
so it is impossible to attribute them to him. Lack of fame and attention, however, did not dent 
Nakano’s confidence. One of his colleagues recalls that from the beginning, Nakano was 
“ambitious, perhaps boastful, full of energy, and … looked down on his peers.”12 With time, this 
attitude grew into outright arrogance and eventually isolated Nakano within the editorial office. 
Nakano’s relationship with editor-in-chief, Ikebe Sanzan, who had invited Nakano to join the 
Asahi, also grew distant, though mainly because of differences in political opinion. Instead, 
Nakano was drawn to the more progressive Yugeta Sei’ichi.13  
 
Politicians in and out of Power 
Having spent almost two years at the Asahi in relative obscurity, Nakano was given a 
chance in early 1911. Encouraged by Yugeta, he wrote a series of ten character studies entitled 
“War on all Fronts - Politicians In and Out of Power,” which laid the foundation of his 
journalistic fame. The series, which started in late spring of that year and was published under the 
pen name “Jūbanba,”14 triggered great interest and some speculation among the readers as to the 
author’s real identity. Many thought the essays had been written by Ikebe. The numerous letters 
of praise that readers mistakenly sent Ikebe – many of which expressed surprise that he should be 
                                                     
11 Nakano in a letter to Yukiko Noguchi quoted in Inomata, p. 46. 
12 A former colleague of Nakano’s quoted in Inomata p. 46. 
13 Yugeta Sei’ichi [楙年譓5/11慎]  (1869 – 1937), journalist and Nakano’s mentor within the Asahi News.  
14 Jūbanba [癨15㮈] literally means “barbarian horse” or “wild horse.” See Inomata p. 50. 
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able to write such ‘young’ prose despite his advanced age – brought a melancholic smile to 
Ikebe’s face. The articles were so successful that they were subsequently republished in a book.15    
The series opened with a statement about being “fed up” with Japan’s politics, which at the 
time were characterized by transcendental cabinets formed alternately by Katsura Tarō16  or 
Saionji Kinmochi17 and this with such regularity that the decade from 1903 to 1913 would come 
to be known as the Katsura-Saionjiera [贅論蕁千]. Nakano wrote that despite the suggestion of 
change implied by the back-and-forth of cabinets between the conservative Katsura, a military 
man and member of the Yamagata faction, and the more liberal but firmly established Saionji 
only masked an underlying political stalemate that obstructed progress toward true party cabinets. 
Describing Katsura as cruel and calculating - “first among the vulgar” [哢態鍍] - and Saionji as 
weak and yielding – “last among the elegant” [哢＊存], Nakano compared the political battles 
between the two men with boring matches between two equally strong sumō wrestlers. Nakano 
wondered when a new “yokozuna” (i.e. sumō champion) would step up to “replace both Katsura 
and Saionji” and establish constitutional government. He then searched for a suitable challenger 
among the political parties’ rising stars. 
In the remaining eight character studies, Nakano profiled the lives and personalities of 
Ōura Kanetake, Gotō Shimpei, Hirata Tōsuke, Hara Kei, Matsuda Masahisa, Inukai Tsuyoshi, 
Ōishi Masami, and Terauchi Masatake.18 In writing their (by and large accurate) biographies, 
                                                     
15 Nakano Seigō “War on All Fronts - Politicians In and Out of Power” [都煙ß琊衲ǒ貢膕齠广], 
(Tokyo, October 1911). 
16
 Katsura Tarō (贅 啣ア ) (1848-1913), Japanese military man, politician, Prime Minister and second 
generation genrō. 
17 Prince Saionji Kinmochi (O論徇 鍍衽) (1849 – 1940), Japanese politician, twice Prime Minister and 
longest surviving genrō. 
18 Ōura Kanetake (哢④ 倒驥) (1850 - 1918), bureaucrat and politician; Gotō Shimpei (歙I 范霸) (1857 
– 1929), medical doctor, high-ranking bureaucrat, and politician; Hirata Tōsuke (霸譓覩拍) (1849 – 1925) 
bureaucrat, politician and statesman; Hara Kei or Hara Takashi (譜舁) (1856 – 1921), party politician and 
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Nakano also identified reasons why each man would fail to overcome hambatsu resistance to 
constitutional government. Most were unlikely to challenge the hambatsu cliques because they 
themselves were either by birth or marriage members thereof. Nakano pointed out that Terauchi 
was born in Chōshū, Ōura in Satsuma, and Ōishi in Tosa. Moreover, Hirata had married into the 
extended family of Yamagata, while Hara had married an adopted daughter of genrō Inoue. Even 
those not affiliated with the clans of the Restoration, however, failed to inspire Nakano’s hope for 
change, as they often lacked personal qualities he deemed necessary for the task.  
While Nakano’s treatment of the politicians’ backgrounds and careers was objective, he 
crossed over into judgment when discussing their personalities and character flaws, sometimes 
even insulting them outright. According to Nakano, Ōura, for instance, was “the loyal guard dog 
of the hambatsu” who could never break out of his policeman mold; Gotō “spineless” and lacking 
courage;19 Hirata “seemingly upright and honest” but in fact a “thief who takes from the people;” 
Hara “too ready to compromise on his ideals;” Matsuda “powerful but incompetent,” combining 
“incapability with endurance;” and Terauchi mediocre, lacking both “integrity and sagacity.” The 
only exception was Inukai, whom Nakano had known and admired since his student days. Three 
of the character studies - those of Terauchi, Hara and Inukai - merit a closer look.  
 
Terauchi 
As a member of the Yamagata faction, Terauchi represented what Nakano loathed about 
Japan’s political system - that access to power was restricted to members of certain cliques. In 
Nakano’s view, power had been handed down in a continuous line from the genrō oligarchs to 
junior members of their domains, and remained within these tight-knit political circles. This 
                                                                                                                                                              
Prime Minister; Matsuda Masahisa (觚譓驟睡) (1847-1914), politician; Ōishi Masami (哢0驟效) (1855 - 
1935), politician; Terauchi Masatake (徇塔驟鯢)  (1852 – 1919), Army general, politician and Prime 
Minister.  
19 Nakano quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 89. 
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reactionary political arrangement, labeled clique (hambatsu seiji [M淚膕齠]) or clan (batsuzoku 
seiji [淚茘膕齠]) government, could be found not only in the civilian bureaucracies but also in 
the army, where it was maintained by Yamagata and his followers Kodama, Katsura and Terauchi.  
Nakano’s attack on Terauchi was twofold. First, following the line of argument used so 
often by ‘men of purpose’ during the restoration some forty years earlier, Nakano claimed that 
assigning position and power by criteria other than merit could only weaken the country. He 
argued that Terauchi had not risen within the army’s ranks because of battlefield valor, noting that 
an injury received during the Satsuma campaign had condemned Terauchi to serve most of his 
career in the rear, performing functions that Nakano believed were “much despised by vigorous 
military men.”20 The only reason the “rubber-stamping bureaucrat”21 had risen through the ranks 
was the fact that he was a man from the domain of Chōshū, protected by other men from Chōshū, 
such as Yamagata, Kodama, and Katsura. Such meritless promotion was unfortunate in and of 
itself, but Terauchi’s determination to perpetuate the system by promoting and protecting juniors 
from the domain of Chōshū was even worse. Nakano warned readers that this would “contribute 
to the weakening of the nation’s armed forces.”22  
Second, Nakano expanded his critique to include the subject of military interference in 
politics. He took up the theme repeatedly in the future, leading some biographers to cast him 
incorrectly as an anti-militarist. Nakano wrote: 
“That the Emperor does not rejoice when military men indulge themselves in politics 
has already been made clear in the [imperial] rescript [to soldiers and sailors]… 
Military men should aspire to show courage on the battlefield. That is where the flower 
of the warrior blossoms. Yet ever since military politicians have made names for 
                                                     
20 Nakano Seigō “War on All Fronts - Politicians In and Out of Power” [都煙ß琊衲ǒ貢膕齠广]; 
(Tokyo, October 1911), p. 219.  
21 The exact term is “Mekura-Han-Oshi” [õ弐礬浩] literally meaning a man who will “blindly stamp.” 
Ibid., p. 222. 
22 Ibid., p. 237-38. 
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themselves in the realm and wielded their authority in the world, the cadets at the 
military academy have completely changed the ideals [they pursue]. They no longer aim 
to cut down enemies and take fortresses. Instead, they want to decorate their breasts 
with medals and become flattered politicians who are addressed as ‘Your 
Excellency’.”23 
 
Nakano concluded the essay on Terauchi by writing: “You are without wisdom and a man 
of narrow measure. If you were ever to become a politician, your policies would fail and your 
reputation would be ruined.”24 Nakano added that the only reason he “felt compelled to include 
such a mediocre warrior as Terauchi in the roster of politicians in and out of power” was because 
he needed a sort of counterweight to the others “who did not display as many weaknesses.”25 
Terauchi’s rise, however, continued despite Nakano’s criticism. He served as governor of Korea 
and, from 1916 to 1918, as Japan’s 18th Prime Minister. In both positions Nakano would attack 
him, making this essay just the starting point of an ongoing enmity.  
 
Hara  
Compared with his skewering of Terauchi and most of the other profiled politicians, 
Nakano’s take on Hara was mildly critical and his treatment of Inukai generous, even laudatory. 
According to Nakano, Hara had backbone, was outspoken, even outstanding, and did not give up 
his lofty ideals easily. While connected to the hambatsu through marriage, Hara had not been 
corrupted by them. And yet, Nakano did not believe Hara would ever confront the hambatsu 
cliques, let alone overcome the system of transcendental cabinets, because he was too willing to 
compromise on essential points.  
                                                     
23 Ibid., p. 256 – 259. 
24 Ibid., p. 249. 
25 Ibid., p. 251.  
 68 
Hara’s subsequent success – he formed Japan’s first pure party cabinet in 1918, making 
him the closest to the “yokozuna”-like figure that Nakano had hoped for – proved Nakano wrong. 
In Hara’s case, willingness to - no, mastery of - compromise led to such success that a later 
biographer made compromise the essential feature of Hara’s political oeuvre.26 One wonders why 
Nakano had so little appreciation for this supremely successful tactic, even after Hara’s death.27 
  
Inukai 
The study of Inukai, who alone among the ten politicians received an uncritically positive 
treatment, is in many ways the mirror image of Nakano’s study of Hara. Where Nakano criticized 
Hara for his willingness to compromise easily, he praised Inukai for his unwillingness to do so. In 
describing the latter’s life – in particular his rebellion against school regulations, his editors, and 
later the powerful political establishment – Nakano argued that “opposition runs through his life 
from beginning to end,” making him an “opposition politician” through and through. This stance 
“made all those who hold power his political enemies” and Nakano predicted that Inukai - “the 
leading character of the netherworld” - would “never come to the surface [i.e., the top].” 28  
Inukai’s unwillingness to compromise on essential matters was, however, not as strong as 
Nakano thought initially. Inukai learned from Hara’s example and eventually made enough 
compromises (far too many, in Nakano’s view) to become Japan’s Prime Minister. Indeed, if 
                                                     
26  Tetsuo Najita even titled his biography of Hara: “Hara Kei and the Politics of Compromise” 
(Cambridge, 1967).  
27  Even after Hara’s assassination in 1921, Nakano’s judgment of Hara remained harsh: “Modern Japan is 
being controlled in all respects by the worship of the powerful [哢征厨コ]. … Hara Kei understood this 
point, and in acting on it he was certainly the best of his generation. First of all he submitted to the genrō 
who held the key to power. …. Through worshipping the mighty he was able to gain power, but … the 
spirit that made him submit to the genrō, was the same spirit that made him ignore the people.” Nakano 
Seigō, “The Environment of the Takahashi Cabinet” [㔾隱塔隆貢猤劵], in Tōhōjiron, December 1922 
(quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 321).  
28 Nakano Seigō, “War on All Fronts - Politicians In and Out of Power”, p. 148. 
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anyone turned out to be the eternal “character of the netherworld” who never rose “to the 
surface,” it was Nakano, on account of his uncompromising stance. At the time, however, 
Nakano’s predictions about Inukai did not seem so far-fetched and the latter is said to have 
wondered after reading Nakano’s article: “Maybe Nakano is the one who knows me?” [ࠊࠇࠍ⍮
ࠆ߽ߩޔߘࠇਛ㊁߆㧫].29 
 
The Chinese Revolution 
Not long after Nakano finished “Politicians In and Out Of Power,” the question of how to 
deal with the Chinese revolution intensified the conflict that had been smoldering at the Asahi 
between the conservatives, represented by Ikebe and Natsume Sōseki, and the more radically 
progressive group led by Yugeta and Nakano. While the conservatives argued for intervention on 
behalf of the government (echoing similar calls by Yamagata, the army and Tokutomi Sohō), 
Yugeta and Nakano (echoing Inukai, Tōyama, Hara Kei, Saionji, etc.) opposed it and supported 
the revolutionaries. 
The conflict between Yugeta and Ikebe (soon to be succeeded by Matsuyama Chūjirō30) 
eventually became one motive behind Yugeta’s resignation in December 1915, but at this stage it 
led only to his and Nakano’s transfer to the Osaka office. There they were joined by newcomers 
Ogata Taketora - who had followed Nakano from Waseda into journalism - and Ōnishi Itsuki,31 
another young man from Fukuoka who had studied in China. It did not take long for Nakano to 
integrate the two newcomers into the Yugeta faction.   
                                                     
29 Inukai Tsuyoshi quoted in Hinoshita Tōgo [ᣣਅ⮮๋], “Nakano Seigō and the Way of the Lion” [ₑሶ
ߩ㆏ ਛ㊁ᱜ೰], (Tokyo, 1986), p. 295. 
30 Matsuyama Chūjirō [᧻ጊᔘੑ㇢] (1870 – 1942), journalist. 
31 Ōnishi Itsuki (or Sai) (ᄢ⷏ ᢪ) (1887 – 1947) journalist and China expert. 
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Nakano soon joined vocally in the ongoing debate over whether Japan should interfere in 
the revolution unfolding on the Chinese mainland. Tokutomi Sohō had fired the opening shot in 
the debate, arguing the case for intervention in an article called “Fire on the Further Shore” [徙應
貢篇 ]. Tokutomi’s article agitated for Japan’s intervention on behalf of the ailing Qing 
government on the grounds that Japan might otherwise soon find itself wedged between two 
republics - America to the east and China to the west – both of which could only “clash with our 
[Japan’s] Emperor-centric ideology [Œ帷腎氛厨コ].” Warning that “the plague is a material 
disease, and republicanism is an abstract one,”32 Tokutomi argued both should be fought.  
In an article aptly titled “Conflagration on the Further Shore” [徙應貢篇尨], Nakano 
countered that Tokutomi’s fear that a Chinese republic would “pose a temptation for the people of 
our own nation, putting in danger the foundation of our nation’s political essence [楼喪],”33 was 
unfounded:  
 
“Just as a current will not flow through matter that is not conducive, our people are not 
conductors of the republican current. Even if the revolutionary events in China were to 
have an effect on our nation, it would not be in the form of a revolution aimed against 
our monarchy.”34  
  
Nakano proceeded to argue that by focusing on Japan’s narrow interest in this question, 
Tokutomi risked sacrificing the larger good - namely, China’s right to self-determination. Given 
the Qing dynasty’s corrupt nature, a revolution was an inevitable process toward the realization of 
popular will. According to Nakano, while Tokutomi was interested in maintaining Japan’s status 
quo, he should have been more concerned about the Chinese people:  
                                                     
32 Tokutomi Sohō quoted in Inomata p. 60. 
33 Nakano Seigō, “Conflagration on the other Shore” [徙應貢篇尨] quoted in Inomata p. 60-61. 
34 Ibid., quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 109. 
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“Why are you needlessly worrying about the fire on the other shore and warning about 
the effects that this might have [on Japan]? Why are you wasting your efforts and 
supporting the Qing dynasty, which cannot stand by itself any longer, thus risking 
turning the 400 million people [of China] into [your] bitter enemies? If we [Japanese] 
were to use the conflagration in our neighboring country as a golden opportunity to 
interfere under the pretence of loyalty [i.e. to the dynasty 帆Œ] … it would be a very 
short-sighted calculation of our national interest … it would be an act of turning a 
benevolent Japan [析コ荳袿] into a predatory Japan [よ❼荳袿].”35        
 
 
At the end of 1911, the Asahi News sent Nakano to China to cover the unfolding events. He 
left in mid-December and, once there, traveled with Inukai and Tōyama, acting as their interpreter 
while reporting for the Asahi. Over the following weeks he met with many Chinese leaders, - 
including Huang Xing [杻85], then head of the revolutionary army, and Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the 
soon-to-be president of the new Chinese republic - as well as many lesser figures.36  
Experiencing the chaotic situation in China first-hand did not weaken Nakano’s support for 
the revolutionary cause. Only in his private correspondence did Nakano voice some reservations 
about Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s ability as a leader in these trying circumstances, describing him as 
“weak” [き瓢] and doubting whether he was “actually capable of ruling the realm.”37 Aware of 
the many problems that lay ahead, Nakano was nevertheless optimistic, expressing “great hopes 
for the new nation.”38 
                                                     
35 Ibid., quoted in Inomata p. 61. 
36 Nakano described the meetings with Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Huang Xing in an article published January 8, 
1912 in the Asahi News, reprinted in Nakano Seigō, “Expressions of the Soul” [网惚鋪晃], (Tokyo, May, 
1938), p. 274-77. Lesser figures which Nakano met at the time included Wang Ching-wei [鸛店ﬁ], who 
during the Sino-Japanese War became head of the Japanese puppet government in China, but also Nakano’s 
Chinese friends from Waseda such as Lin Chō-min [詒憎鴈] and Shin Ch’un-ken [慚蒟爛] father of the 
Chinese student who had boarded at Nakano’s house during his Waseda years. 
37 Nakano in a letter to his superior Yugeta Sei’ichi quoted in Inomata p. 64. 
38 Nakano quoted in Inomata p. 65.  
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On the Popular Rights Movement in the Meiji Era  
Upon his return from China, Nakano began working on a history of the Meiji Freedom and 
Popular Rights Movement. The work was published in 101 installments between October 1912 
and January 1913. Given the success of Nakano’s previous writing, these dispatches were 
displayed prominently within the Asahi News, appearing as lead articles in the editorial section 
and sometimes covering as much as half a page. Since the installments were published daily, the 
workload was considerable. In retrospect, Nakano recalled: “I wrote as if I had drunken castor oil 
and gotten [verbal] diarrhea.”39 Yet the work was worth the effort, for once again the series turned 
out to be popular with readers and well-received by critics.40 After the last article had been 
published, it did not take long for the entire series to be republished as a book under the title “On 
the Popular Rights Movement in the Meiji Era.”41  
As in the past, Nakano’s writing continued to focus on individuals whom he deemed either 
great heroes such as Saigō (and, to some extent, Inoue and Ōkubo), or, more frequently, immoral 
villains. Nakano accordingly peppered his narrative with always moralistic, often critical and not 
infrequently insulting personal portraits.42 As Ikebe wrote in the book’s preface, these personal 
attacks were unlikely to win Nakano friendships that he might need if he ever intended to enter 
politics.43     
                                                     
39 Nakano Seigō quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol.1, p. 116 and p. 88. 
40 An overview of the different critiques can be found in Inomata p. 77-78. 
41 Nakano Seigō, “On the Popular Rights Movement in the Meiji Era”[蕚齠鴈闥別ルクス], (Tokyo, 1913). 
The book was republished in 1994 under the same title by Ashi-shobō Publishing [ね蟷蘯] in Fukuoka.  
42 Thus Nakano calls Iwakura Tomomi “the head of the stubborn party” [購朗妬貢攴罐],  and party 
politician Hayashi Yūzō a “whore of the political world” [膕鈐貢⅓釡妍]. Nakano likened Itō Hirobumi 
and Inoue Kaoru “to stray dogs, who will transmit the disease that will kill even a Buddha.” All quotes 
taken from Inomata, p. 75-76.  
43 Ikebe Sanzan in the preface of Nakano Seigō, “On the Popular Rights Movement in the Meiji Era”. 
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In appearance and structure, “On the Popular Rights Movement in the Meiji Era” was truly 
what it purported to be - namely, a history of the Meiji Freedom and Popular Rights Movement. 
Yet, as early as the introduction, Nakano states that the “purpose of this history is certainly not to 
discuss the details of historical facts” but rather to “study the origins of the stagnation of today’s 
political world, with the hope of outlining” a way to reverse the decline in Japanese politics.44 
And decline was the dominant trend that Nakano found in the previous 44 years.  
The start of the Meiji period, the Meiji Restoration, had been promising enough. Following 
what Nakano considered the “natural trend toward popular nationalism,”45 the Restoration - “an 
unheard-of grand event” driven by an “outburst of vitality of the people bottled up during 300 
years under the bakufu government” - had “destroyed a system of class-based nationalism [̌茘
楼广厨コ] and instead established a system of citizen-based nationalism [鍍鴈楼广厨コ].”46 
According to Nakano, the radically popular spirit of the Restoration had:  
 
“… been fully expressed in the Charter Oath. Breaking with the previous evil customs 
and based on universal justice, it established deliberative assemblies to decide all public 
matters by open discussion. …To expand this spirit … plan the development of the 
nation and increase the well-being of the people is both the duty and right of our 
Empire’s subjects.”47  
 
In Nakano’s view, the Charter Oath made the Restoration a “radical” and “revolutionary 
event.”48 By promising social mobility, legal equality and political participation, the Charter 
                                                     
44 Nakano Seigō, “On the Popular Rights Movement in the Meiji Era”,  p. 74. 
45  Nakano quoted in (and translated by) Tetsuo Najita, “Nakano Seigō and the Spirit of the Meiji 
Restoration in Twentieth-Century Japan” in “Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan”, ed. James Morely 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) p. 381.  
46 Quotes taken form Nakano Seigō, “On the Popular Rights Movement in the Meiji Era”, p. 1. 
47 Ibid., p. 495-96. 
48 Ibid., p. 7-15. 
 74 
“liberated the people from historical obscurity.”49 Consequently, the history of the Meiji period 
had to be read as a struggle between those trying to fulfill this promise and those trying to 
obstruct that fulfillment.  
Initially, the young Meiji government was committed to carrying out the promise made in 
the Charter Oath. Soon, however, some of its members “formed cliques to pursue their interest 
and protect their rights, and in doing so clouded universal justice and returned to the old vices. 
Assemblies were not set up, public debate was not led and the spirit of the Restoration suddenly 
lost its impetus.”50  
Not all the Meiji leaders abandoned the spirit of the Restoration so easily. Saigō Takamori 
and those around him tried to uphold “honor and integrity” [鞭òルクス], but were opposed by those 
“pursuing opportunism” [詑帚ルクス].51 Nakano sympathized with Saigō and his followers even after 
they resorted to violence or “military action” [驥苳帑ネ] to achieve their ends. The leaders of the 
samurai uprisings of the early years of Meiji - Etō Shimpei, Maebara Issei and Saigō Takamori - 
were, according to Nakano, carrying in themselves “the spirit of the Restoration” when they 
“attacked the walls set up by the hambatsu.”52 Nakano believed this made them progressives, 
rather than reactionaries, and accordingly referred to the Satsuma Rebellion or Seinan War as the 
“Seinan Revolution” [O評卸棒] and dubbed Saigō’s followers the “pure revolutionary party” 
[0®紅鵠卸棒妬]. 53  
                                                     
49 Nakano used the phrase “emergence of the masses” [浸鴈貢̈凅]. Instead of this literal translation, I 
have used the more elegant translation provided by Tetsuo Najita, “Nakano Seigō and the Spirit of the 
Meiji Restoration in Twentieth-Century Japan”, p. 381.  
50 Nakano Seigō, “On the Popular Rights Movement in the Meiji Era”, p. 495. 
51 Ibid., p. 496. 
52 Ibid., p. 497 
53 Ibid., p. 47 – 48. 
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The defeat of Saigō’s uprising marked the end of attempts to realize the spirit of the 
Restoration by military means. The promise contained in the Charter Oath, however - initially 
made because the government needed the people’s support - had inspired many citizens to join 
the Meiji Freedom and Popular Rights Movement in the belief that “the spirit of the Restoration 
should be revived by peaceful means”54. In forcing the Meiji government to establish a Diet, 
Nakano believed this group scored an important victory. But “since the opening of the Diet,” 
Nakano continued, “I am afraid the exercise of the restoration’s spirit has become extremely 
rare.” 55  This mistake, which coincided with a failure to establish party government, arose 
because Japan’s leaders had too often followed “policies of compromise [圖表苜ə] that ushered 
in the defeat of the people’s party and helped maintain the hambatsu’s dominant position.”56  
The conclusion Nakano drew from his interpretation of the Meiji period’s political history 
was that the spirit of the Restoration - that is, the promise contained in the Charter Oath - had 
never been fulfilled and accordingly still awaited realization. Nakano believed such realization 
could be achieved through a “Taishō Restoration”57 that would not be brought about by political 
insiders such as Saionji, Yamagata or Ōkuma, because “they have already accumulated power 
and wealth and a Taishō Restoration would rob them of their private power and wealth. Therefore, 
they will never rise up.” 58 Neither did Nakano place his hopes in the political parties, even 
                                                     
54 Ibid., p. 497. 
55 Ibid., p. 498. 
56 Only once had the parties realized the “folly of compromising,” formed a coalition and taken an 
uncompromising stance to bring down “the fortress of the hambatsu,” namely in 1898 when Itagaki 
Taisuke’s Jiyūtō and Ōkuma Shigenobu’s Shimpotō formed the Kenseitō, but even this attempt had been 
frustrated due to “the lack of resolution and want of sincerity among some members of the people’s 
parties.” Nakano Seigō, “On the Popular Rights Movement in the Meiji Era”, p. 499 – 500. 
57 Nakano wrote: “…. at the beginning of Taishō we have to add another great restoration [慎哢黛殱].  … 
a Taishō Restoration [哢驟ⅷ范]…”  Ibid., p. 3. 
58 Ibid., p. 3. 
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warning his readers “against the idea of trying to wash off the poisonous blood of the hambatsu 
by using the soiled blood of the parties.”59 In his view, the next restoration would be brought 
about by “a young, wise, courageous, eloquent, and strong person, a rōnin from among the 
humble commoners.”60 Nakano placed his hope in the Taishō Crisis, which was unfolding as he 
wrote these articles. He advised the activists to learn from Saigō’s “absolute determination” [71徙
秦列] 61 and to take an uncompromising stance in challenging the hambatsu.   
  
Movement to Protect the Constitution 
Nakano was still in the middle of writing his history on the Meiji Popular Rights 
Movement when in November 1912 the army, frustrated in their desire to add two new divisions, 
withdrew the Army Minister and refused to supply a successor, thus forcing the Saionji cabinet to 
resign. Seen by many intellectuals and party politicians as a complete disregard for 
“constitutional government,” the army’s move triggered the so-called Taishō Political Crisis. The 
parties, which in the past had been divided and easily played by the hambatsu, united against the 
new government formed by Katsura in December 1912. This coalition received broad-based 
support outside the Diet from business leaders, intellectuals and activists, held rallies and 
demonstrations, and formed what was soon called the Movement to Protect the Constitution. 
Katsura’s attempts to overcome the parties’ opposition by founding a new party, and by having 
the Emperor issue a rescript demanding cooperation with his government, led to riots, which 
erupted during the following days amid shouts of “Protect the Constitution” and “Bring down the 
                                                     
59 Ibid., p. 501. 
60 Ibid., p. 3. 
61 Ibid., p. 497. 
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hambatsu.”62  Facing determined opposition within the Diet and the “threat of revolutionary 
riots”63 outside it, Katsura finally resigned. His successor, Yamamoto Gombei (Gonnohyōe), was 
able to win the support of the largest political party, Seiyūkai, led by Hara Kei, thus ending the 
inter-party cooperation. For compromising with Yamamoto, Hara Kei was criticized severely by 
many of the movement’s leaders, including Ozaki Yukio – who, with 26 members, left the 
Seiyūkai in protest and formed the Seiyūkai-Club.  
Because of its widespread popular support, the Movement to Protect the Constitution 
seemed to Nakano an opportunity to bring about the sort of Taishō restoration he had envisioned 
in his history of the Meiji Popular Rights Movement. Nakano threw all the political weight he 
had gained as a journalist behind the movement, writing articles and commentaries intended to 
fan the popular passion for constitutional government. Among the many articles Nakano wrote 
during those turbulent days, the best-known are a series of editorials in the form of open letters 
addressed to political figures and parties on both sides of the divide.64  
The editorials contained some familiar themes. As he had done in the past, Nakano 
attacked the hambatsu and made the attack highly personal. He focused his ire on Katsura, 
because according to Nakano all the other genrō were politically dead and “not one of them 
merits that I raise my voice demanding their destruction. … It is because of you [Katsura] that the 
people loudly demand the destruction of the batsuzoku. In that sense, the popular movement 
                                                     
62 See Andrew Gordon, “A Modern History of Japan” (New York, 2003) p. 130-132. 
63 The fear that the situation in the streets might become uncontrollable was shared by Hara Kei who 
confided in his diary that “if [Katsura ] still refused to resign, I think practically a revolutionary riot will 
occur.” Hara quoted in  Andrew Gordon, “A Modern History of Japan”, (New York, 2003), p. 130. 
64 Altogether Nakano wrote nine letters, which were subsequently republished in Nakano Seigō  “Shichi-
Kin Hachi-Jū – Caught Seven Times, Freed Eight” [晋翩都や], (Tokyo, May 1913). 
 78 
demanding the protection of the constitution and the destruction of the hambatsu is entirely 
directed against you.”65  
Nakano also resuscitated his critique of the politics of compromise, violently deriding Hara 
for joining the Yamamoto cabinet - a betrayal that lowered Hara to Katsura’s level in Nakano’s 
eyes:  
“The people are attacking the collusion between Katsura and yourself, Hara, two 
monsters that are the focus of their grudge, and they will not stop until the likes of you 
are swept away. The natural destination of our political world is the moment when you, 
Hara, will die an agonizing death. … We the constitutional people will be able to 
welcome the spring of constitutional government only after you have been overthrown. 
Until we see you die in agony we must not lower the spears aimed against you.”66   
 
Nakano also continued his campaign of insults, calling Yamamoto a “money-loving … 
Jew,”67 and Hara “the vermin inside the body of a lion” [i.e. an enemy from within] who “once he 
saw profit was ready to change his position faster than lightning.”68 As usual, Nakano ignored 
warnings from his friends that insulting powerful politicians was not advisable for someone with 
political ambitions.69  
Nakano’s appraisal of Inukai and Ozaki, already positive before the crisis, now came close 
to adoration. In the editorial addressed to Inukai, Nakano wrote “it was you who achieved most of 
the success. It was you who actually overthrew Katsura, overthrew Saionji and pushed all the 
                                                     
65 Ibid., p. 3. 
66 Ibid., p. 231. 
67 Ibid. p. 228-29. In another piece entitled “Taking Pity on Yamamoto Gombei” [愾袿闥度ヤ哢55惚瓱
黒拷] in Chūō Kōron April, 1913, Nakano repeated and expanded his accusations against Yamamoto, for 
being a “slave to money and fattening his own belly on steel orders for ships and arms procurements” not 
realizing that these accusations would soon shown to be true when the Siemens scandal revealed in March 
1914 that high-ranking officers of the Navy had in fact received kickbacks on a large scale.  
68 Nakano Seigō “Shichi-Kin Hachi-Jū – Caught Seven Times, Freed Eight”, p. 226. 
69 This time the warning came from Nakano’s boss at the Asahi Ikebe Sanzan, who cautioned Nakano no 
to “seek short-lived satisfaction in offense and thus make enemies with your sharp tongue.” Ikebe quoted in 
Inomata, p. 85. 
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ugly remnants of Hara Kei’s compromise era out of politics.”70 The editorial addressed to Ozaki 
is no less laudatory, praising him for remaining true to his convictions and breaking with the 
Seiyūkai after Hara had led it to join the Yamamoto cabinet:  
 
“Though you work in the slippery world of politics, you do not get dirty, but stand tall 
as pristine lotus flower. No matter how many years pass, you remain a virgin in politics. 
… When we celebrate the flowering of the constitution, the virgin of the political world 
should take the main seat [at the table]. The glorious and courageous general who 
destroyed the hambatsu should be mentioned first when the rewards for this 
achievement are discussed. My only hope is that when the spring of our constitution 
comes sometime in the future, I have the honor of enjoying it with you.”71    
 
 
 The hot-blooded zeal with which Nakano delved into his work during the Movement to 
Protect the Constitution impressed those around him as well as himself. Afterward, Nakano wrote 
that “from the very beginning of that movement, I have left the position of commentator and 
instead become the last among the activists. … I was unable to stop the struggle at any point.”72 
And the effort paid off: Once again, Nakano’s article series was a great success with the Asahi’s 
readership and well-received by critics.73 Once again, it was subsequently republished as a book. 
 
Problems at the Tokyo Asahi   
Paradoxically, Nakano’s journalistic success did not strengthen his standing within the 
Asahi News but rather coincided with his increasing isolation. Nakano’s ostracism, however, 
                                                     
70 Nakano Seigō “Shichi-Kin, Hachi-Jū– Caught Seven Times, Freed Eight”, p. 139.  
71 Ibid., p. 164-65. 
72 Ibid., p. 261-62. 
73 The June, 1913 issue of Japan and the Japanese read: “While we all despair at the present situation, the 
heart of the author seems to be filled with grievances. Tackling the harsh realities with his pen, his sharp 
words are to the point. Among the recent authors, this is a more enjoyable one.” While in the July 1913 
issue of Chūō Kōron one could read: “One of the remarkable men of future political change is without 
doubt Nakano Seigō. Even in the present age, where the literary arts are well developed and the readers do 
not complain about the lack of good essayists, we do have great expectations for this author [i.e. Nakano 
Seigō].” Both quoted in Inomata, p. 88.   
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resulted less from his political views than from his personal behavior. Factional strife within the 
Asahi existed throughout Nakano’s tenure, pitting Nakano’s mentor Yugeta against Ikebe and his 
successor Matsuyama, but both editors were intelligent enough to understand that neither 
Nakano’s character nor his political views diminished his quality as a writer.  
Inability to share his passion is part of the explanation for Nakano’s increasing isolation. 
The more enthusiastically Nakano immersed himself in supporting the Movement to Protect the 
Constitution in his articles and attacking its opponents, the less he tolerated anyone around him 
(except Ogata), and the more his colleagues withdrew from the editorial office - leaving the bulk 
of the work to Nakano. On one occasion, Nakano was left alone with Ogata to write the following 
day’s entire political section. Coverage of the movement had become a one-man show and the 
Asahi staff referred jokingly to the Movement to Protect the Constitution as “Nakano’s 
Movement to Protect the Constitution.”74  
More important, however, was Nakano’s feeling of superiority, which - boosted by his 
professional success - turned into arrogance and perhaps even contempt for his colleagues, a 
development that cost him any remaining sympathy among them. Ogata later recalled:  
 
“Soon after entering the newspaper, I felt that Nakano moved somewhere above his 
colleagues. Somehow, he kept apart from the others and occupied a special place above 
the rest. … Surely, Nakano was an excellent journalist, but it was only natural that once 
he started running off all by himself, the slower ones left behind would group together 
in order to defend their position.”75  
 
Though Nakano was aware that his position within the paper was becoming fragile, he 
failed to grasp his contribution to his decline. To him “the accusation voiced by mediocres [態斥] 
has its origin in the fact that from early on I have acted within the company as if it were my 
                                                     
74 Ogata, p. 36.  
75 Ogata, p. 35. 
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own.”76 That labeling - and probably also treating - his colleagues as “mediocres” could be part 
of the problem never seems to have occurred to Nakano. While his journalistic successes could 
have earned him his colleagues’ admiration, they made him more and more conceited and thus 
earned him their envy instead. According to Nishimura Tenshū,77 one of his colleagues at the 
Asahi, Nakano’s position within the paper would continue to deteriorate until what had been 
simple isolation became an outright “Nakano boycott.”78  
Nakano’s divisive presence in Tokyo was likely the main reason he was offered a job in the 
summer of 1913 as the paper’s correspondent in Seoul, Korea. The tacit understanding that after 
Nakano completed his tour in Korea the Asahi would send him to study in Europe likely spurred 
Nakano to accept the post. Before leaving, however, he attended to the important business of 
getting married.  
 
Marriage with Daughter of Miyake Setsurei    
The woman that Nakano chose to become his wife was Miyake Tamiko, the first-born 
daughter of Miyake Setsurei and his wife Kaho.79 Though Nakano must have visited the Miyakes 
at least on some occasions, some accounts suggest he had never met their daughter. He was 
nevertheless confident that “the daughter must be the right choice” simply because “both parents 
are great personalities.”80 When Nakano put out his feelers, employing the offices of Inukai’s 
                                                     
76 Nakano quoted in Inomata p. 94. 
77 Nishimura Tenshū [O襁啀烈]: (1865 - 1924) Journalist and critic. 
78 Nishimura Tenshū quoted in Inomata, p. 93. 
79 Miyake Kaho [申嵶ゑ狼] (1968 - 1943) poet and novelist. 
80 This anecdote is recalled by the matchmaker, Kojima Kazuo. Kojima quoted in Mitamura, Takeo [申譓
襁驥啌], “Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?” [腎ǒ驟悩購奏膣60鈍浩紅拘], (Tokyo, 1953) p. 
128. 
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right-hand man, Kojima Kazuo,81 the reaction was initially lukewarm. Miyake Setsurei worried 
that someone as impetuous, impulsive and impatient as Nakano might spend all his vitality and 
die an early death, while his wife, Kaho, wondered whether a graduate from Waseda University 
was good enough for her daughter.82 Unlike her parents, Nakano’s future wife, Tamiko, seems to 
have been quite happy with the prospect of marrying Nakano.83 In the end Kojima, together with 
Tōyama - who acted as official matchmaker - was able to secure the parents’ consent and the 
young couple married on July 28, 1913. Less than a month later, they left Tokyo for Seoul, Korea.  
 
Correspondent in Seoul 
Nakano and his wife arrived in Seoul during the tenure of Governor General Terauchi, a 
time Korean historians dub a “dark period” because of the oppressive rigor of Terauchi’s rule.84 
An army general, Terauchi had been sent to govern Korea after the relatively moderate approach 
of his predecessor, Itō Hirobumi, had led to a wave of protests ending in open rebellion and Itō’s 
assassination. Terauchi approached the task of pacifying Korea by relying primarily on the 
kempeitai, or military police, with the aim of controlling all aspects of public life.  
 Terauchi was severely criticized even within Japan for his iron-fisted approach to 
government. The two Asahi News correspondents who preceded Nakano had clashed frequently 
                                                     
81 Kojima Kazuo [幣戡慎渣] (1865 – 1952) journalist and politician, had known Miyake since at least 
1888 when he started to contributing frequently to the former’s magazine. 
82 For Miyake Kaho’s reaction see Inomata p. 97 as well as Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 129 According to 
some accounts, it was Nakano who worried that his future wife could die an early death. Nagao writes: 
“When they married, she was young and talented and it was said that talented people would not live a long 
life. Seigō asked her to follow his example and become a bit stupid.” Nagao Ryō [憎悃は], “Moving 
Peoples’ Souls” [鉧网斥惚罰拘溝], (Tokyo, 1998) p. 293. 
83 See Inomata p. 97. 
84 See Michael E. Robinson, “Colonial Publication Policy and the Korean Nationalist Movement” in “The 
Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945”, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), p. 323. 
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with the colonial authorities. On four occasions, censors had gone so far as to prohibit the sale of 
the Asahi News in Korea; once, an Asahi correspondent had even been threatened with 
deportation.85 By sending Nakano, their most sharp-tongued, outspoken and aggressive writer, to 
Seoul, the Asahi made clear that it had no intention of turning down its criticism. Yet, if his 
superiors at the Asahi had hoped that Nakano would pick up the fight against the colonial 
government where previous correspondents had left off, they were initially disappointed, for 
Nakano had different intentions. Shortly after his arrival in Korea, Nakano explained in a letter to 
Kojima Kazuo:  
 
“Having arrived on the spot … rather than talking to God-knows-whom, nothing is as 
telling as taking a direct look by yourself. If you do that you quickly become aware of 
your own ignorance, [and this ignorance] I greatly deplore. I decided to pursue my 
studies and my investigations at the same time and think that for the time being I will 
not write great arguments but increase my knowledge before my term is up.”86  
 
As noble as Nakano’s intention to study the situation before condemning it may sound, two 
things must be borne in mind. First, Nakano’s inability to communicate in Korean would ensure 
his understanding of the situation was always distorted by a Japanese perspective – or, as his son 
Yasuo points out, Nakano never saw Korea through Korean eyes.87 Second, one should not take 
the above to mean that Nakano had not yet passed his judgment on the colonial administration, 
for as he wrote in the same letter, he felt “great discomfort at the deep-rooted evil perpetuated in 
colonial and diplomatic policies by bureaucratic governors lacking knowledge and experience.” 88 
                                                     
85 For example, the issues of Asahi News’ April 3 and 5, 1911 had been taken out of circulation because 
they contained articles by Okano Yōnosuke [慟ǒ掃翠拍], then correspondent to Seoul, which were 
critical of Terauchi regime in Korea. See Inomata, p. 98 and Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 130. 
86 Letter from Nakano Seigō to Kojima Kazuo, dated September 6, 1913 quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, 
p. 131. 
87 Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 133. 
88 Letter from Nakano Seigō to Kojima Kazuo, dated September 6, 1913 quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, 
 84 
If Nakano chose to study the situation before passing his verdict, then it was only to gather more 
evidence against Terauchi, not really to test his forgone conclusion.  
Nakano started his investigation of Korea by traveling within and beyond the colony. In 
September, he visited Daegu province in southern Korea, followed by a second trip to Manchuria 
in October-November. 89 In keeping with his resolve to withhold public judgment, Nakano’s 
reports from his voyages were mostly descriptive, his criticism was mild and directed mainly 
against Tokyo, and only seldom did he venture to address the colonial administrators.90   
 Nakano finally resolved to formulate his criticism of Terauchi’s government sometime in 
late 1913 or early 1914. According to Nakano, he “poured his own hot blood” [60薙控⒞ス惚稿
稿広紘艙d]91 into writing his critique of Terauchi, which was published as a series beginning 
April 16, 1914.92  
Starting off by stating that he “had a belly full of grievances” and could “no longer watch 
silently,”93 Nakano’s Korean series was somewhat more balanced than his past works in that it 
did not aim at Terauchi’s personal faults but rather at the faults of his policies, and in that Nakano 
also mentioned a number of positive aspects. Nakano noted, for instance, that Governor General 
                                                                                                                                                              
p. 131. 
89 The tour to Daegu province is described in “Korea’s Provinces Seen at a Glance” [慎t皇鵠衲靜貢丱
苜] while  Nakano’s account of his trip to Manchuria can be found in “Manchurian Travel Journal” [噌攀
え髏癲ô]. Both are reproduced in Nakano Seigō, “Manchuria and Korea as I saw them” [癪控に紅鵠噌
靜], (Tokyo, 1915), p. 381-83 and p. 151-303 respectively.  
90 See Nakano Seigō, “Manchurian Travel Journal” [噌攀え髏癲ô] in “Manchuria and Korea as I saw 
them” [癪控に紅鵠噌靜], (Tokyo, 1915), p. 141, 163 and following, p. 290 and following.  
91 Nakano Seigō, “Hold on, Father” [査再混鷺査咋刷債債], in “Expressions of the Soul” [网惚鋪晃], 
(Tokyo, May, 1938), p. 313. 
92 As so often before, the articles were subsequently published in a book and it is from there that most of 
the quotes are taken. Nakano Seigō, “The Governor General’s Policies” [GS膕齠ルクス] in “Manchuria and 
Korea as I saw them” [癪控に紅鵠噌靜], (Tokyo, 1915 ), p. 1 – 66. 
93 Nakano Seigō, “The Governor General’s Policies”, p. 4. 
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Terauchi‘s “policies have no doubt made a step toward increasing the welfare of the common 
people.” 94  
Then, however, Nakano recalled that whenever he talked to lower colonial administration 
officials, he “was surprised to find out that … all were full of grievances.” Japanese businessmen 
residing in Korea likewise “did not grow tired of talking critically about the governor’s policies 
and were not afraid to say in public that Korea’s development could not proceed until after the 
governor’s dismissal.” Nakano drew from this the preliminary conclusion that the “well-
intentioned” governor’s “policies were bad” [薬牀貢瀑膕] and warned that “as long as the 
serious and passionate governor does not abandon his mistaken beliefs, I fear that against his 
expectations he will only produce evil results.”95 As the uprisings of March 1919 would show, 
Nakano was right in his prediction.  
Nakano believed the fundamental problem with Terauchi’s administration lay in his trust in 
the “omnipotence of bureaucracy” [巫闥浸㋞厨コ],96 which led him to rely exclusively on the 
controlling power of the military police under his command instead of allowing some degree of 
self-rule. The main problem with this approach, in Nakano’s mind, was that the military police 
had neither the manpower nor the expertise to control all of Korean society:  
 
“On top of the tasks that a normal police would fulfill, they also have to control 
society’s public morals, supervise the press, research the character of individuals, check 
the financial status of entrepreneurs, and supervise the conduct of provincial officials. 
How can a kempeitai officer with his simple knowledge accomplish all this?”97 
 
 
                                                     
94 Nakano Seigō, “The Governor General’s Policies”, p. 5. 
95 Nakano Seigō, “The Governor General’s Policies”, p. 5-6. 
96 Nakano Seigō, “The Governor General’s Policies”, p. 7. 
97 Nakano Seigō, “The Governor General’s Policies”, p. 51-52. 
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In order to protect the public peace in the days directly following Korea’s annexation, this 
heavy-handed approach may have been necessary, but by the time Nakano had arrived in Korea 
(three years after the annexation), he found its limits were apparent.  
According to Nakano, the fundamental mistake of Governor General Terauchi’s 
administration was nowhere better exemplified than in his handling of the Korean press. In his 
effort to control Korean resistance to Japanese rule, Terauchi tried to “unify the press” [クルクス雍欄
貢67慎]98 and to this end enlisted the help of Tokutomi Sohō, who later explained that unification 
meant “the exact opposite of freedom of speech.”99 More specifically, it meant limiting the 
number of newspapers to one per region, and eliminating in the process all those that were critical 
of Japanese rule.100 Tokutomi’s and Terauchi’s policies silenced criticism successfully, as Nakano 
realized soon after his arrival. Writing to his boss, Yugeta, in Tokyo, Nakano remarked: “Even 
though there are many newspapers, my guess is that there is not one [in Korea] that can criticize 
the Resident-General’s office.”101 
Nakano was quick to point out, however, that silencing the administration’s critics came 
with a price. Control of the press meant that the free flow of information and opinions was 
obstructed and this made for a “society in darkness.” Nakano wrote that ruling such a society was 
like driving a horse carriage at full speed during a dark night on a dangerous road and demanded 
                                                     
98 See Michael E. Robinson, “Colonial Publication Policy and the Korean Nationalist Movement” in “The 
Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945”, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, (Princeton, 1984), p. 
312.   
99 Quoted in Inomata, p. 99. Quote taken from Tokutomi Sohō [毫廬え戍], “Autobiography of Tokutomi”  
[毫廬60然], (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Center, 1997).  
100 For a more detailed description of Tokutomi’s role in Korea see John D. Pierson, “Tokutomi Sohō, 
1863 – 1957 – A Journalist for Modern Japan”, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 298-300. 
101 Nakano Seigō in a letter to Yugeta, quoted in Inomata p. 98.  
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“freedom of the speech and press” [クルクス况ぐ貢60譿]102 in Korea. Extending the metaphor, 
Nakano asked the Governor General to “turn the street lantern on.”103  
To correct the kempeitai system’s overarching flaws, Nakano advocated for a fundamental 
shift in Japan’s colonial policy, from bureaucracy [巫齠厨コ] toward self-rule [60齠厨コ], from 
supervision [êS厨コ] toward guidance [窩怡厨コ], and from interventionism [朧葛厨コ] 
toward liberalism [60譿厨コ ]. Whether General Terauchi read Nakano’s criticism remains 
unknown, but the General certainly did not heed Nakano’s advice. Only after the uprisings of 
March 1919 revealed the bankruptcy of Terauchi’s policies did Japanese colonial rule in Korea 
take a more liberal tone under the new governor Saitō Makoto.  
Though Tokutomi Sohō and Nakano again found themselves in opposing camps (they had 
already clashed two years earlier over how to deal with China’s revolution), when Nakano met 
Sohō and his brother Roka 104  in person, they immediately took a liking to each other and 
eventually became friends. Recalling his first impression, Tokutomi later wrote:  
 
“At the time, Nakano’s writing was wild and unrestrained, but from the beginning I 
liked him for his radiant talents, his lively spirit and his forward aggressiveness. I could 
not help but hope for his future. … Nakano had the character of the shishi [man of 
purpose] of the Restoration. He was neither an aristocrat nor a commoner, but a shishi 
… in the sense that anyone with a heart would feel it, would love him, would want to 
become familiar with him, and would want to respect him.”105 
 
                                                     
102 Nakano Seigō, “The Governor General’s Policies”, p. 13 and following. 
103 Nakano Seigō, “The Governor General’s Policies”, p. 7-8. 
104 Tokutomi Roka [毫廬うゑ] (1868 - 1927) novelist. Roka recalled his first meeting with Nakano in his 
“The Shadow of Death” [髞貢緋], (Tokyo, Ōe Shobō [哢鷦蟷蘯], 1917), p. 476. 
105 Tokutomi Sohō [毫廬え戍], “The Character of Men of Purpose of the Restoration” [ⅷ范沒吩貢城賚], 
in “Nakano Seigō is Alive” [腎ǒ驟悩購﨟攻肱広鵠], eds. Seigō-Society [驟悩善], (Tokyo: Akane-shobō 
[巷拘講蟷蘯], 1954) p. 44. 
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With time their friendship became closer and, after Nakano’s death, Sohō wrote Nakano’s 
epitaph.  
As Nakano’s stay in Korea drew to a close, he had no reason to be dissatisfied. He was  
supporting two households, one in Tokyo and his own in Seoul, had become the proud father of a 
healthy boy (Katsuaki [転蕚], born in the spring of 1914, was the first of four sons), and 
continued to be successful professionally. Almost as a matter of course, the articles he had 
written in the course of the year were republished as a book in 1915.106 Better still was the 
prospect of spending the next one to two years traveling and studying in Europe.  
  
On to Europe    
For anyone aiming to become a credible, authoritative statesman, knowledge of Europe - 
then the global center of power and culture - was indispensable. Traveling West and gaining 
exposure to European ways was thus the next logical step for Nakano in his quest to enter politics. 
Even as he prepared for his return to Japan, Nakano sent letters to his mentors - Kojima, Inukai, 
Yugeta, etc.- announcing his intention and sounding out possible ways to finance the voyage.107 
Following Nakano’s instructions, Kojima approached Yasukawa Kei’ichirō,108 a Fukuoka coal 
baron and father of Nakano’s Shūyūkan classmate and friend, Yasukawa Daigorō, asking for Yen 
                                                     
106  Nakano Seigō, “Manchuria and Korea as I saw them” [癪控に紅鵠噌靜], (Tokyo, 1915). The 
monograph was originally published by Miyake Setsurei’s Seikyō-sha [膕臙だ]. Incidentally, the book was 
published a second time as part of a series of monographs on Japanese views of China in 1999. See Kojima 
Shinji [恠戡薑齠] ed., “Accounts of China during the Taisho period: Part 1: Manchuria and Korea as I saw 
them, by Nakano Seigō” [໻ℷЁ೑㽟㘲䤆䲚៤㄀ˍᏏ ˉ៥ǡ㾇ǴȠ⑔冂刷Ё䞢ℷ࠯㨫], (Tokyo, 
Yumani Shobo [ț合行蟷蘯], 1999).   
107 For example in a letter to Kojima reproduced in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 152. 
108 Yasukawa Kei’ichirō [嶢擺舁慎ア] (1849 – 1934) Fukuokan business man, coal baron, founder of 
Yasukawa Zaibatsu and long-standing financial backer of Nakano. 
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5,000 – a sum Nakano had calculated would pay for two years of study in Europe.109 Kojima 
secured the funds in less than a month.  
Even with funding for the trip secure, Nakano still hesitated to quit his job, trying instead 
to obtain a leave of absence from the Asahi (including the option to return to his former position 
after he came back from Europe). Obtaining this leave of absence proved difficult, for while there 
had been a tacit understanding between the Asahi management and Nakano that after having 
served as a Korean correspondent he could go to Europe, no one admitted remembering it. 
Nakano had no friends at the paper and Yugeta, his one remaining ally, wanted Nakano to return 
to Japan, because he believed Nakano could strengthen his own standing within the company. In 
the end (and the end did not come until sometime in February 1915!), Nakano was nevertheless 
able to secure not only a leave of absence but also a monthly stipend from the Asahi, which 
meant that he now had more money at his disposal than he actually needed. Having spent the first 
months of 1915 preparing for his voyage and stay in England, Nakano left Tokyo, this time 
without his wife and son, on March 12.  
 
The Sea Voyage to England   
Nakano kept a diary during his 50-day sea voyage to England, in which he recorded in 
great detail the day-to-day vicissitudes of sea life. He kept track of, among other things, the 
weather, the sea’s changing colors, the points he won and lost in games played on deck (even as 
an adult, Nakano continued to be a bad loser), the food served, the books he read (works by Lao 
                                                     
109 To put the sum in perspective, consider that by 1916 the starting salary of a university graduate was 45 
Yen, assuming that Nakano was to stay away for two years, 5.000 Yen equaled a monthly stipend of over 
200 Yen (more than four times the starting salary of a university graduate!). Even if we consider that he had 
to maintain his entire family as well as himself abroad this seems generous. For wages and prices see 
Iwasaki Jirō [憖扣㎟ア], “Price Conditions over 100 Years” [☞卒貢身ù琨琤琤朮], (Tokyo, Yomiuri 
Shimbun-sha, 1982) p. 286-300. 
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Tsu and Max O’Rell’s “John Bull and his Island”110), and even the dreams he had at night. He 
also described short stays on land (Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, Colombo, Suez, etc.) where 
the ship anchored to load coal. Despite the fact that the world had been at war for over six months 
as Nakano sailed, a brief mention of Allied warships in the Suez Canal and the threat of German 
U-Boat attacks between Gibraltar and England were his only references to WW1.  
Below the surface, however, the account of the voyage, which was later published under 
the title “Mountains and Rivers of a Perished Nations,” 111 is all about the colonized and semi-
colonized “perished nations” Nakano saw along the way, which left a profound and long-lasting 
impression on him.112  
 
“Between our departure from Kobe until our arrival in Marseilles, all the countries we 
have visited [i.e., where we have anchored] were either perished or half perished [i.e., 
colonies or semi-colonies]. Moreover, the people of all those perished countries all 
belong to the intellectual, emotional and cultural tradition of the colored races, while 
their masters, who have conquered and are now exploiting them, all belong to the white 
races.”113 
 
Nakano believed this sort of exploitation could persist for only two reasons: first, 
hypocritical racism on the side of the Western Powers who “shout humanity … but [who], if they 
really wanted to realize their lofty words … would not permit any injustices based on race,”114 
and second, innocent weakness on the side of Asian people whose “only sin lies in the fact that 
                                                     
110 Max O’Rell was the pseudonym of the French born Léon Paul Blouet (1848-1903). His humorously 
critical book on England was widely popular.   
111 Nakano Seigō, “Mountains and Rivers of Perished Nations” [西楼貢愾齊], in “Global Policy and Far 
Eastern Policy” [身鈐膕ø膏鈬覩膕ø], (Tokyo, February, 1917) p. 326-433. 
112 His later writings and speeches on the question of Western colonialism in Asia Nakano would often 
recall the humiliation and indignation felt during this voyage. See for example, Nakano Seigō, “Outline 
Plan for National Reconstruction” [楼广膃△セ逸ⅻ今], (Tokyo, October 1933), p. 130. 
113 Nakano Seigō, “Mountains and Rivers of Perished Nations” p. 326. 
114 Ibid., p. 326. 
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they are weak.”115 While Nakano felt like “cursing the racist prejudice”116 of the West, he “could 
not suppress secret tears of sympathy” for his fellow Asians who “share[d] our customs and 
beliefs [and] were unable to walk on this earth in freedom.”117  The only glimpses of hope 
Nakano saw came during moments “when these, our cursed, colored relatives rise yearning for 
leadership from our side.” Nakano wondered:  “To whom can they appeal today? Only to that 
youthful empire to the East [i.e. Japan].  … If you stop to talk to the more ambitious amongst 
them, you will realize that they look up to us, want to learn from us and then follow our lead.” 118 
Nakano concluded that “in order to create a new paradise in the economic sphere and to do 
away with the oppression of other races, we have to bring the races of the East and the West to 
the same level. That mission rests on our shoulders.”119  This view of Japan’s mission in the 
world formed the foundation from which Nakano criticized the policy of Japanese Foreign 
Minister Katō Taka’aki,120 especially the decision to participate in WW1 on the side of the Allies, 
and the notorious 21 Demands presented to China in early 1915.  
Nakano believed that Japan’s declaration of war against Germany had been precipitous. 
Instead of joining the war on the side of England, almost against England’s will, Katō should 
have waited for England to ask for support. Then, Nakano believed, Kato could not only have 
extracted much more favorable conditions for Japan, but could also have earned England’s 
gratitude and support in subsequent negotiations. Second, presenting China with the notorious 21 
Demands and triggering widespread anti-Japanese feelings went against what Nakano considered 
                                                     
115 Ibid., p. 397. 
116 Ibid., p. 326-433.  
117 Ibid. p. 396. 
118 Ibid., p. 397-98. 
119 Ibid., p. 375. 
120 Katō Taka’aki (Kōmei) [秤I㔾蕚] (1860 - 1926) diplomat, politician, and later Prime Minister. 
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to be Japan’s mission in Asia, namely liberating Asia from colonialism. After arriving in England, 
Nakano commented in a letter home: “When I look at Japanese diplomacy from the center of the 
world’s stage, I find it pathetic and tears run down my cheeks.”121  
Nakano’s suggested alternatives fluctuated between two poles. On the moderate end, he 
argued it would have served Japan’s and Asia’s interests much better if Katō had maintained a 
neutral position in the war in Europe and an anti-imperialist stance in China. In his more extreme 
moments, Nakano suggested Japan should have joined the war on Germany’s side, rather than on 
England’s, thus opening the door for the disintegration of European empires in Asia. When 
Nakano heard that Japan had sent troops to suppress a mutiny among Indian forces about to be 
shipped to the European theatre to fight on England’s behalf, his indignation knew no bounds. 
“How long,” he wondered, “can Japan continue to suppress the colored people on behalf of the 
white? When I think about this, I can feel my hot blood rising through my entire body.”122  
Nakano did not tire of airing his views upon arriving in England in early May 1915, and he 
continued doing so, with remarkable passion and vehemence, long after his return to Japan.123 
Sugimori Kōjirō, 124  then studying in London, later recalled how one day he arrived at the 
Japanese club and was thrown into a heated debate that had pitted all the Japanese expatriates 
defending Japan’s foreign policy against one single man, who later introduced himself as Nakano 
Seigō. Out of pity that day Sugimori showed solidarity with Nakano, laying thus the foundation 
of their future friendship.125  
                                                     
121 Nakano Seigō in a letter to his family dated August 13, 1915 quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 194.   
122 Nakano Seigō quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 178-79. 
123  Nakano eventually also confronted Prime Minister, Ōkuma Shigenobu, with his criticism who, 
however, was little impressed by it. The conversation is recorded in Nakano Seigō, “Reflections in the 
Mirror of Manchuria and Korea”, p. 149. 
124 Sugimori Kōjirō [襃迢峇饅ア] (1881 – 1968) scholar and social scientist. 
125 The entire anecdote is recalled by Sugimori in Sugimori Kōjirō [襃迢峇饅ア], “An intellectual” [ö淤
 93 
Apart from politics – which, during Nakano’s stay, meant mainly the war126 – Nakano 
focused his attention on studying the English language. To this end, he read avidly – according to 
his own (perhaps somewhat exaggerated) account, five to six newspapers a day, as well as a 
number of books – and after about one month started to make his first timid conversations. With 
Sugimori’s encouragement, he began socializing,127 meeting among others university professors 
who recommend readings, mostly social, economic and political works. 128  Nakano’s 
understanding of written English texts improved considerably as a result.129  
Many years later, Nakano described his time in England as an electrifying period during 
which he absorbed vast amounts of literature and built his language skills.130 At least initially, he 
                                                                                                                                                              
貢斥], in “Nakano Seigō is Alive” [腎ǒ驟悩購﨟攻肱広鵠], eds. Seigō-kai [驟悩善], (Tokyo: Akane-
shobō [巷拘講蟷蘯], 1954), p.120-21. 
126 Being in England, at a far distance from the front, Nakano experienced no fighting except for a 
Zeppelin air raid during which a nearby church was destroyed. This, and the Doolittle raid of 1942 were the 
only two first-hand experiences of warfare in Nakano’s entire life.     
127 See Nakano’s letter to his family dated July 2, 1915 in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 190.  
128 According to Sugimori, Nakano read among others Aristotle’s “On Politics” and the English translation 
of Friedrich List’s “Das Nazionale System der Politischen Ökonomie” and a number of books on Germany 
based on which he tried to compare England’s and Germany’s military power in order to predict the 
outcome of the war. 
129 All biographers agree that Nakano could read English well. Whether he was able to express himself 
orally or on paper is a different question. A telegram that he sent to Tōyama in 1919 reporting from the 
Peace Conference at Paris may serve as a gauge, because Nakano provided us with the original English text, 
as well as a Japanese translation of what he supposedly meant to say. He meant to say: “The conference has 
taken an embarrassing turn on Thursday. The United States have created an atmosphere exerting pressure 
under which unfortunately the main pillars of our country a giving way and starting to crumble. Faced with 
this danger, strong public opinion in our fatherland has to be aroused.” [袍蟀荳貢善共同組合購溟肯高攻檍反惚
儲頓浩控囁浩午̶楼貢眛行肱篁攻•江黒浩膵露鴪ª椀ブ貢真伍癪楼貢閹讀購秦杁行豪腑恒拘講肱
ﾞ杭骨膏溝午驢賓粉行墫浩蠱豪樛ﾐ荒鵠]楼貢身ルクス惚勇•溝鵠惚P溝]. What Nakano actually 
wrote was: “Thursday’s conference understood ignominious. Our pillars crumbling unfortunately under 
heavy atmospheric pressure at America’s initiative, especially on south islands. Strongest vernacular voice 
should be raised at this juncture.” See Nakano Seigō, “From the Site of Global Reconstruction” [身鈐膃△
貢敍国酷], (Tokyo: Tōhōjirion-sha, April 1919), p. 29.  
130 See for example Nakano’ recollection in “Special Edition on Totalitarian Policy: The Leading Principle 
of Japanese Diplomacy” [菟喪厨コ膕ø０滾瑍荳袿咤誓貢窩怡譜弴], in Tōtairiku, November 1938, p. 
95-118.    
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was driven by the realization that “the next two years will make the most significant contribution 
to my future career.”131  
While Nakano does not seem to have lost this drive, it was eventually eclipsed by another 
theme that appeared repeatedly in his letters home, namely his increasing dislike for England and 
the English. Already in his very first letter from England, written immediately after his arrival, 
Nakano wrote “Little by little, I come to despise the English,”132 and with the passing of time this 
dislike only grew stronger. Three months after his arrival in England, his dislike had intensified 
so much that he started considering cutting his stay short:   
 
“The more I study the English, the more I come to the conclusion that they are no good. 
…. The politicians, the scholars, the students, none of them are any good. This country 
rots away while priding itself on richness and honor. … There is nothing to learn from 
the English. If it goes on like this, two years will be long.”133  
 
Hoping for a change, Nakano moved from London to Oxford, which he liked somewhat 
better. His view of the English, however, did not change fundamentally. As far as we know, 
Nakano made no English friends, not even a superficial acquaintance with whom he would keep 
in touch through correspondence after his return.  
It is not clear what sort of event caused or triggered Nakano’s dislike. Nakano’s letters do 
not mention any nasty experience or encounter that could explain his aversion and Sugimori later 
recalled that whenever he introduced Nakano to someone, they were received in a friendly way.134 
The fact that Nakano had come to despise the English as soon as he had gotten off his ship 
                                                     
131 Nakano in a letter to his family dated May 28, 1915, reproduced in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 189. 
132 Nakano in a letter to his family dated May 5, 1915, reproduced in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 188.  
133 Nakano in a letter to his family dated August 13, 1915, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 194-5. 
134 See Sugimori Kōjirō, in Gakan, October 1944. 
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suggests that prejudice may be part of the explanation. Whatever the reasons, England did not 
win his heart.  
 After letting his dislike for the British percolate for seven months, in the winter of 1915-6, 
Nakano decided to cut his stay short and return home. Instead of one or two years, as originally 
planned, Nakano spent only seven months in England. After traveling briefly to France, 
Switzerland, Italy, and Spain, he returned to Japan via the United States, completing the once-
around-the-world trip in a bit more than a year. 
Nakano’s dislike for England persisted. Six months after leaving Europe (while traveling 
west through the United States), Nakano repeated that “the English are cunning … they lack 
sincerity and spirit; hypocritical talk is their second nature. … [they] are all rubbish.”135 With 
time his Anglophobia lost some of its acidity, but its essence survived and became a foundation of 
his thinking, often combined with the notion that England was doomed as a nation. In his letter 
from the U.S., Nakano predicted: “No matter if England wins or loses this war, before long it will 
perish.”136  
Though Nakano claimed in his letters to his family and friends that his voyage West was a 
success in that he had achieved his aims, to the outsider it smacks of a lost opportunity, in that the 
experience seems to only have confirmed Nakano’s preconceptions and prejudices, rather than 
putting them into question or up for revision. In that sense, we may speak of Nakano at age thirty 
as a man whose mind was already closed.137    
In most other ways, however, Nakano’s voyage West was a full success. It provided him 
with a clearer understanding of his life’s aims and with even stronger self-confidence. In one of 
                                                     
135 Nakano Seigō in a letter to Tōyama and Miura Gorō dated August 19, 1916, reproduced in Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 207-10.  
136 Ibid. p. 207. 
137 Nakano Yasuo writes that his mentors came to a similar conclusion, i.e. that the trip to England only 
reinforced his prior leanings [地凜]. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 211. 
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the last letters from England to his family he wrote: “I am the god of Japan’s fortune. Once I 
return, the political world will undergo great changes. … This is not an exaggerated delusion!”138  
 
Back in Japan 
Before effecting great changes in Japan’s political world, Nakano also had to consider the 
more immediate question of how to make a living. Returning to his job at the Asahi seemed out 
of the question as the departure of his only mentor, Yugeta, meant Nakano’s support within the 
Asahi had all but vanished. 139 Nakano hung onto the job with the paper until mid-December of 
1916, but quit as soon as had found an alternative, writing for the monthly magazine Eastern 
Affairs [Tōhōjiron 覩苜蕁ルクス]. That magazine was founded by Higashi Norimasa,140 a China 
expert, former secretary general at the Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai and, like Nakano, a 
Waseda man.  
The new job offered Nakano a number of advantages, not least the prospect of professional 
advancement. From the outset, Nakano was not only a writer but also an editor with power over 
the magazine’s contents. This power was soon expanded, as Nakano rose quickly to become 
editor-in-chief and, following Higashi’s retirement at the end of 1918, Nakano ran the paper 
practically alone. The magazine’s politics – especially its anti-colonial Pan-Asian stance on East 
Asian affairs - were also more aligned with Nakano’s than were the Asahi’s. 141 Nakano’s work at 
Eastern Affairs also brought him into contact with intellectually stimulating figures. Among the 
magazine’s contributors we find the names of Yoshino Sakuzō, Miyasaki Tōten, Naitō Konan, 
                                                     
138 Nakano Seigō in a letter to his family dated January 30, 1916, quoted in Inomata p. 122. 
139 Yugeta had left the paper soon after Nakano’s departure to England. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 153. 
140 Higashi Norimasa [覩猫驟] (1886 - ?), journalist and China expert.  
141 See the opening article of the founding issue of Tōhōjiron, September 1916, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, 
vol. 1, p. 215.  
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Baba Tsunego, Kawatsu Susumu, Wakayama Bokusui, Uzaki Rojō, and Itō Masanori, as well as 
some of Nakano’s friends such as Kazami Akira and Ogata Taketora. 142 
The intellectual stimulus and the opportunity for valuable contacts with men of influence 
increased when Nakano, again with financial support from Yasukawa Kei’ichirō, founded a think 
tank, which he called “Eastern Society” or “Tōhōkai” [覩苜善].143 With its monthly meetings, 
this forum brought Nakano into regular contact with people from various occupations who shared 
his interest in Asian affairs. The Tōhōkai membership included the businessmen Kimura Yūji, 
Kaneko Naokichi, Nagasaki Eizō, Takaki Rikurō, Shiraishi Takahira, Mori Kaku, Fujise Seijirō, 
and Eguchi Sadae; the Generals Hayashi Sennjūrō, Haraguchi Hatsutarō and Araki Sadao; the 
diplomats Komura Kin-ichi, Honda Kumatarō and Kimura Eiichi; Fukuda Yūtarō from the 
Ministry of Finance; the scholars Kawatsu Susumu, Shiozawa Masasada (Nakano’s economics 
professor at Waseda) and Sugimori Kōjirō (his acquaintance from London), and finally, the 
journalist (and Nakano’s father-in-law) Miyake Setsurei.144 
                                                     
142  Yoshino Sakuzō [便ǒ捜△] (1878 - 1933), political scientist at Tokyo Imperial University and 
influential advocate of democracy; Miyazaki Tōten [幟扣膏康啀]: (1871-1922). Pan-Asianist and close 
friend and supporter of the Chinese republican revolutionary Sun Yat-sen; Naitō Konan [塔I曙評] 
originally called Torajirō [よ饅ア] (1866 – 1934), journalist and scholar of East Asian history; Baba 
Tsunego [㮈凅溪捧] (1875 – 1956), journalist and political commentator; Kawatsu Susumu (also Kawatsu 
Sen) [齊┭蜚] (1875 – 1943), economist and professor at Tokyo Imperial University; Wakayama Bokusui 
[マ愾☂鵈], (1885 - 1928), poet; Uzaki Rojō [婣扣愔傚] (1873 – 1934), journalist and critic also known 
by his actual first name Kumakichi [ⅶ便]; Itō Masanori [舛I驟毫] (1889 – 1962), journalist and 
commentator on military affairs, especially the Japanese Imperial Navy.  
143 The society’s name, Tōhōkai, would eventually be reused by Nakano to serve as the name of his fascist 
party in the 1930s, but the name and their leader, Nakano Seigō, is about all that the think tank and the 
mass party had in common and they should not be confounded. 
144 Kimura Yūji [袍襁畑饅 sometimes also written 袍襁渣饅] worked as head accountant for the Korean 
Bank [衲靜‘ネ]; Kaneko Naokichi [ů岌ö便] (1866 – 1944,) business man and head of Suzuki Trading 
Company; Nagasaki Eizō [憎扣ラ△] (1881 – 1953), businessman; Takaki Rikurō [㔾袍憤ア] journalist 
and channel through which Nakano received financial support from the Mitsui Zaibatsu. (See Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 219 and p. 235-6.); Shiraishi Takahira [¸0吏霸] or Shiraiwa [¸憖] worked for Dalian 
Steam Shipping [哢ヾ麥u]; Mori Kaku [迢滬] (1882 - 1932), business man and politician; Fujise 
Masajirō [I㌫膕饅ア] (1867 – 1927), businessman working with Mitsui Trading Company; Eguchi Sadae 
[鷦塀巵躇] (1865 - 1946), business man and politician; Hayashi Senjūrō [詒§筆ア] (1876 - 1943), army 
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The new position with Eastern Affairs was not the only change in Nakano’s life in the 
months after his return from Europe. With the help of Okazaki Kunisuke,145 Nakano found a new 
family home in Tokyo. While not luxurious, the new house was larger than the family’s previous 
one and even had a small garden, which afforded Nakano’s father the joy of growing his own 
vegetables.   
 
Nakano’s First Election Campaign 
Amid the tumult of his new job and home, Nakano did not lose sight of his political 
ambitions. His mentors - Tōyama, Inukai, Kojima, and Okazaki - supported him by introducing 
him to various politicians with the understanding that Nakano could join one of their respective 
parties.146 None of these meetings, however, led Nakano to commit.  
Then, in early 1917, about six months after Nakano’s return from Europe, Prime Minister 
Terauchi dissolved the Diet and called for a general election. When Nakano announced his 
intention to run, many of his mentors warned that it was too early and chose not to support him. 
Nakano was also unable to secure support from Higashi, the owner of the Tōhōjiron, who already 
                                                                                                                                                              
general and later Prime Minister; Haraguchi Hatsutarō [譜塀二啣ア] (1876-1949), army officer and 
politician; Araki Sadao [35袍⎠啌] (1877 - 1966), army general and politician; Komura Kin’ichi [恠襁饐
慎] (1883-1930), diplomat; Honda Kumatarō [袿哘ⅶ啣ア] (1874 – 1948), diplomat and foreign policy 
hard-liner whom Nakano had met in Korea; Kimura Eiichi [ 袍襁Å斃 sometimes misspelled Å慎] (1879 
– 1947), diplomat; Tomita Yūtarō [廬譓畑啣ア] (1883 - 1946), bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance. 
145 Okazaki Kunisuke [慟扣れず] (1854 – 1936), party politician. 
146 Among others, Nakano also met with Seiyūkai president Hara Kei, whom he had so severely criticized 
in the past. According to Nakano Yasuo, Hara Kei invited Nakano to join the Seiyūkai, but Nakano rejected 
this feeling much closer to Inukai’s Kokumintō. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 219. Hara Kei recorded 
Nakano’s visits briefly in his diary. See Hara Kei [譜舁], “The Hara Kei Diary” [譜舁荳ヒ], ed. Hara 
Kei’ichirō [譜喩慎ア], 6 vols. (Tokyo: Fukumura Publishing, 1981), See entry for September 14, 1916, vol. 
4, p. 209.  
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had decided to support his former Waseda classmate Nagai Ryūtarō. 147  Only Yasukawa 
Kei’ichirō, a Fukuoka coal baron, came through and once more supported Nakano financially. 
Nakano ran as a free candidate, without affiliation to any party and against two opponents: 
Matsunaga Yasuzaemon, 148  who hailed from Nagasaki, had made his fortune in coal and 
electricity and at the time served as head of the Hakata Chamber of Commerce; and Miyagawa 
Ikkan, a former rival and classmate of Nakano’s at the Shūyūkan and Waseda. Of the two, 
Miyagawa was favored by the local political elite because unlike Matsunaga, he was a Fukuoka 
native. Nakano’s decision to run alongside Miyagawa split the local vote between two native sons. 
After the votes were cast on April 20, 1917, Matsunaga secured the Diet seat with 937 votes; 
Nakano and Miyagawa followed with 528 and 352 votes each, respectively. This was the first and 
last time Nakano would fail to win an election. 
Nakano continued to work as a journalist until the next election, keeping his political aims 
in sight. To this end, he joined a number of political societies and think tanks, including the very 
heterogeneous and short-lived Rōsōkai [67呎善 ], founded by Mitsukawa Kametarō in the 
aftermath of the rice riots of 1918. There Nakano was brought into contact for the first time with 
Kita Ikki, who became a crucial, if not particularly close, contact in the years to come. 149 After 
leaving the Rōsōkai, Nakano became active in the Reconstruction League or Kaizō Dōmei [膃△
弁ç], which was founded in August 1919. Under the overarching aim of reforming Japan by 
peaceful means, the League’s program included as its main goals the realization of universal 
                                                     
147 Nagai Ryūtarō [鵑棲讎啣ア] (1881 – 1944), politician. 
148 Matsunaga Yasuzaemon [觚鵑嶢攣柵著] (1875 - 1971), businessman.  
149  Following Nakano’s return from the Paris Peace Conference in early 1919, Kita approached 
Mitsukawa Kametarō [噌擺瀬啣ア] and asked him to send Nakano and Nagai Ryūtarō a copy of his 
critique of the Versailles Conference (”Judgment on the Versailles Peace Conference”[索昏作左婚咲善共同組合
行徙溝鵠蠱㔾弐麑]. 1919). See Kita’s letter to Mitsukawa quoted in Inomata, p. 152-3.  
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suffrage, the establishment of democratic politics [鴈袿ª膕齠], official recognition of labor 
unions, and reform of the established parties.150  
The years from 1917-20 also saw the start of Nakano’s career as a speaker and lecturer. 
While writing on the major (and often also on the minor) political events of his day, Nakano 
started to hold political lectures and speech rallies both in Japan and abroad. Among the many 
themes on which he commented on during these years, three took up the bulk of his energy: the 
Russian revolution of late 1917; the Rice Riots of the summer/fall of 1918; and the Versailles 
Peace Negotiations of early 1919.  
While Nakano wrote extensively about the Russian Revolution from its outset, the question 
of how Japan should react to it became central to his political activities in the first half of the 
1920s. We return to this question in more detail later, but note now that Nakano’s reaction to the 
Russian Revolution of 1917 was very similar to his reaction to the Chinese Revolution of 1911. 
Not only did he support the event as an expression of the will of the people, and accordingly 
demanded recognition of the Soviet government, he also rejected the notion that a Communist 
Russia posed an ideological threat to Japan and that Japan (or any other country) should intervene 
in Russian domestic affairs.  
  
The Rice Riots of 1918 
During WW1, Japan’s economy experienced an export-led boom, not only because it 
supplied arms, munitions and supplies to its European allies, but also because European 
businesses retreated from Asia’s markets, leaving a gap filled gladly by Japanese entrepreneurs. 
For the first time since the opening of the country, Japan enjoyed a trade surplus. The economic 
                                                     
150 For information about the Reconstruction League, its membership and program see Itō Takashi, “The 
Establishment of the Reformist Faction during the Taishō Period” [哢驟袗碁卸范語╀貢癩U], (Tokyo: 
Hanawa Shobō [剋蟷蘯], 1978), p. 174-194.  
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boom had a downside, however, in the form of shortages and rising prices at home. When the 
price of rice, Japan’s staple food, rose from Yen 23.78 to Yen 41.06 between January and August 
1918, pent-up popular frustration about inflation finally erupted in riots that spread across the 
entire country and in the end required Army intervention to quell.    
Nakano, who already at the time of the first Movement to Protect the Constitution had 
enthusiastically welcomed popular unrest as the harbinger of a spontaneous popular revolution, 
saw the 1918 Rice Riots in a similar light. In two pieces published in September of that year, he 
identified and encouraged the revolutionary potential of the situation. In the first, he stated at the 
outset that “these rioters are to be despised” but was quick to add that “they are nevertheless a 
part of the people.” 151  He then noted how in some instances the police, soldiers and sailors sent 
to suppress the riots had shown signs of support for the rebels, leading him to speculate about the 
possibility of a popular uprising:  
 
“If things go one step further and the police were to join the rioters and the soldiers 
would become revolutionaries, it would be a momentous event indeed. In any nation, a 
revolution is not a matter of armed force but a matter of ideas and the problems of daily 
life. If these problems come to threaten the livelihood of the people, then ideas held by 
the general public will become radical, and even if you have several million soldiers to 
cover the entire country with an iron net … you will not be able to stop the people on 
their way.”152 
 
 The second article, titled “In Memory of Ōshio Heihachirō,” is probably one of Nakano’s 
best-known works.153 Partly historical and partly theoretical, the essay comes as close as anything 
Nakano ever wrote to outlining a theory of revolution. In it, Nakano wrote that the 1918 Rice 
                                                     
151  The quotes are taken from Nakano Seigō, “Editorial”, in Tōhōjiron, September 1918, quoted in 
Inomata p. 127-128. 
152 Ibid. 
153  Nakano Seigō “In Memory of Ōshio Heihachirō” [哢剽霸都ア惚畫康 ] originally published in 
Tōhōjiron, September 1918, full text is reprinted in “Expressions of the Soul” [网惚鋪晃], (Tokyo, May, 
1938), p. 91-116.  
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Riots reminded him of the story of Ōshio Heihachirō, a 19th-century public official, educator and 
Wang Yang-ming scholar who during the Tempō famine of the 1830s tried to help the starving by 
distributing food, eventually even selling his library to buy rice. After exhausting his entire 
fortune and all legal means to save the famished, Ōshio broke into the government’s rice storages 
and led a revolt that the authorities suppressed bloodily. Ōshio’s revolt, Nakano wrote, was not 
only justified but also praiseworthy; he added that he himself “looked up to Heihachirō, who 
sincerely adhered to his beliefs to the death.”154 
Parallel to telling Ōshio’s story, Nakano formulated a moral standard that accommodated 
revolutions within a political philosophy heavily influenced by the ideas of Wang Yang-ming. In 
doing so he provided a moral justification - however general - for those participating in the Rice 
Riots. He begins:  
 
“Sometimes a rebel will become the savoir of his brethren, and at other times an outlaw 
will become the guardian god of the nation. Both Saigō Takamori and Ōshio Heihachirō 
are such men. Not only is it clear to the people of this world that their motives are 
worthy of praise, but the very act of their rebellion has also to be seen as something 
sacred.”155  
 
 While conceding that their actions “had broken the law of the country and upset the 
public order,” Nakano stated that the two men had broken the law “in carrying out their deepest 
beliefs,” and in doing so had “entered into the sphere of morality that exists above the law.” He 
then wondered: “Who can call this a crime that ought to be punished according to the laws of the 
land?”156 To Nakano the answer was clearly that acts such as those carried out by Ōshio should 
not be punished but praised and he reminded skeptical readers that “the shishi of the Restoration 
                                                     
154 Ibid., p. 91. 
155 Ibid. 
156 All quotes taken from Ibid., p. 92. 
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were considered rebels by the old bakufu and then became the founders of the law of the new 
government.”157  At the very least, “In Memory of Ōshio Heihachirō” was an expression of 
Nakano’s sympathy with the rioters and a public defense of their actions. In a more general sense, 
it was also an encouragement. It was no coincidence that Nakano began the essay asking: “Is 
there no Ōshio in today’s world?”158 
 
The Peace Negotiations at Paris  
In late 1918, Nakano decided spontaneously to cover the Paris Peace Conference. He 
traveled on the same ship as the Japanese delegation under vice-plenipotentiary Makino and spent 
his days on board reading news and talking to Japan’s representatives. Roughly speaking, Japan 
hoped to achieve two objectives in the negotiations: first, securing recognition of Japan’s special 
rights in the Far East generally, and especially rights over former German possessions in China 
and the Pacific, which Japan had conquered during WW1; second, including a racial-equality 
clause in the League of Nations’ charter.  
Long before arriving in Paris, Nakano harbored serious doubts about whether Japan’s 
delegation could achieve its aims.159 According to Nakano, Japan’s delegates were “modest” 160 
and full of “good intentions”161 but lacked the “political acumen”162 necessary for holding their 
                                                     
157 Ibid., p. 92. 
158 Ibid., p. 91. 
159  Already before his departure Nakano had written “During the war our country’s diplomacy was 
without direction, confronted with peace it is without preparation.” Nakano Seigō in Tōhōjiron, December 
1918. He would repeat this argument in Nakano Seigō, “From the Site of Global Reconstruction” [身鈐膃
△貢敍国酷], (Tokyo: Tōhōjirion-sha, April 1919), p. 3. 
160 See Ibid., p. 6.  
161 Ibid. p. 6 and p. 13. 
162 About vice plenipotentiary Makino, Nakano wrote: “In his motives Makino is without sin. If one were 
to look for a sin, then the only one would be that he has no acumen as a politician.”  Nakano Seigō, 
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own in the negotiations. He likened their appearance at the Conference - itself a “scene of 
carnage where economic and military power are matched”163- to “sheep being thrown among a 
pack of fighting dogs.”164  This applied even to the otherwise well-liked vice-plenipotentiary 
Makino, 165 and was especially true of plenipotentiary Saionji, who had delayed his departure 
from Japan and was still en route to France when, according to Nakano, the heads of the US and 
England had already begun meeting and had reached agreement on a “program of Anglo-
American domination of the world.”166 
Nakano himself arrived in Paris together with Japan’s delegation on January 8, 1919. The 
events he witnessed over the following weeks seemed to confirm his worst fears. On January 28, 
only 10 days after the negotiations began, Nakano observed how the Chinese delegates - with the 
support and encouragement of the US - “threw a bomb”167 at the feet of the startled Japanese 
representatives by questioning the legality of all Japanese rights in China gained since 1897, and 
especially those gained through WW1’s notorious 21 Demands. Developing a theme to which he 
would return frequently in future, Nakano wrote that China was allowing itself to be used as a 
puppet of the Anglo-Saxon Powers, in this case the United States, who, “wishing to feast on 
                                                                                                                                                              
“Witnessing the Peace Conference” [パスカル北善共同組合惚ò纒浩肱], (Tokyo, 1919), p. 20. 
163 Nakano used the phrase “scene of carnage” [黛八凅] repeatedly. See Nakano Seigō, “Witnessing the 
Peace Conference” [パスカル北善共同組合惚ò纒浩肱], (Tokyo, 1919), p. 8, but also Nakano Seigō, “The Color of the 
Japanese Flag is Fading” [萓荳莢檬72浩], in Tōhōjiron, May 1919, republished in Nakano Seigō, “Facing 
the Facts” [﨑帑惚ö煙浩肱], (Tokyo 1921).   
164 Nakano Seigō, “From the Site of Global Reconstruction”, p. 3,  
165  See Nakano Seigō, “From the Site of Global Reconstruction”, p. 2 as well as Nakano Seigō, 
“Witnessing the Peace Conference”, p. 9 and 12. 
166 Quote taken from Nakano Seigō, “From the Site of Global Reconstruction”, p. 23. See also Nakano 
Seigō, “Reflections in the Mirror of Manchuria and Korea”, p. 93  and 110-101. 
167 Nakano Seigō, “Witnessing the Peace Conference”, p. 61 and  69. 
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Japan, do not use their own hands …. but instead use China.”168  The events of January 28 left a 
deep impression on Nakano, for on that day the Chinese representatives  
 
“aggressively came down [35晃㔟広籏杭酷浩] on the Japanese delegation. This came 
to them truly like a bolt out of the blue. Alas, January 28 is truly an important date for 
we Japanese that should be remembered. On this day, the fate of our country at the 
peace conference was cut short … The ringleaders of this were, on the one hand, our 
good neighbor and friend China, and on the other hand, America, to whom we have 
been  heavily indebted ever since they opened the port of Uraga for us.”169 
  
 The prospect of China, a fellow Asian nation, turning against Japan under direction of the 
US truly alarmed Nakano. The following day, Nakano visited a member of the Chinese 
delegation, and engaged the latter in a heated argument on Sino-Japanese relations.170 Soon after, 
Nakano sent a telegram to Tōyama in Japan, in which he urged that public opinion be aroused 
against the Peace Conference. 171  Unable to continue watching inactively, Nakano in mid-
February decided to return to Japan – long before the negotiations’ end and a good ten days 
before Japan’s plenipotentiary had even arrived in Paris – to “inform the public about how 
useless our plenipotentiaries are and demand their dismissal.”172 In a piece intended to shame the 
Japanese delegation into action, Nakano warned that “the Paris Peace Conference represents one 
giant threat to our country” and expressed his hope that Japan’s “delegates will put up a good 
fight … Even if the good fight will yield nothing and they return defeated, I hope that they will 
                                                     
168 Ibid., p. 61. 
169 Nakano Seigō, “From the Site of Global Reconstruction”, p. 6.  
170 Nakano’s account of the conversation can be found in Ibid., p. 10-11. 
171 Telegram from Nakano Seigō to Tōyama Mitsuru quoted in Ibid., p. 29.  
172 That was the explanation given by Nakano to fellow journalist Itō Masanori [舛I驟毫] (1889 - 1962) 
a specialist in military affairs, who had also been sent France to cover the peace conference for the Jiji-
Shimpō-sha [蕁征范况だ]. Itō quoted in Inomata, p. 145. 
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stand before our 60 million brethren with wounds and cuts obtained in battle and blood smeared 
across their face.”173 
Nakano left France on February 22, 1919 and, traveling via London, he picked up his 
acquaintance Sugimori Kōjirō, who later recalled that Nakano was “mad with indignation” at the  
Paris developments.174 The news the duo read in newspapers obtained at stops along the way did 
not calm Nakano’s worries.175 The headline of Nakano’s last dispatch written along the way -
“The Color of the Japanese Flag is Fading” - reflected his increasingly pessimistic outlook.176 
After arriving in Japan on April 29, 1919, Nakano wasted no time before publicizing 
what he considered a diplomatic disaster in the making. Starting on May 4, he gave a series of 
speeches organized by the Osaka Daily News, in which he alarmed the Japanese public.177 From 
May 6 on, Nakano also started publishing a series of articles in the Osaka Asahi News. As so 
often in the past, the series was eventually re-published as a book, which became Nakano’s 
greatest literary success to date. 178  The volume went through more than ten reprints. As a 
welcome side-effect, the circulation of Nakano’s magazine, Tōhōjiron, increased from two to 
                                                     
173 Both quotes are taken from a pamphlet Nakano wrote on February 7, 1919 subsequently published in 
Nakano Seigō, “From the Site of Global Reconstruction” p. 29 and 30 respectively. 
174 Nakano’s indignation with the outcome of the Paris Peace conference would remain a constant feature 
of his thinking and writing. See for example Nakano Seigō, “The Attitude of the Japanese Delegation at the 
Peace Conference” in “Outline Plan for National Reconstruction”, (Tokyo, 1933), p. 140-146.  
175 From the papers bought while in Singapore, Nakano learned of the recent uprisings in Japan’s Korean 
colony, also known as the March 1 Incident [″U浸髀征浅].  
176 “Nakano Seigō, “The Color of the Japanese Flag is Fading” [萓荳莢檬72浩], in Tōhōjiron, May 1919. 
177 The first speech held at a public hall in Osaka was published by the Osaka Daily News under the 
headline “Two Sides of the Peace Conference - Listen to the Passionate and Painful Report of why the 
Young and Spirited Nakano Seigō is Worried about the Future of the Nation” Osaka Daily News [哢史鯱荳
范ⓥ], May 6, 1919.  
178 Nakano Seigō, “Witnessing the Peace Conference” [パスカル北善共同組合惚ò纒浩肱], (Tokyo, Tōhōjiron-sha, 
1919). 
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seven thousand copies. The novelist Ozaki Shirō179 described his feelings upon reading one of 
Nakano’s dispatches from Paris as follows:  
 
“The first time I was moved by reading one of his articles was in January 1919. Nakano 
had attended the peace conference opening in Paris … There he witnessed how our 
plenipotentiary was cornered and made fun of by the Chinese delegation …. in front of 
the Powers. His dispatches from Europe were filled with anger and disappointment. 
Unable to constrain the indignation that filled his entire being, he made a little pamphlet 
with the title ‘The Colors of the Japanese Flag are Fading’[萓荳莢檬72浩] … Reading 
this pamphlet, of which every word and every phrase were filled with defying letters, I 
was impressed by the elegance of his style, even if I had little interest in diplomacy.”180   
 
Among the members of the Hara Kei cabinet, however, which together with the 
plenipotentiary Saionji were the main targets of Nakano’s biting critique, the reports were less 
well-received.181 
 
An Outline of Nakano’s Political Views up to 1920 - Domestic Affairs 
Having told the story of Nakano life in the years 1909-20, let us now try to outline the 
contours of his political thinking and thereby build a framework against which future 
developments can be measured. Central to Nakano’s view of Japanese domestic politics in these 
years was the idea that the Meiji Restoration held the promise of being a popular revolution, but 
that this promise, for myriad reasons, had not been realized. From this lack of fulfillment flowed 
a number of consequences and questions.  
                                                     
179 Ozaki Shirō [悃扣吩ア] (1898 – 1964), writer.  
180 Ozaki Shirō quoted in Inomata, p. 151. The quote is taken from Ozaki Shirō “Nakano Seigō” in 
Bungei Shunjū, October 1963, special edition. 
181 On September 13, 1919, Hara Kei noted in his diary, how upset vice-plenipotentiary Makino had been 
over the media coverage of the peace negotiations in Paris. See Hara Kei [譜舁], “The Hara Kei Diary” [譜
舁荳ヒ], ed. Hara Kei’ichirō [譜喩慎ア], 6 vols., (Tokyo 1965), vol. 5, p. 142.   
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First, the legacy of the failed Meiji Restoration contained the imperative to strive for the 
realization of its popular ideals. Where Saigō, the leaders of the Freedom and Popular Rights 
Movement, and the party politicians had failed, others – including Nakano - had to carry on and 
aim to achieve the promise of popular politics. If one were to speak of Nakano’s political mission 
in life, this was it! If there was one constant aim in Nakano’s political career, it s was popular 
participation in politics, the political awakening and emancipation of the masses. In the 1910s, 
this made Nakano into one of the most vociferous advocates of constitutional politics, which to 
him meant that the party with a majority in the Diet should form the government – or, in 
Nakano’s words: “Those who in proposing policies for the country succeed in leading the 
majority of the people should receive the imperial command to form a cabinet.” 182 For the same 
reason, Nakano became a champion of universal suffrage in the 1920s and – less predictably, but 
equally naturally – fell for fascism’s popular appeal in the 1930s.  
Second, understanding Nakano’s conception of what Japanese politics were and what they 
ought to be reveals the crux of his critiques of political opponents (and his praise of allies).  
Politicians whose “only aim was holding power and whose only fear was losing it” stood in the 
way of the natural course of history toward popular political participation and, accordingly, came 
under harsh attack by Nakano.183 Nakano’s populism made him anti-establishment and anti-status 
quo - or, more specifically, anti-genrō and pro-Saigō, anti-Satchō-cliques and pro-Freedom and 
People’s Rights Movement, anti-hambatsu (alternatively anti-batsuzoku) and pro-political parties, 
and, finally, anti-transcendental cabinets and pro-party cabinet.    
What means did Nakano consider employing to spur popular participation? He believed 
overthrowing the political leaders who opposed progress would be futile, for such leaders would 
                                                     
182 Nakano Seigō “Shichi-Kin, Hachi-Jū– Caught Seven Times, Freed Eight”, p. 266. 
183 Ibid.  
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always be replaced by others with similar beliefs. Moreover, it did not solve the fundamental 
problem beneath, which lay in the people’s lethargy: 
  
"Even if you cut down Katsura, the people will not awake. Even if you slaughter Hara, 
some other opportunist [呟ò70] will emerge on the surface of society ... In the end, 
politics reflect the spirit of the entire people, for it is due to the fact that the people spoil 
Katsura and Hara that they can pursue their interest as they like.”184 
  
Any attempt to effect political progress that did not involve stirring a popular spirit of self-
determination was futile. From that conviction flowed Nakano’s prescription regarding 
politicians’ primary task, namely to act as educators:  “To explain the ways of government and 
enlighten the hearts and minds of the people is the basic task of politicians. When political power 
… reaches the hearts of the people, it will naturally result in returning it [political power] into 
their hands.”185 
Once the people were awoken, reactionaries and conservatives could still stand in their way, 
but ultimately their opposition would be overcome. Whether politics would progress peacefully 
or violently was determined solely by whether the popular will could be realized peacefully or 
was obstructed and frustrated. In the context of the 1918 Rice Riots, Nakano also argued that, 
under certain circumstances, violent revolts and revolutions were justified. He believed in a 
“freedom of revolution” [卸棒貢60譿], a concept whose origins he placed with the political 
philosophers of 18th-century Europe. While, generally speaking, “the law of the land should be 
respected and the people who are placed under the law of the land should accept being bound by 
that law,” Nakano saw the possibility that the law was faulty simply because it was crafted and 
administered by human beings. In such cases, the law required changing, or those administering it 
                                                     
184 Ibid., p. 277. 
185 Ibid., p. 266. 
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needed to be replaced. Otherwise “the well-being of country and people will be devastated.” 
Doing so “by legal means is called reform [膃卸]… if these reforms are carried out smoothly and 
without stalling, then the country will be at peace and the people will be happy and 
prosperous.”186 But other circumstances called for other means:  
 
“What if those administering the law are caught by private interests and use their power 
to keep the people from carrying out legal reforms only to maintain the present order for 
another day, thereby extending the difficulties of the people for another day? Then it is 
only natural that someone who does not obey the man-made law of the land rises 
defiantly with no regard for the law or the people administering it and tries to change by 
non-legal means. This kind of reform that falls outside the law of the land is called a 
revolution [卸棒].”187 
 
Under such circumstances, revolution was not merely a right, but a duty, for “when the evil 
customs of an age cannot be mended by relying solely on legal means … it is expected from these 
heroes, who according to the law of the land are rebels, to do away with decorum and clear the 
way for the progress of society… Accordingly, a criminal under the law of the land can be a 
champion of morality.”188  
Progress, in short, could come about either through peaceful, legal reforms or through 
violent, illegal revolutions. Peaceful and legal reform was preferable, but, if natural progress were 
obstructed it would eventually push its course by brute force, as it had done during the Meiji 
Restoration or the Satsuma rebellion. Nakano not only glorified past rebellions (notably, the Meiji 
Restoration, the Satsuma rebellion and the uprising led by Ōshio Heihachirō), but also welcomed 
and supported popular riots, protest movements, and revolutions in his own day (e.g. the 
Movement to protect the Constitution,  the Rice Riots following WW1, revolutions in China and 
                                                     
186 All quotes taken from Nakano Seigō “In Memory of Ōshio Heihachirō” reprinted in “Expressions of 
the Soul”, p. 92. 
187 Ibid., p. 93.  
188 Ibid., p. 92.  
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Russia). To put it crudely, every time there was a rumble in the street, Nakano took it as the first 
sign of popular awakening and hoped it might the beginning of an “outburst of popular vitality” 
leading to another Restoration. He was regularly disappointed.  
While welcoming all sorts of violent outbursts of popular dissatisfaction in his speeches 
and writings, Nakano’s own behavior was much more careful and he generally shied away from 
violence as a means of attaining his political goals (except when defending himself against thugs). 
 
People and Leaders 
Nakano’s fervent support for popular uprisings and belief in the power of the people was 
not without its contradictions. Despite his constant talk about the people’s vitality and 
resourcefulness, Nakano also called them “stupid masses” [テ犖 ] lost in the “slumber of 
indulgence” [烝摑貢+酷]. Moreover, he saw the people not as active agents of history, but as 
passive, lethargic, and in need of awakening, arousal and “rescue from their indulgence.”189 Thus, 
in his “On the Popular Rights Movement in the Meiji Era,” he starts off describing the Meiji 
Restoration as an “outburst of popular vitality bottled up under 300 years of bakufu 
government”190 - and yet his narrative of the events revolves around the actions of a limited 
number of individuals. 191  Agents of political change, according to him, were exceptional 
individuals. Such agents could be virtuous individuals such as Saigō, Napoleon, Ōshio 
Heihachirō, etc. or corrupt figures such as the representatives of the genrō or hambatsu who, 
                                                     
189 Both quotes taken from Nakano Seigō  “Shichi-Kin Hachi-Jū– Caught Seven Times, Freed Eight”, p. 
262.  
190 Quotes taken form Nakano Seigō “On the Popular Rights Movement in the Meiji Era”, p. 1. 
191 This contradiction has been pointed out by Tetsuo Najita, “Nakano Seigō and the Spirit of the Meiji 
Restoration in Twentieth-Century Japan”, p. 380.  
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seeking to protect their vested interests, “manipulate the people … control the majority in the 
Diet and thus suppress the ambitions of the people.”192 
So how, exactly, did Nakano believe a politician could wake the people? “Explaining the 
ways of government and enlightening the hearts of the people” certainly included keeping the 
people informed. On more than one occasion, Nakano praised politicians who told their voting 
electorate about the nation’s situation, even when the truth was unpleasant. Lloyd George earned 
Nakano’s respect for doing so at the outset of WW1,193 as did Hitler for telling Germany about 
the events in Stalingrad in early 1943. Similarly, Nakano criticized politicians who failed to keep 
the public informed, including, for example, Japan’s Premier Tōjō during the Pacific War.  
If Nakano’s own actions as a journalist and politician-in-the-making during the years 1909-
20 are any indication, however, keeping the public informed was not a politician’s sole 
responsibility. On occasion, political duties also included whipping up popular emotions in the 
hope of turning demonstration into riot, riot into revolt, and revolt into revolution or restoration. 
Nakano’s belief in this duty was obvious during the Taishō political crisis, the 1918 rice riots, and 
his reporting on the Peace Conference of Versailles. In each instance, he tried to fan the flames of 
popular dissent. 194  At the risk of oversimplifying, one might say that Nakano believed the 
successful politician knew both how to turn a wind into a storm and then how to ride that storm.  
Nakano’s conception of good political leadership notably lacked any element of coercion. 
In his eyes, appealing to the people was enough.195 The good politician should not lead the people 
                                                     
192 Nakano Seigō “Shichi-Kin, Hachi-Jū– Caught Seven Times, Freed Eight”, p. 266. 
193 See Nakano Seigō, “Witnessing the Peace Conference”, p. 5-6.  
194 In one of his dispatches sent to Japan from Paris he wrote as much, stating that the aim of his “running 
about, talking, campaigning, criticizing and attacking” was to “appeal to my countrymen and arouse public 
opinion, which I believe to be the most suitable means to get my voice heard by the delegates.” Nakano 
Seigō, “From the Site of Global Reconstruction” [身鈐膃△貢敍国酷], p. 1. 
195 Accordingly, when in 1929 Nakano published a collection of his speeches up to that date, he titled it 
“Appealing to the People” [楼鴈行ヰ康], based on Fichte’s “Addresses to the German Nation” [translated 
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like an ox by a ring through the nose, nor by carrot (let alone stick), but by implanting 
convictions in their minds and emotions in their hearts that would move the people to do the right 
thing. One may call this noble, but it also was convenient, in that it made it easy to shift 
responsibility onto the people whenever things did not turn out as Nakano had anticipated. After 
the collapse of the Movement to Protect the Constitution, Nakano explained its failure as follows: 
“If we look back and ask for the fundamental reasons why the movement to protect the 
constitution stumbled midway, then we have to conclude that it is because our nation's people 
have still not awoken from the ancient sleep of indulgence.”196  
  
Foreign Affairs 
Nakano’s views on foreign affairs were, fundamentally, an enlarged replica of his domestic 
views. For one thing, Nakano typically supported the popular cause when analyzing foreign 
political situations, a tendency that led him to support the revolutionaries in China in 1911 and in 
Russia in 1917. Regarding China in 1911, Nakano wrote: “Since in political matters I love 
freedom, I do not rejoice at the despotism of a particular clique or party. Accordingly, I hate the 
despotism of the Qing Dynasty and welcome the liberal thought of the revolutionaries.”197   
The similarities between Nakano’s stances on domestic and international politics run 
deeper: If in domestic politics it was a leader’s mission to awaken the people from their slumber 
and lead them toward political emancipation and participation, in international affairs, it was 
Japan’s mission to awaken the colonized people from their slumber and lead them toward 
liberation and independence from colonialism. In both cases, Nakano aimed at breaking the status 
                                                                                                                                                              
into Japanese as 彩婚最楼鴈行胞更]. Nakano Seigō, “Appealing to the People: A collection of Speeches 
by Nakano Seigō” [楼鴈行ヰ康:腎ǒ驟悩哢儲㌲滾] (Tokyo, April, 1929). 
196 Nakano Seigō  “Shichi-Kin Hachi-Jū– Caught Seven Times, Freed Eight”, p. 262.  
197 Nakano quoted in Inomata, p. 67. 
 114 
quo and, in both cases, this aim made the defenders of that status quo his natural enemies and the 
challengers his allies.  
 
Enemies and Allies 
Given such a worldview, it followed that Nakano perceived the Western colonial Powers as 
Japan’s enemies. As beneficiaries of the global order, they were most heavily invested in its 
maintenance. Such a stance pitted them against the suppressed nations of the world, which 
Nakano believed Japan would lead to freedom. While he directed his enmity against the West in 
general during his youth, his worldview became somewhat more nuanced with age, as he 
recognized important differences and power shifts within the Western camp. If in his early years 
his ire was directed at “the Powers” [樛楼] in general, in the course of WW1 and the fall of 
Czarist Russia, Imperial Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it focused more on England, 
America and France. While France subsequently lost priority in Nakano’s thinking, the US 
loomed increasingly large as Japan’s main enemy.198 He believed the “Program of Anglo-Saxon 
World Domination” through which England and America sought to cement their position 
following WW1 ought to be countered in East Asia by a “Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine.”199  
One overarching constant in Nakano’s worldview was his life-long hostility toward 
England – and, on the flip side of that Anglophobia, a life-long sympathy for Germany, which he 
viewed as a challenger of the global order. The first signs of his affections for Germany became 
visible in his letters from England to his family during WW1. Repeatedly, he mentioned both his 
wish to study German and his disappointment over the fact that the poisoned war-time 
                                                     
198 For the shift in importance among the Western Powers see Nakano Seigō, “Witnessing the Peace 
Conference”, p. 40. 
199 The phrase “Program for Anglo-Saxon World Domination” appeared first in Nakano’s coverage of the 
Paris Peace Conference. Nakano Seigō, “Witnessing the Peace Conference”, p. 18, & 22. His counter 
program, “The Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine” was born at around the same time. See ibid. p. 81. Both 
would become integral parts of his analysis of world politics.  
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atmosphere rendered such study impossible. 200 His prediction that England was doomed found 
its counterpart in a belief that Germany would win the war.201  
 
Relations with Japan’s Asian neighbors  
Defining relations with the West was relatively clear-cut, but things were more difficult 
with respect to Japan’s neighbors, the colonized suppressed nations of Asia whom Japan should 
liberate. The problem was that Japan simply did not play the role that Nakano had cast for it. 
Until the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 it had been possible to view Japan as an anti-colonial 
force in international politics. In the years after 1905, however, Japan step by step abandoned the 
role of liberator, choosing instead - much to Nakano’s dismay – to be “the last among the strong, 
rather than the first among the weak.”202 At each step along the way, Nakano criticized domestic 
leaders for failing to realize what he saw as Japan’s destiny. This had been the rationale behind 
Nakano’s support for the Chinese revolutionaries in 1911, his critique of Katō’s 21 Demands and 
his condemnation of the Nishihara loans203 following a trip to China in the summer of 1918.204 
                                                     
200 See for example, Nakano Seigō in a letter to his family dated September 3, 1915 quoted in Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 195. 
201 In a letter to his family dated May 5, 1915 Nakano writes about English: “They cannot possible win 
against Germany.” The letter can be found in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 188.   
202 Nakano Seigō “Editorial: Advice to Japanese and Chinese Statesmen” [蕁ルクス瑍荳腑膕帛行㌯康], in 
Tōhōjiron, May 1918, p. 6. 
203 Officially, the loans made to the Beijing government were to be used for civilian projects but most of 
the money went into armaments used to fight the southern government. Nakano criticized the loans in “The 
Far East is in Danger, our Country is at Danger” [覩盛賓康浩伍楼賓康浩], in Tōhōjiron, August 1917.  
204 Nakano traveled to China in the summer of 1918, visiting Shanghai, Hankou, Beijing and Dalian 
where he met some of his former student friends from Waseda, but also many Chinese government leaders 
such as Tang Shaoyi [名26亭] (1862 – 1938), Sun Hung-Yi [崕┲舛] (1872-1936), Duan Qirui [鮗┉棏] 
(1865-1936), and Feng Guozhang [肉楼渹] (1859-1919). His thoughts and experiences are described in 
Nakano Seigō “Editorial: Advice to Japanese and Chinese Statesmen” [蕁ルクス瑍荳腑膕帛行㌯康], in 
Tōhōjiron, May 1918.  
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Nakano offered two explanations for why Japan failed to take on the role of liberator and 
champion of freedom in East Asia. First, he said, Japan lacked the necessary strength - a view 
shared by many of his contemporaries.205 In the course of WW1, Japan’s position vis-à-vis the 
Powers had grown weaker in both absolute and relative terms. Since Japan had not participated 
fully in the fighting while other nations had developed their military and technological powers, 
Japan’s “national defense facilities are markedly behind the global trends.”206   
Japan had weakened also in relative terms, because before the Great War, Japan had been 
one of half a dozen Powers of similar strength, but highly heterogeneous interests, in Asia, 
enabling Japan to play the others against each other. With Europe’s self-destruction (and the fall 
of Russia, Germany and Austro-Hungary), geopolitical power was concentrated in the hands of 
far fewer players and the two most powerful ones - England and America - could not be played 
against each other, because “both … had come to see Japan as their common enemy in the South 
Pacific as well as in China.”207  
Japanese weakness, however, was only part of the problem. In addition, Nakano faulted the 
Japanese political class, and especially Japan’s diplomats, for a lack of self-confidence and a 
tendency to overestimate the Western Powers’ strength. This psychological mindset resulted from 
the fact that most Japanese diplomats had been trained during an era when submissiveness toward 
the West was imperative.208 Docility, “good intentions” and “modesty”209 were the words that 
                                                     
205 See Itō Masanori [舛I驟毫] “Coming Back to One’s Country, there are Tears” [膣楼行昜酷肱㍉巷
酷] in Tōhōjiron, January 1920. 
206 Nakano Seigō “The Not-Thorough-Going Foreign Relations Investigation Society” [秦氈枡貢咤誓㌽
谺善] in Tōhōjiron, July 1917. 
207 Nakano Seigō, “Witnessing the Peace Conference”, p. 34  and following.  
208 The argument that Japan’s diplomats were submissive toward the Powers can be found frequently in 
Nakano writings. For example, Nakano Seigō “Getting Rid of Diplomacy Carried out with Only One Eye 
and One Ear” [㏈<橄ⓑ貢咤誓惚簟溝], in Tōhōjiron, April 1918 or Nakano Seigō “The Far East is in 
Danger, our Country is in Danger” [覩盛賓康浩伍楼賓康浩], in Tōhōjiron, August 1917.  
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Nakano used to describe the Japanese delegation in Versailles, only to add that in international 
affairs, resoluteness, hardness and even genius were needed. Accordingly, he gave the delegation 
“full points for morals,” but “zero points for politics.”210  
Worse still were diplomats who combined “idolizing the white” with “despising the 
yellow,” such as Japan’s envoy to China, Hayashi Gonsuke:211  
 
“As much as he is submissive toward the white races, he is also arrogant toward the 
Chinese and puts up a show of strength that will only earn us the antipathy of the young 
politicians in the north [of China] and insult the politicians of the south, inviting the 
hostility of the Chinese people in general.”212 
 
Nakano, moreover, believed that Japan’s meekness toward the West was not limited to its 
diplomatic corps, but rather endemic and pervasive across the country’s elite, including the press 
corps, which idolized foreign papers such as the English Times and the French Le Temps. 
Accordingly, Nakano demanded: “If you want Japanese diplomacy to become independent from 
England, you must first make the Japanese newspapers independent from England.”213  
 
Contradictions in Nakano’s Views on Foreign Affairs 
Of course Nakano’s perspective on Japan’s relations with its neighbors was not without 
contradictions. For one, Nakano was unwilling to give up any of the territorial conquests Japan 
had made since 1868 at the expense of its Asian neighbors. For instance, while he conceded that 
                                                                                                                                                              
209 Both quotes taken from Nakano Seigō, “From the Site of Global Reconstruction”, p. 6 and p. 13. 
210 Ibid., p. 6. 
211 Hayashi Gonsuke [詒闥拍] (1860-1939) Japanese diplomat whose appointment Nakano criticized 
severely in Nakano Seigō, “Opening Article” [敝姿], in Tōhōjiron, February 1918.  
212 Nakano Seigō, “Opening Article” [敝姿], in Tōhōjiron, February 1918. 
213 In Nakano Seigō “Getting Rid of Diplomacy Carried out with Only One Eye and One Ear” [㏈<橄ⓑ
貢咤誓惚簟溝], in Tōhōjiron, April 1918. 
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the territories that Russia had leased from China and that Japan had obtained through the Treaty 
of Portsmouth (1905) “belonged rightfully to China” and that they would “have to be returned 
without further ado after a certain period of time,” Nakano wrote that Japan’s investment in blood 
and treasure to acquire and develop these territories meant returning them would be difficult and 
produced a number of justifications why Japan should hold on to them.214 
Nakano’s attitude toward Korea, the crown jewel of Japan’s empire, repeated this 
contradictory pattern in that he condemned colonialism in the case of the Western Powers while 
at the same time condoning it in the case of Japan. When, on his way back from Versailles, 
Nakano learned of the riots and revolts that had shocked Korea in the spring of 1919, he 
sympathized with the Korean nationalists seeking independence:    
 
“There is no reason why in our day and age this sort of thought [i.e., nationalism] 
should not find its way into Korea … Nobody can hide the fact that in Korea a restless 
spirit is spreading … When witnessing the rebellion in Egypt, I shed a tear on behalf of 
the beautiful young revolutionaries. How can I remain calm and cold toward events in 
Korea? If I did, I would not be any different from those politicians in the West who, 
while talking about justice and humanity, secretly try to control the independent nations 
of the world.”215      
 
Still, when it came to the question of whether to grant Korea independence, Nakano was 
opposed and would remain consistently opposed in the future. The argument Nakano put forward 
for this opposition forms the basis of his remarkable justification of both Japan’s empire as well 
as its colonial ambitions. In an essay from Korea, Nakano wrote that WW1 had shown the  
danger and foolishness of small nations’ desire to remain independent [恠楼鴈厨コ], because 
                                                     
214 Quotes taken from Nakano Seigō, “Manchurian Travel Journal” in “Manchuria and Korea as I saw 
them”, p. 169-73. 
215 Nakano Seigō, “Witnessing the Peace Conference”, p. 171-2. Two years later he would write in a 
similar vein, that it would be unnatural for Koreans not to develop a strong nationalist movement, at a time 
when all over the world peoples were developing a national consciousness. See Nakano Seigō, “Reflections 
in the Mirror of Manchuria and Korea”, p. 22. 
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small, independent nations had little military defense against larger countries in times of conflict. 
He therefore opposed granting independence to either Korea or any other Japanese colony, 
proposing instead a “greater nationalism” [哢楼鴈厨コ] that comprised the whole of Japan’s 
empire.  
A second important contradiction in Nakano’s thinking was that, though he recognized how 
Japan’s actions vis-à-vis China and other Asian nations could only antagonize them, he was 
nevertheless surprised when representatives of these countries expressed their disappointment, 
antagonism or even hostility toward Japan. Nakano’s reaction to the Chinese delegation’s 
appearance at the Paris Peace Conference is but one example. Though he had warned the 
Japanese political world repeatedly that Japan’s foreign policy (e.g., Katō’s 21 Demands) could 
only antagonize Chinese nationalist feeling - and though he admitted that “the speeches of the 
delegates of our ally China … displayed both the fervor of youth and a passionate love for their 
country. Secretly I could not help but admiring them.” - he also “found it regrettable that they 
were not thorough in [their understanding of] the actual situation … as they suggested … that all 
relations between Japan and China since around the Russo-Japanese war were characterized by 
Japanese aggression.” Conveniently ignoring the conflicts between China and Japan since 1905, 
Nakano wrote:   
 
“Today it is Japan that according to some dim-witted propagandists should be seen as a 
militaristic and aggressive country. I am really perplexed by this … In what state would 
China be today if, at the time, the Japanese people had not risen for the sake of peace 
and humanity? … Why does China demand the return of only those rights gained by 
Japan since 1897? If they are generally demanding the return of all rights, why don’t 
they point to Hong Kong too?”216   
 
 
                                                     
216 All quotes taken from Nakano Seigō, “Witnessing the Peace Conference” [パスカル北善共同組合惚ò纒浩肱], 
(Tokyo, 1919), p. 73-75. Nakano expressed similar ideas Ibid. p. 86-89. 
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Paradoxically, Nakano - who usually was first to criticize Japan’s foreign policy - came to 
its defense when Japan was criticized by China, Korea or other nations.  
With these ideas Nakano entered politics.  
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Chapter 3: Nakano and the Liberal Twenties 
 
Introduction  
For Nakano, the decade following his entry into politics in 1920 was one of political 
progress and personal advancement. Known commonly as the era of Taishō democracy, these 
years saw the realization of some political aims that Nakano had long advocated and sought to 
achieve. Constitutional government, which for Nakano meant party cabinets, seemed to become 
firmly established with the 1924 cabinet of Katō Kōmei, which also passed universal suffrage.  
Nakano’s own career also progressed positively and can be seen as a slow if steady move 
from the political fringe to the center. As a new parliament member, Nakano first joined a group 
of unaffiliated MPs, then a small party led by his mentor, Inukai Tsuyoshi, before finally entering 
the Kenseikai (later renamed Minseitō) - one of the two large established parties in 1924 - just as 
this party formed the Katō Kōmei cabinet. Once inside the party, he rose relatively quickly 
through the ranks to become head of its propaganda bureau. He was rewarded for his services 
with positions in the administration, becoming first parliamentary councilor in the Ministry of 
Finance in 1927, and in 1929 parliamentary vice-minister of Communications, a position he held 
for 18 months. By the decade’s end, Nakano was a well-known political figure, of whom many 
expected an ascent to minister of state and perhaps more. Nakano’s private life, too, was by and 
large happy and characterized by material progress.  
This is not to say that the 1920s were all roses for Nakano. He suffered personal tragedies, 
such as his father’s death and losing his leg due to a botched surgery. Politically, too, there were 
setbacks and failures. Nakano had entered politics with the idealistic hope of reforming the 
political system through a popular mass party. Accordingly, during his first term, he took a 
pro-Soviet stance, hoping to use Russia as a rallying point of popular (i.e. labor) sentiment and 
support. The move, however, alienated his Fukuoka constituency and spurred him to switch 
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strategy after he almost lost an election. In 1924, he joined the Kenseikai, a move which by many 
was seen as a necessary compromise with the realities of power; others, however, saw it as a 
betrayal of Nakano’s deepest ideals. Within the Kenseikai, Nakano’s advance was thwarted by the 
bureaucratic faction. Frustrated, Nakano left the party at the end of 1931.  
The greatest source of his political dissatisfaction was Japan’s role in international affairs. 
The Anglo-American Powers, for one thing, continued cementing what Nakano perceived as an 
unfair global order through a series of international treaties, beginning with Versailles in 1919 and 
followed by Washington in 1921-2 and London in 1930. Even worse in Nakano’s eyes, Japan – 
rather than becoming a champion of freedom and opposing this unjust international order - 
became both a bully and servile supporter of the system.  
 
Nakano’s Election to the Diet 
When in 1920 Premier Hara Kei dissolved the Diet and called a new election, Nakano 
immediately began planning a campaign, his second after the botched 1917 effort. Several factors 
worked in his favor this time: First, Genyōsha president Tōyama had convinced Miyagawa Ikkan 
not to run, meaning Nakano enjoyed the undivided support of voters who wished to be 
represented by a Fukuoka native (the only other candidate, the incumbent Matsunaga, hailed from 
Nagasaki). Second, the tax requirement for voter qualification had been lowered in the 
intervening years, broadening the electoral base. Nakano took advantage of this more-inclusive 
political playing field by relying more on mass-targeting activities such as rallies and newspaper 
ads than on the traditional campaign tactic of visiting individual voters’ homes (and buying their 
votes with money
1
). Matsunaga also experimented with mass tactics but could not match 
                                                     
1 Concerning the custom of politicians to visit individual homes to buy votes, see Kojima 
Kazuo [幣戡慎渣], “Reminiscences of an old politician” [慎67膕齠广貢憐熾], (Tokyo: Chūō 
Kōron-sha, 1951), p. 107-109. 
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Nakano’s reliance on the press.2 Finally, Nakano received help from Inukai Tsuyoshi, Baba 
Tsunego and many others, who supported him by endorsing him either in their writings or 
speeches (often traveling all the way to Fukuoka to speak on his behalf). 
Even before election day, many expected Nakano to win, but the strength of his victory 
came as a surprise – even to Nakano himself. After the votes were cast on May 10, 1920, the 
count showed Nakano with 2,596 votes, giving him a lead of 879 votes over Matsunaga. This 
election was Matsunaga’s last. He left politics for good, devoted himself to a successful business 
career and later supported Nakano’s political activities financially. For Nakano, the election 
marked the beginning of a lifelong career as a parliamentarian.   
 
The Professional and Economic Dimension of Nakano’s Life  
From May 1920 until his death, Nakano held – almost without interruption
3
 - a seat in the 
Diet. Parallel to that he continued his journalistic work, writing for various Japanese outlets and 
publishing his own magazines (Tōhōjiron until 1923, Gakan [癪に] between 1923 and 1936 and 
thereafter Tōtairiku [覩哢憤]). In 1928, Nakano also became president of the Kyūshū Daily News 
[屋協郭匁], successor of the Genyōsha’s organ, Fukuryō Nippō [鈝万咒匁], a position he held 
until 1940 when the paper was bought by the Yomiuri Shimbun.
4
  
Journalism and politics were complementary activities. Writing let Nakano reach a large 
                                                     
2 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 284. 
3 The only interruption was between spring of 1939 when Nakano voluntarily resigned 
from his seat in the Diet and February 1942 when he was reelected. See chapter five.  
4 Founded in 1887 by Tōyama as the Genyōsha’s organ, the paper had declared bankruptcy 
in 1927-8 after seeing its advertisement income dwindle in the course of the Shōwa financial 
crisis. Unwilling to give up the paper, its employees had gathered capital and continued its 
operation inviting Nakano to act as president. Busy with his own projects in Tokyo, Nakano 
often left the day-to-day management of the paper to one of his followers. See Nakano Yasuo, 
vol.1, p. 462-64. 
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audience, and his name recognition became a valuable asset when popular masses appeared on 
the Japanese political stage following the introduction of universal suffrage. Having control over 
the Kyūshū Daily News, one of two daily papers in Fukuoka city, also gave Nakano a vehicle to 
influence public opinion in his electoral district, which turned out to be a great advantage in 
election campaigns.
5
 Parliamentary office, meanwhile, provided Nakano a stipend high enough 
for a life free of financial worries; plenty of time when the Diet was not in session to travel, read, 
research, and write; and access to important personalities in Japan as well as abroad.
6
 Such was 
the basic structure of Nakano’s professional life from 1920 on.  
Within this framework, there were of course continuities and discontinuities. Motivated by 
a desire to gather first-hand information about overseas developments, he continued to travel 
regularly – to Korea and Manchuria in 1920; to China, Manchuria and Siberia in 1925. Such trips 
yielded, as they had in the past, material for subsequent writings and speeches. Nakano continued 
to be a prolific and successful writer, publishing some three dozen books (and many pamphlets) 
in his remaining 23 years, bringing his lifetime total to over 40. Simultaneously, he published 
about one article a month (less in the late 1920s, more in the 1930s).  
He was less successful as a magazine manager. After Higashi resigned from the 
Tōhōjiron-sha presidency due to ill health in September 1918, Nakano assumed managerial 
duties.
7
 Combined with the responsibilities of his Diet seat, magazine management proved 
overwhelming. When the paper’s financial situation started deteriorating amid the Japanese 
economy’s post-WW1 downturn, Nakano tried keeping the magazine afloat with his private 
money. In 1922, however, he handed the management reins over to Hayashi Shizuo [詒餌啌]. 
                                                     
5 The other daily paper in Fukuoka was the Seiyūkai-affiliated Fukuoka Daily [┗慟荳荳] 
which on occasion carried articles critical of Nakano.  
6 As a member of the lower house Nakano received 3.000 Yen p.a. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, 
p. 178.   
7 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 359. 
 125 
The magazine’s finances continued deteriorating, giving birth to the idea of combining Tōhōjiron 
with Miyake Setsurei’s Japan and the Japanese, but it was not until the Great Kantō earthquake 
of 1923 destroyed the offices of both magazines that the merger was actually carried out.
8
 The 
entity that emerged in October 1923 was the magazine Gakan [癪に], meaning “Our Views” or 
“My Views.” Nakano’s responsibilities within the magazine varied with time. He often 
contributed articles, but when necessary also acted as editor, manager or fundraiser.  
 
Private Life 
Thanks to Nakano’s income from writing, publishing and serving as an MP, 
his family enjoyed a lifestyle that, by the standards of the day, was wealthy if not elite. Goods 
that for average Japanese would become affordable only during the post-WW2 era’s economic 
boom - such as a radio, a gramophone, a French-made car, and regular dinners at Western 
restaurants - became part of Nakano's private life during the 1920s.
9
  
In the years following his return from England, Nakano’s family grew steadily. Between 
1918 and 1922 three more sons - Yūshi, Tatsuhiko and Yasuo - were born, making Nakano the 
proud father of four boys.
10
 As before, Nakano took care of his parents as well as his younger 
siblings. In addition, the family also employed up to three maids and one driver, and offered room 
and board to a number of students. All heads counted, there were anywhere between 12 and 17 
                                                     
8 When the earthquake hit Tokyo on September 1, 1923, Nakano was on his way to work 
and immediately turned around to look after his family, which was unhurt. Some people from 
Fukuoka living in Tokyo had been less fortunate and the Nakano family offered shelter to as 
many as possible of those who had been rendered homeless in the disaster. See Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 367-68.   
9 For a description of the family’s consumption patterns see Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1 p. 458-60. 
10 Of his four sons, the first two Katsuaki (1914 – 1931) and Yūshi [渣沒] (1918 – 1933) 
were to die in accidents before their father. The other two, Tatsuhiko [け檢] (1920 -?) and 
Yasuo [┘渣] (1922 - ?) survived their father. While little is known of Tatsuhiko except that he 
worked as Ogata Taketora’s secretary after the war (see Ogata, p. 263), Yasuo later became 
professor at Waseda University and wrote several books about his father.  
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people living under Nakano’s roof during the 1920s and 30s.
11
  
 To accommodate all these people, the family in 1918 moved into a house in Harajuku, 
financing the move with money borrowed from Takagi Rikurō of the Mitsui Zaibatsu. Following 
Nakano’s electoral victory in 1920, he was able to repay Takagi’s loan and henceforth owned his 
own home, which in the course of the 1920s expanded repeatedly, growing to twice its original 
size by the decade’s end. The family lived in the Harajuku house until 1932, when they moved 
one final time to nearby Yoyogi.  
The only truly tragic event in this otherwise happy tableau was the loss of Nakano’s leg in 
1926.
12
 Hopeful of losing the ugly scars left by previous operations and assured by his doctor 
Sumita Masao
13
 that  cosmetic surgery would preserve his leg and he would be scar-free within 
three weeks, Nakano decided to undergo surgery in the first half of 1926. The operation 
miscarried, leaving his leg with insufficient blood flow and causing it to rot from the toes upward. 
Encouraged by his doctor and with the help of increasingly strong opiates, Nakano struggled for 
some weeks hoping to save his limb, but when the pain became unbearable, he asked a second 
doctor, Maeda Tomosuke,
14
 to amputate the leg above the knee.  
Nakano took the blow stoically. He did not blame the doctor responsible nor did he ever 
regret his decision to undergo surgery. Jokingly, he told his friend Ogata that the missing leg 
provided him with an excellent excuse to skip boring social events, for he now could claim that 
his injury made sitting for long periods of time difficult.
15
 For the rest of his life, he wore a 
                                                     
11 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 407-8. 
12 Nakano provides a personal account of the operation in Nakano Seigō, “Hold on, Father” 
[査再混鷺査咋刷債債], in Chūō-kōron [腎啅鍍ルクス], August 1933, republished in “Expressions of 
the Soul” [网惚鋪晃], (Tokyo, May, 1938), p. 312 and following. 
13 Sumita Masao [創譓驟渣] (1878 – 1946), medical doctor.  
14 Maeda Tomosuke [撚譓仏拍] (1887 -1975), medical doctor.  
15 See Ogata, p. 32 – 33.  
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prosthesis and walked with a stick, neither of which kept him from practicing jūdō and sumō, 
participating in brawls, or taking up horseback riding in 1932, a sport at which he excelled in 
various tournaments.
16
  
Losing his leg, especially the many weeks of intense pain, made Nakano re-evaluate his 
life. According to his own account he came out of the experience resolved to pay more attention 
to his family, even if this meant giving up politics. His resolve, however, was not very strong and 
before long he returned to political life with the same devotion he had shown in the past.  
 
The Student Dorm: Yūkō-kyo  
Nakano continued offering students room and board, and to this end built a dormitory 
annexed to his house in the spring of 1921. Called “Yūkō-kyo” [㍎85悖],17 the dormitory housed 
about five students at any given time. Admission to the dorm was informal: Of the 50-some 
students who stayed with Nakano over the years, many were distant family members or relatives 
of friends and mentors, while others arrived at Nakano’s doorstep with little but a letter of 
introduction.  Hasegawa Shun
18
, who had no prior connection to Nakano and came to Tokyo in 
1929 with nothing but a basket containing all his belongings, secured a room after a short 
informal talk. Nakano explained his motives to Hasegawa:  
 
“The reason I have decided to offer board to students such as yourself is that I did not 
want to use the compensation I receive for lecturing for my own private purposes, but 
much rather prefer to see it used for your expenses. When, during my lecturing tours 
                                                     
16 See Ogata, p. 43.  
17 According to Nakano the name was derived from a saying by Mencius, to wit : “A heroic 
warrior will rise even without the King of Wen” [\\苧貢吩購艙侒荒浩膏禺豪㍎85鵠]. When 
boarding students asked him what it meant, he explained that “Even though your teacher 
[i.e. Nakano himself?] is stupid, at least one of you should turn out to be great!” See Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 314. 
18 Hasegawa Shun [憎〞擺戮] (1912 - ?), journalist, politician and one of Nakano’s followers. 
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through the countryside, I see a young student burning with the desire to study, I offer 
him a place here. Even if this means I will have to face some financial difficulties at 
times, it does not really matter to me.”
19
  
 
In some cases, Nakano offered free boarding, and if students could not afford their school 
fees, Nakano would also pay those, providing lucky students with an all-round scholarship to 
complete their education. 
At least two considerations motivated Nakano’s generosity toward students. First, offering 
lodging to students was a way to return favors to and cement relationships with mentors, patrons 
and supporters. Among the students who lived in Nakano’s dorm we find not only Shintō 
Kazuma
20
 - the son of Genyōsha founder Shintō Kiheita, who ran Nakano’s constituency 
organization in Fukuoka
21
 - and Shibata Tokuo, the nephew of Nakano’s former Chinese 
teacher
22
, but also the cousin of the nurse who had cared for Nakano at Kyūshū hospital.
23
  
Nakano’s second motivating factor was the belief, doubtless influenced by the example of 
Kaneko Sessai’s academy at Dalian, that education should be accessible to all members of society. 
In 1919 Nakano wrote:   
 
“Soon education will only be for the children of rich families, while the offspring from 
anywhere below the middle will be denied access at the school’s gate. The progress of 
civilization, however, does not pause a single day. Compared to the farmers of 
nowadays, the farmer of the future will be required to have modern knowledge. The 
carpenter who today can hold a hammer, in the future will have to able to operate 
                                                     
19  The conversation is recorded in Hasegawa Shun [憎〞擺戮 ] “The Master and the 
Yūkō-kyo” [纏﨟膏㍎85悖], in “Nakano Seigō is Alive” [腎ǒ驟悩購﨟攻肱広鵠], eds. Seigō-kai 
[驟悩善], (Tokyo: Akane-shobō [巷拘講蟷蘯], 1954), p. 27-28.  
20 Shintō Kazuma [〕I慎㮈] (1904 - 1992), later became mayor of Fukuoka. 
21 See Oates, p. 25 and p. 40. 
22 Shibata Tokuo [讒譓毫渣] was the nephew Shibata Fumishiro.  
23 Noguchi Kiyoshi [ǒ塀拐] was cousin to Yukiko Noguchi, Nakano’s teenage love and nurse 
at Kyūshū University Hospital. See Nakano Yasuo. vol. 1, p. 390. 
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sophisticated machinery. If education is limited to the descendents of the upper classes, 
then the children of the middle classes and lower classes will not grow up to become 
sound workers.”
24
  
 
Though Nakano offered students generous help, he did not spoil them. He served bland 
food and expected students to take on some household chores. Most were minor, such as walking 
the dog or clipping newspaper articles when Nakano was absent from Tokyo,
25
 but some students 
got actively involved in supporting Nakano’s political activities. Kanematsu Naoki, who had been 
Kaneko Sessai’s student, accompanied and supported Nakano during the 1924 election campaign, 
giving speeches on Nakano’s behalf.
26
 While staying at the dorm, Shintō Kazuma accompanied 
Nakano on his 1925 trip to Siberia, Manchuria and Northern China; after graduation he became 
Nakano’s secretary. Nagata Masayoshi
27
 worked first as a journalist after graduating from 
University, but later became actively involved in Nakano’s fascist party.  
 
Voyage to Korea and Manchuria 
Nakano’s 1920 voyage to Manchuria and Korea followed a now-familiar pattern. Nakano 
put the impressions gained abroad on paper; originally published as a series of 51 articles in 
Tokutomi’s Kokumin Shimbun, Nakano’s descriptions were so popular that they were 
subsequently published as a book, entitled “Reflections in the Mirror of Manchuria and Korea.”
28
  
                                                     
24 See Nakano Seigō, “Opening Article”[敝姿], in Tōhōjiron, October 1919, quoted in Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 278. 
25 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 487-88. 
26 Kanematsu Naoki [倒觚ö袍] died of Typhus while still living with the Nakano’s in 
February 1925. Nakano seems to have formed unusually close ties with Kanematsu and held 
a long at his funeral. See Nakano Seigō, “Yūkō-kyo and Kanematsu Naoki” [㍎85悖膏倒觚ö
袍] in “Expressions of the Soul” [网惚鋪晃], Tokyo, 1938, p. 301 and following.     
27 Nagata Masayoshi [鵑譓驟コ] (1911 - ?), journalist, and Nakano’s political followers.  
28 Nakano Seigō, “Reflections in the Mirror of Manchuria and Korea” [噌靜貢2行萵港肱], 
(Tokyo, Tōhōjiron-sha, March 1921). One of the fondest readers of Nakano’s travel 
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Nakano arrived in Korea about 18 months after the violent rebellions that engulfed the 
Korean peninsula in the spring of 1919 had put an end to Governor General Terauchi’s harsh rule, 
which Nakano had criticized as an Asahi correspondent in 1913-4. Terauchi was succeeded by the 
moderate Navy admiral Saitō Makoto,
29
 who strove to replace Terauchi’s “militarism” with 
“civility.”
30
 Nakano welcomed the shift in colonial policy,
31
 but as he traveled through Korea he 
identified a different, deeper threat to peace in Korea: Japanese racism toward the Koreans, which 
he called “mean thinking of the Japanese people” [漂矧淞熾].32 The crux of this problem lay not 
with the colonial administration but with Japanese expatriates who demanded a return to 
iron-fisted suppression of Korea and whose “rudeness …. and nastiness surprised and 
disillusioned”
 33
 Nakano: 
 
“The shadow of the haggard Yamato people is cast over Korea and Manchuria. … The 
rebels are not in the mountains. They have hidden inside the hearts of our decadent 
compatriots. The most urgent task in our policy today is not that of suppressing 
rebellion … We have to polish the mirror inside our hearts that enables us to see the 
demon [ÿ⻀劵] and instead of doing away with dangerous thought, we should do away 
with mean thought. … The corruption of Japan’s politics is nowhere better visible than 
in Korea. It has made the Japanese residents there mean in their thought.”
34
  
                                                                                                                                                              
descriptions was Tokutomi Sohō, who wrote: “Nakano-san, I have read with great respect 
your ‘Reflections in the Mirror of Korea and Manchuria.’ It was the first thing I would read 
when opening the People’s Paper every morning. …With respect to East Asian questions, you 
represent the heart of the Japanese and for that I thank you. Your observations are not 
commonplace. They are [a class] apart from the ordinary arguments, and filled with a fresh 
and true spirit. … Even someone who is not moved by the argument will still be moved by 
your style. I will have both friends and foes read this.” Letter from Tokutomi Sohō to Nakano 
Seigō quoted in Inomata, p. 170 
29 Saitō Makoto [艤I帑] (1858-1936), navy officer, politician and later Prime Minister.  
30 For concise assessment of Saitō’s policies see Andrew Gordon, “A Modern History of 
Japan” (New York, 2003), p. 178. 
31 See Nakano Seigō, “Reflections in the Mirror of Manchuria and Korea”, p. 111 and p. 53. 
32 Nakano elaborates the concept of “mean thinking” in Ibid., p. 1-5.  
33 Ibid., p. 2-3. 
34 Ibid., p. 1-2. 
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 Nakano believed the origins of Japan’s “mean thinking” had to be sought within an 
education system that “demand[ed] submission to special authorities, while respect and love for 
human beings are not established.”
35
 Such schooling produced an attitude Nakano described as 
“worship of the powerful” [征哢厨コ]36 and contempt for the weak. Domestically, Nakano found 
the terrible consequence of this attitude was “the absolutism of the political parties who cater to 
the privileged classes.”
37
 In international affairs the consequences were even worse, as the 
Korean population was being antagonized by the contemptuous and racist “attitude of the entire 
Japanese people, whom I cannot help but consider cowards.”
38
 Pointing out that the uprisings in 
Korea had been inspired by the principle of national self-determination included in US President 
Wilson’s 14 points, Nakano wrote: 
 
“The slogan of humane justice [驟コ斥ぐ] that the hypocritical Wilson from America 
advocates has caused a sensation among the small nations of the world, even though it 
is only a word. Think how powerful humane justice is if only the sound of the words 
have so much influence. If Japan were to seriously live up to this ideal in Asia, the 
hearts of the people of China, Russia, and Korea would – like splinters of iron drawn to 
a magnet – race to be the first to join us under our flag.”
39
 
 
 
 “Mean thinking,” by contrast, had caused the adoption of a “conservative servile 
diplomacy”
40
 that antagonized the people of Asia and, ironically, drove them into America’s arms. 
Nakano saw “the independence movement of the Korean people [as] a crystallization of their 
                                                     
35 Ibid., p. 77.  
36 For Nakano’s explanation of the concept see Ibid., p. 5 and following.  
37 Ibid., p. 8. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid., p. 2. 
40 Ibid., p. 8. 
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contempt and hatred against Japan”
41
 and, increasingly, saw a similar pattern unfolding with 
regard to Japan’s relations with China. Nakano quoted Sun Yat-sen saying: “’It was the Japanese 
who taught the Chinese about anti-Japanese movements … For they [the Japanese] will threaten 
the Chinese by shaking their fists, but when England or America scolds them, they will retreat 
with their tails between their hind legs’.”
42
 
Unless Japan succeeded in “reforming the heart of the Japanese,” Governor General Saitō’s 
cultural rule would remain the “frivolous talk of bureaucrats.”
43
 As the title of his account 
implied, Nakano hoped it would serve as a mirror that would cause the Japanese people to reflect 
and reform. He put forward numerous proposals. Fundamentally, he demanded that the Japanese 
educational system teach different values, with the aim of “establishing respect for oneself and 
for others.”  
With regard to the more immediate question of dealing with Korea’s nationalism and drive 
for independence, however, Nakano remained opposed. While Nakano heard and respected the 
calls for granting Korea independence from among Japanese intellectuals - notably Yoshino 
Sakuzō but also Nakano’s mentor Kaneko Sessai as well as his friend Ogata Taketora
44
 – he 
himself rejected the notion on the grounds that granting independence to Korea would only invite 
another Power to occupy the abandoned territories and enslave the population. For military 
strategic reasons, he believed that fighting Western imperialism meant Japan had to maintain 
control of Korea, Taiwan and other colonies, even if Korea’s strong anti-Japanese sentiment 
                                                     
41 Ibid., p. 8. 
42 Sun Yat-sen quoted in Ibid., p. 5-6. 
43 Ibid., p. 18. 
44 For Japanese intellectuals favoring Korean independence see Andrew Gordon “A Modern 
History of Japan”, (New York, 2003) p. 179. For Kaneko’s views see Nakano Seigō, 
“Reflections in the Mirror of Manchuria and Korea”, p. 145. Ogata formulated his policy 
recommendations for Korea in “The Korean Question in the Context of Global Trends”, in 
Tōhōjiron September 1922. 
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would make it more a liability than an asset in any military conflict.
45
 Instead, Nakano proposed 
a compromise according to which Koreans should be made full-fledged citizens of the Japanese 
empire, enjoying the same rights as the citizens of the Japanese homeland [慎え弁析貢弁泌膕
ø].46 Once they were full-fledged citizens of the empire they would be invested in it and 
become pillars of its support, rather than trying to break away from it. 
 
Nakano’s Position Outside the Established Parties, 1920-4  
Unlike many of his contemporaries, who entered politics by affiliating themselves with one 
of the two major established parties, Nakano hoped from the start to establish a new political 
party based on popular support, and thus to reform Japan’s political system. This ambition – 
which could also properly be labeled a dream in that it was born of Nakano’s idealism and would 
remain unrealized – was a constant and recurring element in Nakano’s political career. One of 
Nakano’s earliest articulations of this ambition came in an article published in the fall of 1920:  
 
“Ever since witnessing parliamentary politics, I cannot help but hope for the birth of a 
healthy party. … This party of the future must be different from the traditional parties in 
its structure. … In the case of the parties of the past, the leaders gathered money, with 
which they created an electoral base [丱ë] and raised their followers. From now 
onward, parties will be organized by the people themselves. Those involved will each 
contribute a little money and with that send a representative to the Diet. They … will 
finance the work and activities of the party members with their contributions. While the 
established parties … collude with a politically interested businessman to raise the 
party’s funds … the new party based upon the people must [rely] … on the efforts and 
contributions – however small they may be - of individual party members. Instead of 
colluding with one or two businessmen and using three or four persons of great wealth, 
one will have a steadier base of support by far if one addresses the masses in requesting 
efforts and sacrifices … I must renew the stagnant air of the political world and add a 
                                                     
45 Taking stock of the first ten years of the Taishō period in the January 1921 issue of 
Tōhōjiron, Nakano wrote with respect to Japan’s colony in Korea: “In today’s situation the 17 
million people of Korea will be of no help for Japan in case of an emergency. Quite the 
opposite, they would be a cumbersome weight.” Nakano quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 
312. 
46 See Nakano Seigō, “Reflections in the Mirror of Korea and Manchuria”, p. 135-37.  
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new popular axis to the party movement.” 
47
  
 
Accordingly, Nakano preferred, at least initially, to remain unaffiliated. In January of 1921, 
he and other unaffiliated parliament members formed the Mushozoku Club [㏍盻慍胆鉤グ, lit. 
the “Unaffiliated Club”]. This, however, did not change the fact that Nakano continued to exist on 
the fringes of political power, a vantage point from which mustering support for any given 
position within the Diet was frustratingly difficult.  
Nakano launched his first attempt to create a new kind of mass party while still a member 
of the Mushozoku Club. His effort spawned the extra-parliamentary Yūshin-sha [弗范だ], a 
society Nakano established with some fellow-Tōhōkai members during the summer of 1922.
48 
The society’s platform, written by Nakano, demanded that “the people must become the driving 
power of reform” and aimed to “form a group that will become the core of a popular movement.” 
To this end, the society “called out to interested youths throughout the country” and sought 
“contacts with like-minded people from all corners of society.”
49
 The Yūshin-sha also organized 
lecture tours throughout Japan, during which Nakano, Baba Tsunego, Miyake Setsurei, 
Mitsukawa Kametarō, and others spoke on foreign policy (mostly Russian affairs) and tried – 
largely unsuccessfully - to recruit local members.
50
 The Yūshin-sha’s lukewarm reception and 
the fact that every motion Nakano introduced into the Diet up to then had been rejected likely 
spurred him, in the fall of 1922, to make a first step toward the political mainstream by 
                                                     
47 Nakano Seigō “The New Axis of the New Political Movement” [范膕齠ぉ罰貢范ヱぉ], in 
Tōhōjiron, September 1920, p. 2-24. 
48 The society’s members included fellow Tōhōkai members such as Masumoto Uhei [跚袿瀕
霸], Miki Yorinobu [申袍友椄], Mitsukawa Kametarō [噌擺瀬啣ア], Kazami Akira [城Wd], 
and Nakano himself. The society’s headquarters were in the offices of the Tōhōjiron-sha. See 
Nakano Yasuo vol. 1, p. 338-42. 
49 Quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 339. 
50 See Nakano Yasuo. vol. 1. p. 342. 
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participating in the founding of the Kakushin Club [㕟ᣂ୾ᭉㇱ literally “Innovation Club”], a 
parliamentary party led by his mentor Inukai Tsuyoshi. If Nakano had hoped to move closer to 
power by joining the party, the outcome must have disappointed him. While Nakano could 
congratulate himself in the fall of the following year, when Inukai accepted a ministerial position 
in the Yamamoto cabinet, on belonging to a government party and having some indirect influence 
on policy through Inukai, the bills Nakano himself introduced into the Diet continued to be 
rejected.
51
 Nakano’s hope to use the Kakushin Club as a platform to create a new popular party 
was equally frustrated. Though the Club’s manifesto stated that “the Club will … link up with the 
masses of the realm, overthrow the established parties and renew the political world,”
52
 most of 
its members had no intention of establishing new mass-based sources of power, let alone of 
giving up their traditional power bases. Half a year after its inception, Nakano complained that 
the Club had been created to reform the political world and “break the status quo, yet was already 
in need of being reformed itself.”
53
  
 
The 1917-Revolution, the Siberian Intervention, and Soviet Russia 
Of all the political questions with which Nakano concerned himself in the years 1917-25, 
Russia received the most time and energy. The Bolshevik revolution of 1917, the establishment of 
a communist regime and the exit of the greatest land-powers from the war posed a double 
challenge to Japan and its allies. On a strategic-military level, the collapse of the Russian front 
threatened the Entente Powers fighting Germany and Austria, in that the latter could transfer 
                                                     
51 Nakano hope to influence policy indirectly was expressed in Nakano Seigō “What the 
People Expect from Lord Yamamoto Gombei, Mr. Gotō and Mr. Inukai” [࿖᳃ߩᦼᓙߔࠆᚲ
㧙 ጊᧄᮭ౓ⴡષߣᓟ⮮᳁ߣ›㙃᳁], in Gakan [ᚒⷰ], October 1923.  
52 The Club’s program and founding manifesto can be found in Tōhōjiron, May 1923, and 
Inomata, p. 182 as well as Nakano Yasuo, vol.1, p. 335-6. 
53 Nakano Seigō, “From Contraction to Expansion” [✕❗ࠃࠅᥰዷ߳], in Tōhōjiron, August 
 136 
troops from the eastern front to the West and bring them to bear against England, France and the 
US. Ideologically, the Russian revolution, and the Soviet regime that emerged from it, also posed 
a political challenge to the capitalist world.  
The Entente Powers reacted by launching what soon came to be known as the Siberian 
Intervention, supporting White Russian counter-revolutionary governments in the hope of wiping 
out the Bolshevik regime. While Prime Minister Terauchi hesitated, the succeeding Hara 
administration decided to participate and by the end of 1918 more than 70,000 Japanese troops 
were operating in Siberia. Efforts to overthrow the Bolshevik regime, however, failed. White 
Russian admiral Kolchak’s regime, supported by the Western Powers, collapsed in the summer of 
1919. General Grigory Semyonov’s regime, which was backed by Japan, followed suit as soon as 
Japan withdrew its support. Unlike the Western Powers, who had all but withdrawn their troops 
from Siberia by the end of 1920, Japan maintained a military presence there for another two years, 
actually increasing troop levels in response to a massacre against six hundred Japanese at 
Nikolayevsk (March – May 1920) and extending its occupation to include northern Sakhalin. 
While the bulk of Japan’s forces were withdrawn by October 1922, Japan did not resume 
diplomatic relations with Russia or withdraw its last troops from northern Sakhalin until 1925. 
Nakano supported the Russian revolutionary forces from the outset and opposed any plan to 
intervene there militarily. His position was not based on a thorough understanding of Bolshevik 
ideology, practices or activities; at least initially, Nakano knew little of Bolshevism.
54
 As late as 
January 1918, he wrote that the Bolshevik ideology was “socialism close to anarchism” and that 
the October Revolution was a liberal-nationalistic revolution like the one that had shaken France 
                                                                                                                                                              
1923, quoted in Inomata p. 192. 
54 While his understanding of the Bolshevik ideology and movement was shallow, Nakano 
was surprisingly accurate in gauging the relevance of the events unfolding in Russia. 
Nakano wrote: “The Russia revolution will cause wide-reaching changes in the political 
structure of nations in the 20th century.” Nakano Seigō, “Editorial: The Fortieth Session in 
Dull Atmosphere” [蕁ルクス瑍¶裂筆共同組合善貢熬鴪], in Tōhōjiron, February 1918, p.19-21.  
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some hundred years earlier.
55
 At this stage, Nakano’s support sprang from spontaneous emotional 
solidarity with the Russian people, whom Nakano believed to “have gladly gathered around 
[Lenin] because he deplored the despotism of the Czarist regime and showed empathy with the 
people.”
56
  
Accordingly, Nakano opposed Japan’s military intervention. As early as October 1917, 
Nakano stated categorically: “We should not forget that sending troops at the request of a foreign 
nation is a taboo.”
57
 He repeated his opposition to intervention regularly thereafter.
58
 When the 
government dispatched troops anyway, the national debate about intervention, and Nakano’s 
argument against it, became more specific and sophisticated.  
In the early stages of Russia’s revolution, Japan’s internal debate revolved around whether 
Lenin was a German spy on his way to becoming a German puppet (hence opening the possibility 
of placing Russia’s resources in the hands of Germany’s war machine). Nakano calmed the 
alarmists, stating: “Lenin is certainly not a Germany spy but a champion of the Russian 
extremism. Lenin has received support from the German government …but the Russian people 
do not follow him because he has received support from Germany.”
59
  
After Germany’s surrender in November 1918, Japan’s interventionist argument shifted to 
focus on Russia’s political instability and the threat it posed to Japan. Nakano sympathized with 
                                                     
55 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial: Precipitate Warnings before the Fact” [蕁ルクス瑍征撚貢㍽胞癧き竕] 
in Tōhōjiron, January 1918, p. 2-21. 
56 Nakano Seigō, “Opening Article” [敝姿] in Tōhōjiron, February 1918 issue, quoted in 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 245. 
57 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial: The Belligerent Powers’ Ability to Persevere and Calculate” [蕁
ルクス℀ルクス瑍誓皚難楼貢80睡陪膏睛Ô陪], in Tōhōjiron, October, 1917, p. 2 – 21. 
58 See Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōhōjiron, March 1918 and Nakano Seigō, 
“Shallow Diplomacy and Humiliating Expeditions” [╄琿咤誓悒ゲ頓度], in Tōhōjiron, July 
1918, p.19-36. 
59 Nakano Seigō, “Opening Article” [敝姿] in Tōhōjiron, February 1918, quoted in Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 245.  
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the desire to bring law and order to Russia but stated clearly that taking such a position was “not 
the same as arguing that Lenin’s regime should be annihilated.”
60
 While Nakano had by this 
point become critical of Lenin’s regime - calling the Russian leader a ruthless “autocrat more 
despotic than Peter the Great” - he did not think that either the Russian aristocracy or the various 
puppets propped up by the Powers posed viable alternatives.
61
 Accordingly, he wanted to 
“quickly end [Japan’s] support of the Semyonov regime.”
62
   
Nakano addressed the interventionists’ fear that a Communist Russian regime might 
encourage the spread of radical thought across the Japanese empire in his first-ever speech before 
the Diet. He argued that “radical thought does not originate in Russia” but arose instead from 
injustices internal to Japanese society.
63
 Accordingly, radical thought could not be fought with 
bayonets, but only by addressing inequalities within Japan. Speaking again before the Diet on the 
question of recognizing Soviet Russia in 1922, Nakano added that “not interacting [with Russia] 
out of fear of [radical] thought is nonsense” because “when followed to its final conclusion [this 
argument] would bring us back to the seclusion policy adopted by Japan in antiquity.”
64
 
Positioning himself against those who would try in vain to insulate Japan from global intellectual 
currents, Nakano suggested a new perspective on Russian communism, one according to which it 
could be seen as a social experiment from which Japan could learn important lessons:  
 
                                                     
60 Nakano Seigō, , “The Responsibility for the Failed Siberian Policy and a Basic Counter 
Policy” [O禅肉膕ø唸臍貢⎡染膏賤袿ª徙ø], in Tōhōjiron, July, 1920, p. 2 – 20. 
61 Nakano’s dismissal of the Semyonov regime supported by Japan can be found in Ibid., p. 
2 – 20.  
62 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōhōjiron, December 1920. 
63 Nakano Seigō, speech held before the Diet on February 6, 1921. A very similar argument 
can be found in Nakano Seigō, “Reflections in the Mirror of Manchuria and Korea”, p. 187  
64 Nakano Seigō, speech in Diet held on March 20, 1923 quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 
356-57..  
 139 
“Lenin, the hero, has put the Russian people and territory into a test tube and is 
conducting a communist experiment. It is not in the interest of outsiders to interfere. ... 
It is quite all right to watch from the outside. The results of this experiment should 
contribute to the sciences all over the world. Also the idealists around the world could 
be woken up by the experiment. … The Russian government is aware that the 
experiment they are conducting in Russia has failed and they are gradually reforming 
Communism.”
65
 
 
While the Western Powers one after another withdrew their troops from Russian soil in the 
course of 1920, Japan’s interventionists sought to make withdrawal conditional on the Soviets 
paying compensation for the massacre at Nikolayevsk. Nakano’s immediate reaction was to 
propose establishing an investigative committee that would examine the events leading up to the 
massacre, especially the role of the Japanese army, but the proposal was voted down by the 
Seiyūkai majority.
66
 Two years later, Nakano went further, arguing that responsibility for the 
massacre lay with Japanese forces; that, accordingly, Japan should withdraw from Sakhalin; and 
that instead of demanding compensation from Russia Japan itself should pay reparations.
67
 
Nakano’s opposition to Japan’s military intervention in Russia went hand in hand with his 
position that Japan should recognize the revolutionary regime and open diplomatic relations with 
Russia.
68
 Apart from the fact that most European nations had already recognized the Soviet 
Union in one way or another and Japan risked being left behind, Nakano’s main argument was 
economic: “For a country such as Japan, which has industry but neither primary raw materials nor 
                                                     
65 Nakano’s speech in the Diet on March 20, 1923, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 356-57. 
The same argument can be found in Nakano Seigō, “Reflections in the Mirror of Manchuria 
and Korea”, p. 216 ff.  
66 See Nakano Seigō, speech before the 43rd extraordinary Diet held on July 9, 1920 quoted 
in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 291-94.  
67 Nakano Seigō, speech in the Diet held March 20, 1923 quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 
356-57. 
68 Nakano had demanded recognition of the Lenin regime as early as July 1920. See 
Nakano Seigō, “The Responsibility for the Failed Siberian Policy and a Basic Counter Policy” 
[O禅肉膕ø唸臍貢⎡染膏賤袿ª徙ø], in Tōhōjiron, July, 1920, p. 2 – 20. 
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markets, cooperating with Russia, which has primary resources and markets, is completely in line 
with economic principles.”
69
 Nakano argued, moreover, that a closer relationship with Russia 
could improve Japan’s position vis-à-vis the other Powers, deflecting England’s and America’s 
“program for control over the world” [ラ̶身鈐腑ョ貢菜咋些碕冴].70 Thus motivated, Nakano 
made recognizing the Soviets the center of his writing and speechmaking in and outside of the 
Diet in the first half of the 1920s.  
 
Loss of Political Capital 
Nakano’s support for Soviet Russia following the 1917 revolution may be seen as a 
political victory, as the Japanese government ultimately did withdraw from Siberia and recognize 
the Soviet regime, if not until 1925. Yet, even if viewed as a victory, the outcome was meager 
compared to the political capital that Nakano had invested in achieving it. Much of his writing in 
the Tōhōjiron magazine had focused on the Soviet question; the magazine’s June 1923 issue 
focused entirely on Russia, including essays by authors spanning the entire political spectrum.
71
 
When Nakano spoke in the Diet, or introduced a bill or motion during his first tenure, it was 
mostly about Russia.
72
 The political society Yūshin-sha, which Nakano launched in the summer 
                                                     
69 Nakano’s speech in the Diet on March 20, 1923, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 360.   
70 Nakano quoted taken from Inomata p. 181.The same argument can be found in Nakano 
Seigō, “The New Path of International Japan” [楼墫荳袿貢范┽と], in Tōhōjiron, January, 
1922, p. 2 – 33.  
71 Besides the obligatory essay from Nakano and Sugimori this special issue also contained 
essays by social activist Ōyama Ikuo [哢愾か赶] (1880 – 1955), socialist Sano Manabu [双ǒ
嶌] (1892 - 1953), legal scholar Ninagawa Arata [59擺范] (1873 - 1959), politician Tsurumi 
Yūsuke [庾Wぼず] (1875-1973), right-wing activist Ōkawa Shūmei [哢擺鳳蕚], novelist 
Shirayanagi Shūko [¸讎┵曙] (1884-1950) and politician Itō Chiyū [舛IKえ] (1867 – 1938). 
See “Special Issue on the Russo-Japanese question” [荳顳黙主偏],Tōhōjiron June 1923. 
72 For example, his virgin speech in the Diet of July 9, 1920 demanding the establishment 
of an committee investigating the events leading up to the massacre at Nikolayevsk, 
Nakano’s speech given on February 6, 1921 demanding non-interference in Russian affairs 
and the withdrawal of all Japanese troops, or his speech of March 20, 1923 demanding 
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of 1922, focused on promoting and normalizing relations with Russia. Yūshin-sha members in 
1922 organized a meeting with the Soviet representative in Japan, Antonov, in which they 
explored the possibility of a rapprochement between the two nations.
73
 In the fall of 1922 and the 
first half of 1923, the society also organized rallies across Japan advocating the recognition of 
Soviet Russia.  
The only real reward Nakano reaped from all these efforts was becoming one of the first 
Japanese officials to be invited to visit Russia’s eastern territories after the resumption of 
diplomatic relations in 1925.
74
 He and his co-travelers, Shintō Kazuma (a boarding student of 
Nakano’s) and interpreter Hirooka Kōchi, received a very warm welcome, as many of Nakano’s 
pro-Soviet articles had been published in the Russian press.
75
 The group visited hospitals, mills, 
sanatoriums, prisons, and other public facilities, and also participated in sumō wrestling contests. 
Overall, they came away with a positive impression of the Soviet Union.
76
 
Outside of Russia, however, Nakano’s efforts were futile to say the least. Not one of the 
proposals he submitted to the Diet was accepted. When he proposed establishing a committee to 
                                                                                                                                                              
recognition of the Soviet Union and resumption of diplomatic relations.   
73 The society met with the Soviet representative (since no formal diplomatic relations were 
established, there was no ambassador), Antonov, on two occasions, namely on August 15 and 
18, 1922. The contents of the talks conducted during the meetings were published in 
Tōhōjiron the following month and were rather harmless in terms of content. See Nakano 
Seigō, “Interview with Antonov” [坤策宰済斎膏煙籬浩肱], in Tōhōjiron, September 1922.   
74 A description of the trip can be found in Watanabe Yukio [喰グネ赶], “The Enigma of 
Nakano Seigō’s Suicide” [腎ǒ驟悩貢60麑貢デカ], (Fukuoka, 1996), p. 220-24.  
75 Nakano in a letter dated September 2, 1925 quoted in Inomata p. 198 but also in Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 403.   
76 Hirooka Kōchi [杰慟甜齠] who accompanied Nakano as an interpreter on the Russian leg 
of the journey, recalled Nakano’s positive assessment of conditions in the Soviet Union in 
Hirooka Kōchi, “Nakano Seigō’s Visit to the Far East”[腎ǒ驟悩鳰貢鈬覩ヨ黙] in Soviet 
Studies [裟ヾｫ!], June 1954, quoted in Inomata p. 198-9. 
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investigate the Nikolayevsk massacre,
77
 Prime Minister Hara Kei dismissed the idea, saying “the 
days would not be long enough if we were to look into each problem that incidentally arises,”
78
 
and the motion was blocked by the Seiyūkai majority. The following spring, when Nakano 
demanded non-interference in Russian affairs and the withdrawal of all Japanese troops from 
Russia, not one cabinet member was present to listen and the rebuttal was made by the 
vice-secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The following day’s newspapers reported that 
many MPs were discussing private matters during Nakano’s speech; the proposal itself was also 
voted down by the Seiyūkai majority.
79
 Finally, when Nakano as a member of the Kakushin Club 
demanded in March 1923 the speedy recognition of the Soviet Union, the proposal also failed to 
gain enough votes to pass.
80
 
Worse still, Nakano’s pro-Soviet activities also made him a number of important enemies. 
That his opposition to the Siberian Intervention cost him sympathies among the pro-intervention 
army hard-liners is understandable. Calling the Army Minister General Tanaka Gi’ichi a “military 
man of small talent” [恠眸岌ヲ斥]81 and suggesting that the army general staff officers were 
generally driven by the hope of “advance[ing] their careers”
82
 as well as a psychological 
                                                     
77 See Nakano Seigō, speech in the 43rd special Diet session, July 9, 1920. Large portions of 
the speech can also be found in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 291-94.   
78 Hara Kei quoted in Inomata, p. 162. 
79 See Inomata, p. 173. 
80 Nakano’s speech in the Diet of March 20, 1923, is quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 360 
and following.   
81 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōhōjiron, January 1920. On a different occasion he 
wrote about Tanaka that he was a military man who had lost the bushidō [way of the 
warrior]. See Nakano Seigō, “Reflections in the Mirror of Manchuria and Korea”, p. 17.  
82 Nakano Seigō, “Shallow Diplomacy and Humiliating Expeditions” [╄琿咤誓悒ゲ頓度], in 
Tōhōjiron, August 1918, p. 19 - 36 
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mind-set of “getting as much as you can” [焚黒鵠荒穀伍焚獄康]83 could only make him enemies 
among the army’s mainstream. Finally, he antagonized moderate and neutral factions within the 
armed forces by arguing before the Diet that the Japanese army was responsible for the 
Nikolayevsk massacre. Even among rank-and-file soldiers fighting and freezing in Siberia, 
Nakano’s stance was noted and much resented. Mitamura Takeo
84
, a soldier who later became a 
follower of Nakano’s, recalled that:  
 
“At the time we were in Siberia and we listened to Nakano’s opposition to the Siberian 
intervention with single-minded hatred. To the present day, I cannot forget either the 
difficult position in which we were placed or the sad return we were given because of 
his criticism.”
85
   
 
Nakano’s pro-Russian stance would continue to haunt him. It made him vulnerable in 
political struggles because it left him open to implications and direct claims that his sympathy for 
Soviet Russia reflected socialist or radical communist beliefs, or, worse still, that he was a Soviet 
spy. In the 1924 election, Nakano’s opponent played up Nakano’s Russophile activities so 
convincingly that Nakano almost lost his seat in the Diet.  
 
Why Support Communist Russia?  
Why did Nakano continue supporting Communist Russia so energetically despite the 
obvious political cost? Ideological conviction is not the answer. Though in the year before his 
death Nakano admitted to his son – with a somewhat embarrassed smile – that he once had 
                                                     
83 Nakano Seigō, “Founding Declaration of the Yūshin-sha” [弗范だ貢帶然], in Tōhōjiron, 
August, 1922.  
84 Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁驥啌] (1899 – 1964), police man and politician. 
85 Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁驥啌], “Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?” [腎ǒ驟悩購奏膣
60鈍浩紅拘], (Tokyo, 1953).  
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“almost become a Bolshevik” [抗黒豪豪康怙浩腔在作鍍行荒鵠膏梗獄紘耕紅国], and though 
he admired Lenin’s leadership throughout his life, Nakano never embraced either socialism or 
communism.
86
 Nakano’s understanding of Soviet Russia – which, as we have seen, was shallow 
at first – deepened quickly and his assessment of communist ideology became increasingly 
critical. He saw Marxism as a “sort of emotional classic [犲炒ª42怒] that stirs the people facing 
great hardships and makes them carry out a revolution,”
87
 adding that there was “nothing as 
powerful as socialist literature when it comes to stimulating stupid people.”
88
  
As early as 1920, Nakano recognized that Lenin’s communist experiment in Russia had 
failed and stated that “post-revolutionary [Russian] society is certainly not the kind of society the 
revolutionaries envisioned.”
89
 He believed the experiment’s failure sprang from the fact that 
human beings “cannot work hard from morning till evening for the sake of the public alone. The 
individual’s wants and desires are best at arousing man’s activity. Any social organization that 
blocks that will, as a result, kill ingenuity and the desire to make an effort.”
90
 Nakano also 
believed that, by going against human nature, communism required heavy controls and coercion 
that created bureaucratic authoritarianism: “Those controlling need to be controlled, so that the 
                                                     
86 For the quote from the conversation with his son see Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 290. For 
Nakano’s appreciation of Lenin’s leadership abilities toward the end of his life see ”War-time 
Prime Ministers” [皚蕁幤ùルクス], Asahi News, January 1, 1943.  
87 Quote taken from a conversation between Nakano and Chinese warlord Feng Yu-shiang 
[肉侒─] (1882-1942) also known as the “Christian general,” whom Nakano met on his trip to 
China, Manchuria and Russia in the fall of 1925. The conversation is recorded in “The 
Wanna-be Russian Feng Yu-shiang” [顳O盛拘降黒貢肉侒─] in Nakano Seigō, “Expressions of 
the Soul” [网惚鋪晃], (Tokyo, May, 1938), p. 133. 
88 Nakano Seigō, “From contraction to expansion” [Bれ国酷蜑悽香]; in Tōhōjiron, August, 
1923, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1. p. 365. 
89 Quote taken from a conversation between Nakano Seigō and Chinese war-lord Feng 
Yuxian in “The wanna-be Russian Feng Yu-shiang” in Nakano Seigō “Expressions of the 
Soul”, p. 129. 
90 Ibid.  
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whole system suffers to an indescribable extent from the vices of bureaucracy.”
91
  
By this time, Nakano’s criticism was also targeted at the Soviet regime and Lenin himself. 
Even while arguing that Lenin was Russia’s legitimate ruler and encouraging Japan to recognize 
his regime, from at least 1920 onward Nakano’s view of Lenin’s personality became increasingly 
harsh. He recognized that while advocating internationalism and world revolution, Lenin had 
based his power firmly on Russian nationalism and pursued clearly imperialist aims: “He has 
advocated self-determination of nations, but will not recognize the independence of the nations of 
the Baltic countries, southern Russia or Siberia. … People like Lenin have always at one level the 
strong will to rule other people. The spiritual will to rule others is an imperialist tendency that 
they have in their heart.”
92
 About Lenin’s character Nakano added: “He kills people to control 
those who are still alive. … He is an idealistic, moralistic and deliberate despot.”
93
 
If neither ideological conviction nor personal adoration for Lenin were the driving forces 
behind Nakano’s enthusiastic support for Soviet Russia, how else can we account for it? 
Nakano’s “romantic infatuation with revolution,”
94
 which in the past had led him to side with the 
revolutionary cause in China, was partly responsible, as were his liberalism and his open-minded 
attitude toward new ideologies. He approached the phenomenon, in part, with intellectual 
curiosity and scientific detachment, hoping to learn from Russia’s experience. Unlike many of his 
contemporaries, Nakano did not consider Communism dangerous and believed it could not be 
suppressed by force.
95
 Though convinced that the ideology was fraught with mistakes, he 
                                                     
91 Ibid. p. 134. 
92 Nakano Seigō “New Phenomena and New Personalities” [范﨑〵膏范斥☞] in Tōhōjiron, 
January 1920.  
93 All three quotes taken from Nakano Seigō “New Phenomena and New Personalities” [范
﨑〵膏范斥☞] in Tōhōjiron, January 1920. 
94 Aochi Shin [⻗丱藹], “Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩], in Chisei [ö淤], February 1955, p. 156 
95 Following the assassination of the socialist activist Takao Heibei [㔾悃霸度ヤ] (1895 - 
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remained confident that “pure reason” was sufficient “to expose Communism’s shortcomings 
while at the same time pointing out its failures in history.”
96
  
Nakano likely also saw political gain in supporting Russia’s revolution. By showing 
solidarity with a communist Russia, the homeland of workers and farmers, Nakano likely hoped 
to win the sympathies of Japan’s workers and farmers. Having identified a worldwide trend 
toward mass political participation, made manifest in the fall of German, Austrian and Russian 
monarchies; the expansion of suffrage in the Western nations; and the politicization of women 
and workers in the aftermath of the Great War, Nakano foresaw a similar pattern for Japan.  
The question was how to prepare oneself to benefit politically from this turn of events. 
Since the mass of the people, were workers and farmers, Nakano concluded that industrial 
laborers would play a pivotal role in the future of Japanese politics. He wrote as much after 
participating in a rally demanding non-interference in Russia in the summer of 1922. The event, 
which was organized by student and labor groups, ended in a fistfight between police and 
organizers:  
 
“The organizers of the rally come either from the Shinjin-kai, the Kyōmin-kai [ both 
student societies] or some labor group. When you take a closer look at these groups, 
you see that they are made up of so-called ‘new people’ [范斥], leaders of the labor 
movement, etc. It goes without saying that both groups lean heavily to the left. … 
Anyway, as I looked the attitude of these gentlemen, I had no doubt that I was looking 
at the powerful leaders who would rule the next era of Japan.”
 97
 
                                                                                                                                                              
1923) whom Nakano had known personally, Nakano wrote about the futility of trying to 
suppress socialist or communist through by force: “In the history of the world, several 
nations have tried to suppress socialism, and more than on police force has clamped down on 
it. And yet in spite of all this suppression, socialism has not diminished its force.” Nakano 
Seigō, “From Contraction to Expansion” [Bれ国酷蜑悽香], in Tōhōjiron, August, 1923 quoted 
in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1. p. 365. 
96 Nakano “From Contraction to Expansion” [Bれ国酷蜑悽香]; in Tōhōjiron, August, 1923, 
quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1. p. 365. 
97 Quote taken from Nakano Seigō “Founding Declaration of the Yūshin-sha” [弗范だ貢帶然], 
Tōhōjiron, August, 1922 , quoted in Inomata, p. 178. The rally had been organized by 
Inamura Ryūichi [I̊襁吏慎] of Waseda University’s Kyōmin-kai [蝣鴈善] and Miwa Jusō [申
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Accordingly, Nakano’s support of the Russian Revolution and subsequently the Soviet 
regime were attempts to capitalize on the entrance of the masses onto Japan’s political stage. If 
the reader recalls how Nakano entered politics in 1920 with the aim of creating a new popular 
mass party, his support of the Russian revolution and the Soviet regime loses its tinge of 
eccentricity and seems a rather reasonable calculation, even if  subsequent events showed it to 
be premature. It is certainly no coincidence that Nakano’s Yūshin-sha society, founded in the 
summer of 1922 to become “the core of a [Japanese] popular movement,” made Russia its central 
issue.
98
 Nor is it a coincidence that Nakano’s solidarity with the Soviet Union and the cause of 
the workers came to an end when, in the course of the 1924 general election, he learned his 
position did not strengthen his support among the Japanese electorate.  
 
General Election of 1924 
Nakano’s campaign for re-election on May 10, 1924 turned out to be much harder than that 
of 1920, yielding a much narrower victory. Nakano beat his opponent, Miyagawa Ikkan, by only 
25 votes (2,786 versus 2,761). Afterward, Nakano said: “My expectations were wrong, as I had 
anticipated an easy campaign but it turned out to be stupidly difficult, and I almost failed to be 
elected.”
99
  
                                                                                                                                                              
ね徘呎] of Tokyo Imperial University’s Sinjin-kai [范斥善]. For Inamura’s recollection of the 
event see Inamura Ryūichi [I̊襁吏慎]; “The Ideal of Asian Liberation” [坤沙坤る膠貢弴熾], in 
Seigō-kai eds. [驟悩善], “Nakano Seigō is Alive” [腎ǒ驟悩購﨟攻肱広鵠], (Tokyo, Akane-shobō 
[巷拘講蟷蘯], 1954), p. 22-24. 
98 The quotes are taken from Nakano Seigō, “Founding Declaration of the Yūshin-sha” [弗范
だ貢帶然], in Tōhōjiron, August, 1922 reproduced in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 339. 
99 Nakano Seigō quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 390. 
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The main reason behind Nakano’s near defeat was his pro-Soviet stance.
100
 It cost him the 
support of Fukuoka hardliners in and around the Genyōsha, who did not wish to be represented 
by someone concerned more with Russia than Japan and who “seems to believe that his business 
ends with commenting on politics.”
101
 The hardliners produced their own candidate, Uchida 
Ryōhei, Tōyama Mitsuru’s nephew and founder of the Kokuryūkai, who, however, withdrew his 
candidacy and was replaced by Nakano’s old-time rival Miyagawa Ikkan two weeks before the 
election. Though late to the race, Miyagawa was a strong opponent. He had won the sympathies 
of many by generously surrendering his candidacy to Nakano in the last election. Now, he wasted 
no time to attacking Nakano’s weakest point - his association with left-wing thought and the 
Soviet Union - by, among other things, running ads in the Fukuoka Daily News reading 
“Miyagawa Ikkan does not try to parrot the radical thought of red Russia.”
102
  
Though Nakano’s position on Russia likely imperiled his campaign, he himself blamed 
Inukai Tsuyoshi, in particular Inukai’s flirtatious rapprochement with the Seiyūkai, which by 
1925 led to a merger between the Kakushin Club and the Seiyūkai. Within a month after the 1924 
election, Nakano broke with Inukai and left the Kakushin Club. In an open farewell letter, he 
explained the political strategy underlying his decision:  
   
“In 20 years it could be that a labor party or a socialist party could become strong, but 
this is not what will save Japan from its present predicament. … If the Kakushin Club 
really tried to reform the political world and overthrow the established parties, it would 
not concern itself with the Diet, but look for success at a later date and take on the color 
                                                     
100 This at least is the conclusion of the Fukuoka Daily News [┗慟荳荳范ⓥ] post-election 
editorial of May 14, 1924. The paper had polled the 4th graders at a local school what they 
thought about the two candidates (supposedly this reflected the views of their fathers) and 
24 students had answered that they disliked Nakano because “because he helps Russia.” See 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 380.  
101 Editorial of the Fukuoka Daily News [┗慟荳荳范ⓥ] April 25, 1924.   
102 See Miyagawa’s Election Advertisement in the Fukuoka Daily News [┗慟荳荳范ⓥ], May 
9, 1924, also quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 378.   
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of a labor party. However, the character of our members (including myself) is not suited 
to this task. In fact, I believe that the Club should try to become an established party by 
advocating policies similar to those of the established parties.”
103
 
 
Rather than becoming an unaffiliated outsider again, Nakano joined the Kenseikai, one of 
the two established parties. His decision surprised many onlookers, for immediately after the 
election he had continued casting himself as a rebel, declaring: “I have set out to destroy all the 
established political forces in order to enter a new era. … I believe the Japanese political world is 
about to see the first act of destruction of the status quo and I shall play an important role in it.”
104
 
The Seiyūkai-affiliated Fukuoka Daily News highlighted the irony that someone who had started 
his political career opposing the established parties and who only recently had criticized Nagai 
Ryūtarō for joining the Kenseikai should now do the same.
105
 Aware of the contradiction in his 
decision, Nakano gave a half-baked explanation in the same farewell letter to Inukai. 
Fundamentally, however, the move was motivated by the hope that membership in a large party 
would increase his influence.
 106
 Many years later, Nakano explained his decision to join the 
Kenseikai quite frankly by saying “even Saigō needed the backing of the Satsuma-han.”
107 
 
Nakano’s decision to join the Kenseikai not only marked a break with Inukai but also the 
low point of Nakano’s relations with Tōyama. After Tōyama’s refusal to support Nakano in the 
last election, joining the Kenseikai may be seen as Nakano’s attempt to wean himself from 
                                                     
103 Nakano’s open letter to Inukai, published in Gakan, May 1924, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, 
vol. 1, p. 382. 
104 Nakano Seigō quoted in Inomata, p. 191 
105 “Nakano Seigō switches to the Kenseikai,” in Fukuoka Daily News [┗慟荳荳范ⓥ], May 
22, 1924 
106 See Ogata, p. 31. 
107 Nakano quoted in Inomata p. 193. 
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over-dependence on his old mentor.
108
 After freeing himself somewhat from Tōyama’s grasp, 
Nakano also grew distant from other Fukuokan figures. Shibata Fumishiro, Nakano’s former 
teacher, remarked after one of Nakano’s visits to Fukuoka around 1926-7 how far apart they had 
grown intellectually.
109
 
 
Within the Kenseikai 
Nakano’s switch to the Kenseikai was, despite the political complications outlined above, 
well-timed. On June 11, 1924 Katō Kōmei, president of the Kenseikai, was asked to form the 
next cabinet. As it happened, this cabinet would play an important role Japanese inter-war history, 
not only because it restored party cabinets after a brief re-emergence of transcendental cabinets, 
but more importantly because it introduced universal suffrage. It was under Katō that Japan 
entered the full bloom of what later came to be known as “Taishō democracy.”  
While Nakano could easily identify with the cabinet’s program – apart from universal 
suffrage and recognition of the Soviet Union, it also included reductions of both armaments and 
public-official head count – he was not welcomed with open arms. His hostile criticism of 
established parties, as well as the insults he hurled against Katō Kōmei (whom Nakano once 
called “the incurable disease of the Kenseikai”
110
) still rang freshly in the ears of many members 
– including Katō’s. It was only through the offices of Adachi Kenzō
111
 and Nagai Ryūtarō that 
Nakano was accepted into the party.  
Almost by default Nakano joined the Adachi or pure-party faction, which included party 
                                                     
108 See Oates, p. 32. 
109 See Shibata Fumishiro [讒譓艙傚], “Memories of Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩甫貢淞広頓], 
(Tokyo, 1968), p. 45. 
110 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōhōjiron, August 1919, quoted in Inomata p. 193. 
111 Adachi Kenzō [嶢けバーツ24] (1864 - 1948) Politician and leader of the Minseitō faction to 
which Nakano belonged in the late 1920s.  
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politicians such as Miki Bukichi
112
 and Nagai Ryūtarō and thematically focused on domestic 
reconstruction (i.e., reform) and the Chinese question. These priorities contrasted sharply with 
those of the bureaucratic faction led by Egi Tasuku,
113
 which was comprised largely of imperial 
university graduates who served as career bureaucrats before becoming politicians. Roughly 
speaking, while the party faction bore much of the brunt of political battles (speechmaking, 
campaigning, etc.), the bureaucratic faction was nevertheless able to secure the best positions 
within the administration whenever the party was called upon to form a cabinet. During the next 
half-dozen years that he spent with the Kenseikai (later Minseitō), the friction between these two 
factions caused Nakano great frustration, and more than anything else it was the bureaucratic 
faction’s rise to pre-eminence after president Hamaguchi Osachi’s assassination in late 1930 that 
caused Nakano to leave the party in 1932.  
As a member of the governing party, Nakano found himself in an entirely new and 
unfamiliar situation. In the past, he had occupied positions that carried neither power nor 
responsibility, which let him criticize others sharply without becoming much of a target himself. 
Now he had to tread more carefully. The task was easy enough as long as he agreed with the 
cabinet’s policies, but controlling his tongue sometimes cost him considerable energy and 
sometimes he could not help himself from speaking out.
114
 When the Kenseikai government 
bundled the passage of the universal suffrage bill together with a Peace Preservation Law meant 
to contain labor and tenant farmer unrest, Nakano submitted a motion claiming that “the Peace 
                                                     
112 Miki Bukichi [申袍驥便], (1884 - 1956) politician and occasional ally of Nakano’s.  
113 Egi Tasuku [鷦袍62] (1873 – 1932) bureaucrat and politician. For dynamics within the 
party see Itō Takashi [舛I吏], “Research in early Shōwa Political History” [蓖北二袗膕齠別ｫ
!], (Tokyo 1969), p. 29-31.  
114 Overall, Nakano approved of the party’s line and praised the Katō cabinet’s passage of 
universal suffrage and recognition of the Soviet Union. See Nakano Seigō, “The New Value of 
Friendly Russo-Japanese Relations” [荳顳ち誓貢范卒単], in Gakan, March 1925, p. 51.   
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Preservation Law submitted by the government is contrary to the spirit of the constitution.”
115
 
Comparing Nakano’s appearance in the Diet to his former speeches, the Osaka Asahi News 
commented:  
 
“The critic Nakano Seigō, ever since entering a party, has found it rather difficult to say 
what he wants to say. You can watch his belly swelling [i.e., him getting angry] and it 
looks as if it is bugging him. … On the few occasions that he is on his seat in the Diet 
he shouts things like: ‘Why don’t you leave it at that?’ [広広秤祇行驗濠骨拘瑱] or ‘I 
cannot listen to this in silence.’ … His speeches lack depth and weight. The attacks that 
he makes against his opponents will split bamboo, but they will not cut their bodies.”
116
 
 
Eventually, however, Nakano settled into his new role within the Kenseikai, overcame any 
reservations the party’s members may have harbored against him and began his rise through the 
party’s ranks.   
Nakano’s main advantage in the game of politics was his dexterity with words. Roughly 
speaking, this advantage took two forms: On the one hand, Nakano soon developed into a party 
ideologue who eventually rose to become director of propaganda [帶然グ憎] (what today we 
might call public relations). In this capacity, he was entrusted with writing the party’s program 
when it transformed itself into the Minseitō in 1927 and with formulating the party’s strategy 
during elections. At the same time, Nakano earned the respect of his enemies and the gratitude of 
his peers by using his oratory skills to cut down political opponents. Parliamentary debate was, 
then as now, a vicious war of words and Nakano liked being in the thick of it. Two debates that 
Nakano fought for the Kenseikai - both against the Seiyūkai president and future Prime Minister, 
Tanaka Gi’ichi - were particularly spectacular.  
      
                                                     
115 Nakano in a declaration submitted together with Kiyose Ichirō and Hoshishima Jirō on 
February 19, 1925 quoted in Inomata p. 197. See also his speech held in the Diet on 
February 10, 1925. 
116 Osaka Asahi News, March 7, 1925 issue quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 391. 
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Nakano - a Soviet Spy? 
The first clash between Nakano and Tanaka Gi’ichi came toward the end of the 52
nd
 Diet 
session, which lasted from December 1925 to March 1926. Army General and Seiyūkai president 
Tanaka Gi’ichi had attempted to bribe members of the coalition parties of the Kenseikai 
government under Katō to withdraw their support and thus bring down the cabinet. Though 
Tanaka claimed the bribery money came from private sources, rumor suggested it came from 
booty confiscated in Russia during the Siberian intervention and a secret army fund that, itself, 
had been created illegally by misappropriating monies from army’s operational budget in Siberia.
 
 
Nakano fired the opening shot of the vicious mudslinging contest on March 4, 1926, by 
taking the stand in parliament and calling Tanaka’s bribes “the most serious incident since the 
Siemens scandal.”
117
 Nakano noted that from 1922-4 Tanaka, then Army Minister, and his 
vice-minister Yamanashi had spent 800 million Yen on the futile Siberian intervention and, 
claimed that 40 million of the total had found its way into a secret army fund, where it had been 
put to nobody-knew-what purpose. Nakano also mentioned the Semyonov gold ingots which, 
after falling into the Japanese army’s hands during the Siberian intervention, had mysteriously 
disappeared; large bank accounts opened under the names of Tanaka and Yamanashi with various 
Japanese banks; and, finally, rumors that Tanaka had used part of the proceeds from the sale of 
the ingots to replace Takahashi Korekiyo as Seiyūkai president.
118
 Weaving these rumors 
together into a comprehensive accusation, Nakano demanded that the questions surrounding the 
origin of Tanaka’s funds and the future Prime Minister’s role in obtaining them be investigated.  
Tanaka and Yamanashi denied the accusations and the Seiyūkai was up in arms against 
Nakano. The press described the atmosphere as “filled with the thirst for blood” and anticipated 
“strong retaliation from the Seiyūkai,” warning that “Nakano Seigō’s life is in danger as the 
                                                     
117 Nakano’s speech before the Diet, March 4, 1926 quoted in Inomata p. 207-9. 
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extra-parliamentary thugs of the Seiyūkai are after him.”
119
 Nakano shared these fears and, in the 
days following his broadside, retained two body guards.
120
  
 Nakano’s attack on Tanaka took his own party by surprise, because Nakano had not 
informed his colleagues about the content of his speech beforehand. Army Minister and 
Kenseikai member Ugaki Kazuo brushed Nakano’s accusations coolly away as “nonsense,” but 
his diary shows he was upset with Nakano for using the “army to deliver a blow against the[ir] 
real enemy, the Seiyūkai.”
121
 Given Nakano’s lack of support both within and outside of his party, 
his motion for an investigative committee did not pass.    
Outside the Diet, however, Nakano received support from two different sources. First, the 
press - sensing a scandal in the making - pounced on the news. The day after Nakano’s speech, 
the Tokyo Asahi’s headline read “Suspicious Rumors Concerning the Disappearance of Four 
Million Yen During Tanaka’s Tenure Expose Ugly Reality of Chōshū Military Clique in Diet” and 
the paper’s entire second page, as well as its lead editorial, focused on the topic.
122
  
Second, and more importantly for subsequent events, the day after Nakano’s speech, the 
army’s former paymaster - who had served with Tanaka and Yamanashi - filed accusations of 
                                                                                                                                                              
118 See Ibid. 
119 All quotes taken from Inomata, p. 209-11.  
120 For Nakano’s use of body guards see Oates, p. 34-35.  
121 Both quotes taken from Ugaki’s diary, entries for March 4 and 5, 1926. Ugaki Kazunari 
[嶄倡慎癩], “The Diary of Ugaki Kazunari” [嶄倡慎癩荳ヒ], ed. Tsunoda Jun [み譓抅], 3 vols 
(Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1970), volume 1, p. 512-16. This was probably the low-point in the 
relations between Ugaki and Nakano. Over the following years they would move closer and 
eventually become allies in the struggle against Tōjō. Ugaki would express his regrets over 
the losing Nakano after the latter’s death. Ibid. volume 3, p. 1568. 
122 The Tokyo Asahi editorial “The Secrets of the Army cliques” [憤ヲヲ淚貢╄廡], March 6, 
1926, agreed with Nakano writing: “Even someone naïve will become suspicious at these 
facts. We wish to request that the army’s authorities would make [the details of] this 
question completely public.” quoted in Inomata, p. 218.  
 155 
fraud and misappropriation of public funds against Tanaka with the public prosecutors.
123
 These 
accusations more or less substantiated Nakano’s claims. If proven true, the charges would have 
destroyed Tanaka’s political career, even if they would have been insufficient to impeach him 
immediately given the immunity he enjoyed as a member of the Upper House. 
The Seiyūkai’s counterattack was immediate. Beginning on the afternoon of March 4, 1926 
(the very day of Nakano’s speech in the Diet), the Seiyūkai-affiliated Nihon Shimbun newspaper 
started running articles attacking Nakano for sympathizing with communism.
124
 The most 
serious of these, published on March 5, contained a quote by Kubota Eikichi, former member of 
the Japanese expeditionary forces in Siberia, who said that while in Russia he met a white 
Russian who told him “both Miyake [Setsurei] and Nakano [had] actually received 100,000 Yen 
from [the Soviet representative] Antonov” in order to write positively about the Soviet Union.
125
 
Attacks in the Diet accompanied the defamatory media campaign. On March 11, 1926, the 
Seiyūkai submitted a proposal to parliament that Nakano should “repent” [鮒ÿ] for having held 
“nonsensical speeches on the sacred Diet floor, confused the people, upset military discipline … 
and having secretly been directed by Communists to drive a wedge between the people and the 
                                                     
123 The full text of the paymaster’s accusations was published by the Jiji Shimpō [蕁征范况], 
March 6, 1926. See Inomata p. 210-13. 
124 The first, published on March 4, made Nakano responsible for the calamities that 
allegedly had befallen three individuals (and their families) after listening to Nakano’s 
pro-Russian speeches in the early 1920s. See “Nakano’s Red Speeches Destroy Three 
Families” [腎ǒ貢◇泌儲㌲申广柎惚ｹ厠溝] in Nihon Shimbun March 4, 1926.  
125 The Nihon Shimbun had published the account of Kubota’s imprisonment in the Soviet 
Union in a series of articles starting November 1925 and ending March 1926. The account 
was subsequently published as a book: Kubota Eikichi [睡胎譓豐便], “Two years in a Soviet 
Prison” [◇顳性朮貢㍎腎﨟┽], (Tokyo 1926) see p. 145 for the quote. Kubota repeated his 
accusations in his “Declaration to my people concerning the Nakano question” [腎ǒ黙主行恣
広肱癪控楼鴈㌒甫行ヰ康], (Tokyo, 1926), see p. 4-31. Trying to label Nakano as a communist, 
the same Nihon Shimbun (March 5, 1926) also ran an article under the headline: 
“Communism or Democracy? Let’s do Both – The interview between Nakano and Soviet 
Russia’s Secret Envoy” [努﨡拘鴈厨拘仁こ拘杭鵠左察膏腎ǒ膏◇顳貢廡藻膏貢善W]. 
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army.”
126
 Seiyūkai member Makino Ryōzō,
127
 casting himself in the role of protector of the 
army’s honor, used the Kubota quote to accuse Nakano of taking 100,000 Yen from the Soviet 
representative Antonov for the purpose of turning Japan communist, as well as of being a secret 
member of the Communist 3
rd
 International. 
128
  
The ensuing debate was, to say the least, heated. The March 5 morning edition of Tokyo 
Asahi News carried the following description: “Amidst disorder, the [Diet] session lasted until 
late in the night before the proceedings were interrupted. Even when the chairman rang his bell, 
he was not heard. During yesterday’s lower house session it was proposed that Nakano Seigō 
commit suicide.”
129
 The debate continued throughout March 12 and 13, when Makino proposed 
that Nakano face an inquiry commission. Sensing an opportunity to prove his innocence, Nakano 
and the Kenseikai supported the motion.  
In the event, three of the four witnesses Makino summoned to testify against Nakano 
before the inquiry commission could not confirm that he had received Yen 100,000, which left 
Kubota’s quote as the only support for Makino’s case.
130
 Desperate for evidence, Makino 
produced what he called a translation of an article from a Russian paper stating that Nakano had 
received money from Antonov. Nakano, however, was able to show that the article was a 
forgery.
131
 In the end, the inquiry commission concluded that the accusations against Nakano 
                                                     
126 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 417. 
127 Makino Ryōzō [☂ǒY申] (1885∫1961), lawyer and politician. 
128 For Makino’s speech see Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 417-18. 
129 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, March 12, 1926, (quoted in Inomata p. 225).  
130 Katō Mineo, who had been named by Makino as a witness of Nakano receiving money 
from the Soviets, published a denial in various newspapers on March 15, stating that “I feel 
sorry for Mr. Makino, but as far as I know, can only state clearly that Nakano never did such 
an ugly thing.” Katō quoted in Inomata p. 226. 
131 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 418 The article is partly quoted in Inomata p. 227-8. 
 157 
were without substance.
132
  
Before the end of the month, it became clear that the Seiyūkai’s smear campaign had 
backfired – or, as one newspaper put it, “Makino helped Nakano get a name. Thank you.”
133
 In 
desperation, the Seiyūkai played their last card: physical intimidation. After the end of the Diet 
session on the evening of March 26, twelve thugs visited Nakano’s home. He confronted them in 
front of his house and – so we are told by his son - shortly afterward, eight fled while four fell to 
their knees apologizing. Not satisfied, Nakano led the remaining four into his garden, had them 
kneel down again and gave them a warning talk while a group of boarding students armed with 
wooden swords watched over them. Nakano’s wife took pity on the quartet and came to their 
rescue, bringing them hot noodle soup to warm them up before inviting them into the house.
134
  
Though this incident marked the end of the Seiyūkai’s attacks and Nakano emerged 
uninjured physically, the hit to his reputation lingered. Moreover, Tanaka and his aides suffered 
no lasting political damage,
135
 rendering Nakano’s sacrifice smaller in retrospect.
 136 
 
                                                     
132 In an interview conducted in 1955, even Makino acknowledged: “I no longer believe that 
Nakano received money from Russia. Nor that he is a secret member [of the Comintern]. …. I 
must admit that that fight ended clearly in a victory for Nakano.” Makino in Hasegawa Shun 
“Three Enigmas of Japan – The Theory that Nakano Seigō was a Secret Member of the 
Communist Party ” [０滾艙ウ蒟┽瑍申千荳袿貢デカ―腎ǒ驟悩╄廡妬満㌲] special edition of 
Bungei Shunjū [艙ウ蒟┽], 1955, partially quoted in Inomata, p. 225-229.  
133 Quoted in Inomata p. 229. 
134 See Watanabe Yukio [喰グネ赶], “The Enigma of Nakano Seigō’s Suicide”, p. 119-120. 
135 Neither Tanaka nor his aide were ever charged in the matter. Investigations against 
them were terminated after Ishida Motozuki [0譓儼] the public prosecutor in charge was 
found dead under a bridge in Tokyo in October 1926.  
136 Rumors surrounding Nakano’s involvement in the communist party survived well into 
the postwar period. In 1955, former prosecutor Koizumi Terasaburō made claims that 
Nakano had been a member of the Comintern, operating under the name “Comrade 818” and 
charged with reporting the strength and location of Japanese military facilities. Koizumi 
based his claims on documents to which he had access while working at the prosecutor’s 
office of the Tokyo district court before 1945. However, since these were subsequently lost in 
the war, it is impossible to ascertain whether Koizumi’s claims are right. While Koizumi’s 
former colleagues confirm that the Secret Higher Police were investigating Nakano following 
 158 
 
Nakano’s First Position in the Administration   
Nakano’s efforts on his party’s behalf were rewarded when, on February 4, 1927, he was 
offered the position of parliamentary councilor [複紳巫] to the Ministry of Finance under 
Kataoka Naoharu. Nakano at first rejected the offer on the grounds that he was simply “not cut 
out” [諞腔購荒広] for the job, adding: “My ambition lies in governing the nation. Financial 
administration should be left to the accounting magistrates [閥巵喃ネ]. How can I, Nakano Seigō, 
become such a scruffy public servant?”
137
 Nakano’s immediate reaction smacks of the disdain 
that samurai traditionally held for members of the merchant class, as well as for mathematics and 
monetary affairs in general. In the end, however, his predecessor Miki Bukichi convinced Nakano 
that economics and finance were integral to modern politics and Nakano accepted the position.  
The job gave Nakano an opportunity to deepen his understanding of finance and economics, 
and taught him to respect bureaucratic expertise. His tenure, however, was brief, as he 
surrendered the position on April 17, 1927, when Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō
138
 (who had 
succeeded Katō after his death) resigned. Until the formation of the Hamaguchi cabinet in 1929, 
Nakano and the Kenseikai found themselves once again in the opposition.  
                                                                                                                                                              
the nation-wide crack down on communists starting March 15, 1928, they do not agree with 
him as to the results of these investigations. The fact that the police did not take any action 
against Nakano after the investigation was completed, put Koizumi’s claims into question. 
See the appendix entitled “The Enigma of Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩貢デカ ] in Koizumi 
Terasaburō [恠龜ぢ申ア], “History of Taishō Period Crimes” [哢驟╪二別驟㍃], (Daigaku Shobō, 
Tokyo, 1955) (reprinted in 1997); p. 223 – 254. For a discussion of Koizumi’s allegations see 
Inomata, p. 230-40 
137 Nakano quoted by Miki Bukichi who offered Nakano the position after resigning himself. 
Miki Bukichi [申袍驥便], “Fight to the death against the Tōjō cabinet” [覩襭塔隆膏貢髞帰], 
part of a special feature “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩惚畫康], in Japan and the 
Japanese [荳袿沸砿荳袿斥], January 1956, p. 11. 
138 Wakatsuki Reijirō [マ鑽ぜ饅ア] (1866-1949), politician and later Prime Minister of 
Japan. 
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Founding of Rikken Minseitō  
The Kenseikai used its time out of government to regroup and prepare for the next election, 
which – following the passage of universal suffrage in 1925 – was expected to involve new 
campaigning tactics including mass media. Nakano’s journalistic background, writing skills and 
populist bent made him an ideal person to guide his fellow Kenseikai members through this 
transition period. 
To strengthen their position in the Diet and in the hopes of capturing the votes of the newly 
enfranchised Japanese populace, the Kenseikai merged with the Seiyū-hontō in early June of 
1927. As the party’s propaganda chief, Nakano not only drafted the new party’s platform and 
founding declaration, but, according to Ogata, was also “the parent who gave the party its 
name.”
139
 The new party, called “Rikken Minseitō” - meaning “Constitutional Popular 
Government Party”- proposed to “reflect the general will of the people in the Diet and to realize 
politics centered upon the Diet under the administration of the Emperor.” Nakano’s passion and 
enthusiasm for writing the party’s declaration was contagious. After reading the document, 
Minseitō president Hamaguchi, said: “Even someone with his body full of diseases will, upon 
reading this declaration once, feel his entire body overflow with hot blood.”
140
  
Nakano was also charged with formulating the 1928 general election strategy. He sought to 
cast the Minseitō as popular party along the lines of the idealistic project he had pursued on and 
off since entering politics. Touring the country as head of the election campaign department [え
㌲グ憎], Nakano attended all the party’s provincial-chapter launches, giving speeches touting the 
party’s grass-roots base:  
                                                     
139 Ogata, p. 21. According to Inomata Nakano was aided by Nagai Ryūtarō. See Inomata p. 
255. 
140 Hamaguchi quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 455. 
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“The Rikken Minseitō is not made from the top but is being built from the bottom up. 
Based on its members in the provinces all over the country, chapters are set up. The 
central headquarters is established on these provincial chapters, so that the will from the 
provinces reaches the center, and the central direction reaches the provinces.”
141
  
 
 
The 1928 General Election 
Following an established pattern, in late 1927, the incoming Seiyūkai government 
dissolved the Diet and called a general election for early 1928. The cabinet calculated that 
through the ministry of the interior, then headed by Suzuki Kisaburō, and the police force - which 
was controlled by said ministry - the Seiyūkai would be able to influence the election so as to 
strengthen their support base and possibly even gain an absolute majority in the Diet.  
The 1928 general election was Japan’s first held under universal suffrage, where 
“universal” meant all men over the age of 25 were eligible to vote, making for a dramatic 
increase in the electorate. Nakano’s electoral district, which included not only urban Fukuoka but 
also the surrounding rural districts, now counted 110,127 registered voters, up from less than ten 
thousand. The sheer size of the new electorate, as well as the fact that three-quarters of voters 
lived in rural districts, rendered the tradition of visiting and bribing individual voters at their 
homes completely impracticable. Speechmaking continued to be crucial to campaigning, but, 
more than ever before, printed mass media - including posters,
142
 hand-outs and, especially, 
newspapers - came to play a central role in the campaign process. The fact that Nakano had 
become president of the Kyūshū Nippō just prior to the election proved invaluable in winning 
votes over the coming weeks.  
                                                     
141 Nakano Seigō quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 455. 
142 The February 18, 1928 issue of the Kyūshū Nippō wrote that “The streets of Fukuoka 
look like there was a poster exhibition.” Quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol.1, p. 469.  
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Still, the campaign was tough. For one, as head of the Minseitō’s election campaign bureau, 
Nakano had to tour the country supporting candidates in other districts and thus could not devote 
himself wholeheartedly to campaigning in Fukuoka. Even more important, his opponents from 
the Seiyūkai could count on the police to interfere on their behalf. At the campaign’s outset, 
Nakano got a taste of what government interference could mean, as the police entered the Gakan 
offices and confiscated a pamphlet Nakano had intended to use in the campaign. But while the 
government was able to obstruct the pamphlet’s distribution, its intention to torpedo Nakano’s 
campaign backfired, as the incident was reported in newspapers across Japan. Nakano also used it 
to attack the government in subsequent campaign speeches.  
Most commonly, police interference in the election took the form of censoring speeches. 
All political speeches were monitored by a police officer who was authorized to interrupt or even 
end a speech for content deemed out of order. Doing so was a double-edged sword, however, for 
police interference could win voters’ sympathies. When Nakano in a February 9, 1928 speech 
attacked the government’s confiscation of his pamphlet, the police officer monitoring the speech 
issued a “Warning” [┑牀 also meaning “attention”]. When Nakano parried the interjection with 
irony, the officer asked Nakano to “Stop” [腎驗]. Nakano continued teasing the officer by 
pretending not to have understood; much to the delight of his audience, he asked innocently: “Do 
you want me to stop?” Onlookers began shouting slogans such as “Police Oppression” [㍽弭闢
蜻 ] and “Election Interference” [ぬ竕朧葛 ], enabling Nakano to continue. 143  Unofficial 
interferences by hecklers were harder, though not impossible, to handle. On February 17, 1928, a 
tin can filled with human excrement was hurled at Nakano from among the audience; Nakano 
simply continued his speech while the culprit was apprehended.  
Nakano won the election thanks to his oratory skills and control over the Kyūshū Nippō, 
                                                     
143 Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 469. 
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obtaining 18,761 votes - more than any other candidate in his district. Overall, the election 
produced a stalemate in the Diet, yielding almost an equal number of seats to the two established 
parties (219 for the Minseitō and 217 for the Seiyūkai).  
 
Nakano against Tanaka and the Seiyūkai 
Encouraged by his victory, Nakano left Fukuoka three days after the election and – in his 
own words - “returned to the capital to overthrow the cabinet.”
144
 Even before the Diet opened, 
the Minseitō put out feelers to see if there was a majority for a vote of non-confidence to topple 
the Tanaka cabinet. The response from the other opposition parties was lukewarm.
145
 Still, after 
the opening of the 55
th
 extraordinary Diet, the Minseitō led the opposition parties in submitting a 
bill demanding, among other things, the impeachment of Suzuki Kisaburō, Minister of the 
Interior, for using the police to interfere in the election. The bill also proposed laws that would 
make future interference difficult or impossible.
146
 While this bill passed with the support of the 
other opposition parties, forcing Suzuki’s resignation, the Seiyūkai blocked a subsequent vote of 
non-confidence in the cabinet.  
After the Diet’s closing, Nakano - who had played a central role in each anti-Cabinet move 
- continued harassing the government over Tanaka’s China policy. In the 1920s, China presented 
a dilemma to Japanese policy makers. Should Japan support the Kuomintang government under 
Chiang Kai-shek, heir to the republican revolution of 1911, which controlled southern China and 
was attempting to unify the country through a series of military campaigns? Such had been the 
foreign policy of the Kenseikai cabinets up to 1927, despite the fact the Kuomintang’s closeness 
                                                     
144 Nakano Seigō in the Kyūshū Nippō, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 470.  
145 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 472. 
146 The bill also attacked the government’s heavy-handed dealing with left-wing radicals 
during the wave of mass arrests that had swept through Japan on March 15, 1928.   
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to the Communists and the prospect of military conflicts in the north, where most of Japan’s 
interests were, made it a risky option. Alternatively, Japan could try supporting regional leaders, 
so-called ‘warlords’ who controlled portions of China’s north, in hopes that the warlords would, 
in exchange, act as protectors of Japanese interests in the area. By supporting the warlords, 
however, Japan stood in the way of Chinese unification and thus risked antagonizing Chinese 
nationalist sentiment. Unable to choose between these two options, Tanaka - who served 
concurrently as Prime and Foreign Minister - did a bit of both, with disastrous results.  
Things initially looked promising enough. In late 1927, Tanaka met with Chiang Kai-shek 
and agreed that Japan would recognize China’s unification under the Kuomintang as long as the 
Kuomintang distanced itself from the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union. Chiang 
kept his word, announcing a break with the Chinese Communist Party and ending relations with 
the Soviet Union. Tanaka did not. When Chiang’s troops moved north the following spring to 
take control of northern China, Tanaka sent expeditionary troops to the Shandong to protect 
Japanese residents, de facto also shielding northern warlord Chang Tsuo-lin.
147
 Japanese and 
Chinese nationalist troops clashed in the city of Jinan on March 3, 1928, bringing anti-Japanese 
sentiment in China to a boil.  
While the Tanaka government seemed to be supporting Chang Tsuo-lin’s regime, Japanese 
officers on the Chinese mainland decided he stood no chance against Chiang Kai-shek’s troops 
and believed the only way to avoid a bloody conflict in northern China was to get rid of Chang. 
Without informing (let alone asking for permission from) Tokyo, on June 3, 1928, they blew up 
Chang’s railway carriage, killing him. This let Chiang Kai-shek move his troops to Beijing 
unopposed and thus completed the unification of China, but rumors that Chang had fallen victim 
                                                     
147 Chang Tsuo-lin [槨捜酖] (1875 – 1928) Chinese warlord in control of northern China. 
Nakano had met Chang Tsuo-lin in the fall of 1920 when traveling through Manchuria and 
Korea and described his personality in Nakano Seigō, “Reflections in the Mirror of 
Manchuria and Korea”, p. 168.  
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to Japanese scheming further fanned the flames of anti-Japanese feelings in China.       
Nakano’s criticism accompanied Tanaka as his policy stumbled from one disaster to the 
next in China. Speaking to an audience that included Fukuoka businessmen on July 31, 1928, 
Nakano blamed Tanaka’s policy not only for the rise of anti-Japanese boycotts in China, but also 
for the loss of Japanese lives during the Jinan Incident.
148
 Nakano said Tanaka’s policy meant 
anti-Japanese sentiment had become stronger than ever, so much so that “in the area around 
Shanghai even children know that he [Tanaka] is a sworn enemy.”
149
 In a pamphlet called “The 
Miserable Failure of the Tanaka Foreign Policy,” Nakano stated categorically that “China’s 
unification is the over-riding trend of modern China” and noted that anyone opposing it risked 
“having to face the whole of China as an enemy.” Rather than seeing Chinese unification as a 
threat to Japan, Nakano argued it should be viewed as “a natural historical development” [橲®貢
髏別ª̇悽] that did not contradict Japan’s interests.150  
Nakano’s most famous and influential attack on Tanaka, however, came during the 
Question and Answer sessions of budgetary hearings at the beginning of the 56
th
 Diet. Before the 
Diet’s opening, Tanaka met with opposition leaders and requested that they exclude the Chang 
Tsuo-lin Incident from debate because of its international implications.
151
 They refused and when 
                                                     
148 Subsequent quotes are taken from the speech “Renewal of the Policy vis-à-vis China” [徙
腑膕ø貢蠍范] published in “Appealing to the People: A collection of speeches by Nakano 
Seigō” [楼鴈行ヰ康:腎ǒ驟悩哢儲㌲滾], (Tokyo: Heibon-sha [霸独だ], April, 1929), p. 213-316. 
For Tanaka’s responsibility see Ibid. p. 242. 
149 Ibid., p. 297. 
150 Quotes taken from Nakano Seigō, “The Miserable Failure of the Tanaka Foreign Policy” 
[譓腎咤誓貢複臍 ], (Tokyo December 1928), partly reproduced in Inomata, p. 270 and 
following. 
151 According to general Kaneko Sada‘ichi, the army officer in charge of investigating the 
assassination of Chang Tsuo-lin, Tanaka had been informed that the bombing had been 
carried out by the Japanese army on October 18, 1928. Thus, while Tanaka knew this, 
Nakano – according to Kaneko – remained ignorant. See Kaneko Sada’ichi [ů岌巵慎]; “A 
military man’s view on Nakano Seigō”[慎ヲ斥貢ö鵠腎ǒ驟悩] in Japan and the Japanese [荳
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the Diet opened on January 22, 1929, Nagai Ryūtarō of the Minseitō was the first to bring up the 
subject. Three days later, Nakano took the stand and over the course of three full days (January 
25, 26 and 29) pummeled Tanaka and his Army Minister Shirakawa with a barrage of questions. 
Tanaka initially tried answering Nakano’s queries, but Nakano’s relentlessness meant Tanaka’s 
answers grew increasingly shorter and evasive. On day three, Nakano’s mentor, Adachi, took 
Nakano aside and asked him “to wrap it up” as Tanaka was “already screaming for mercy.”
152
 
Nakano concluded by asking for Tanaka’s resignation.  
While Nakano did not attain his aim of toppling the government at this stage, his duel with 
Prime Minister Tanaka was reported widely in the press, adding to Nakano’s fame. On January 30, 
the Yomiuri celebrated Nakano’s stand in the Diet, writing:  
 
“Today it was again Nakano Seigō from the Minseitō who put Prime Minister Tanaka in 
a tight spot by pressing him for an answer concerning the important incident.  
….[Tanaka] was confused and his answers were incoherent. In the end he sought shelter 
behind phrases such as “This is presently being investigated”, “I am not responsible” or 
“I won’t take responsibility for that.”
153
    
 
The fight against Tanaka also improved Nakano’s position within the Minseitō, where 
became known for his oratorical skills, for his expertise on China and as a “heroic fighter.”
154
 
Together with Nagai Ryūtarō, Nakano was now seen as one of the party’s rising stars; both could 
reasonably hope to be offered influential positions when the Minseitō was asked to form the next 
cabinet. 
                                                                                                                                                              
袿沸砿荳袿斥], April, 1956. 
152 Adachi quoted in Inomata p. 287.   
153 The Yomiuri Shimbun, January 30, 1929, quoted in Inomata p. 287-88. 
154 This at least is how Nakano was described in the 1930 edition of “Meiji & Taishō 
History: Taishō Personalities” [蕚齠哢驟別―哢驟斥鞭ウ怒], ed. Noyori Hideichi [ǒ属┵斃], 
(Tokyo, 1930). 
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Nakano’s Role in the Hamaguchi Cabinet 
When the Tanaka cabinet finally fell in the summer of 1929, Minseitō president 
Hamaguchi Osachi was asked to form the next cabinet. His administration set out an ambitious 
program, foreseeing fiscal retrenchment, a return to the gold standard, public-official pay cuts, 
armament reductions, and the rationalization of industry. To gain a favorable majority in the Diet, 
Hamaguchi called a general election for February 1930; he won 103 seats (up from 170), taking 
his total to 273 and giving him a wide lead over the Seiyūkai, which counted only 174 
representatives. Most of the credit for this victory went to Nakano’s mentor Adachi, Minster of 
the Interior under Hamaguchi, but Nakano, as head of the party’s election campaign bureau, also 
contributed to the victory and was himself returned comfortably to parliament.
155
  
Bolstered by an absolute majority, the Hamaguchi cabinet began implementing its 
ambitious program - with catastrophic results. As the effects of the Great Depression reached 
Japan and the domestic economy slowed, fiscal retrenchment and returning to the gold standard 
made a bad situation worse. The cabinet’s most controversial move, however, was ratifying the 
London Naval Arms Treaty submitted to the 58
th
 extraordinary Diet in April 1930, which brought 
the cabinet into conflict with the armed services, right-wing groups and the Privy Council. The 
right-wing activist who shot and wounded Hamaguchi on November 14 justified his act on the 
grounds that the cabinet’s policies had worsened the recession, increased unemployment and 
weakened the imperial navy. While Hamaguchi was in hospital, his duties were carried out by 
Foreign Minister Shidehara. After Hamaguchi’s death in the spring of 1931, he was succeeded by 
                                                     
155 As head of the party’s election campaign bureau, Nakano had introduced new media 
such as film showings of speeches by Hamaguchi, Adachi and other important party figures 
into the election campaign process. This not only made it possible to transport speeches to 
more than one location at a time, film showing also greatly impressed voters in the 
countryside where movies were still rare. Unfortunately, it also opened the opportunity for 
new ways of sabotaging election campaigns. In Fukuoka one of the showing was interrupted 
by a Seiyūkai supporter cutting the cables to the speakers. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 532. 
 167 
party president Wakatsuki.    
Nakano’s role in the Hamaguchi administration was somewhat removed from these tragic 
events and much less dramatic. For his efforts on the party’s behalf, Nakano won the position of 
parliamentary vice-minister [膕鳩饅巫] within the Ministry of Communications [ヷ袋ÿ]. 
Compared to Nagai Ryūtarō, who had been made parliamentary vice-minister in the more 
prestigious Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nakano’s posting was somewhat of a disappointment; 
Nakano noted that he considered the decision strange.
156
  
In fact, the appointment came not because of Nakano’s expertise (the ministry managed 
Japan’s telecommunications network), but rather because the Minister of Communications, 
Koizumi Matajirō
157
, was the only cabinet member who did not the object to having a “wild card” 
[潼㮈]158 such as Nakano on his team. Nakano’s placement in Koizumi’s ministry also had its 
perks. Koizumi gave Nakano wide-ranging freedom and responsibilities, telling him in one of 
their initial talks that he would “leave all political matters in your hands and concentrate mainly 
on harmonizing relations with the party.”
159
 Nakano accepted the position because he saw it “as 
an opportunity to learn.”
160
 Over the next 18 months, he immersed himself in reforming the 
Japanese telecommunications network, producing a proposal for its privatization that bore some 
similarity to the privatization carried out in post-war Japan.  
                                                     
156 See Nakano Seigō [腎ǒ驟悩]; “Until I return to the Party Headquarters” [妬袿グ行昜鵠
合腔], in Gakan [癪に]; February, 1931, p. 22-28. 
157 Koizumi Matajirō [恠龜弗饅ア] (1856-1951), politician. Nakano had known Matajirō 
since at least 1925 when he presented him with a dog, which he brought back from his trip to 
Siberia and Manchuria. Koizumi was the grandfather of later Prime Minister Koizumi 
Jun’ichirō. 
158 Ogata, p. 39. 
159 Koizumi quoted in Inomata, p. 292. 
160 Nakano Seigō [腎ǒ驟悩]; “Until I return to the Party Headquarters” [妬袿グ行昜鵠合腔], 
in Gakan [癪に], February, 1931, p. 22-28. 
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Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Communications 
As parliamentary vice-minister, Nakano quickly engaged in pork-barrel politics, 
distributing favors to past - and hopefully future - supporters. One of his first decisions at the 
Ministry of Communications was opposing bureaucratic salary cuts, which the government had 
made part of their fiscal retrenchment program. Nakano’s stance won him great popularity among 
ministry officials and facilitated his eventual appointment to an executive position in the 
ministry’s union. Similarly, he favored the application of the Kyūshū Electric Association for a 
research facility over competing applications from other regions.    
Nakano’s main project at the ministry, however, was the “Plan for the Privatization of the 
Telegraph and Telephone Business” [袞袋袞㌄征釡貢鴈遊贐]. Japan had followed the examples 
of the Western Powers by providing telecommunication services through a state-owned and -run 
monopoly. In formulating the privatization proposal, Nakano was heavily influenced by G.D.H. 
Cole’s “The Next Ten Years in British Social and Economic Policy,”
161
 to which he had been 
introduced by his longtime friend, Prof. Sugimori from Waseda.  
 Japanese literature often stresses how much energy Nakano poured into this proposal’s 
development and how his enthusiasm rubbed off on ministry officials. After the initial proposal 
passed at the cabinet level, the ministry’s bureaucrats carried out a massive research project under 
Nakano’s leadership. Amid the hottest summer in years, truckloads of documents were brought to 
the ministry, sifted through and analyzed. The ministry’s staff worked not only until late at night 
but also on weekends and holidays, and it is said that two officials actually collapsed at work due 
                                                     
161 George Douglas Howard Cole “The Next Ten Years of British Social and Economic 
Policy”, (London, 1929). Nakano was so taken with Cole’s ideas that he pushed Senkura 
Publishing to translate the text and publish it in Japanese. The translation prepared by 
Shimizu Motohisa [拐鵈填徘] was published in 1931 under the title “State control of the 
Economy”[42喝貢楼广67韮] (Tokyo, Senkura Shobō, 1931) and included a preface by Nakano. 
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to exhaustion. The plan Nakano developed with their help proposed creating a private company 
under government control. According to Nakano:  
 
“The plan foresaw that the operation of the telegraph and telephone services would 
remain firmly in the hands of the government, while construction, improvement and 
maintenance were to be carried out by a semi-public/semi-private corporation that 
would be financed by private capital. … The expansion [of the infrastructure] would 
proceed at a pace twice as fast as today’s. … If this proposal were carried out, the 
installation of a telephone line would no longer require a large sum of money such as 
one thousand or several hundred Yen, as is the case today. A small special monthly 
installment payment would suffice entirely.”
162
  
 
When the proposal, which had been kept secret during its development, was finally 
announced on July 1, 1930, it caused quite a stir. In the words of a contemporary journalist, the 
proposal ran counter to “the economic principles then in vogue worldwide, which stated that all 
public utilities should be run by the government.”
163
 The proposal drew criticism in particular 
from left-wing parties, who feared that private ownership of the telecommunications 
infrastructure would drive up the prices of telecommunication services, rendering them affordable 
only to the rich. Nakano countered that while private capital would fuel the network’s expansion, 
the network itself would remain under government control.
164
  
In the end, however, it was not criticism by left-wing parties that torpedoed the proposal, 
but rather the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Hamaguchi in Tokyo Station. Foreign 
Minister Shidehara, who took over Hamaguchi’s duties, declared that all controversial bills or 
policies would be temporarily put on ice and that the government would concentrate on neutral 
themes until the situation calmed down. Nakano’s proposal was among this decision’s first 
                                                     
162 Nakano Seigō [腎ǒ驟悩]; “Until I Return to the Party Headquarters” [妬袿グ行昜鵠合
腔]; in Gakan [癪に]; February, 1931, p. 22-28. 
163 Unnamed journalist quoted in Inomata, p. 295. 
164 See Inomata, p. 296.   
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victims. Sensing that the project’s postponement was probably its death, Nakano resigned from 
his position as parliamentary vice-minister in November 1930.  
 
Intra-Party Struggle Over Hamaguchi’s Succession  
Nakano’s resignation has been seen by some biographers as “the turning point in his 
political life, as it marked the limit of his adaptation to a career pattern within the established 
order and the beginning” of his move away from liberalism.
165
 While true, this only became clear 
in retrospect. At the time, Nakano certainly did not think of it as a turning point, but as, at best, a 
setback. The title of one of Nakano’s essays of the time - “Until I Return to Party 
Headquarters”
166
 - makes clear his intention to return quickly to a position of power within the 
Minseitō. Only after all his attempts to re-integrate himself into the established order had failed 
did he turn away.  
For the time being, Nakano continued defending the Minseitō party and government 
against outside attacks (be they from the Seiyūkai, the Army or elsewhere), while engaging in 
intra-party power struggles. As Hamaguchi fought for his life, the party prepared to fill the two 
positions his death would open. Temporary prime ministership went automatically to 
vice-premier and Foreign Minister Shidehara (himself a member of the bureaucratic faction), but 
only for the duration of Hamaguchi’s hospitalization. More important in the long term was the 
party presidency, for the Minseitō president would in all likelihood form the next cabinet after 
Hamaguchi’s death. Accordingly, the pure party faction to which Nakano belonged tried securing 
the party presidency for their leader, Adachi.  
As early as December 12, the young pure party politicians proposed a resolution according 
                                                     
165 Oates, p. 42-43. 
166 Nakano Seigō, “Until I Return to Party Headquarters” [妬袿グ行昜鵠合腔], in Gakan, 
February 1931, p. 24-5. 
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to which, “until the complete recovery of our president [Hamaguchi], an important figure from 
within or party should be elected to serve as temporary Prime Minister.”
167
 There was little doubt 
that the “important party figure” allusion targeted Adachi. When this resolution failed to produce 
the desired shift in Minseitō policy, Nakano appealed directly to the bed-ridden Hamaguchi.  
In a much-quoted letter to Hamaguchi, Nakano expressed his misgivings about seeing 
Shidehara become Prime Minister. Nakano believed Shidehara was not suited to “act as the 
representative of the Minseitō cabinet” because he was “not a party member” and had “publicly 
declared that he is ashamed of being a party politician.”
168
 Nakano directly advocated making 
Adachi, whom he called “fair and without conceit, careful in his dealings and never selfish,”
169
 
party president. He concluded his letter: “Adachi has always respected your wishes with respect 
to party affairs. … would be able to restore the party’s prestige internally and externally. … If you 
don’t believe that Adachi would make a clear-headed president, I don’t know what else to say.”
170
  
Nakano’s exertions on Adachi’s behalf were not without self-interest. Had he succeeded in 
convincing Hamaguchi to make Adachi his successor, Adachi might very well have become 
Japan’s next Prime Minister – and Nakano would likely have been offered a ministerial portfolio. 
In spite of Nakano’s efforts, however, Hamaguchi handed the party presidency to bureaucrat 
Wakatsuki Reijirō. Accordingly, when on April 13, 1931 the entire cabinet resigned due to 
Hamaguchi’s worsening medical condition (he died of his injuries on August 26 of the same year), 
the prime ministership went to Wakatsuki and Nakano was not offered a ministerial position.  
 
                                                     
167 Quoted in Inomata, p. 302. 
168 Nakano’s letter to Hamaguchi dated January 8, 1931, reproduced in Nakano Seigō, 
“Trends of Japan in Transition” [ゞ絋荳袿貢罰圃], (Tokyo, 1932), p.56-76, quote taken from p. 
58-59. 
169 Ibid. p. 63. 
170 Ibid., p. 64-65. 
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Movement for the Coalition Cabinet  
Temporarily relegated to the political sidelines, Nakano concentrated on writing. This 
relatively politics-free interlude ended with the Manchurian Incident of September 1931, in 
which young army officers took control of Manchuria. The move, carried out without permission, 
let alone orders, from Tokyo, was welcomed enthusiastically by the Japanese public but caused 
great division within the government. The Wakatsuki cabinet was soon split between the Army 
Minister, who wanted to separate Manchuria from China, and most of the other cabinet ministers 
(but especially Foreign Minister Shidehara), who wanted to discipline the army and come to a 
diplomatically negotiated solution with the Chinese government. Sensing that public opinion 
supported the army hard liners, Nakano, who heard the news while recovering from dengue fever 
in Kyūshū, returned to Tokyo and started lobbying on their behalf. Arguing the case for 
intervention, Nakano met with his party elders, including Wakatsuki and Shidehara, and 
recommended separating Manchuria from China.
171
   
As the government hesitated and the crisis persisted, Nakano hoped to capitalize on the 
government’s weakness by supporting a move for a coalition government supported by both the 
Minseitō and the Seiyūkai. The idea was launched by Wakatsuki after the October 17 Incident, in 
which young officers tried to carry out a coup d’état, and was driven by the hope that a coalition 
cabinet supported by the entire people would have more authority to deal with the disobedient 
                                                     
171 More specifically, Nakano told Wakatsuki: “As for the Manchurian problem, even in the 
worst case, the Powers will not send any soldiers in cooperation against Japan, because the 
mutually competitive nationalism of Europe has become ever stronger and keeps them from 
reaching out and cooperating. Also the economy, industry and livelihood of the world’s 
Powers are at risk beyond description. They have problems in their own kitchen. There is not 
a single country which at a time like this has been spare time and money to run out the back 
door to interfere in a fight between Japan and China in their backyard. No need to worry.” 
Nakano Seigō in a speech held January 15, 1932 titled “The Political Situation and the 
Direction of our Movement” [膕悄貢*ù膏捧歸貢罰圃] quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 
604-07.      
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army.
172
 Nakano readily embraced the notion, not so much because he was keen to chastise the 
now-popular army, but because he sensed that a coalition cabinet might return the political parties 
- and, more importantly, the Minseitō’s Adachi faction - back to the political center. While 
different versions of the idea bounced around Japan’s political world, the version for which 
Nakano campaigned feverishly foresaw the establishment of a coalition government between the 
Seiyūkai under Inukai and the Minseitō under Adachi (because Adachi enjoyed the trust of the 
army). In either case, Nakano was reasonably sure to be given an important position.  
Between mid-October and mid-December 1931, Nakano visited not only party elders but 
also army officers, businessmen, Seiyūkai members, and even Inukai himself (offering him the 
premiership in the would-be coalition cabinet) to gain support for the idea. But Nakano’s frenzied 
activity itself caused the scheme to fail. As Adachi put it: “Nakano Seigō did not keep a secret a 
secret. Because he told everyone, solidarity among the [Wakatsuki] cabinet strengthened as each 
cabinet member feared for his post, tried to protect himself and opposed the idea.”
173
 On 
December 11, Wakatsuki announced that he would not be part of a coalition cabinet and asked 
Adachi to either abandon the scheme or withdraw from his cabinet post. When Adachi did not 
reply within the given time, the Wakatsuki cabinet resigned in toto on December 13, 1931. On the 
same day, both Adachi and Nakano left the Minseitō in protest. Over the next month, they were 
followed by most of the members of the Adachi faction.
174
 The notable exception was Nakano’s 
                                                     
172 Wakatsuki’s recollection of the events (followed by Nakano’s) can be found in Ogata, p. 
156-164. 
173 Adachi Kenzō [嶢けバーツ24], “The Autobiography of Adachi Kenzō” [嶢けバーツ2460粉然], (Tokyo, 
1960), p. 268-69. 
174 Those who left with Adachi were: Sugiura Takeo [襃④驥渣] (1890-?), Tanaka Kiyotatsu 
[譓腎掃け] (1885 - ?), Miura Torao [申④よ渣] (1883 - ?), Yutani Yoshiharu [譿〞コ齠] (1888 – 
1958), Okano Ryū’ichi [慟ǒ瀹慎] (1893 - ?), Kangyū Tsuneo [Ǎ⬆独啌] (1894 - ?), Kuhara 
Fusanosuke [睡譜蘯翠拍] (1869 - 1965), Yamaji (also Yamamichi) Jō’ichi [愾ぐd慎], (1882 - 
1941), and Tomita Kōjirō [廬譓杁饅ア] (1897 – 1938). Tomita, however, soon returned to the 
Minseitō.  
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rival, Nagai Ryūtarō, who chose to remain behind, soon founded his own faction within the 
Minseitō and eventually became a minister in the Saitō cabinet.
175
 Hopes that Adachi, as leader 
of this group of renegades, would be offered a position in the next cabinet - a Seiyūkai cabinet 
formed by Inukai - were not fulfilled, and this final burst of activity marked the end of Nakano’s 
career within the established parties.  
 
Conclusions: Domestic Politics  
In what ways did Nakano’s political views develop in the 1920s, as the youthful ideals he 
had developed during his days as a journalist clashed with the sobering harshness of the real 
world? As has been shown, Nakano’s central domestic objective was fostering popular 
participation in politics. One might thus expect the 1920s, which saw the introduction of 
universal suffrage, the emergence of party-cabinets and of Diet-centered politics - in short, the 
flowering of democracy in Japan despite some setbacks including the Peace Preservation Law – 
to have brought Nakano the satisfaction of a goal fulfilled and the promise of a future aligned 
with his ideals. And yet they did not.  
Nakano continued to be frustrated by the way in which the Japanese people participated in 
politics. He deplored the lack of a popular party. Having tried in vain to establish such a party for 
the first part of the 1920s, Nakano in 1924 concluded the attempt had been premature and hence 
joined the Kenseikai. When the Kenseikai transformed itself into the Minseitō, Nakano, as head 
of the propaganda bureau, was able to give it a popular coloring - but the transformation 
remained largely superficial and the party continued relying on traditional power structures. 
Comparing China and Japan with respect to popular political awakening, Nakano wrote in 1929:  
 
                                                     
175 See Oates, p. 46. 
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“Within the Chinese people … popular awareness [鴈茘60き] has gradually been 
fostered. In the past, the working classes submitted unconditionally to the ruling classes 
and did not even have the right to speak, but today political awareness is appearing 
within the laboring classes. … In Japan, Tanaka is still at the helm of the cabinet, and 
keeps plowing on with no end in sight. According to public opinion, the reason Tanaka 
cannot be overthrown is that our Minseitō lacks verve, but you could also wonder if this 
is not a result of the fact that our labor class has not yet politically awoken. In China, 
the atmosphere of the politically awoken laboring class has swept away Chang Tsuo-lin, 
while our people seem to unable to topple the Tanaka cabinet even under universal 
suffrage. This is truly a great shame.”
 176
  
 
Nakano never gave a single coherent explanation for Japanese voters’ failure to awake and 
play the role he had cast for them, but it is possible to piece together a number of factors that he 
held responsible.  
First and fundamentally, the nature of Japanese education instilled a “worship of the 
powerful” [征哢厨コ]177 that rendered citizens docile subjects incapable of independent critical 
thought. Second, political parties - which Nakano envisioned as vehicles of popular participation 
in politics - were instead vehicles of the land-owning class and, with Japan’s industrialization, 
increasingly of the business class. Nakano deplored this in his letter to Hamaguchi dated January 
1931:   
     
“Another uncomfortable point that I cannot bear is that our party is exhibiting all the 
symptoms of being the political bureau of Mitsubishi [i.e. the Mitsubishi Zaibatsu]. 
When the head of Mitsubishi barks, the Minseitō will move; when his son-in-law 
Shidehara appears then the 270 men of the Minseitō will happily submit to him. Even if 
politics require money, politicians should not be the servants of money.”
178
  
 
                                                     
176 Nakano Seigō, “Appealing to the People: A collection of speeches by Nakano Seigō”, p. 
225-26. 
177 For Nakano’s explanation of the concept see “Reflections in the Mirror of Manchuria and 
Korea”, p. 5.  
178 Letter from Nakano to Hamaguchi dated January 8, 1931, reproduced in Nakano Seigō, 
“Trends of Japan in Transition” [ゞ絋荳袿貢罰圃], (Tokyo, 1932), p. 56-67, the quote is taken 
from p. 62. 
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Third and lastly, non-popularly-elected elites continued to hold more power than Nakano 
thought they deserved. In the course of the 1920s, Nakano picked fights with both the military 
and the Privy Council over their interference in Diet politics. Even within political parties, the 
power of non-party elites was greater than Nakano liked, as he discovered after Hamaguchi’s 
assassination ushered in the rise of the Minseitō’s bureaucratic faction. In short, while popular 
participation in politics had been rendered possible by universal suffrage, the political awakening 
and emancipation of the Japanese people and the launch of a popular mass party remained 
elusive. 
It is tempting to sum up Nakano’s life in the 1920s as that of a typical young man entering 
politics with lofty ideals and then, when confronted with reality, slowly accommodating himself 
with the political status quo until he eventually became a firm supporter thereof. This reading 
would be superficial. Nakano engaged with and tackled the political realities of his day and in the 
course was indeed drawn away from his ideals, but he did not surrender them. When confronted 
with the crisis of 1929-31, in fact, he abandoned his place within the established parties and 
returned to his ideals – not the other way around.  
 
Foreign Relations 
Nakano’s views on foreign relations at the decade’s outset had been ordered around the 
fundamental distinction between the colonial Powers and the colonized nations. He believed 
Japan’s mission was to lead the colonized nations of Asia (and, if possible, the world) to freedom 
by challenging the Western Powers’ dominance. Nakano’s frustration with Japanese foreign 
policy in the 1920s thus arose mainly from the fact that Japan chose, instead, to embark on a 
colonial program of its own. The main contradiction in Nakano’s thinking was his unwillingness 
to concede to Chinese or Korean representatives that Japan had actually become a colonial 
empire itself.   
 177 
In the course of the decade, the basic distinction between colonizer and colonized was 
partially supplanted by distinctions between haves and have-nots, or between capitalist and 
proletarian nations – terms first popularized in Japan by Kita Ikki.
179
 According to Nakano, 
“from an international perspective, Japan is a proletarian [nation]. Our people who have an 
interest in the domestic proletarian movement should direct the same consciousness against the 
international capitalist [nations], that is, England and America.”
180
 
Nakano’s view regarding which countries were capitalist and which were proletarian 
remained in flux throughout the 1920s. In the decade’s first half, Nakano included Soviet Russia 
in the proletarian camp, mainly because Russia challenged the international order on ideological 
grounds. This move made Russia Japan’s natural ally and partially explains Nakano’s support for 
recognizing the Soviet regime, as well as his advocacy on behalf of Russia’s admission to the 
League of Nations. In the decade’s latter half, Nakano included Russia more often among the 
capitalist nations because, like England and America, Russia held “vast territories and 
resources.”
181
    
The capitalist vs. proletarian worldview led Nakano to see two options for Japanese foreign 
policy. First, with the cooperation of the capitalist Powers, Japan could strive to establish a more 
egalitarian international order. This could only be achieved, however, if the principles imposed by 
the Western Powers in East Asia - armament reduction, free movement of people, open markets, 
and free access to resources - were applied equally to the rest of the world. Thus, when discussing 
                                                     
179 The origin of the term “Proletarian Nation” is disputed. Gordon credits it to Corradini 
while Sottile claims that it was coined by Gramsci. See Andrew Gordon, Labor and Imperial 
Democracy in Imperial Japan, (Berkeley, 1991), p. 255, note 52 and Joseph P. Sottile, “The 
Fascist Era: Imperial Japan and the Axis Alliance in Historical Perspective” in Japan in the 
Fascist Era, ed. E. Bruce Reynolds, (New York, 2004), p. 24. 
180 Nakano Seigō, “Appealing to the People: A collection of speeches by Nakano Seigō”, p. 
301. 
181 Ibid., p. 301. 
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the Western Powers’ support for a Chinese open-door policy, Nakano demanded a “global 
open-door policy” [身鈐ª著盡梅膠], saying: “Open the door to India, liberate the region subject 
to the Monroe doctrine, leave Africa,  Oceania, to the free movement of the world’s people!”
182
 
Nakano demanded a worldwide “abolition of all economic barriers to resources and markets.”
183
 
“The principles of international cosmopolitan economics have been applied to East Asia. 
That is fine with me. However, if these sort of principles of international economics are 
applied to East Asia, why is the same economic liberation not also practiced in Mexico 
and India? … If you advocate international cooperation then you must have 
international economics - that is, trans-national economics that go beyond the 
nation-state and abolish national borders. Otherwise it will remain an ideal - a lifeless 
project on the planning table … However, as a fact, this economic internationalism is 
enforced only in the Far East, while in Europe and America the Powers oppose it and 
stick to their policy of economic seclusion [42喝ªǍ楼厨コ] and nationalism. That 
makes me angry from the bottom of my heart.” 
184
 
 
Nakano railed against what he saw as similar hypocrisy in the Western Powers’ approach to 
arms reduction. Commenting on the armament reductions discussed in Washington in the early 
1920s, Nakano said he had “nothing against armament limitations, in fact I am a passionate 
supporter of them,” only to then ask rhetorically: “What would England say if we proposed 
holding a conference on arms limitations and Indian problems? What would the US do if we were 
to propose a Mexican conference on Pacific Problems?”
185
 
Nakano’s perception of Western bias colored his assessments of the various international 
conferences, treaties, and institutions of the interwar period. The Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty 
of Washington, the Kellog-Briand Pact, and the London Conference were all attempts, in his 
mind, by the Anglo-Saxon Powers to cement their paramount position and realize their “program 
                                                     
182 Ibid., p. 301-04. 
183 Ibid., p. 301. 
184 Nakano Seigō in Diet Speech held on February 19, 1922 quoted in Nakano Yasuo. vol. 1, 
p. 331. 
185 Ibid., p. 330. 
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for control over the world” [ラ̶身鈐腑ョ貢菜咋些碕冴]. The League of Nations was little 
more than a “self-defense league for the strongest among the victors of WW1” and “not suited for 
true international justice.”
 186
 Moreover, Nakano deplored that successive Japanese governments 
supported these arrangements rather than opposing them.  
The second policy option that the capitalist vs. proletarian worldview left open to Japan 
was one Nakano thought it ought to pursue if the Powers refused to cooperate in establishing a 
truly just international order. This option called for Japan to unilaterally carve out its own sphere 
of influence, following the US example of the Monroe Doctrine, which had declared Latin 
America a sphere in which the US would not tolerate interference, and of England, which Nakano 
believed was doing much the same with its colonies. Nakano thus believed Japan should declare a 
“Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine,” according to which the country would not tolerate outside 
interference in the East Asia region.  
Throughout the early part of the decade, Nakano continued to prefer the international 
cooperation option. By the end of the decade, however, he changed his tone, writing, “I don’t 
believe that diplomatic isolation is necessarily a bad thing. On occasion, it may even be necessary 
to oppose the UK and the US in the Far East and act freely and independently of them.”
187
 By 
1931, international isolation had become “honorable”
188
 in his eyes and he gave up on the idea of 
international cooperation altogether.   
 
Relations to Asian Neighbors 
The two policy choices Nakano had outlined for Japan had important implications for the 
                                                     
186 Nakano Seigō, “Appealing to the People”, p. 298. 
187 Ibid., p. 267. 
188 Nakano Seigō, in a speech held February 21, 1933 in expectation of Japan’s withdrawal 
from the League of Nations quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 686.  
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country’s relations with its Asian neighbors, especially China. Since access to overseas markets 
and resources was of paramount importance to proletarian Japan, it could not risk alienating 
China, Russia, or any other neighbors by ignoring popular trends within those countries. Much to 
Nakano’s regret, this was exactly what Japan had done during the Siberian Intervention and, by 
ignoring the reality of Chinese nationalism, was doing again in the second half of the 1920s. 
Nakano wanted Japanese government officials to see that “China’s development is in Japan’s 
interest.”
189
 Instead of dealing with corrupt warlords,  
 
“the partner of our foreign policy must be the national government [i.e. the Kuomintang 
government], which actually holds power. … Otherwise, everything is useless. To deal 
with the government at Mukden [喃啀 , i.e. the warlord regime in the north] and base 
one’s plans on that is just like dealing with and lending support to the regimes of 
Kolchak and Semyonov at the time of the Siberian intervention. It is absolutely 
stupid.”
190
 
 
Nakano believed Prime Minister Tanaka Gi’ichi’s failure to understand this reality caused 
him to situate Japan as an obstacle to China’s development, thereby spurring China’s 
anti-Japanese sentiment and actions. The Western Powers, meanwhile, had played on Chinese 
nationalism to “isolate Japan in the Far East.” Nakano hailed such isolation as “the greatest 
danger for our country on the international level. If we leave it at this, it is only natural that 
relations between Japan and China will come to an end.”
191
 
                                                     
189 Nakano Seigō, “Appealing to the People”, p. 308. 
190 Ibid., p. 274. 
191 Both quotes from Ibid., p. 314-15. It should be noted that in spite of all his sympathy for 
the rise of Chinese nationalism and support for Chinese unification, Nakano continued to 
oppose the idea of returning Japanese rights to China: “I don’t hesitate to feel sympathy, 
even favorably and supportive toward China when it comes to the questions of tax autonomy, 
the abolition of extraterritoriality, but let me state clearly that our country should reject 
Chinese demands for the return of Port Arthur, the Manchurian Railway and Guandong. 
With the exceptions of some patients inhabiting the mental asylums, everybody in Japan 
high and low agrees on this.” Nakano Seigō, “Rebirth of Stagnant Japan” [黏牌荳袿貢蠍﨟], 
Tokyo, August, 1931 quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 587. 
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The chasm between Japan’s actions and Nakano’s ideals widened throughout the decade, 
and his sole refuge was his belief in a far-larger contradiction in the international order through 
which WW1 victors claimed the mantle of fairness while cementing injustice. An important 
continuity in his foreign policy outlook during the decade was his belief that Japan’s foreign 
policy ought to align with foreign countries’ popular trends rather than with the Western Powers’ 
official pronouncements, as popular movements would spur far more dramatic and permanent 
change.
192
  
 
What Might Have Been 
By the end of the 1920s, Nakano had become famous, not only in political circles but also 
to many common people with an interest in contemporary affairs. From at least 1925 on, his 
name was included in Japan’s Who’s Who and appeared frequently in the news.
193
 If celebrity 
can be measured by the fact that the media report even insignificant details about one’s life, 
Nakano met the criteria. His leg surgery in 1926 was covered,
194
 as was his 1932 move to a 
bigger house, when the papers critiqued his style at length. Even Nakano’s youngest brother’s 
marriage to a Spanish woman made the news.  
More than one biographer has remarked that had Nakano remained with the Minseitō at the 
end of 1931, he likely would have eventually headed a ministry or, perhaps, even become Prime 
                                                     
192 For the notion that popular trends cannot be opposed see Nakano Seigō, “Appealing to 
the People”, p. 226 and following. 
193 Both the 1928 edition of “Who is Who” [哢テ斥征砥┐], edited by Ino Saburō [㊝ǒ申ア] 
(Tokyo, 1928) and the 1930 edition of “Meiji & Taishō History: Taishō Personalities” [蕚齠哢
驟別―哢驟斥鞭ウ怒 ], edited Noyori Hideichi [ǒ属┵斃 ] (Tokyo: 1930), contain a short 
biography of Nakano. 
194 Under the headline “Mr. Nakano Seigō is sick. Underwent surgery in order to mend his 
leg. Half the left ankle is rotten”, the August 5, 1926 edition of the Kokumin Shimbun 
reported on Nakano’s surgery.  
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Minister.
195
 Had Nakano, instead, died at that time - perhaps of the dengue fever he contracted in 
September 1931 in Kyūshū - he would likely be remembered as a true liberal, whose 
open-minded approach to communism and socialism and whose unique mixture of scientific 
curiosity and impartial self-confidence put to shame not only many of his contemporaries but also 
many a paranoid cold warrior of the post-WW2 era. A Nakano who passed away in 1931 would 
be remembered as a progressive modernizer – perhaps even a visionary - who more than once 
was ahead of his time. After all, this was a man who, as early as 1919, when his contemporaries 
were still debating whether to grant suffrage to all men over the age of 25, was already 
advocating female suffrage.
196
 His vision of the international economic order - the “global open 
door policy” with free access to markets and resources - became the foundation of unprecedented 
global prosperity in the post-WW2 era. His critique of the Japanese political system (particularly 
of military interference in politics and Zaibatsu financing of political parties) foreshadowed the 
critique underlying the reforms introduced during Japan’s occupation after 1945. Even his plan 
for the privatization of the telecommunications network preempted the post-war privatization that 
led to the establishment of NTT.
197
 Would the reader have guessed that the following extract was 
written by Nakano in 1921 and not by an anthropologist advising the US occupation forces on 
educational reforms in 1947?:   
 
“In modern Japan, the morals that are taught demand submission to special authorities, 
while respect and love for human beings are not established. As long as we do not 
establish respect for oneself and for others, as well as love for oneself and for others; as 
long as we do not establish the SELF [哢60癪] as the commanding principle in the 
hearts of the Japanese people, we don’t have the right to talk … [to others] about love. 
                                                     
195 See Ogata, p. 31. 
196 Although never central to Nakano’s political activities, he took a consistently favorable 
and supportive stance on the question of female suffrage. See Nakano Seigō, “Witnessing the 
Peace Conference” [パスカル北善共同組合惚ò纒浩肱], Tokyo 1919, pp. 255-58. 
197 See “Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩], in Zaikai Kyūshū [⎡鈐枢攀], November 2005, p. 118. 
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… Personally, I propose the term ‘greater individualist’ [哢鐸斥厨コ] to replace today’s 
submissive morals. …The purpose of education is to build people. A complete person is 
an independent autonomous being [″U60厨貢斥].”198  
 
Had Nakano passed away in 1931, he would also be remembered as a man of integrity who, 
despite some contradictions, possessed a strong sense of justice, which he applied even when it 
was not in his interest. Unlike some Pan-Asian intellectuals and activists who talked of Asian 
brotherhood, only to add that Japan would be the elder (leading) brother, Nakano generally meant 
equality when he said it and advocated extending full citizenship rights to Japan’s colonial 
subjects. Unlike many other Pan-Asian thinkers, Nakano attacked racist acts as expressions of 
“mean thinking,”
199
 not only when perpetrated by Europeans, but also when carried out by 
Japanese. Of the many times Nakano made a stand against Japanese racism, one example stands 
out: While traveling through Manchuria in 1920, Nakano wore a traditional Chinese suit, a gift 
from friends. As he tried to board a train, the conductor said a Japanese gentleman traveling alone 
had refused to share his compartment with Nakano, saying: “Me in the same compartment as a 
Chinese? I don’t like Chinks [抗黒購債堺策唆咋広麹紘].” After learning that the gentleman 
was a Japanese army officer, Nakano entered the compartment, confronted the official and, upon 
his return, endeavored to file a complaint about him.
200
  
Overall, an impressive and likable character, was he not? A reader who nods in agreement 
may be surprised to learn that the next thing Nakano - this likable visionary and man of integrity - 
did was to turn fascist.   
                                                     
198 Nakano Seigō, “Reflections in the Mirror of Manchuria and Korea”, p. 18. 
199 Ibid., p. 1 - 5  
200 When Nakano told a Korean about this, the latter replied: “You were lucky to have worn 
Chinese clothing. Had you worn Korean dress, you have gotten beaten up.” This anecdote 
can be found Ibid., p. 163-168.  
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Chapter 4: The Road to Fascism 
 
Introduction  
One way to view Japan’s politial history during the 1930s and early 1940s – and Nakano’s 
role within it – is through the lens of a country gradually stumbling toward war. Mobilization for 
war was in many ways the principle issue of the period and questions of both foreign and 
domestic policy can best be understood in its context. Such questions fall into two broad camps. 
The first is physical – that is, harnessing and channeling the nation’s economic, industrial and 
scientific powers toward waging war. The second is political – that is, gaining the people’s 
consent and, ideally, their cooperation in mobilizing the nation and enduring war’s inevitable 
hardships. Both aspects of Japan’s mobilization were matters of great controversy and the 
military’s encroachment on civilian society was opposed from many sides.  
Those who had known Nakano in the 1920s were surprised by the fact that throughout the 
complex process of negotiating mobilization, he often sided with the army rather than the people. 
The liberal-democratic, populist and seemingly anti-military views he expressed during the 1920s 
led many to expect him, as an elected representative of the people, to resist the expansion of state 
and military power in the 1930s. Instead, he often took the army’s side, helping clear the path for 
the expansion of the state’s hold over its citizenry. Following the Great Depression, Nakano 
systematically abandoned essential elements of a liberalism that championed free markets, party 
politics and representative democracy. His about-face was so severe that, in early 1932, a 
political commentator wondered whether Nakano’s “advocacy of democracy as star of the 
Minseitō had been only pretense.”1 
The policies Nakano came to embrace – including economic controls, a strengthened 
executive branch and a hard line in international relations – smacked of European fascism and 
                                                     
1 Tokyo Asahi News, around March 1932 following Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, from 
the Kenteki [答ů] column, quoted in Inomata p. 349. 
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earned him the label “Japan’s Hitler” 2 as early as 1932. His affinity for the fascist ideology grew 
stronger in subsequent years, but it was only after meeting Mussolini and Hitler in the winter of 
1937-8 that Nakano fully associated himself and his party with the European fascist movements. 
In the course of the 1930s, Nakano’s activities, and those of his party, produced the closest 
imitation of European fascist movements seen in Japan in the inter-war period, complete with 
uniforms, mass rallies, a youth organization, and talk of a “third way” in economics. Nakano and 
his followers also advocated that Japan form an alliance with the European axis powers.  
This chapter traces the nature of, reasons for and consequences following Nakano’s 
ideological shift from liberalism to fascism, a process that began in 1929 and ended in 1938.  The 
shift can be explained by global and domestic political changes as well as by deeper-lying 
internal continuities that span Nakano’s entire intellectual career. 
 
Letting Go of Laissez-Faire 
The first component of liberal thought that Nakano abandoned was his belief in unfettered 
free markets - in the power of Adam Smith’s invisible hand to deliver ideal economic outcomes 
in the presence of a laissez-faire government. Without question, the most important factor in 
Nakano’s move away from classical liberal economics was the economic crisis of the late 1920s 
(which, in Japan, was preceded by the Shōwa banking crisis). The Great Depression threw 
economies around the world into disorder and its length, depth and severity put the efficacy of 
free markets into question. It seemed to be a disease against which the market’s self-healing 
powers were useless and for which liberal economics offered no cure. Classically liberal 
remedies implemented by the Hamaguchi cabinet, which in early 1929 returned Japan to the gold 
standard and debuted a public spending austerity program, seemed only to make things worse; 
                                                     
2 On February 1, 1932 the Tokyo Daily News [┎絢陞陞范ⓥ] commented on Nakano’s leaving the 
Minseitō and his January 15 speech at the Japan Youth Hall under the heading: “Japan’s Hitler – Nakano 
Seigō” quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 644.  
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Finance Minister Inoue Junnosuke’s assurances to the opposite were rendered increasingly 
hollow as the economy sank deeper into recession. Echoing Keynes’ famous dictum that 
government intervention was necessary in the short run because “in the long run we are all dead,” 
Nakano wrote in 1931: “When statesmen talk about financial and economic policy, the one thing 
they should not forget is that the cells of which the national economy is comprised are the lives 
of the people. Long before their orthodox economic principles will show any effect, the lives of 
the people will have withered away and there will be nothing to be done about it.” 3   
Nakano believed fervently that something else had to be done. As the Great Depression put 
orthodox liberalism into question, economists around the world proposed alternative policies.  
Nakano found food for thought among the ideas of G.D.H. Cole4.  In 1929, Sugimori Kōjirō – a 
friend of Nakano’s and a Waseda University professor of political science - had introduced 
Nakano to Cole’s writings, in particular to “The Next Twenty Years of British Social and 
Economic Policy,” 5 in which Cole argued for a more interventionist stance in economic matters. 
Cole’s ideas had heavily influenced Nakano’s proposal for reorganizing Japan’s 
telecommunications industry. Nakano subsequently had Cole’s book translated into Japanese.6 
When the effects of the Great Depression reached Japan, Cole’s interventionist ideas provided 
Nakano with the intellectual equipment to criticize the government’s classical liberal position and 
formulate alternatives.  
                                                     
3 Nakano Seigō; “The Rebirth of Stagnant Japan” [≜⒲᮹ᴀȃ᳈⫳], (Tokyo: Senkura Shobō [गם᳌
᠓], 1931), p. 55. 
4 Cole, George Douglas Howard (1889 – 1959) socialist economist, political scientist, historian and 
author of numerous detective novels.  
5 George Douglas Howard Cole, “The Next Twenty Years of British Social and Economic Policy”, 
(London: Macmillan, 1929). 
6 The Japanese translation of Cole’s book, prepared by Shimizu Motohisa [⏙∈ܗᇓ] and published in 
1931 under the title “State control of the Economy”[㌠⏜ȃ೑ᆊ㍅ࠊ] (Tokyo, Senkura Shob| [桧琢蟷蘯], 
1931) owed its existence to Nakano, who had approached Senkura Publishing and recommended that the 
book be translated into Japanese. Nakano also contributed the preface to the Japanese translation.  
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Nakano’s shift from a classical laissez-faire position to a more interventionist stance was 
gradual. As a member of the governing Minseitō and, especially, as a member of the government 
while serving as Parliamentary Vice-Minister in the Ministry of Communications, Nakano 
muffled his criticism. When, in July 1930, Nakano published a piece entitled “Economic 
Progress through National Controls,” he carefully phrased his argument to ensure it would not 
read like a critique of Inoue’s financial policy. Still, his insistence that only an “active industrial 
economic policy”7- i.e., state intervention in the market - could overcome the crisis was an early 
sign of his departure from liberal laissez-faire principles.  
After resigning from the Communications Ministry, Nakano became more outspoken. The 
differences between his interventionist stance and the Minseitō mainstream’s classical liberalism, 
and especially between Nakano’s opinions and those of Finance Minister Inoue, made Nakano 
somewhat of an opposition force within the party. The increasing discord between Nakano and 
the party leaders is aptly illustrated in the May 1931 issue of the party organ “Minsei” [鍗邏], 
which carried an Inoue speech reading: “There is no policy that will actively turn the present 
recession into an economic boom, and those [policies] that seem to do so will bring about a 
hundred evils and no good.” Inoue’s speech ran alongside an editorial by Nakano Seigō that 
suggested “the planned expansion of sweeping economic policy should be stressed.”8  
A collection of Nakano’s essays from the summer of 1931, published subsequently as a 
book called “Rebirth of Stagnant Japan,”9 show the extent to which Nakano had already departed 
                                                     
7 Nakano Seigō, “Economic Progress through National Controls” [肉垤Â腰｠¯を35洀梗], (Tokyo: 
Heibon-sha [桷坑合名会社], July, 1930), p. 13. 
8  Inoue Junnosuke [哀モ┭φ晒 ], “Breaking out of the Present Crisis and the Continuation of a 
Contractionary Policy” [篨寉羣塍》⁴‘鑷綈｠茗ï ] and Nakano Seigō, “Reflections on the 59th Diet” 
[阿守Нゔ⊘洩は鱡き〉] both in Minsei, May 1931. 
9 The articles had originally been published in the course of 1931 in the Kokumin Shimbun [楼鴈范ⓥ] 
and  Gaikō Jihō [咤誓蕁况] and were then re-published in Nakano Seigō, “The Rebirth of Stagnant Japan” 
[lǍ陞麝｠鴦ナ], (Tokyo: Senkura Shobō [朱粥鵄网],  1931) 
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from both laissez-faire economics as well as the Minseitō mainstream long before he left the 
party at the end of 1932. The essays provide in-depth analyses of the causes of the Great 
Depression, the subsequent deepening of the economic crisis and the breakdown of international 
trade. In his writing, Nakano also unveiled various “active” - that is, interventionist - policy 
proposals to overcome the crisis. He believed that the crisis sprang, in essence, from global 
consumers’ weakened purchasing power. He blamed president Hoover - “a nouveau riche 
politician without education”10 - for leading the US to adopt an economic policy that Nakano 
called “a mercantilist [紞尊ε閒], narrow-minded, national egoism that aims to enrich one’s own 
nation by sacrificing others.”11  Following the stock market crash of October 1929, Hoover began 
raising trade tariffs to protect American industry, setting off a vicious cycle of rising tariffs, 
falling trade and depressed demand around the globe. As other nations followed the American 
example, these beggar-thy-neighbor policies led to the establishment of four economic blocs [弥
磓鈍] - one American, one English, one French, and one Russian. Although Nakano saw the four 
blocs as different in some respects, he wrote that they all shared the basic aim of “autarky [鬘°
鬘僇], even as they jealously eyed each other.”12 
Based on this analysis of the predicament in which Japan and the world found themselves, 
Nakano believed, first, that since the Great Depression had its origins in the United States, any 
solution also had to come from America. Ideally, he hoped the US government would cancel “the 
war debt and [abolish] tariffs on trade, which would as good for the world as it would be for the 
                                                     
10 Ibid., p. 12. 
11 Ibid., p. 8.  
12 Ibid., p. 22. 
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nation.”13 Nakano acknowledged, however, that his proposal was not very realistic and, believing 
a global solution was unlikely, he proposed a regional solution for Japan. 
His package, aimed at alleviating Japan’s domestic depression, included liberal policies 
such as lowering the land tax. The bulk of his proposals, however, were interventionist policies, 
such as government deficit spending on large infrastructure projects and the introduction of “a 
nationally controlled economic stimulus” [೑ᆊ㍅ࠊȃ㌠⏜ⱎࢩ ] of strategic industries, 
especially the fertilizer, ship-building, iron, and automobile sectors.14  Liberalism, which had 
previously been Nakano’s favored economic theory, had been replaced by “state-controlled 
capitalism” [㍅ࠊ䊛ᴀЏ㕽]. 
The Great Depression also pushed Nakano to abandon his liberalism with respect to 
international economics. As one nation after another resorted to dumping, currency devaluation 
and protective trade tariffs, Nakano demanded that Japan’s leaders follow suit: 15  While he 
believed that “neither dumping nor high trade tariffs are phenomena to be welcomed,” Nakano 
recommended that Japan” react to the global competition by adopting emergency means and 
developing secret defensive policies.”16 Nakano was aware that by following the global trend 
toward protectionist economic policies, Japan would only accelerate the erosion of international 
trade. He recognized and regretted that such policies would likely cause the global economy to 
                                                     
13 Ibid., p. 61. 
14 Ibid., p. 81-3. According to him, this nationally controlled stimulus would be “different from Adam 
Smith’s laissez-faire. Nor is the same as the traditional protectionism of capitalist privilege. Rather, by 
pointing the capital into the right direction, and putting this safely to work for national plans, we intend to 
put the profit motive into the service of the nation’s masses’ welfare.” Ibid., p. 48-49.  
15 England’s decision to abrogate the Treaty of Commerce between Japan and India and thus close Indian 
markets to Japanese goods seems to have angered Nakano more than any other. Repeatedly, he deplored 
the impact that his had on business in Kansai (where his constituency was placed). See Nakano Seigō, 
“Indicator of National Reconstruction” [楼广膃△貢窩閹], speech held in Hibiya Public Hall, Tokyo, on 
November 2, 1933; reprinted in “Collected Speeches by Nakano Seig|” [Ё䞢ℷ࠯⇣໻ⓨ䂀䲚], (Tokyo: 
Asakaze-sha [衲城だ]), 1936, p. 10-11.  
16 Both quotes from Nakano Seigō; “The Rebirth of Stagnant Japan”, p. 24. 
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disintegrate into regional economic blocs, but argued that Japan’s self-preservation left it with no 
choice but to build its own economic bloc.  
After leaving the Minseitō at the end of 1932, Nakano criticized liberal economics ever 
more openly17 while advocating active state intervention. Ironically, however, he opposed the 
economic controls the government introduced following the outbreak of war with China in 1937 
on the grounds that they suffocated economic life.  
 
From International Cooperation to Unilateralism  
The second major shift in Nakano’s thinking during the years in which he gravitated 
toward fascism concerned Japan’s position in the world. Nakano had never approved of the post-
WW1 global order that had been codified in the treaties of Versailles, Washington and London, 
as well as in the covenant of the League of Nations. He believed the treaties and the covenant 
cemented an unjust international order that served the Western Powers’ interests while restricting 
Japan’s development and independence. As we have seen, Nakano  believed during the 1920s in 
two possibilities for rectifying this global wrong – either the Powers willingly renounced their 
respective Monroe Doctrines18 and granted all nations access to the markets and goods of the 
territories under their control, or Japan established its own sphere of exclusive influence and 
                                                     
17 Thus, in a speech held January 15, 1932 Nakano said: “While I was still in the Minseitō, I criticized the 
Shidehara diplomacy and Inoue’s financial policy. … With respect to domestic politics our view was that 
we should move away from liberalism and towards a controlled economy [㍅ࠊ㌠⏜]. I said these things 
while being in the Minseitō, but now that I have left the party, I can say them more freely.” Nakano Seigō, 
“The Real Political Situation and the Direction of our Movement” [ᬓሔȃⳳⳌǽ਒ᕦȃࢩ৥]  speech 
held on January 15, 1932 at the Japan Youth Hall [᮹ᴀ䴦ᑈ仼] subsequently published in “Trends of 
Japan in Transition” [䒶᦯᮹ᴀȃࢩ৥] January 20, 1932. The speech is quoted in NY, vol. 1, p. 640-41.  
18  According to Nakano not only the US, but also England and France had Monroe Doctrines. He 
deplored that state of affairs and advocated that Japan too should declare her own Monroe Doctrine to 
establish her sphere of interest in East Asia. See Nakano Seigō, “Outline Plan for National Reconstruction” 
[೑ᆊᬍ䗴㿜⬏㎅䷬], (Tokyo: Senkura Shob| [गם᳌᠓], October 1933), p. 132-140.  
 191 
declared a Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine.19 Sometime around 1930, however, Nakano came to 
believe that global cooperation had become a naïve dream and unilateral action an imperative. 
Since all the powers were about to “create their own economic blocs through political 
power,”20 Nakano believed “Japan should quickly sweep away China’s worries and start building 
an Asian bloc based on [the two countries’] common aspirations.”21  By mid-1931, Nakano 
concluded that: “Laissez-faire in economics and indifference in diplomacy are the tranquil 
dreams of a former era. Neither is suited to effect the transformations of a world threatened by an 
economic crisis.”22 In a world where international cooperation had disintegrated, Japan should 
“emancipate [⋛邉 ] itself from the standard of English diplomacy and establish its own 
independent foreign policy.” 23 
Nakano thereafter became a pronounced advocate of unilateral action in international 
relations. Nowhere is this more apparent than in his stance toward the Manchurian Incident, an 
event Nakano and many of his compatriots welcomed. Was the occupation of Manchuria not the 
first step toward building an East Asian economic bloc, the construction of which Nakano had 
come to see as necessary for Japan’s survival? He accordingly urged Prime Minister Wakatsuki 
in the fall of 1931 to support the army’s schemes on the mainland and not to fear any retaliation 
from the Western Powers, let alone from China.24 Nakano celebrated Japan’s escape from the 
entanglement of the international treaty system:  
                                                     
19 For the concept of Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine and the shift that it signaled in Japanese politics see 
James Crowley, “Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930 - 1938”,  
(Princeton, 1966), p. 195. 
20 Nakano Seigō; “The Rebirth of Stagnant Japan”, p. 87-88. 
21 Ibid., p. 113. 
22 Ibid., p.118. 
23 Nakano Seigō quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 607 and following. 
24 According to Nakano, Japan should not fear any military intervention or even an economic embargo by 
the Western powers who had more than enough “problems in their own kitchen” and niehter “spare time or 
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“Japan was tied down by these unnatural bonds…The rotten ropes of the West were 
binding [Japan], but the Yamato people continued to grow even as they were bound and 
they eventually ripped the rotten ropes that tied them…This is what happened on 
September 18... The Incident of September 18 taught the European people that the 
Yamato race cannot be bound by a rotten Western-style rope for eternity.” 25 
  
Once Nakano saw that unilateral action produced results, there was no stopping him. As 
the Guandong Army tried to cement its position by establishing a separate state, effectively 
compromising China’s territorial integrity, Nakano – completely contrary to all his prior cautions 
against antagonizing Chinese nationalism - campaigned for the speedy recognition of the new 
state.26 Holding a speech occasioned by the visit of Komai Tokuzō27, head of general affairs of 
Manshūkoku, who had come to Tokyo in early August 1932, Nakano urged Japan’s leaders to 
stop hesitating and to recognize Manshūkoku unilaterally:  
 
“The aspirations of 30 million people hoping to establish a nation without exploitation, 
and the dream of the Japanese people to build a Far-Eastern economic bloc that will 
contribute to world peace, have come together in a perfect match...Now it all depends 
on whether or not Japan recognizes Manshūkoku and pours its energy into that 
country…It must be our unshakable conviction that a firm attitude on Japan’s side will 
have the power to determine the decisions of all the Powers and China. In that sense, I 
                                                                                                                                                             
money … to interfere in a fight between Japan and China.” Nakano Seigō, in a speech titled “The Real 
Political Situation and the Direction of our Movement” [膕悄貢*ù膏捧歸貢罰圃] held on January 15, 
1932 and quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 607-08. 
25  Nakano Seigō, “Outline Plan for National Reconstruction”, p. 153-54. 
26 Nakano’s campaigning on behalf of the government of Manshūkoku was not without self-interest. A 
few weeks before Komai’s visit, Nakano had welcomed a delegation of the Manshūkoku government, 
including Ting Chien-hsiu [ϕ䨥ׂ], his former class mate at Waseda and now head of Manshūkoku’s 
communication department, from whom he received Yen 100,000. See Komai Tokuzō [侦ѩᖇϝ], “A 
Look behind the Scenes of Political Fund Raising” [ᬓ⊏䊛䞥ȃὑሟ㺣]; part of a special feature 
“Remembering Nakano Seig|” [Ё䞢ℷ࠯ȧដǛ], in “Japan and the Japanese” [᮹ᴀঞȈ᮹ᴀҎ], 
January 1956, p. 18-21. 
27  Komai Tokuzō [侦ѩᖇϝ] (1885 - 1961), central figure in the establishment of Manshūkoku. 
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believe that we should do away with all hesitation and speedily recognize the state of 
Manshūkoku.”28      
 
In the spring of 1933, a week before the matter went to the League of Nations for 
deliberation, Nakano demanded that if the League refused to recognize Manshūkoku, “Japan 
should withdraw as quickly as possible from the League of Nations and be ready to uphold its 
honor in isolation.”29   
From the Manchurian Incident onward, Nakano argued consistently that Japan push ahead 
unilaterally in pursuit of its aims and disregard foreign opposition. Only after hostilities with 
China erupted in the summer of 1937 and it became clear that Japan could not settle the conflict 
on its own did Nakano consider returning to some form of international cooperation. When he 
did so, however, he sought partnerships with nations that, like Japan, existed on the fringes of the 
international community as defined by the post-WWI treaty system - namely, with Fascist Italy 
and Nazi Germany.  
 
Embracing Armed Force  
The Manchurian Incident also convinced Nakano of the effectiveness of military force. As 
late as mid-1931, Nakano still held out hope that Japan could attain its goals peacefully. He wrote 
that, in dealing with the other Powers, Japan should avoid “confronting them as enemies. [ᭉ
ᇒ]”30 Regarding  Japan’s Asian neighbors, Nakano wrote:  
 
                                                     
28 Nakano Seigō, “Advocating the Speedy Recognition of Manshūkoku” [噌攀楼敏蕁矼㌙惚㔾㌽溝] 
speech held at Tokyo Kaikan on August 2, 1932 reproduced under the same title in Gakan, Sptember 1932, 
p. 39.  
29 Nakano Seigō in “Facing the Withdrawal from the League of Nations” [䗷ⲳ㜅䗔ȀⳈ䴶Ǭǻ] speech 
held on February 21, 1932 at Hibiya Public Hall, reproduced in “Collected Speeches by Nakano Seig|” [Ё
䞢ℷ࠯⇣໻ⓨ䂀䲚], (Tokyo: Asakaze-sha [衲城だ]), 1936, p. 141.  
30 Nakano Seigō; “The Rebirth of Stagnant Japan”, p. 113. 
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“Japan’s foreign policy must not become…colonial [ ։⬹Џ㕽 ]. Japan has to 
organically organize the co-existence and co-prosperity [݅ᄬ݅ᷘ㌘㐨] of China, 
Manchuria, Mongolia, … Siberia, and Japan by supporting their economic interests. 
When making demands Japan must base them on order. In choosing its means, Japan 
must be active.”31  
 
The events of September 1931 changed Nakano’s stance on Japan’s relations with its 
Asian neighbors. His tone became more martial and confrontational, and his proposals  for how 
Japan ought to  deal with Chinese nationalism increasingly included the threat of military force. 
He supported the Japanese army’s advance into northern China in the first half of the 1930s and, 
after the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in the summer of 1937, he advocated 
the escalation of the conflict. After France and the Netherlands fell in 1940, Nakano advocated 
taking possession of their colonies in South East Asia.  
Nakano reassured himself and others that Japan’s aggressive foreign policies would go 
unchallenged. 32  His confidence came, in part, from the Powers’ weak responses to the 
Manchurian Incident, as well as to Italy’s war against Ethiopia and to Germany’s occupation of 
the Rhineland.33 Nakano also reckoned that, with each territorial addition, Japan would become 
stronger and hence more capable of handling future military or economic challenges. Crucially, 
he overlooked the fact that, long before adding to the nation’s strength, territorial conquests 
would amplify the nation’s weakness by draining its resources.  
                                                     
31 Ibid., p. 23. 
32 To name just one example: On September 10, of 1936 Nakano predicted that a war between Japan and 
China would not escalate into a world war. See Nakano Seigō, “The Bandits in the Mountains and the 
Bandits in the Heart” [ቅЁȃ䊞ǽᖗЁȃ䊞] memorial address held on September 10, 1936 at the Japan 
Youth Hall on behalf of two journalists of the Tokyo Daily News killed in an anti-Japanese incident and 
reprinted under the title “The Pillar of East Asia: Japan” [覩┠貢腑讀伍荳袿 ], in in Collected Speeches 
by Nakano Seig| [Ё䞢ℷ࠯⇣໻ⓨ䂀䲚], Tokyo, Asakaze-sha [衲城だ], 1936, see p. 420.  
33 According to Nakano, the Abyssinian crisis and the ensuing Second Italo-Abyssinian War showed that 
the League of Nations embargo could not be enforced effectively. See Nakano Seigō, Editorial: The 
Confrontation between England and Italy, in Gakan, October 1935, p. 2-4.  
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Nakano’s shift in attitude regarding the use and efficacy of armed force brought with it a 
new attitude toward the armed forces themselves. Where in the past Nakano had repeatedly 
resisted military interference in politics, he now took the opposite position in select instances. In 
the 1934 debate over the army’s publication of a pamphlet, which many considered interference 
in politics, Nakano came to the army’s defense, arguing that the pamphlet contained nothing new 
and was merely educational.34 He also sympathized with the army rebels of February 26, 1936. 35 
In the debate over Saitō Takao’s May 1936 speech – which attacked the army’s continued 
interference in politics following the February 26 incident and cautioned (rightly) against the 
possibility of a military dictatorship - Nakano again sided with the army. He chided Saitō for a 
formalistic application of the law against “those elements in and out of the army trying to reform 
the Japanese political system by illegal means” and disagreed with the more principled Saitō on 
the grounds that:    
 
“Today’s reforms are not legal but political in nature. They are not about administering 
the given laws but about the necessity of making new laws…Saitō represents simply 
and directly the opinion of formalistic legalism and conservatism, dismisses 
restructuring and reforms as the talk of ‘political outcasts and social dropouts’, and 
states that there is no need for reforms in today’s Japan…I cannot agree with the short-
sighted opinion that all we must do is  apply the law strictly and punish mercilessly in 
order to discipline the army and bring peace to society.” 36 
 
The shift in Nakano’s attitude toward the military has led some observers to label him a 
militarist, but it should be remembered that Nakano never gave up his principled distinction 
                                                     
34 See Oates, p. 68; quoting Kampō Gōgai [囮糞偏咤] 2 December, 1934 p. 77.  See also Nakano Seigō, 
“Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Gakan, January 1935, p. 2-5. 
35 When on February 26, 1936 young officers staged a coup d’état Nakano talked about distributing hot 
soup to the rebels but did not do it. After the suppression of the rebellion, Nakano tried to purchase the 
rebels’ flag which Ishiwara Kanji had collected from the battle field. After Kita Ikki’s execution, Kita’s 
followers presented Nakano with parts of the former’s furniture. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 131, 146 and 
p. 270. 
36 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, June 1936, p. 5.  
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between political and military affairs. Even during 1936-7, the heyday of his efforts as a 
parliamentary representative of the army reformers, Nakano stressed that he and his party would 
be “in charge of national defense in the broader sense,” while the military would be responsible 
for “national defense in the narrow sense.”37  
 
New Friends and Allies 
The shift in Nakano’s political views that was triggered by the Manchurian Incident also 
pushed Nakano to form friendships and alliances with figures he had shunned previously. After 
Matsuoka Yōsuke, Japan’s ambassador to the League of Nations, returned to Japan as a hero for 
orchestrating Japan’s withdrawal from the League, Nakano sought him out. The two men met 
several times in meetings noted by the media. 38  Though Matsuoka and Nakano continued 
advocating similar policies in following years (e.g. an alliance with Germany on the eve of 
WW2), their relationship never developed beyond these few meetings in 1933, likely because of 
a lack of personal chemistry. 
More important and lasting was Nakano’s relationship with Colonel Ishiwara Kanji. In the 
1920s, Nakano was known as an enemy of important military figures such as Tanaka and Katsura, 
but in the early 30s he began drawing closer to Ishiwara, an architect of the Manchurian Incident 
who was one of Japan’s foremost military strategic thinkers. Initially, Nakano’s desire to 
associate with Ishiwara was probably motivated by the hope of sharing some of the glory 
Ishiwara had earned for his involvement in the Manchurian Incident. If that was the case, 
however, the motivation was soon supplanted by genuine intellectual appreciation for Ishiwara’s 
thought. As Nakano came under Ishiwara’s influence, military strategic thinking and geopolitics - 
                                                     
37 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial: Thus the Tōhōkai pushes ahead” [蕁ルクス瑍覩苜善購莓晃〕拷], in Tōtairiku, 
June may 1937, p. 9.  
38 For more details on the relationship between Matsuoka and Nakano as well as the media’s coverage see 
Inomata p. 348-9.  
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which had hitherto played only a minor role in Nakano’s writing - came to feature more 
prominently.39 Among Nakano’s many political alliances in the years 1932-7, his association 
with Ishiwara was among the most important. While Nakano acted as Ishiwara’s mouthpiece in 
the Diet, Ishiwara supported Nakano’s Tōhōkai think tank by orchestrating the foundation of a 
Tōhōkai chapter in Sendai.40 Collaboration between the two men reached a climax in 1936-7, 
when Ishiwara’s influence was at its height, but thereafter disintegrated over disagreements 
concerning the war with China.  
 
Abandoning the Established Parties and Parliamentary Democracy  
In mid-1931, Nakano still believed the policies he proposed could and would be carried 
out by the established political parties - ideally by the Minseitō, of which he was still a member. 
He still adhered to what he once called “Diet-centered politics,” which aimed for party cabinets, 
and he still engaged in political battles between the two major established parties. It was not the 
Manchurian Incident itself that caused Nakano to change his opinion but rather the established 
parties’ failure to react to the situation - in particular, their failure to establish a coalition cabinet 
strong enough to regain control. While Nakano welcomed the occupation of Manchuria and the 
establishment of Manshūkoku, it did not escape him that movement’s driving force was not the 
government in Tokyo but rather radical young officers in the field acting independently. Based 
on his understanding of Wang Yang-ming’s teachings, Nakano condoned and even praised the 
                                                     
39 See for example Nakano Seigō, “The New Power of the Air Force” [$ヲ貢范壗陪], in Gakan, 
October 1935.  
40 After returning to Japan from Manchuria, Ishiwara was stationed in Sendai. Even though as a member 
of the armed forces he was barred from political activities, Ishiwara guided from behind the scenes the 
foundation of a political group [邏̂̊合名会社] called “Tōhōkai.” In due time, this Sendai Tōhōkai was to 
become the Sendai chapter of Nakano’s Tōhōkai. See Police Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior [献止く
ʲ較寉], “Monthly Bulletin of the Special Higher Police” [ⓔ'03鶇糞], December 1933, no.2; p. 53-5. and 
October 1934, p. 43-44.   
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Incident’s two main architects, Colonel Ishiwara Kanji and Colonel Itagaki Seishirō. Years later, 
Nakano wrote:  
 
“I have always admired [䊯㕢] those responsible at the time, even worshipped [ዛᢱ] 
them. It is possible that I will never have the fortune in the course of my life to 
accomplish such a great feat, but as part of my effort to cultivate my mind I pray day 
and night that if I am given the opportunity to achieve something great, I will be able to 
do so with the same motivation and resolve as Ishiwara and Itagaki.”41 
 
In his euphoria, Nakano overlooked the fact that these acts of subordination set a 
dangerous precedent that could (and would) lead to a breakdown of discipline in the Japanese 
Army. What Nakano did not overlook was that by taking independent action, the officers in the 
field had wrested political initiative from Tokyo and that, at least in this instance, the government 
- still a Minseitō cabinet – was not leading but rather following events. To ensure that such 
insubordination remained an isolated incident and would not result in a shift of Japan’s political 
center of gravity, Nakano sought initially to help the Minseito regain political initiative. His 
feverish activity in the fall of 1931 to help establish a coalition cabinet between the two 
established parties was motivated by the hope of bringing the Minseitō, and the Adachi faction 
especially, back into positions of power. On a more general level, it was also an attempt to return 
the established parties to the center of politics.42  
                                                     
41 Nakano Seigō, “The Bandits in the Mountains and the Bandits in the Heart” [ቅЁȃ䊞ǽᖗЁȃ䊞] 
reprinted under the title “The Pillar of East Asia: Japan” [覩┠貢腑讀伍荳袿 ], in Collected Speeches by 
Nakano Seig| [Ё䞢ℷ࠯⇣໻ⓨ䂀䲚], Tokyo, Asakaze-sha [衲城だ], 1936,  p. 383.  
42 It is doubtful whether Nakano who enthusiastically supported the idea of a coalition government, really 
shared Wakatsuki’s hope that this cabinet would then actually discipline the insubordinate army, for 
Nakano basically agreed with the occupation of Manchuria. In fact, in a conversation with Wakatsuki 
Nakano suggested that any future cabinet should not discipline the army, but instead coordinate the actions 
of the foreign service with those of the army (i.e. the foreign service should explain the army’s actions), for 
otherwise “The foreign service would make promises that the army was bound to break.” Nakano Seigō, 
“The Real Political Situation and the Direction of our Movement” speech held on January 15, 1932 quoted 
in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 612. 
 199 
When the attempt to establish a coalition government strong enough to reign in the 
insubordinate army failed at the end of 1931, however, Nakano was quick to withdraw from the 
Minseitō and give up on the established parties altogether. In doing so, Nakano not only reacted 
to the established parties’ decline, but also accelerated it.  
After leaving the Minseitō, Nakano criticized the established parties ever more severely, to 
the point of denying them their basic function as representatives of the people. In a speech at the 
end of 1933, he said: “The established parties are struggling. They are struggling and they have 
entirely lost their leadership over the people…They have decided to no longer call things by their 
name.”43 The parties’ reticence came “partly from the fact that they are cowards, but mostly 
because they have nothing to say.”44  
At the same time, Nakano felt that “the masses require action” and that “the people wait 
for leadership.”45  Since the established parties were “useless when it comes to meeting the 
requests of the people and executing great reforms in and out of Japan,” 46 Nakano demanded that 
those among “Japan’s politicians who have lost power to lead the masses retreat from public 
life.”47 He even predicted that the parties “would be kicked out of the world if they failed to 
act.”48   
Who or what could fill the void if the major parties dissolved? Nakano saw two 
possibilities. First, if the popular will did not find a legal means of expression, it would turn to 
                                                     
43 Nakano Seigō, “Indicator of National Reconstruction” [楼广膃△貢窩閹], speech held November 2, 
1933; reprinted in “Collected Speeches by Nakano Seig|” [Ё䞢ℷ࠯⇣໻ⓨ䂀䲚], (Tokyo: Asakaze-sha 
[衲城だ]), 1936, p. 4-5.  
44 Ibid. but also quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 769. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid.  
47 Ibid. but also quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 770-71. 
48 Ibid. but also quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 769.  
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violence:  “If you leave frustrations unanswered, there is always the risk that they may explode. 
The less organized popular reforms are, the more destructive that explosion will be.”49 Nakano 
believed that the series of independent acts and terrorist incidents that shook Japan’s political 
establishment in the 1930s had to be seen in this light. According to Nakano, the radical activists 
were expressing the will of the people, as evidenced by the fact that the activists had won the 
people’s sympathy.50 He explained and justified their acts by stating: “In today’s Japan, there is 
no political force organized as a group that leads trends.The people therefore start to act on their 
own. It is because there is no legal popular movement that illegal direct action is planned.” 51 As 
much as Nakano sympathized with the radicals’ aims, however, he did not share their violent 
means. Unlike them, he sought to effect political change legally.  
Nakano’s preferred option for filling the void left by the political parties’ vacuum was 
therefore the creation of a new kind of mass-based party that would take the established parties’ 
place. Like the established parties, it would have representatives in the Diet, but it would also be 
rooted in a “legal popular movement”52 outside the Diet. This combination would give the new 
party the strength necessary to effect political change. As an alternative to the destructive 
explosion Nakano foresaw if the popular will were left unanswered, he hoped that “if the various 
social forces are organized into groups and proceed as a public movement, secret conspiracies 
                                                     
49 Nakano Seigō, Nakano Seigō, “Indicator of National Reconstruction” [楼广膃△貢窩閹], speech held 
in Hibiya Public Hall, Tokyo, on November 2, 1933; reprinted in “Collected Speeches by Nakano Seig|” 
[Ё䞢ℷ࠯⇣໻ⓨ䂀䲚], (Tokyo: Asakaze-sha [衲城だ]), 1936, p. 21.  
50 Later Nakano would go one step further and state that the Manchurian Incident, Japan’s withdrawal 
from the League of Nations, and the abrogation of international treaties limiting arms were all “carried out 
by the people themselves.” [楼鴈控麹耕紅].  See Nakano’s farewell speech before leaving for Europe held 
November 11, 1937 at the Gunji Kaikan in Kudanshita, reprinted in Nakano Seigō, “Upon Departing” [頓
え行59壕肱], in Tōtairiku, December 1937, p. 97-113, the quote is taken from page 102.  
51 Nakano Seigō, “Indicator of National Reconstruction”, p. 19.   
52 Nakano Seigō, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1. p. 770. 
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will disappear and turn into an open movement.”53 Confronted “by the state’s internal instability 
… and difficulties from abroad,” Nakano called on “the mass of the people … to stand up.” He 
appealed to: 
 
“the workers, the farmers, the main productive forces, and, in addition, … engineers 
and salaried persons - …to organize according to their occupational functions and to 
bring these associations together [to create] a national organization that then becomes 
the core of the national popular movement.”54  
 
Nakano’s rejection of the established parties went hand in hand with his criticism of the 
very workings of parliamentary democracy. The earliest signs of this pairing can be found in a 
piece Nakano wrote in 1932:  
 
“In times of national emergencies or national crises, it does not have to be the majority 
[that makes political decisions]…The regular procedures of constitutional government, 
universal suffrage and democracy are only means, but the real ends [lit. 麝蒅 = real 
qualities] lie deeper than that. I believe that we are in a period of time when, in order to 
achieve these real ends, one may have to do out-of-the-ordinary things.”55  
 
Within a year, Nakano demanded the establishment of a strong executive government 
unfettered by parliamentary checks on power, thus abandoning the central piece of his former 
liberal convictions. By 1938, he put even more firmly into question the majority principle so 
fundamental to democratic decision-making:  
 
“Democracy has lost its spirit and turned into a mere mechanism…It won’t do for a 
majority to gather their voices. Casting your vote alone won’t do either. Human beings 
                                                     
53 Nakano Seigō, “Indicator of National Reconstruction”, p. 21. 
54 Ibid., p. 22. 
55 Nakano Seigō, “Trends of Japan in Transition”  [㡀衒陞麝｠斯埴], (Tokyo: Senkura Shobō [桧琢蟷
蘯], 1932), p. 75-76. 
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have to gather organically one by one, hold the same ideals and the same feelings…and 
only then can we speak of a popular organization.”56 
 
As Nakano questioned the essence of parliamentary democracy and rejected the 
established parties outright, he returned to his pet project of establishing a mass party – the vision 
with which he had entered politics in 1920. During the remainder of his life, he sank his time and 
energy into this dream’s realization. 
  
Emulating the European Fascist Parties 
When Nakano left the Minseitō in December 1931, the idea of establishing a new mass 
party modeled on European fascist parties was already circulating among Nakano, Adachi and 
the seven ex-Minseitō members who had followed them.57 At that stage, however, the matter was 
far from decided.58  While Nakano and his followers were all for it, the Adachi faction and, most 
importantly, Adachi himself pursued the idea only half-heartedly, hoping instead for a chance to 
return to the Minseitō. A general election scheduled for February 20, 1932, moreover, made 
campaign preparation a far more pressing task than establishing a new party.  
Stuck between his desire to create a new party and the need to maintain some sort of 
cohesion with the other dissenters, Nakano took a somewhat ambivalent position. On one hand, 
he tried keeping the door open for a return to the Minseitō at some later stage. Traveling to 
Fukuoka in early January 1932, Nakano gave a 90-minute speech at the Minseitō Fukuoka 
                                                     
56 Nakano Seigō in his speech at the first Tōhōkai party convention, December 9, 1938 reproduced in “On 
the occasion of the Tōhōkai’s Frist National Convention” [┎鑷洩ゔヘ豚傑肉弥洩【驥き〉 ], in 
Tōtairiku, March, 1939, p. 9 
57 The seven Minseitō members to leave the party with Adachi and Nakano at the end of 1931 were 
Sugiura Takeo [鼕d橾碳], Tanaka Kiyotatsu [ヨΟ網湉], Miura Torao [メd欤碳], Yutani Yoshiharu [ラ
楤閒̂], Kazami Akira [喫⓵ゕ], Okano Ryūichi [帶𥿠泑ヘ], and Kangyū Tsuneo [コ75坑約]. Tomita 
Kōjirō [塹ヨ梔尞玊] also left the Minseitō around this time, but soon returned.  
58 See Tokyo Asahi News [┎絢鷯陞鑄靜], January 12, 1932. 
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chapter’s New Year’s party, in which he requested members’ support in the upcoming election 
and reassured them that, though he had “left the Minseitō,” there still “remained a deep 
connection to the party that I cannot cut, no matter how much I try.”59 Nakano’s efforts paid off 
handsomely. His Fukuokan supporters remained loyal – the evening ended with three shouts of 
“Nakano Banzai!” – and in the February election Nakano was duly returned to his Diet seat.60 
On the other hand, Nakano also began toying publicly with the idea of creating a new mass 
party. In a speech at the Japan Youth Hall on January 15, 1932, Nakano posed a rhetorical 
question about whether he intended to start a new party. He answered: “I would do it at once if I 
had more power,” adding that, for the time being, he was only “testing the air.”61  
At this stage, Nakano remained vague on the question of where the party would stand 
ideologically. Stating that his position could be best described as “Social Nationalism” (using, 
alternately, the terms sōsharu nashonarizumu [ずバぎïà刷ぷぎêぷüごÜ] and shakai 
kokumin-shugi [合名会社洩肉鍗ε閒]), Nakano sketched the broad outlines of a “nationalism that 
focuses on this society” 62  but that differed from National Socialism (what he called “State 
Socialism” [げぱバぴ刷ずバぎïüごÜ or だ善楼广厨コ]).63 He also distinguished Social 
Nationalism from socialism, which he considered economically unviable, and from international 
                                                     
59 Nakano Seigō during his speech held at New Year’s Party of Fukuoka Chapter of Minseitō on January 
3, 1932, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 643. 
60 Nakano was returned comfortably with 19,557 votes, the second highest in his electoral district. The 
three other seats of Fukuoka went to candidates of the Seiyūkai. For Nakano’s election results see Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 645. 
61 Nakano Seigō, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 640-41. 
62 Nakano Seigō, “Trends of Japan in Transition”, p. 72-73. 
63 Ibid. Nakano Yasuo points out correctly, that Nakano used different Japanese terms for the English 
“nation”, translating it with “Kokumin” [楼鴈] (stressing the people making up a nation) when describing 
his position, but using “Kokka” [楼广] (referring to the statist character of a nation) when explaining 
European National Socialism. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 643.  
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capitalism, which he considered racist and unfair. 64 If Nakano’s intention with these distinctions 
was to set himself apart from German National Socialism, however, he clearly failed, for the 
Tokyo Asahi News ran an article around this time under the headline “Nakano Seigō – Japan’s 
Hitler.”65  
As the new party took form in the course of 1932, Nakano clarified his hazy and 
rudimentary pronouncements. Contrasting his Social Nationalism with the ideologies of Japan’s 
traditional right- and left-wing parties, Nakano wrote:  
 
“The traditional right-wing factions are mostly concerned with the nation. As for the 
elements that form the nation, they lean toward the privileged classes, while their 
awareness of the social masses was insufficient. The traditional proletarian parties, on 
the other hand, are mostly concerned about the proletarian masses and lacked 
awareness of international and national affairs. Their reaction to the Manchurian 
Incident - namely their absolute opposition to it as an act of imperialistic aggression - 
proves that they have not understood that the masses depend on the nation and that the 
nation works within an international context. The Social Nationalist party I envision 
pays attention to international affairs, national affairs, the masses, and the fair 
distribution of production; it will aim to harmonize, organize and regulate these in a 
nationalistic manner.”66 
 
By positioning himself in opposition to both the traditional right and the traditional left, 
Nakano followed the example of European fascism, which cast itself as a third way between 
socialism and capitalism. 
                                                     
64  On a different occasions, Nakano defined his new “Social Nationalist Party” [合名会社洩肉鍗詣 ] as 
“opposing monopoly financial capital”  as well as “opposing the established parties.” See Nakano Seigō, 
“The Characteristics of Social Nationalism”┢ずぎïà刷ぷぎêぷüごÜ｠噯淦【〉, in Kaizō [邂氎], 
February 1932.  
65  Tokyo Asahi News, February 1st, 1932. More analytical observers however were aware of the 
differences between Nakano’s position and German national soclialism. The People’s Lecture League [肉
鍗ʘ楮汍浄合名会社] published a little booklet around the same time intended to educate the people on the 
subject of fascism and in it described Nakano’s position in terms very similar to those he himself used 
setting it apart from national socialism. See People’s Lecture League [肉鍗ʘ楮汍浄合名会社]; What is fascism 
[Çふでぎê〉鴬ひ′], (Tokyo, 1933), p. 45. 
66 Nakano Seigō, “Trends of Japan in Transition”, p. 74-75.  
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Adachi’s and Nakano’s initial understanding of the new party was that it would be 
modeled on European fascist parties, and that Adachi would be the party’s head while Nakano 
ran its platform and ideology. As Nakano busied himself fulfilling his end of the bargain, 
formulating the outlines of Social Nationalism in the first half of 1932, Adachi dragged his feet 
long after election campaigning ceased to be a credible excuse, largely because he and his 
followers continued hoping they could return to the Meinseitō. 67 Only when all of Adachi’s 
attempts to return to the Minseitō failed and eight members of his faction were forced to leave the 
party in June 1932 did he finally commit himself to the new party. 68 Preparations for the new 
party’s debut then began in earnest. 
Casting itself as a gathering place for all those who had moved away from their former 
democratic or social democratic beliefs after the Manchurian Incident and who now could loosely 
be labeled “Social Nationalists,” the nascent party soon attracted four members from the 
Kakushintō [蠛鑄詣],69  the successor of the Kakushin Club [蠛鑄肝♡璡], as well as an 
unaffiliated MP named Matsutani Yojirō.70 Over the course of the summer of 1932, the National 
                                                     
67 Most notably in this context were Yamaji Jōichi [峺湈ロヘ], Furuya Yoshitaka [笑寳笳瓤], and Koike 
Jinrō [婀D委玊] who with the help of the young members of the Adachi faction started a campaign to 
have Adachi reinstated into the party. Support for Adachi’s reinstatement was strong both within and 
without the party. However, the party executive took a hard stance opposing this movement and was thus 
able to silence the Adachi faction. See the Tokyo Asahi News [┎絢鷯陞鑄靜], June 20, 21, 22, 1932. 
68 These were Yamaji Jōichi [峺湈ロヘ], Furuya Yoshitaka [笑寳笳瓤], Katō Tai’ichi [殺頞,2ヘ], 
Nonaka Tetsuya [𥿠Ο濂П], Satō Kei [欧頞打], Fukamizu Kiyoshi [ゲ鰀ボ], Izu Tomito [閏歧塹以], and 
Koyama Tanizō [婀峺楤衟], all of whom had to leave the party after failing to reinstate Adachi. See Tokyo 
Asahi News [┎絢鷯陞鑄靜], July 2, 1932. 
69 Originally, Nakano had hoped that the new party would be joined by Ōtake Kan’ichi [弥ち窅ヘ], 
Kiyose Ichirō [ボe̊ヘ玊], Suzuki Shōgo [臁麌橫震]  Akamatsu Katsumaro [鮄┛敬搰], Shimonaka 
Yasaburō [ャΟ毓メ玊], and Shimanaka Yūzō [抔Ο碳メ] who at that time were making their switch from 
Social Democracy [合名会社洩鍗εε閒] to National Socialism [肉垤合名会社洩ε閒] but two of the Kakushintō 
members, namely Akamtsu and Shimonaka, did not join Nakano, instead creating their own independent 
party, “National Socialist Party” [肉鍗合名会社洩詣]. See Sanyō Shimpō [小猢鑄糞], April 13, 1932. 
70 Matsutani Yojirō [┛楤ユы玊] (1880 - 1937), social activist and politician. 
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Policy Research Club [肉ツせヽ肝♡璡], from which the new party was to emerge, met 
regularly and agreed on the party’s name - Kokumin Dōmei [肉鍗蒸z] or National League - and 
its platform, which was by and large determined by Nakano and his followers.  
The party’s program contained three broad principles: the re-establishment of international 
justice, the establishment of a controlled economy and the full realization of popular politics [肉
鍗邏̂｠濂棣].71 The first principle articulated Nakano’s belief that the post-WWI international 
order was an “Anglo-Saxon-Centered Peace” and argued for “world-wide territorial revision.”72
 The second principle was to be realized by establishing an Economic General Staff to 
impose controls on the most important national industries (including coal, steel, electricity, 
banking, and others), and to manage foreign exchange and trade. The “controlled economy” 
plank also advocated maintaining low interest rates, redistributing income through fiscal reforms, 
protecting non-monopolistic sectors (such as small and medium enterprises as well as 
agriculture), and, finally, forming an economic bloc between Japan and Manchuria.73 
The third principle - the “full realization of popular government” - was not only an aim but 
was also a means of achieving the first two principles, for only a strong popular government 
would be able to carry out the reforms Nakano envisioned. Concretely, this third plank entailed 
abolishing the cabinet system and concentrating domestic, foreign and military matters in the 
hands of a Board of National Affairs.  
                                                     
71 See the Tokyo Asahi News [┎絢鷯陞鑄靜], July 29th, 1932 or Adachi Kenzō, “Autobiography of 
Adachi Kenzō” [嚏湉ʔ衟鬘湘穎], (Tokyo, 1960), p. 331. 
72 See Nakano Seigō, “The Characteristics of Social Nationalism” [ずぎïà刷ぷぎêぷüごÜ｠噯淦
【〉] in Kaizō, [邂氎], 1932. 
73 See the Tokyo Asahi News [┎絢鷯陞鑄靜], December 18 and 20, 1932. 
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The National League’s formal foundation ceremony took place on December 22, 1932, at 
Hibiya Public Hall in Tokyo. Over four thousand party members from across Japan attended.74 
The factionalism that had delayed the party’s foundation persisted despite myriad declarations 
and speeches calling for unity amid crisis. The party’s core members – the two upper house 
members and the 33 lower-house members (29 former Minseitō members, three former 
Kakushintō members and one formerly unaffiliated parliament member) - were divided into two 
rival groups.  
The smaller of these groups was comprised of politicians who had left the Minseitō under 
Nakano’s leadership in late 1931.75 Responsible for the formulation of the party’s platform and 
ideology, and boasting some background in mass mobilization, this group was particularly 
committed to realizing “popular politics” - that is, to creating a mass party with power bases 
outside the traditional power structures.  
The other group, led by Yamaji, was comprised of members who joined the Kokumin 
Dōmei a full six months later, and then only because they were forced to leave the Minseitō. Not 
really committed to establishing a new party, let alone a new type of mass party, their 
participation in Nakano’s mass mobilization activities was lukewarm at best. While the Nakano 
faction aimed to create something new, the Yamaji faction seemed more intent on reviving 
something old, something they had lost - namely, their place within the Minseitō. In subsequent 
years, Yamaji tried more than once to negotiate agreements in which Adachi and/or the Yamaji 
                                                     
74 See Tokyo Asahi News [┎絢鷯陞鑄靜],  December 23, 1932. 
75 Of those Minseitō members who had left with Nakano at the end of 1931, Sugiura, Tanaka, Miura, 
Okano, and Kangyū  all failed to be reelected in the election of 1932. Therefore only Nakano, Kazami, and 
Yutani were left from the original batch. They were joined by Washizawa Yoshiji [寙£ユ惇ы], Mori 
Mineichi [扈忸ヘ], and Toda Yumi [缸ヨラ花], who left the Minseitō in the summer or 1932. The two ex-
MPs Watanabe Yasukuni [た梙Ò爇] and Yamauchi Ryō [峺献鮎] were also considered to be part of the 
Nakano faction. 
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faction and/or the entire Kokumin Dōmei would have cooperated with the government or the 
Minseitō. Nakano consistently opposed these attempts.  
These fundamental divisions were on full display at the founding ceremony in December 
1932. Fashion tells the tale best. In imitation of the European fascist parties, Nakano and his 
followers wanted all party officials to wear a black uniform76 and carry the party’s flag, which 
showed the “Sacred Mirror [one of the three imperial regalia] and an eagle on purple ground.” 
Uncomfortable with fascist pomp, party president Adachi refused to wear such a “silly thing” [╉
ひ』ど½ô。こ｠をヌちとひ] and attended the ceremony in a hakama with a traditional 
crest.77 Undaunted, Nakano and his followers showed up in uniform and their appearance, more 
than anything else, led a newspaper reporting on the event  to describe the group  as the first 
“Japanese-style fascist party” [声喫Çふでぎê詣].78 In subsequent years, Adachi managed to 
bridge this fundamental division within the Kokumin Dōmei, but it resurfaced periodically and 
led eventually to the party’s dissolution.  
 
Creating a Mass Party 
With the party’s founding and other organizational matters completed by the end of 1932, 
Nakano set out to bring his dream of a new mass party to life. Animating the vision required two 
things: creating a popular movement to serve as the party’s power base and formulating a 
coherent party ideology.  
Nakano made various attempts to create a mass movement, some of which are hard to take 
seriously, such as enlisting his wife to attend research meetings at which methods of preparing 
                                                     
76 The uniforms were black serge suits, came with two breast pockets an arm band and cost about 22 Yen 
a piece. It did not take long before the press labeled them “fascio uniforms.” See Inomata, p. 345  
77 See Tokyo Asahi News [┎絢鷯陞鑄靜], December 21, 1932. 
78 Quoted in Inomata, p. 345. 
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nourishing dishes for the masses from inexpensive food items were demonstrated.79 More to the 
point, in April 1933, Nakano established the party’s youth organization - called the “National 
Youth League” [肉鍗蕝桿蒸z] - with the official aim of “act[ing] as the advance guard of mass 
mobilization.” 80  Emulating the para-military structure and comportment of European fascist 
youth organizations, the League’s members were drawn mainly from among students and 
distinguished themselves by wearing uniforms.  
As he mobilized students, Nakano also sought to “promote the formation of associations 
consisting of farmers, entrepreneurs in small- and medium-sized enterprises, salaried people, and 
workers.” 81 He hoped that “by mixing and concentrating these various forces and turning them 
into an all-encompassing national movement” he could “create a force able to change the flow of 
the time” [顯鰯㡀衒｠蝠洀察》』╅].82 One outgrowth of Nakano’s efforts was the Farm-
Village-Relief-Petition Movement [桫齟酥をŚ魕淈斯], which party-follower Kazami Akira 
started in an attempt to stretch out feelers to rural communities.Another was Nakano’s 
rapprochement with the labor movement. Rather than creating new organizations from scratch as 
he had envisioned, Nakano won influential positions in already-existing labor unions. In the fall 
of 1933, Nakano became president of a Communications Ministry union called the 
Communications Friends and Comrade Society [殛招蒸瀰洩], which boasted roughly 1,200 
members. 83  The fact that Nakano had served as Vice-Minister of Communications under 
                                                     
79 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 665. 
80 See Sanyō Shimpō [小猢鑄糞], April 5, 1933  
81 See Nakano Seigō, “Policy Paper on the Formation of a National Labor Union League” [肉鍗産匡„浄
蒸z̊縟鑷綈鵄] in Sanyō Shimpō [小猢鑄糞], August 8, 1932.  
82 See Nakano Seigō, “Outline Plan for National Reconstruction”, p. 116. 
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Hamaguchi helped him win the presidential slot, as he was a known quantity to the union’s 
members. Around that time, Nakano also accepted a directorial position at the Yawata Labor 
League [潔柢至産蒸z], which was comprised of Yawata Steel Works employees in Kyūshū.84  
Nakano’s overtures to the labor unions attracted the media’s attention. The Hōchi News 
wondered how much Nakano could actually achieve for Japan’s workers,85 while the Osaka 
Mainichi – nearing Nakano’s real intention - asked: “Nakano Seigō rides the labor movement. 
Will he unify the unions as the Nazis have done?”86 We shall see below that the answer to both 
questions was negative.   
Nakano also returned to journalism to broaden his reach. Having written relatively little 
during the 1920s, he became a productive writer again in the early-1930s. More importantly, he 
re-established control over the operations of Miyake’s Gakan magazine, which he had neglected 
during his Minseitō years. In the summer of 1934, he made Shintō Kazuma, a former boarder at 
his student dorm and the son of Genyōsha founder Shintō Kiheita, both publisher and editor-in-
chief of the magazine. The new Gakan was launched in September 1934 and included, for the 
first time in a long time, an editorial by Nakano on contemporary affairs. By 1935, Nakano was 
                                                                                                                                                             
83 At the time there were 170,000 employees in the Japanese Communications Ministry, of which only 
half, mainly the postal workers in the urban centers were organized in unions. The first of these unions had 
been founded in 1925 and been presided over first by Suzuki Bunji and then Akamatsu Katsumaro. When 
the latter turned to the right in 1932, the union split into three parts, of the which the Communications 
Friends and Comrade Society [殛招蒸瀰洩], was the most left-leaning and most combative one.  
84 Besides the Teiyū-Dōshikai and the Yawata Labor League, other labor unions with whom the Nakano 
faction had relations or tried to have relations were the Fukuoka Kinrō Kokumin Dōmei [｟帶至産肉鍗蒸
z] and the Yokosuka Kaigun Kōshō [min鎊緂u崹擺橢]. However, it is not clear if Nakano actually 
succeeded having them affiliate themselves with the Kokumin Dōmei. See Sanyō Shimpō [小猢鑄糞] 
February 11, 1933. For a more detailed treatment of the relationship between the Kokumin Dōmei and the 
Labor Unions please see Itō Takashi [舛I吏],  “Nakano Seigo and the Tōhōkai” [腎ǒ驟悩膏覩苜善], in 
The Politics of the Showa period [蓖北袗貢膕齠], (Tokyo, 1983).  
85 Hōchi News [糞s], October 10, 1933. 
86 Osaka Mainichi News [弥棫﨟陞鑄靜], October 10, 1933. 
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back to publishing at least one, and often two, articles a month. In the process, Gakan gradually 
became the mouthpiece of Nakano’s popular movement.  
 Around this time, Nakano also revived the Tōhōkai [┎鑷洩], or Far Eastern Society, 
which had served as a think tank affiliated with the Tōhōjiron magazine in the 1910s and -20s. 
He re-launched the Tohokai in October 1933 as a cultural society that aimed to serve as forum for 
study, research and discussion.87 In addition to re-enrolling many of its former members, the 
society attracted some new faces, most notably Colonel Ishiwara Kanji, Honda Kumatarō and 
Kojima Sei’ichi, 88  who advised Nakano on military, diplomatic and economic matters, 
respectively.89  
Since the Yamaji faction’s members showed, from the beginning, very little interest in 
creating a mass party, mass mobilization activities were left to Nakano and his followers. With 
time, Nakano placed these activities outside the party and under the Tōhōkai’s umbrella. While 
this move accentuated already-existing divisions and made Nakano’s faction something of a 
party unto itself within the National League, it had the advantage of securing Nakano’s hold over 
key projects. Having personal control over the party’s mass mobilization activities paid off 
handsomely for Nakano when the National League dissolved at the end of 1935, as it made 
transforming the Tōhōkai think tank into a political association and Gakan into its organ 
relatively easy.  
 
                                                     
87 The Tōhōkai program written by Nakano can be found in the inside cover of Nakano Seigō, “Outline 
Plan for National Reconstruction” [肉垤邂氎ㇾ日0闒], (Tokyo: Senkura Shobō, October 1933).  
88 Kojima Sei’ichi [婀恠ɚヘ], (1895 - ?), scholar and author of numerous books on economics.  
89 In addition to the above, the Tōhōkai also included  Nakano’s friend, the philosopher and professor at 
Waseda, Sugimori Kōjirō [鼕扈梔尞玊],  the military experts Yamasaki Yasuzumi [峺恬虆h] and Saitō 
Naomiki [錻頞U條], the farm movement activist Inamura Ryūichi [げ齟瓤ヘ], and two members of the 
military namely Kagesa Sada’aki [淅欧〙聿] and Hanaya Tadashi [嬥楤橫]. In the following months, 
many members of the Nakano faction (MPs as well as former MPs) joined the think tank, so that 
eventually it also included people like Kazami Akira, Kimura Takeo, and Sugiura Takeo.   
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Formulating the Fascist Manifesto 
Creating new mass organizations and tapping into pre-existing groups comprised only 
about half of Nakano’s efforts to create a popular party. He also sought to replace the hitherto 
piecemeal and often contradictory ideological pronouncements with a more systematic, cohesive 
and appealing description. Most important in this respect is his “Outline Plan for National 
Reconstruction,” 90 a book published in October of 1933 and considered by some to be Nakano’s 
“fascist manifesto.”91 Nakano wrote the book at the Tōhōkai’s offices in the summer of 1933, 
drawing on the expertise of the society’s members - in particular, Ishiwara Kanji, Honda 
Kumatarō, Kojima Sei’ichi, and Sugiura Kōjirō. As the similarity of titles indicates, however, 
Nakano drew his inspiration from Kita Ikki’s notorious and influential “Outline Plan for the 
Reorganization of Japan.”92  
In terms of style, “Outline Plan for National Reconstruction” was strikingly different from 
the elaborate refinement and attention to detail that had characterized his past works. Divided 
into nine chapters, each of which starts with several short bullet-point statements followed by two 
or three brief explanatory paragraphs, the text is bare of Nakano’s typical flowerly ornament. We 
find no allusions to Chinese history to illustrate a point, no proverbs, no displays of learnedness. 
“Outline Plan for National Reconstruction” was intended as a program for action and its 
straightforward structure – the text reads almost like a to-do list – emphasizes Nakano’s sense of 
urgency.  
                                                     
90 Nakano Seigō, “Outline Plan for National Reconstruction” [肉垤邂氎ㇾ日0闒], (Tokyo: Senkura 
Shobō, October 1933). 
91 For example Inomata on p. 355. 
92 For a comparison between Nakano’s work and Kita Ikki’s “Outline Plan for the Reorganization of 
Japan” [楼广膃△譜弴哢今]  of 1919 see Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 747-61. 
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Nakano began by explaining the origins of this sense of urgency, titling the first chapter 
“Declaring the Crisis” [螌曰顯圖ㇷ].93 The text declared that Japan found itself in the midst of a 
“great global crisis,” which initially had been economic (“the dead end of capitalism”94) but soon 
became social and geopolitical. As beggar-thy-neighbor policies crippled world trade and 
triggered economic wars between the emerging economic blocs, Nakano feared escalation into an 
armed conflict; he envisioned a potential second world war, perhaps as soon as 1936. Japan, 
lacking a viable economic bloc of its own and having earned England’s hostility because of its 
export competitiveness, 95  was in a particularly vulnerable position: “Japan sorely needs a 
national policy to deal with the above-mentioned crisis.” With his “Outline Plan for National 
Reconstruction,” Nakano offered “a suitable, active and aggressive practical program” and 
promised to “pour all our energy into its realization.” 96  
In the remainder of the work, Nakano detailed the policies and reforms necessary to 
overcome the crisis. His most fundamental proposals were political, aimed at creating a 
government that would be strong enough to carry out the economic and foreign policies required 
to resolve the crisis.97  He believed the political parties in their current form were not only 
incapable of achieving such a task,98 but were actually an “obstacle” to its realization.99 It was 
                                                     
93 Nakano Seigō, “Outline Plan for National Reconstruction”, p. 9. 
94 Ibid., p. 196. 
95 See Ibid., p. 11. 
96 All three quotes from Ibid., p. 13. 
97 Throughout this book, Nakano returns over and over again to the term “Kyōryoku Seiji” [沍察邏̂] 
which depending on the context I have rendered as either “strong politics” or “strong government.” On 
occasion he uses related terms such as “Kyōryoku Naikaku” [沍察献嬡] meaning “strong cabinet,” or 
“Kyōryoku Seisaku” [沍察邏ツ] meaning “strong policies.”   
98 Nakano Seigō, “Outline Plan for National Reconstruction”, p. 208. 
99 Ibid., p. 15. 
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therefore necessary “to abandon traditional party politics entirely and … form a powerful 
cabinet.”100 This “people’s cabinet” - or “strong cabinet,”101 as Nakano also called it - would be 
“unrestricted by the majority of the Diet” and “invested for a limited period of time by the Diet 
with the power necessary to carry out emergency policies.”102  
 Nakano stressed that he did “not deny the principle of democracy” and that “the Diet will 
continue to be convened as in the past, [will] hold sessions, and [will], of course, monitor the 
government’s actions. The powers given to the government will be limited in time, because we 
expect that the crisis will eventually be solved and that the Diet, through structural reforms, will 
one day recover the people’s trust.”103 In support of this aim, Nakano noted that temporary 
transfers of power to the government’s executive branch had many historical precedents, 
including England during WW1. 104  He noted that Italy and Germany, meanwhile, were 
undertaking such transfers as he wrote and that “even [in] the democratic USA… the president is 
following this path and pushing ahead with economic control policies.” 105  Nakano’s motto 
throughout the book was: “Democracy is the end and autocracy the means.”106 
Nakano envisioned that, after such political reforms were implemented, the way would be 
cleared for the introduction of a controlled economy. His overarching aim was “national power” 
or, more specifically, “the organizational development of the national productive power, with the 
                                                     
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid., p. 212. 
102 Ibid., p. 16. 
103 Ibid., p. 16-17. 
104 Ibid., p. 206. 
105 Ibid., p. 16-17. Nakano’s idea was perhaps modeled on Germany’s “Ermächtigungsgesetz” of January 
1933, through which Hitler had been legally given – temporarily at first - dictatorial powers by the German 
Reichstag to deal with that country’s problems. Initially limited to five years, Hitler was able to expand the 
duration and the purview of his power and establish tyranny which lasted for 12 years.  
106 Nakano Seigō, “Outline Plan for National Reconstruction”, p. 16. 
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aim of increasing the people’s well-being.”107 Nakano did not advocate “nationalization of each 
and every business,” but aimed rather to “allow for private interest in each and every enterprise, 
with the state only providing guidance concerning the national economy’s direction.”108 More 
specifically, he advocated establishing controls over a wide swath of business areas, including the 
financial sector, with the aim of channeling private monies into public works. He sought to 
impose controls on industry and commerce, especially  areas such as as “investment decisions, 
production levels, sales, purchases of raw materials, the raising of capital, the definition of 
accounting standards, and labor conditions;” 109  on agriculture, 110  through price controls on 
important agricultural goods and the establishment of a system of  self-ruled cooperatives; on the 
labor unions, which would retain the right to bargain collectively while the state “strictly 
prohibited private struggles that cause the breakdown or standstill of production” and thus 
mediated between labor and management for the benefit of  society; and on various other aspects 
of the economy such as the flow of trade, foreign exchange markets and public utilities, whose 
prices would be determined by the public.  
In the main body’s final chapter, Nakano proposed policies that would establish a 
controlled economy between Japan and Manchuria,111 including abolishing trade barriers between 
the two countries,  establishing a common currency, transferring Japanese capital and labor to 
Manchuria, and establishing a Manchurian Development Board.  
                                                     
107 Ibid., p. 21. On pages 102-3 of the same work, Nakano defined “national power” as follows: “The 
general national strength includes first, the nation’s military power, its economic productive capacity, and 
the factors which form the basis of this military and economic powers, that is the physical strength of the 
workers, farmers, and general people, their skills, and spiritual strength. The totality of these factors is 
what I call general national strength.”  
108 Ibid., p. 22. 
109 Ibid., p. 46. 
110 Ibid., p. 53-63. 
111 Ibid, p. 80-93. 
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For all the effort he poured into his manifesto, Nakano knew that formulating and 
publishing a coherent ideology was not enough. Starting in the second half of 1933, Nakano 
made a sustained effort to spread his beliefs in person, by touring through Japan and popularizing 
his views through speeches and lectures. The first series, held in the summer and called “In Favor 
of a Far-Eastern Monroe Doctrine” 112  was followed in early November by a speech titled 
“Indicators of National Reconstruction,”113 which summarized his plan.  
 
Normalizing the Extraordinary  
Nakano’s initial intellectual shift rightward was triggered specifically by a series of crises 
that included the Great Depression, the Manchurian Incident and the May 15 incident, and, more 
generally, by the feeling of emergency that gripped Japan in the early 1930s. It was this feeling of 
“crisis” [賓雍] - or, as Nakano most often put it, the sense that Japan was going through an 
“extraordinary time” [延晝蕁] - that led Nakano to call for extraordinary policies, extraordinary 
reforms and, eventually, for an extraordinary political leader.  
When Nakano realized that a crisis - and the fears it triggered - could lend great power to 
whomever proposed a solution, he worked the mechanism of spotting an emergency and 
suggesting a resolution into his repertoire. With time, this alarmist element became so 
fundamental to Nakano’s thinking that he was unable or unwilling to surrender it, even after 
Japan re-entered a period of relative calm after 1933. The gap between Nakano’s alarmist 
rhetoric and Japan’s actual situation was perhaps largest during the Sait| and Okada cabinets. 
Increased armament spending, combined with a program of public construction projects launched 
                                                     
112 Nakano Seigō, “In Favor of the Asian Monroe Doctrine” [ȪɀȪ刷ɪɻɵόЏ㕽ȃᦤଅ] speech 
held in June & July 1933 and reproduced in Nakano Seigō “Outline Plan for National Reconstruction” [೑
ᆊᬍ䗴㿜⬏㎅䷬], Tokyo, 1933, p. 119-174. 
113 Nakano Seigō in a speech titled “Indicators of National Reconstruction” [೑ᆊᬍ䗴ȃᣛ῭] held at 
Hibiya Public Hall on November 2, 1933 and quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 762. 
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by Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo (who served in both cabinets), had improved Japan’s 
economic conditions enormously. Keenly aware that the receding crisis took the bite out of his 
reform agenda, however, Nakano argued vehemently that the emergency was far from over.  
When speaking in the Diet in early 1934, Nakano lamented that the economic expansion 
was only superficial and that “the fundamental currents are diametrically opposed to it.”114 
According to Nakano, the Saitō program had caused “an economic boom for the upper classes 
that does not reach the lower classes”, as rising inflation had eroded farmers’ and workers’ 
purchasing power. While he welcomed increased armament spending and the development of 
Japan’s heavy industry, Nakano feared that these trends would come to an end once the demand 
for arms was satisfied.115 When Okada replaced premier Saitō in 1934 and continued many of his 
predecessor’s policies, Nakano continued criticizing what he viewed as complacency:  
 
“The mission of the Okada cabinet is … to suppress the hard liners of the navy and the 
army, to dissolve the feeling of emergency and to lead Japan into a false sense of 
security and peace…The fact that this is an extraordinary time does not lead to make 
extraordinary efforts. The fact that this is an extraordinary time leads them to use opium 
in hope of tranquilizing the people.”116 
 
In his speeches and writings, especially “The Empire’s Crisis is Far From Resolved,”117 
Nakano maintained that the real crisis would come in 1936. Influenced by the writings of 
Tōhōkai member Kojima Sei’ichi, Nakano said in a 1933 speech that 1936 would be a crucial 
year, one in which new armament treaties and many territorial questions (including Manchuria, 
                                                     
114 Nakano Seigō in a speech held in the 65th Diet on January 25, 1934 quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 
787. 
115 Nakano wrote that “Armament good are non-consumables” failing to understand that once theyr break 
out wars create a sheer unlimited demand for arms. Ibid. p. 793. 
116 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [顯ť] in Gakan, October 1934, p. 12-13. 
117 Nakano Seigō, “The Empire’s Crisis is far from Resolved” [晝肉｠螌曰顯鐺╄〉⋛í╇╆], (Tokyo, 
March, 1934). 
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the Pacific Islands entrusted to Japan by the League of Nations after WW1, etc.) would be 
negotiated between the Powers.118  In order to prepare for the Powers’ redistribution of the 
world’s colonies and markets, Japan had to reform internally. “If that is not a crisis,” Nakano 
asked to applause, “what is it?”119 Ironically, in declaring the crisis to be permanent, Nakano 
made the “extraordinary time” quite ordinary and normal.  
Nakano’s predictions about the importance of the year 1936 were vindicated – almost 
spookily – when, on February 26, 1936, young officers of the Imperial Way Faction [38湈<] 
started a mutiny that saw the Tokyo Police Headquarters, the Diet and the Army Ministry 
buildings succumb to occupation and several high-ranking government figures lose their lives at 
the hands of rebel forces. Returning home unexpectedly early that day, Nakano took his sons on a 
city tour and was disappointed when all they could see of the chaos was a machine gun 
embankment guarded by rebel soldiers and a young rebel officer giving a speech in the street. Yet 
when the mutiny’s initial shock faded in the aftermath of the rebels’ suppression and Nakano 
sensed the Japanese public becoming complacent, he was quick to talk up the crisis again. He 
compared the Hirota cabinet, which succeeded Okada after the February 26 uprising, with a 
“calm wind before a storm.”120 The need to whip up an artificial crisis atmosphere ended with the 
outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan in the summer of 1937 and the eventual 
expansion of that conflict into the Pacific War. Thereafter, the storm about which Nakano had 
long warned became real.  
 
                                                     
118 The idea of 1936 as a crisis climax of crisis had been popularized among others by Kojima Sei’ichi [婀
恠ɚヘ] in his “The Global Crisis of 1936” [ヮ01住▊ヘНメ結桿], (Tokyo: Senkura Shobō [桧琢蟷蘯], 
1933). For Nakano’s treatment of the same idea  see for example Nakano Seigō, “Indicator of National 
Reconstruction”, p.  29 
119 Nakano Seigō, Speech held in the 65th Diet on January 25, 1934 quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 
791. 
120 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Gakan, April 1936, p. 6.  
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The Failure of the Kokumin Dōmei: The Labor Union Example 
By the end of 1933, Nakano had laid claim to two instruments through which he hoped to 
influence the course of politics: first, a budding mass movement with a published ideology, a 
think tank, a youth organization, and a hold over two labor unions; second, his traditional power 
base, which consisted of a Fukuoka constituency, membership in a minor party and a seat in the 
national parliament. How did Nakano use these tools in the game of politics?  
Let us first look at Nakano’s attempt to mobilize the populace by bringing mass 
organizations under the Kokumin Dōmei’s umbrella. When he launched the National League, 
Nakano had hoped it would quickly attract other reform-minded individuals and groups. This did 
not happen to the extent he had desired. Many groups in the reformist camp chose to remain 
independent or to affiliate themselves with other political parties. For example, the new 
bureaucrats sought parliamentary representation through reform factions in the established parties, 
while army reformer Colonel Nagata Tetsuzan approached the Social Mass Party rather than 
Nakano’s National League. Those few organizations that did come under the Kokumin Dōmei’s 
umbrella, moreover, did not remain for long. The National Youth League dissolved quickly, 
while Nakano’s term as president of the Communications Union lasted just ten months. The 
Farm-Village-Relief-Petition Movement lasted longer, but Nakano had never had a direct 
affiliation with that project, which had always belonged to Kazami Akira.  
Fundamentally, however, the failure of Nakano’s mass movement rested on internal 
contradictions in Nakano’s ideological position. His dealings with the Communication Ministry’s 
labor union provide one illustration of the point. Following the European fascist parties’ example, 
Nakano cast the Kokumin Dōmei’s social nationalism as a third way that transcended socialism 
and liberal capitalism. This formulation worked well on paper and sounded good in speeches, but, 
in reality, the position’s ideological contradictions could not be ignored. 
In launching his mass movement, Nakano’s professed aim had been integrating Japan’s 
farmers and workers, whom he called “abandoned people” or “people without voice” [100陣｠鍗], 
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into national politics.121 Giving voice to these people was part of his political mission, and after 
1931 his speeches make ample use of the labor movement’s vocabulary. When attacking the 
Important Industry Law in a Diet speech in early 1934, Nakano stated that it did not further “the 
welfare of the masses” because “today’s Industrial Control Law seems to have been created on 
behalf of one part of monopoly capital, and not on behalf of the masses.”122 In the same speech, 
he attacked classical liberal economics on the grounds that:  
 
“Letting freedom loose within a society as advanced in its organization as today’s 
means allowing the strong to eat the weak [氣誕沍椽] and surrendering the economy to 
anarchism. The organized social classes will then suppress the unorganized social 
classes. The strong classes will suppress the weak classes. The strong will eat the 
weak.” 123  
 
He then commented on capitalists’ cynical motives:  
 
“Seen through the eyes of a capitalist who thinks only about short-term profit, it is 
better to keep the rural villages in poverty, for if you do so the villages become a 
limitless source of slave- and low-wage labor. If the farmers are in distress, they will 
volunteer to work for free. If you keep them poor, cheap labor becomes available.”124 
 
Nakano’s tactic of criticizing capitalism and using labor-movement terminology was 
clearly designed to appeal to workers, but was it enough to make him a credible union leader? 
Doubts are justified at least on two grounds. First, Nakano’s critique of classical liberal 
economics does not mean he had abandoned the totality of liberal economic thought. He believed 
that capitalism required reform and taming through controls, but that its main aspects, such as 
                                                     
121 Nakano Seigō, “Indicator of National Reconstruction”, p. 26.  
122 Nakano Seigō, Speech held in the 65th Diet on January 25, 1934 quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 
801-02. 
123 Ibid., p. 804. 
124 Ibid., p. 805-06. 
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private property rights and the profit principle, should be retained. When explaining the content 
of his economic policies, Nakano always took care to distance himself from socialist thinkers, so 
as not to alienate potential business supporters. The controlled economy he proposed was 
“neither national management of each and every economic enterprise nor their nationalization 
and socialization.” More than once, he stressed that the National League still aimed to foster “the 
individual’s and the group’s lively originality and free capacity for action, and [to make] both 
contribute to the welfare of the masses.”125 In short, though Nakano spoke at times like an anti-
capitalist, he never was one at heart - and even if he had been, this stance alone would not have 
made him pro-labor.   
Second, even when Nakano did take a pro-labor position, he saw limits to labor’s demands. 
In his “Outline Plan for National Reconstruction” he wrote:  
 
“Our workers and farmers should now abandon the one-sided principle of class struggle 
and return to a national perspective. They have to become aware of their true and 
original mission, and fulfill the positive role of functioning as the axis for the increase 
of the nation’s general power [㍰ড়ⱘ೑࡯๫䘆]. The state [೑ᆊ] should respect this 
active mission of the workers and farmers, and should support them in fulfilling their 
function.”126  
 
According to Nakano, the interests of workers, management and capitalists had to be 
subordinated to the overarching aim of increasing national strength. Nakano, in short, was pro-
labor only as long as labor was pro-state.  
This conception put severe limits on what Nakano was prepared to do for labor. He was 
quite frank in communicating his ideological position to the union over which he presided. On 
                                                     
125 For both quotes see Tokyo Asahi News [ᵅҀᳱ᮹ᮄ㘲], December 18, 1932. Nakano repeated the 
argument that economic controls would kill competition and creativity in Nakano Seigō, “The Dangers and 
Rationality behind Positive Expansionism” [〡Ὁᢵ໻Џ㕽ȃॅ″ᗻǽড়⧚ᗻ], (Tokyo: T|tairiku-sha 
[ᵅ໻䱌⼒], 1937), p. 25-27.  
126 Nakano Seigō, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 757.  
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the occasion of his inauguration, he gave a speech confirming a worker’s right to “pursue one’s 
interest based on one’s class position,” but also added:  
 
“When it becomes an obstacle to the advancement of the nation’s combined strength, 
capitalism should be overthrown. To the extent that communism is harmful to this 
combined national strength, it should also be eradicated.”127 
 
He thus made clear that there was a limit to workers’ demands and that this limit was 
dictated by Japan’s quest for “national strength,” to which he believed all other aims should be 
subordinated.  
Nakano’s forthright description of his beliefs should have been a warning to union 
members not to expect too much from him. When four members of the union’s executive 
committee were discharged by the Communications Ministry, Nakano appealed to the minister 
but was unable to have the workers reinstated. Much to the union’s disappointment, Nakano did 
not force the issue by calling a strike:   
 
“A dumb dog will not bite the person that hits him, but instead clench its teeth into the 
stick with which it is beaten. The officials of the Ministry of Communications are 
committing an outrage in carrying out the labor laws of the Saitō cabinet, but the source 
of this oppression is the cabinet, not the ministry officials themselves. They are but the 
stick of the person beating the dog. The Communications Friends and Comrades 
Society should oppose the illegal pressure of the Communications Ministry. I myself 
will have to fight politically against the labor policies of the present cabinet.”128 
 
If we are to believe the critical assessment of a newspaper, Nakano’s passive attitude was 
typical of his general attitude toward the union:  
 
                                                     
127 All quotes taken from Nakano Seigō, speech held on October 8, 1933 when accepting the position of 
director of the Communications Friends and Comrade Society, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 745 and 
again in Inomata p. 352-53. 
128 Nakano Seigō, Nakano Seigō, “Indicators of National Reconstruction”, p. 46.  
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“Mr. Nakano, in spite of being the union’s president, never mingled directly with the 
general union members, so that in the end a feeling has spread throughout the 
membership that relying on him is unwise. From the very beginning, Mr. Nakano never 
had  the intention to look after each and every  task on his own. His original idea was to 
enter the union only under the condition that he would determine its general direction. 
Nakano has always been a politician with a very busy life and accepted the position 
only after having been asked. He is not the sort of man who can afford to spend his time 
caring about the affairs of a small and inactive union.”129 
 
 
Nakano’s unwillingness to deal with the union’s boring, day-to-day work and his failure to 
produce results on this and other occasions were the main reasons he rapidly lost popularity 
among union members. He resigned from his position as president only ten months after 
accepting it. 130  Nakano’s ambivalent ideological position was mirrored by that of the 
Communications Union, which had made Nakano its president in hopes of finding shelter from 
the government’s anti-socialist suppression. While one newspaper described the appointment as a 
“fresh conversion from National Socialism toward Fascism” [肉垤合名会社洩ε閒┷ちÇふでぎごÜ
っ｠117し┷』㡀埴 ], 131  it was in reality an effort to hide behind Nakano without truly 
subscribing to the Kokumin Domei’s ideology. All the union sought was a patron; when they did 
not get the protection for which they had hoped, they were quick to bail.  
 
                                                     
129  “A Strange Accident in the Communications Sector” [殛革産匡01｠29妄 ], published in 
“Communication Economics” [梓毚¯を] September, 1934.  
130 Another instance where Nakano failed to deliver results was recorded by Kazami Akira. When the 
head of a post office ordered some of the postal workers under his supervision not to join Nakano’s union, 
Nakano approached Kazami who was on good terms with the then Minister of Communications to have 
head of the post office fired. Kazami refused. See Kazami Akira [城Wd], “The Diary of Kazami Akira” 
[城W檳荳ヒ], (Tokyo, Misuzu Shobō, 2008), p. 78-79. 
131 The Yorozu-chō-hō News (also known as the Man-chō-hō) [ミ鷯糞], October 9, 1933. 
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The Failure of the Kokumin Dōmei as a Political Party  
Not all of Nakano’s hopes were tied to the Kokumin Dōmei’s success as a popular mass 
movement. He also hoped to gain influence the traditional way - that is, through the Kokumin 
Dōmei’s presence in the Diet. Those hopes were also dashed.  
From the time of the Kokumin Dōmei’s foundation in 1932, the party, and Nakano’s 
position within it, was under continuous attack by various forces. The “national unity cabinet” 
[萃肉ヘ𪘚献嬡] under Saitō, for instance, set out to implement many of the policies that the 
National League (i.e. Nakano) advocated, thereby hollowing out the Kokumin Dōmei’s platform. 
Under Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo, the government began a program of public works 
aimed at providing paid jobs for the unemployed, as well as for impoverished peasants during the 
off season. In line with a foreign policy targeting “autonomous strength”132 and under pressure 
from the army, the Saitō cabinet also increased armament spending. Okada Keisuke, who 
replaced Saitō in July 1934, also pursued an activist economic policy involving increased 
government spending on infrastructure and armaments. The combined effect of these policies 
was to improve Japan’s economic conditions immensely, and thereby to take the urgency out of 
Nakano’s alarmist reform agenda.   
 Nakano faced similar competition from the established parties, which not only supported 
the Saitō and Okada cabinets but also adopted or imitated parts of the National League’s platform. 
In the summer of 1933, the Seiyūkai announced its new economic policy under the title 
“Rectification of Capitalism,”133 causing some in the National League to wonder aloud if the 
established parties were “following our party’s ideas.”134 Although it took the Minseitō two more 
                                                     
132 Saitō broke with the “cooperative diplomacy of previous party cabinets, and instead followed a new 
strategy of autonomous strength.” See Crowly, “Japan’s Quest”, p. 195-9, and 231.  
133 See Tokyo Asahi News [┎絢鷯陞鑄靜], June 15, and August 30, 1933. 
134 See Tokyo Asahi News [┎絢鷯陞鑄靜], August 30, 1933. 
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years to follow suit, in the summer of 1935 they decided to “discard the former passive [i.e. 
laissez-faire] policy” and discuss a new active national policy.135  As the established parties 
adopted important aspects of the National League’s platform and supported the Saitō and Okada 
cabinets in carrying out policies similar to those advocated by the Kokumin Dōmei, the latter’s 
raison d’etre dissolved.  
The debate over how to reverse or stop this process brought the old division between the 
Nakano and Yamaji factions back into the open. Party president Adachi, who in the past had 
often acted as an arbiter between the two sides, became increasingly unable to bridge the gap. 
Nakano, despite Japan’s improving economic situation, maintained his alarmist insistence that 
the country was in crisis and advocated that the party stick to its radical course. The pragmatic 
Yamaji faction, by contrast, continued to support traditional routes to power, such as gaining 
positions within the government in exchange for support in the Diet, either directly or in a 
coalition with an established party. This option became viable when Prime Minister Okada, 
hoping to strengthen the cabinet’s support in the Diet, asked all parties to cooperate, and offered 
ministerial posts in exchange for such collaboration. The Minseitō accepted but the Seiyūkai 
refused, creating an opening for the Kokumin Dōmei. Yamaji, who had long been unhappy in a 
minor party and sensed an opportunity, campaigned to have Adachi appointed Minister of 
Development or, alternatively, to have the National League return to the Minseitō. While the 
scheme failed, giving the Nakano faction the last word on this occasion, the Yamaji faction 
prevailed in future.136  
The question of whether to cooperate with the Okada cabinet arose again when Okada 
submitted an enormous budget proposal to the Diet in early 1935. The Yamaji faction favored 
                                                     
135 See Tokyo Asahi News [┎絢鷯陞鑄靜] June 3, 1935. 
136 See Nakano Yasuo, vol.2, p. 28. 
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supporting Okada and passing the budget, but Nakano believed that increasing armament 
spending would drive up inflation and harm overall living standards. Nakano challenged the Diet:  
 
 “Today, those who have benefited from the crisis dance for joy, but what has happened 
to the victims of the crisis? (A supporter shouted: ‘They cry.’). The wage- and salary-
earning classes? … And what about the farmers? Why don’t you take a look? … They 
have fallen into a life of slavery.”137  
 
When neither faction yielded, Adachi approved the budget single-handedly, but a total of 
seven party members (mostly affiliated with Nakano) abstained.138  
A similar pattern repeated itself later that spring, when Okada offered Adachi a seat on the 
cabinet deliberative council [献嬡夛⊘洩]. Predictably, the National League’s two factions 
clashed, with Yamaji favoring acceptance and Nakano opposing it. In the end, it was again 
Adachi who forced the decision by accepting the position, much to Nakano’s regret. Lamenting 
the fact that all the members of the council were firmly established figures in mainstream politics, 
Nakano wrote:  
 
“The cabinet’s deliberative council has not been formed based on the demands of the 
people, but on the demands of the genrō and senior ministers’ cliques. It is not fresh 
water welling up from below, but stale water being poured down from above.”139  
 
Calling the council a “gathering of softliners,” Nakano predicted it would “remain a 
passive entity and never take any active initiative.”140 By joining the deliberative council, Adachi 
                                                     
137 Nakano Seigō speaking during the 66th Diet quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 38.  
138 Those absenting form the vote were Nakano, Kazami, Yutani, Washizawa Yoshiji [寙£ユ惇ы], 
Toda Yumi [缸ヨラ花], Suzuki Shōgo [臁麌橫震], and Takahashi Jutarō ['03㊙佞役玊]. See Tokyo Asahi 
News [┎絢鷯陞鑄靜] February 14 and 15, 1935. 
139 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial: A Gathering of Softliners”  [蕁ルクス瑍巩<邏團｠磓浄], Gakan, June 1935 , 
p. 4. 
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had turned the Kokumin Dōmei into a de facto government party, which emboldened the Yamaji 
faction to go a step further and begin discussing the possibility of re-joining the Minseitō 
ranks.141 Aware that ideological competition from the established parties was eroding the party’s 
appeal, the National League’s leaders – doubtless with one eye on the upcoming provincial and 
general elections - planned to revise the party platform at the 1935 convention.142 The attempt to 
shore up the party’s steady decline, however, came much too late.   
When the Kokumin Dōmei suffered a crushing defeat in the late 1935 provincial elections, 
unease about the general election scheduled for February 1936 started spreading among the 
party’s members. 143  Disappointed with the failure of the Kokumin Dōmei as both a mass 
movement and a political party, on December 9, Nakano left the League on December 9. He was 
followed by the members of his faction, with the notable exception of Kazami Akira. The 
Kokumin Dōmei continued to exist as a minor splinter party until 1940, when it dissolved itself 
to join Konoe’s IRAA.  
 
After the Kokumin Dōmei  
Nakano’s activities after leaving the Kokumin Dōmei followed a familiar pattern. As in 
1932 when, following his withdrawal from the Minseitō, Nakano traveled to the East Asian 
mainland, in late 1935 he again visited Manchuria and China. Nakano’s consistent reaction to 
                                                                                                                                                             
140 Ibid. p. 4. In a separate section of the same editorial titled “What We Expect from Adachi” [嚏湉╁ひ
【鷦く], Nakano also expressed his hope that Adachi would use the influence on the council in order to 
carry out reforms. 
141 See Tokyo Asahi News [┎絢鷯陞鑄靜] May 30, 1935. 
142 See Tokyo Asahi News [┎絢鷯陞鑄靜] April 3rd, 1935. 
143 Prior to the election the National League had held 65 seats in provincial parliaments. The party had 
filed a total of 64 candidates of which, however, only 31 were elected. The main factors contributing to the 
defeat were the fact that with the easing of the economic crisis the National League’s ideology and 
program had lost its appeal but also lack of campaign funds.  
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political setbacks – essentially, to flee the scene - was motivated by the desire both to distance 
himself geographically from his mess and to regain the strength and orientation necessary to 
make a new start. Nakano followed this same pattern in early 1939, after failing to merge the 
Tōhōkai with the Social Mass Party.144  
After returning to Japan in mid-January 1936, Nakano threw himself into the campaign for 
the upcoming general election, scheduled for February. Since he and the members of his faction 
that had followed him out of the Kokumin Dōmei had had no time to regroup, each ran as an 
independent candidate. As much as he could, Nakano supported his followers by giving speeches 
to their constituencies in various parts of Japan, with encouraging results: Nine of his faction’s 
members were re-elected. Nakano, who by now had accumulated a wealth of campaign 
experience, also managed to get re-elected with the highest numbers of votes in his district.   
The army revolt of February 26, 1936 gave Nakano and his followers direction as they 
considered whether, and in what form, they would pursue their aims. The uprising vindicated, 
among other things, Nakano’s warnings that Japan was in state of crisis. While economic boom 
induced by the policies of the two preceding cabinets had temporarily created complacency 
among Japan’s population and governing elite, the army’s revolt had revived the sense of crisis. 
Nakano hoped to exploit what he saw as a sorely needed wake-up call for his purposes.  
More importantly, Nakano saw the suppression of the uprising (which he called a 
revolution), as the end – at least for the time being – of efforts to bring about reforms by violent 
                                                     
144 Leaving for China at the end of the year in the company of ten people, including Tōhōkai members 
Kojima Sei’ichi, Sugimori Kōjirō and Nakayama Yū [Ο峺隈 ], Nakano traveled through Korea to 
Manchuria, where they visited the new capital, and then onto China, visiting Shanghai and Nanking, where 
Nakano met with the leader of Nationalist China, Chiang Kai-shek.  Nakano said the two most important 
findings of this tour were, first, a generally positive impression of developments in Manchuria under army 
leadership and, second, the contents of his conversation with Chiang Kai-shek, to whom he had proposed a 
total political, economic and military union of Japan and China. Nakano’s recollection of the conversation 
between him and Chiang can be found in a pamphlet entitled “The Chinese Question in the Eleventh Year 
of Shōwa” [蓖北慎慎朮貢荳腑黙主] and in a speech held by Nakano on September 10, 1936 (more than 
half a year after the discussion and therefore should be taken with a grain of salt). Alternatively see Nakano 
Yasuo. vol. 2, p. 116 - 122.  
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means. With Kita Ikki imprisoned, Nakano calculated that the time was ripe for the non-violent, 
legal reform movement he had long envisioned. He was convinced that Japan would follow the 
examples of Fascist Italy and, especially, of Nazi Germany, where mass-based parties led by 
charismatic figures had legally grasped power and carried out the kind of reforms Nakano saw as 
necessary for national survival. Believing the Hirota cabinet to be the Japanese counterpart to the 
Papen and Brüning cabinets that preceded Hitler’s rise to power,145 Nakano felt confident that 
Japan, too, would soon see the rise of a fascist leader.  
Nakano’s analysis led him to take two crucial steps. First, he aligned himself and his 
followers even more closely with Ishiwara Kanji and the army reformers close to him, to the 
point that Nakano came to act almost as the army’s mouthpiece in parliament. Second, Nakano 
renewed his attempt to create a mass-based party to serve as the legal non-violent vehicle of 
Japanese political reform. This new party was modeled more on the European fascist parties than 
the Kokumin Dōmei had ever been. Before the end of 1937, Nakano had traveled to Europe as 
the ”Envoy of the People” [肉鍗禾ご] and met with both Mussolini and Hitler. Upon his return, 
Nakano propagated fascism so passionately that his life-long friend Ogata Taketora concluded 
“that he had gone crazy.”146 We return to Nakano’s and his followers’ efforts to create another 
mass-based party in the next chapter.  
 
Japan and the Axis Powers 
Though Nakano’s political position in the early 1930s contained enough elements 
borrowed from European fascism to earn him the label “Japan’s Hitler,” and though the Kokumin 
Dōmei’s uniforms led some commentators to call it a “Fascist” party, Nakano was not yet 
wedded exclusively to the fascist model. When he argued for a strong government in 1932-3, he 
                                                     
145 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, November 1936, p. 9-10.  
146 Ogata, p. 23.  
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did not necessarily envision a dictatorship mimicking those in Germany and Italy. A strong 
presidency - such as those modeled in the US by Roosevelt or in post-WWI France by 
Clemenceau- was an acceptable alternative.147 It was only in the years 1936-8 that shifts in the 
international situation caused Nakano to commit himself fully and exclusively to European 
fascism, and it was only with Nakano’s trip to Europe in the winter of 1937-8 that his move 
toward fascism was complete. After he returned from Europe in March 1938, Nakano’s first 
public speech in his native Fukuoka ended with: “Long Live the Fascists! Long live 
Mussolini!”148 
Two factors pushed Nakano to take this final step toward fascism. First, he was enamored 
of the spectacular economic and diplomatic successes of Germany under Hitler and, to a lesser 
extent, of Italy under Mussolini. Of all the powers, Germany seemed to have dealt most 
successfully with the challenge posed by the Great Depression, especially considering its difficult 
starting position following its defeat in WW1. Like many of his contemporaries around the world, 
Nakano was deeply impressed with Germany’s rise from the ashes; he was not alone in 
concluding that Japan could learn something from Germany’s experience. Germany’s ascent in 
1936-41 to heights that had seemed unimaginable only a decade earlier not only led Nakano to 
feel vindicated in associating himself with the German Nazis, but also encouraged him to deepen 
that association.  
The second factor pushing Nakano toward his ultimate embrace of fascism was the fact 
that Japan, in its search for national security based on economic autarky, came increasingly into 
conflict with the non-fascist Powers (England, France, the US, and Soviet Russia). Nakano 
believed these conflicts were a natural outcome of Japan’s position in the international order, 
                                                     
147 See Nakano Seigō, “Strong politics versus authoritarian politics” [沍察邏̂┷沍sec邏̂┷], in Gakan, 
May 1936, p.2. 
148 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, May 1938, p. 5.   
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which resembled Germany’s and Italy’s positions more than it did those of the other Powers. Not 
only did Japan, Germany and Italy all reject Communism, making them enemies of Russia, but 
each also rejected the post-WW1 international order because it denied them access to markets 
and resources. Nakano recognized that “Italy’s situation is very similar to that of Japan. Its 
territory is poor and its population is growing rapidly. Pressure from outside is immense.” He 
also saw that these similarities made the three nations natural enemies of the “League of Nations 
system, the Versailles System.”149 After his return from Europe in the spring of 1938, Nakano 
would state with more clarity that:  
 
“Japan, Germany and Italy … must correct and overcome the unjust Versailles Treaty 
System that presently governs the world and [instead] establish true justice …These 
three countries must reach out to each other to reconstruct today’s international order. 
At present, the world is being bullied by the status-quo faction with England at its 
center and Russia, France and the vast USA acting as allies…The Versailles Treaty 
System governing the world at present is evil. …Correcting this [evil] is Japan’s 
responsibility as well as the responsibility of Germany and Italy, who have stood up in 
cooperation with Japan.” 150 
 
With every German revision of the Versailles settlement –whether diplomatic before 1939 
or military thereafter – Nakano found his interpretation of international relations more 
convincing. Having first associated the Tōhōkai with the Italian Fascists and German Nazis, 
Nakano soon came to advocate that Japan join the European Axis, as he believed that 
consolidating Japan’s empire and economic bloc would be more feasible in cooperation with 
Germany and Italy. In doing so, he bore responsibility for Japan’s association with fascism.  
 
                                                     
149 Both quotes from Nakano Seigō “People, Stand Up! – returning from Italy and Germany” [೑⇥ȝ䍋
Ǣǻ — ⣀Ӟȝȟᐄȟǻ], in TGtairiku, April 1938, p. 7. 
150 Ibid., p. 3-4. 
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An Implausible Explanation for Nakano’s Attraction to Fascism: Personal Life  
Some biographers have argued that Nakano’s move away from liberalism and toward 
fascism was the result of a series of personal tragedies.151 The amputation of Nakano’s leg and 
the death of his father in the second half of the 1920s were followed by the death of his first-born 
son, Katsuaki, during a mountain-climbing accident in the summer of 1931. Two years later, 
Nakano’s wife was diagnosed with tuberculosis, from which she died in June of 1934. On top of 
all this, his second-born son, Yūshi, after suffering several mental breakdowns and developing 
symptoms of schizophrenia, died of blood poisoning in July 1935.152 Did these tragedies change 
the way Nakano thought about politics?  
The death of his father in the summer of 1928 does not seem to have hit Nakano 
particularly hard. His father’s advanced age – 71 – meant near-term death was likely. Nakano’s 
relationship with his father, moreover, had never been close. The loss of his first-born son, 
Katsuaki, by contrast, left a more profound impression – enough to make Nakano re-evaluate his 
relationship to the rest of his children. Describing the experience in detail and with unusual 
emotional intimacy in an article, Nakano, then 46 years old, wrote that his son’s death was the 
“first taste of sorrow in my life.”153 The death made Nakano believe that, up to then, he had been 
an “unnaturally strict father,”154 which he saw as a result of his own upbringing in a Kyūshū 
samurai family, where he “had been greatly influenced by the feudal way of the warrior…and 
                                                     
151 For example, his son Nakano Yasuo writes, that the year 1933 during which Nakano’s wife fell ill was 
a period of “internal changes” [献螞35㡀▊] and implied that this also accounted for some of the shifts in 
Nakano’s political views. Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 714.  
152 There was in Nakano’s family a history of insanity. The younger brother of Nakano’s mother Tora had 
become insane and died at a young age. Likewise, Nakano’s younger brother Yasukai had been 
hospitalized several times following nervous breakdowns caused by stress.  See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 
21. 
153 Nakano Seigō, “Hold on, Father” [ぎでよüぎ▲捓 ぢぢ] in Nakano Seigō, “Expressions of the Soul” 
[09は嘱┻] (Tokyo, 1938), p. 314. 
154 Ibid., p. 324 
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raised to believe that showing love and sadness is most shameful for a man.”155 Realizing that 
hiding his emotions masked “his own inability to accept the painful truth on its own terms,” 156 
Nakano gathered his remaining sons around him under the mosquito net in his bedroom and for 
the first time allowed himself to cry in front of them. 
Before Katsuaki’s death, Nakano had been seen by his children as somewhat of a “rustic 
brute” with no appreciation of arts, literature or even moving pictures. Their characterizations 
included descriptions of a man who could, on occasion, behave like a “violent tyrant” [魍食] 157 
and who even had a “sadistic”158 streak. Katsuaki himself had been so afraid of his father that 
when the first-born son made a list in his diary of things to fear, it included “earthquakes, 
lightning, fire, and the old man” [ゆöぐ].” 159 While Nakano’s eldest two sons dealt with their 
fear through rebellion and criticism, the younger sons withdrew from their father. 
Following Katsuaki’s death, Nakano tried to bridge the emotional gap with his younger 
sons by bringing them to restaurants, attending their sporting events and taking them on trips 
through Japan. More than anything else, he rode frequently with them on horseback. Nakano’s 
efforts produced little tangible results - his youngest son later recalled that during the restaurant 
visits, “besides the food, there was no exchange at the level of the heart” [よ｠濕｠梓?を』┷
[╋].160  
The death of his wife in 1934, by contrast, seems to have impacted Nakano more broadly. 
She had been one of the few female presences in Nakano’s life (others included Noguchi Yukiko, 
                                                     
155 Ibid., p. 317.  
156 Ibid., p. 320 and p. 323.  
157 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 571. 
158 See Ibid., vol. 2, p. 101. 
159 See Ibid., vol. 1, p. 491. 
160 See Ibid., vol. 2, p. 83. 
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the nurse whom Nakano met at Kyūshū hospital as a youth, and his beloved mother, Tora). His 
wife’s death not only put an end to what seems to have been an overall happy marriage, 161 but 
also seems to have marked end of Nakano’s sexual life. Even as a bachelor, Nakano does not 
seem to have entertained many amorous relations or to have frequented prostitutes or brothels. It 
is untrue that “his life was without romance,” as Aochi stated,162 because Nakano was attracted to 
women in general and, on occasion, showed his interest with such crude directness that it 
embarrassed those around him.163 He seems, instead, to have shied away from extramarital sex, 
perhaps on account of his leg injury. When Nakano and Kazami Akira, freshly employed 
journalists for the Tokyo Daily sometime around 1909, prowled through the Yoshiwara red-light 
district, Nakano was approached by a prostitute who tried to pull him into the brothel. He resisted 
the invitation vehemently, nearly getting into a fight with her. Kazami saw Nakano’s resistance 
as a reflection of his “purity” [㋨ⳳ].164 Ogata shared this view, calling  Nakano’s lifestyle 
“puritan” [ɜɭόɲɇɻⱘ⫳⌏] and adding that Nakano “did not like liquor or tobacco, and of 
course he stayed away from women and song.”165 After his wife’s death, Nakano’s followers 
brought him to a Geisha in Shimbashi where he spent some pleasant hours. When those same 
                                                     
161 Ogata writes that Nakano’s marriage life was a happy one until the death of his son. See Ogata, p. 32. 
This view is shared by Nakayama Yū [Ёቅ۾]; “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [Ё䞢ℷ࠯ȧដǛ]; in 
“Kyōtsū no hiroba” [݅䗮ȃᑗจ]; September 1952, p. 46. 
162 Aochi Shin [⻗丱᰼], “Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩] in Chisei [ö淤], February 1955, p. 154. 
163 Kazami Akira recalled the following anecdote about Nakano. “When he was 24 or 25 starting to be 
relatively known as a writer, we left the Tokyo Daily News because we felt were not being well treated 
there and joined the Tokyo Asahi News. Since we were both bachelors at the time, we would often roam 
around the city together. His lack of etiquette [⛵䘴ᝂǪ] or shall I call it his carefree attitude often 
embarrassed me. For example, if a young woman would sit opposite to us on a train he would ask me in a 
loud voice. ‘What do you think about that chick?’ I really had trouble answering that question.” Kazami 
Akira quoted in Mitamura Takeo, Mitamura Takeo [ϝ⬄ᴥ℺໿], “Why did Nakano Seig| Committ 
Suicide?” [Ё䞢ℷ࠯Ȅԩᬙ㞾ߔǬǴǠ], (Tokyo, 1953),  p. 125-26. 
164 See Mitamura, “Why did Nakano Seig| Committ Suicide?”, p. 126 
165 Ogata, p. 32. 
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followers, wishing to do him another favor, brought him there again a couple of weeks later, 
Nakano got angry and said: “Don’t make fun of people.”166 Indeed, unlike Nakano’s idol Saigō 
Takamori, that great patron of brothels, and Nakano’s mentor Tōyama Mitsuru, who is said to 
have spent two months living in a brothel “practicing Zen on top of the belly of his favorite 
prostitute,”167 Nakano cultivated the image of an ascetic. In one of the notes he wrote the evening 
he killed himself, Nakano stated: “Since 1934, I have lived the life of a bachelor [碩厂嶂酷膏浩
肱﨟攻肱攻紅].” 168 It is impossible to tell whether Nakano really was the ascetic he claimed to 
be or whether he was only better at keeping his affairs, whether romantic or purely sexual, secret. 
Even contemporaries were unsure whether Nakano’s image was calculated to appeal to voters or 
whether it was an expression of genuine respect for women.169 Whatever the answer, after his 
                                                     
166 Tomatsu Keigi [缸┛笳⊘]; “A Record of Friends and Mentors: General Ishiwara Kanji, Nakano 
Seigō and I” [曁招₁◇G初洑46妍崹┚Ο𥿠橫鎖》ゟ]; in Sōgō Bunka [ñ浄錮湿]; September 1956, p. 
80-81. 
167  Toyama was a notorious womanizer. While in Tokyo, during his younger days, he once spent 
two months without interruption in a brothel, called the beach house [Z｠垤], where he claimed to have 
practiced his way of Zen. When one of this followers visited him there and asked him what he did all day 
long, Toyama replied: “I am walking the way of Buddha.” [叶を∥｠湈は≳[〉┰て ] and then 
explained: “I am a man without spirit and whatever I do I quickly grow tired of it. Buying Geishas is the 
only thing I do with all my heart and sincerity and it is the only thing I do not grow tired of. I believe this is 
my way to enlightenment [叶｠∥｠湈′な┲] and I follow it every day.”  Toyama summed up the 
wisdom that he had arrived at during his studies of Zen by reverting the Buddhist saying “All attachment is 
void” [噯十韋ア] into “All emptiness is sexuality.” [ア十韋噯].  See Hinoshita Tōgo [陞ャ頞震], The 
way of the lion: Nakano Seigō [17啀｠湈Ο𥿠橫鎖], (Tokyo, 1986) p. 247 and following. 
168 Nakano Seigō quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 811. 
169 Tomatsu Keigi suggested that that respect that Nakano claimed to have for women was a political 
calculation, i.e. a way to appeal to voters. See Tomatsu Keigi [缸┛笳⊘]; “A Record of Friends and 
Mentors: General Ishiwara Kanji, Nakano Seigō and I” [曁招₁◇G初洑46妍崹┚Ο𥿠橫鎖》ゟ]; in 
Sōgō Bunka [ñ浄錮湿]; September 1956, p. 81. Nakano’s friend Ogata on the other hand, praised 
Nakano’s “puritan life-style” and added that “there are not many contemporary politicians who cannot 
compare to him.” Ogata, p. 32. 
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wife’s death, Nakano never re-married and his mother became once again the main, and perhaps 
sole, female presence in his life.170  
Nakano’s wife’s death also left a spiritual void in his home. She had brought cultural 
refinement, urban cosmopolitanism and arts appreciation into the house, and after her death, the 
home’s atmosphere was dominated by the rustic style of the Kyūshū samurai ethos that Nakano 
and his mother cultivated. Nakano tried filling this void by taking an interest in matters about 
which he had previously cared little. He became religious, for instance, building a Buddhist altar 
in his wife’s former room, where he prayed regularly. He also started reading and appreciating 
poetry. 171  
Another way in which Nakano dealt with the loss of his family members was by 
channeling much of his free time into horseback riding. It may have been a form of escape or 
distraction, but it afforded him at least some emotional relief. Even as a child, Nakano had liked, 
and occasionally ridden, horses. During his trip to Manchuria in 1932, he realized how practical 
horse-riding could be for someone missing a leg and, once back in Tokyo, he started taking 
lessons. After his wife’s death, this hobby became a veritable passion. Nakano bought at least 
half-dozen horses in the next ten years,172 built stables and horse-riding grounds in both Tokyo 
                                                     
170 See Ogata Taketora [₂鑷ち欤]; “Nakano Seigō a Dutiful Son” [咯啀｠Ο𥿠橫鎖食] in Seigō-kai eds. 
[橫鎖洩], “Nakano Seigō is Alive” [Ο𥿠橫鎖をナ┹〉┰て], (Tokyo: Akane-shobō [┮┷‒鵄网], 1954); 
p. 48-49. See also Ogata Taketora [₂鑷ち欤], “His Strong Sides and his Gentle Sides” [沍┰螞刷隈╃┰
螞]; part of a special feature “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [Ο𥿠橫鎖は籏┲], in “Japan and the 
Japanese” [陞麝抄ぇ陞麝以], January 1956, p. 16-18. 
171 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 179. 
172 Nakano Yasuo also addresses the interesting question of how Nakano could pay for this expensive 
hobby, which given that a single horse could cost several thousand Yen and Nakano’s income as a member 
of parliament was only 3,000 Yen per annum, was clearly beyond his means. According to his son, the 
horses were often presents from political supporters and businessmen. Thus, a backer of Kazami Akira, by 
the name of Saitō Shigeo [錻頞愜ヘ] helped Nakano to buy a horse, while another was a present by 
Shindō Shintarō [よ頞穗役玊] who like Nakano came from Fukuoka and as a child had studied under 
Nakano’s teacher Shibata Fumishiro. The present included the fodder necessary to maintain the horse. See 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 78 and p. 201. 
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and Fukuoka, arranged for his sons to receive instruction so they could accompany him on 
outings, and perfected his own skill as a rider. Wind or rain, he began each day with a two-hour 
ride, which afforded him the time and peace to prepare for the typically-turbulent day ahead. In 
one of his more intimate pieces, Nakano described how after “having lost a son, then my wife 
and then another son” it was only when riding a horse that he could “transcend the border 
between dream and reality.” He added that horse-riding was “the only state in life that will afford 
me joy today.”173 
But for all the changes that losing a wife and two sons may have caused in Nakano’s life 
and personality, the deaths did not paralyze him either privately or professionally. He continued 
to be an active patriarch, buying in 1928 a vacation home on the beach near Yokosuka where the 
family spent summer weekends,174 building in 1932 a new house in Yoyogi only months after 
Katsuaki’s passing, and building in 1934 another weekend refuge west of Tokyo on the Tama 
river, which he called the “House of Benevolent Rain” [禀簉棐]. As before, Nakano took an avid 
interest in the education of the students living in his dorm, this time building at his new home a 
sumō wrestling ground, an archery shooting range and a jūdō hall where students were instructed 
once weekly by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police’s jūdō instructor. Finally, Nakano’s personal 
losses did not diminish his passion for politics. He continued traveling, touring the country giving 
lectures and speeches while writing abundantly and engaging in politics with typical vigor.  
Do these personal tragedies, individually or in sum, really provide an explanation for 
Nakano’s move toward fascism? This biographer leans toward a qualified no. It is true Nakano’s 
family tragedies triggered changes in his personality, but the changes smacked little of the 
emotions we associate with fascism. Stated simply, Nakano did not harden through the 
                                                     
173 Nakano quoted in Inomata, p. 367 – 68, quote taken from Nakano Seigō “Riding Akatsukikaze” [驀喫
【Зて]. 
174 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 589-90. 
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experience, but became rather soft. Personal loss made Nakano more lenient, forgiving and 
patient - not only toward his children, but even toward the family’s pet dogs. In the past, Nakano 
had often kept dogs for fighting and had not thought twice about giving them away if they lost a 
fight. After his family members’ deaths, Nakano held on even to the dogs that lost, and as his 
interest in horses increased he gradually lost all appetite for dog fights.175 In short, it is difficult to 
see how a gentler and more lenient attitude toward the people around him, or his new- found 
religiosity and appreciation for poetry, would have pushed Nakano to join the fascist camp. The 
only way in which Nakano’s personal tragedies may be seen to have influenced his political shift 
to the right is that they may have colored his mood and intensified the sense of crisis that 
permeated his thinking in those years.  
 
Continuities and Discontinuities between Nakano’s Liberal and Fascist Periods 
We have so far explained Nakano’s intellectual move to the right mainly in terms of 
changes in the world around him. This approach, while popular among most of Nakano’s 
biographers, only gets at part of the truth. We now explore an alternative explanation for 
Nakano’s turn toward fascism, one that stresses the continuities in his thinking and has been 
explored in greater detail by Muro Kiyoshi.176 The two approaches are not mutually exclusive, 
but the second requires that we take a step back to examine the entirety of Nakano’s life in search 
of elements visible before the 1930s that suggest his embrace of Fascism and Nazism in 1937 
was, in fact, not a break with his past but rather a continuation of major elements of it.  
Neither Nakano’s critique of the established parties nor his desire to establish a mass-
based party, for instance, originated in 1931. Both elements were already present in Nakano’s 
                                                     
175 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1,  p. 624-25 and vol. 2, p. 102. 
176 Muro Kiyoshi [ᅸ┨]; Topple T|j| – An Appraisal of Nakano Seigō [ᵅᴵ㿢ǹȎǬ Ё䞢ℷ࠯䀩
ӱ], (Tokyo, 1999), pp. 17 – 59. 
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thinking when he entered politics in 1920. The 1930s break in Nakano’s attitude toward the 
military was also not as stark as some biographers suggest. Nakano had never been a pacifist and 
once even dreamt of a military career. As for economic controls, Muro has suggested that the 
first seeds of such leanings in Nakano’s thinking can be found in the Minseitō program of 
1927.177  
A deeper-lying continuity in Nakano’s thinking, one that spans both his liberal and his 
fascist period, is his view of political leaders. In brief, Nakano’s soft spot for charismatic leaders 
such as Saigō, Napoleon, Clemenceau, and Lenin made him susceptible to the pull of Europe’s 
Fascist and Nazi leaders. As early as 1927, while still praising parliamentary constitutional 
politics as the preferred mechanism for gathering and prioritizing a society’s conflicting interests, 
Nakano mentioned that a dictatorship could fulfill the same function. Using Mussolini’s Fascist 
regime as an example, Nakano wrote:  
 
“If we study the nature of present-day dictatorships, it is not as if a single hero with an 
iron fist and no regard for the people steps on them and oppresses them randomly. It is 
rather the case of someone who illuminates the people’s emotions and observes their 
hopes and feelings very sensitively; someone who … is not taken by the vices and who 
executes the people’s highest and most daring beliefs. Mussolini from Italy is a man 
who, when the patriotism of the people was aroused by the diplomatic humiliation after 
the Great War, and when the reaction of the right wing against the blind actions of the 
left wing reached a climax, grasped the national psyche and rose in anger. At the back 
of the dictator’s iron fist is modern Italy’s general will and emotion…A people with 
                                                     
177 As evidence Muro points to a short piece by Nakano in the February 1928 issue of the Minseitō party 
organ “Minsei” in which he called the basic platform of the party “National Adjustism” [೑ᆊᭈ䂓Џ㕽] – 
a phrase that according to Muro was nothing else but the advocacy of economic controls. Muro maintains 
that Nakano gave life to these ideas in his proposal fort he private management of the telecommunication 
industry while serving as parliamentary Vice-Minister in the Communications Ministry and concludes that 
“consequently there is seamless continuity between the two, and I cannot see any break” between Nakano’s 
position in 1927/28 and the position laid out in Nakano Outline Plan for National Reconstruction. Muro 
Kiyoshi [ᅸ┨]; Topple Tōjō – An Appraisal of Nakano Seigō [ᵅᴵ㿢ǹȎǬ Ё䞢ℷ࠯䀩ӱ], (Tokyo, 
1999), p. 10; See also Nakano Seigō, “National Adjustism as Emphasized by our Party” [៥ܮȃ催䂓ǮȠ
೑ᆊᭈ䂓Џ㕽], in Minsei [⇥ᬓ], vol. 2, February 1928, p. 28. 
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education and a strong spirit will respect a hero and trust a great person, but will not 
follow him blindly and will not idolize him [يڣ㽪].” 178 
 
Nakano’s favorable opinion of Europe’s fascist leaders was confirmed when he met 
Mussolini and Hitler in the winter of 1937-8. Nakano concluded that both were great individuals 
equipped with the rarest political acumen and put them into the same category as his life-long 
idol, Saigō Takamori - probably the highest compliment Nakano could pay any politician.179  
Discussing the impressions he gained in Europe, Nakano said: 
  
“From his outside appearance, Mussolini is like Saigō Takamori. In terms of human 
nature, however, clarity of mind makes Mussolini more like Katsu Kaishū, while Hitler 
is more like Saigō. On the one hand, we have Hitler [and] Saigō, who have arrived at 
their insights from respectful faith...Mussolini, on the other hand, starts from thorough 
knowledge to enter the realm of the pure human condition. Both share an abundant 
humanity. On the one hand a man of great wisdom, on the other hand a man of great 
faith, and yet I believe that ultimately they both converge toward the same point.”180  
 
Further continuities become clear if we recall the general ideas that Nakano developed 
about the nature of political progress while still a journalist in the 1910s. Then, Nakano had seen 
the over-arching trend of politics as steady progress toward ever-greater popular participation. 
Within Japan, Nakano’s conception of political progress meant emancipating the people from the 
                                                     
178 At this stage in his career, Nakano still warned that “dictatorial governments should only come about 
in times when the nation is in emergency or under threat in order to save the nation, through the appearance 
of a great hero.” Nakano added that if a dictatorship was to appear under different circumstances, “it 
should be viewed as a misfortune for the nation” and under normal conditions, a great nation and this of 
course included Japan should adhere to constitutional politics centered around a parliament, but even at this 
early stage, he did not rule out dictatorships categorically and clearly sympathized with Mussolini. Nakano 
Seigō quoted in Nakano, Yasuo vol.1, p. 456-57. 
179 In a conversation with Nakayama Y}, Nakano compared Hitler and Mussolini to the first generation of 
Genyōsha activists: “When I meet with Mussolini and Hitler, it did not feel as if we were meeting for the 
first time. It was like meeting the senpais [ܜ䓽] of the Genyōsha in the old days….” Nakano quoted in 
Nakayama Y} [Ёቅ۾]; “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [Ё䞢ℷ࠯ȧដǛ]; in Kyōts} no hiroba [݅䗮ȃ
ᑗจ]; September 1952, p. 49. 
180 Nakano Seigō “People, Stand Up! – returning from Italy and Germany” [೑⇥ȝ䍋Ǣǻ — ⣀Ӟȝ
ȟᐄȟǻ] , in TGtairiku, April 1938, p. 31. 
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Japanese elites; externally, it meant emancipating the Asian nations from the Western colonial 
powers. Having sought to achieve these aims through democracy in the 1920s, Nakano found no 
difficulty accommodating both emancipatory projects within his interpretation of fascism.  
Like many of his contemporaries, Nakano saw the European fascist regimes as 
emancipatory political systems that facilitated popular participation in domestic politics. After his 
return from Europe in 1938, Nakano stated:  
 
“Both fascism and Nazism are different from the despotic politics of antiquity. They are 
not a form of conservatism that has regressed backwards from democracy. They have 
overcome and gone beyond democracy and are even more popular [⇥Џⱘ]. This is not 
the opinion of scholars, but mine.” 181 
 
In support of this view, Nakano pointed out repeatedly the humble origins from which 
Mussolini, Hitler and many of the Nazi leaders had risen. He believed the fact that Nazi Germany 
opened government positions to young talent was the reason “things move in Germany.”182 More 
than once, he contrasted the allegedly pragmatic and dynamic administration of Germany with 
Japan’s ossified bureaucracy, calling the latter the “disease that would bring about Japan’s 
death.”183 In Nakano’s eyes, Italian Fascism and German Nazism were modernizing, progressive 
movements - radical, perhaps, but nevertheless positive forces that had channeled non-elite 
popular energy into necessary reforms. 
                                                     
181 Nakano Seigō in his speech at the first T|hōkai party convention, December 9, 1938  reprinted in “On 
the Occasion of Tōhōkai’s First National Convention” [ᵅᮍӮ㄀の?ಲܼ೑໻Ӯȃ㞼Ȕǻ], Tōtairiku, 
March 1939, p. 9. 
182 Nakano Seigō “People, Stand Up! – returning from Italy and Germany” [೑⇥ȝ䍋Ǣǻ — ⣀Ӟȝ
ȟᐄȟǻ] , in TGtairiku, April 1938, p. 50.  
183 Ibid. p. 50  
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More continuities can be found in the area of international relations, where Nakano had 
always advocated the liberation of East Asia from Western colonialism. As early as 1915, 
Nakano’s anti-colonialist belief had led him to argue that Japan should have entered WW1 on 
Germany’s side, not on England’s. In the post-WW1 global order that Nakano saw as 
characterized by a conflict between the haves and the have-nots, Nakano had initially hoped for 
Japan to move closer to Soviet Russia. As the economic stress caused by the Great Depression 
deepened this conflict, dividing the world into the “defenders of the status quo” [イせ̅茗<] on 
the one hand  and those trying to overcome the status quo [イせ羣塍<] on the other, Nakano 
returned to advocating closer ties with Germany and Italy, which he saw as Japan’s natural allies. 
Accordingly, Nakano demanded that Japan should expand the Anti-Comintern Pact (directed 
primarily against the Soviet Union) to a military alliance directed against all the Powers, 
especially England and the U.S. 
 To what extent is Nakano’s move toward fascism a reaction to changes in his political 
environment, and to what extent is it an expression of fundamental ideological continuities in his 
thinking? Perhaps the briefest answer to this question would be to state that Nakano’s embrace of 
the fascist model was a clear break in terms of political means but less of one in terms of political 
ends. Both as a liberal as well as a fascist, Nakano pursued the same objectives - namely the 
emancipation of the people of Japan and Asia – throughout his life.  The difference was that 
before 1930, Nakano hoped to achieve his aims through democracy, while thereafter he pinned 
his hopes on fascism. Adopting fascism in the early 1930s, moreover, seemed to make good 
political sense. Nakano believed that Germany and Italy were examples of a general historical 
pattern, according to which “after the fall of the established [i.e. liberal] parties, social democracy 
will raise its head. Once the inherently faulty nature [of social democracy] has been exposed, 
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however, it is the natural course that our activities [i.e. fascism] will come to the forefront.”184 By 
launching a fascist movement in Japan, Nakano hoped to exploit a rising political force that could 
push him to the center of power, just as it had done with Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany.  
                                                     
 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial: The Social Mass Party and its Historical Role” [蕁ルクス瑍だ哢妬膏稿貢髏別ª
櫻琶], in Tōtairiku, June 1937, p. 6.  
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Chapter Five: Imitating Fascism - The Tōhōkai  
 
Introduction  
In the years after 1937, Nakano renewed his attempt to launch a Japanese fascist party that 
would develop into a mass movement. This second attempt, which yielded a party called the 
Tōhōkai, was influenced and shaped by three main factors. Developments in Japan and in the 
world at large played the most important role of the three. Most noteworthy on the international 
stage was the 1937 outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, which drove Japan into opposition with 
the United States and England and into the arms of Germany and Italy. That conflict culminated 
in the Pacific War and Japan’s total defeat. The dominant theme on the domestic front, meanwhile, 
was mobilization for war. The debate over what role the Japanese citizenry would play in this 
mobilization process climaxed during the second and third Konoe cabinets (July 22, 1940 to July 
18, 1941), which saw the launch of the New Order Movement [范喪韮ぉ罰] that in turn, led to 
the establishment of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) [哢膕62⇨善] in October 
of 1940.  
Nakano’s efforts to launch a fascist party were also shaped by his political views, his 
evolving understanding of fascist ideology and movements, and the practical mass-mobilization 
experience he had gained throughout the 1930s. As has been demonstrated, Nakano’s overarching 
political aims - bringing the Japanese people into politics and liberating the Asian people from 
colonialism – remained unchanged. What had changed was the means he hoped to employ to 
achieve his goals. A liberal democrat up to 1930, the economic crisis of the early 1930s caused 
Nakano to make the case for a temporarily stronger executive that would, with the support of a 
mass-based popular party, implement policies to bring Japan back to health. The failure of the 
Kokumin Dōmei, Nakano’s first attempt to create a proto-fascist movement in Japan, did not 
cause him to fundamentally question his strategy for mass mobilization and party organization. 
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The Tōhōkai continued absorbing already-existing organizations such as labor and farmers’ 
unions into its fold, and thus continued dealing with all the challenges to ideological and 
organizational coherence such a strategy entailed. The main difference was that when Nakano 
launched the Tōhōkai he went about it much more whole-heartedly than he had with the 
Kokumin Domei, not bothering the second time around with un-committed actors such as Adachi 
and the Yamaji faction followers. In launching the Tōhōkai, Nakano took matters into his own 
hands and, having more control over the input, he achieved an outcome closer to his ideals.    
Last but not least, the size, structure, organization, and, ultimately, power of Nakano’s 
party determined, to a large extent, how he could use it to influence Japanese politics. 
Accordingly, one thread of this chapter’s narrative will highlight Nakano’s attempts at party 
organization and expansion, as well as the way he wielded both the party’s power and his own 
influence over the masses. As will be argued, Nakano’s ultimate failure to influence Japanese 
politics through the Tōhōkai was very much a result of his failure to establish a monolithic party 
that could sway large parts of the population.  
 
Founding the Tōhōkai  
Nakano’s turbulent withdrawal from the Kokumin Dōmei at the end of 1935, which was 
followed by the 1936 general election and the dramatic events of February 26, neither shook 
Nakano’s faith in his approach nor triggered a frenzy of activity on his side. If anything, the 
February 26 events served as vindication of his beliefs and approach, and it is the relative calm - 
even lethargy - with which he approached politics over the next 30 months that is remarkable.  
Nakano held on to his plan to create “a national mass movement that will become a force 
in pushing forward the changes of the times,”1 but went about realizing it at a rather leisurely 
pace. He spent the spring of 1936 re-grouping his followers into a new party - a process that, in 
                                                     
1 Nakano Seigō, “Outline Plan for National Reconstruction” [楼广膃△セ逸ⅻ今], (Tokyo, Senkura 
Shobō [桧琢蟷蘯], 1933), p. 116. 
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some ways, proved easier than launching the Kokumin Dōmei in 1932. One difference: Nakano 
was his own boss and was not kept waiting by a reluctant Adachi and a non-committed Yamaji 
faction. The party infrastructure was also already in place. Having placed many of the Kokumin 
Dōmei’s mass activities and organizations under his direct control, Nakano salvaged them when 
he left the party in late 1935. Transforming the Tōhōkai think tank into a political party in May 
1936 was thus a mere formality.2 Renaming Miyake Setsurei’s “Gakan” magazine “Tōtairiku” 
[覩哢憤], or “Eastern Continent,” 3 a month later and henceforth using it as the Tōhōkai’s party 
organ was similarly straightforward. Finally, familiarity also played a role, as Nakano and his 
followers drew on their hard-won experience launching the Kokomin Domei in their second 
attempt to start a fascist party. 
Still, though the new party was officially founded in mid-1936, it took another year for the 
first party convention to appoint party officials and determine the party’s platform.4 For those 
twelve months, the Tōhōkai was a far cry from a mass-based party. As late as May 1937, Nakano 
described the Tōhōkai as “a think tank that engages in practical research concerning politics, 
economics, foreign affairs, and national security. It is not a political party.” He added, however, 
that “at some future date could serve as a core for a popular party.”5 
Two potential explanations, both ideological, present themselves for Nakano’s slowness in 
                                                     
2 Up to May 1936, the Tōhōkai had been a cultural group [艙泌練喪], but on May 25, of that year it 
became a political association [膕齠46だ]. In order to underline the new beginning, Nakano moved the 
Tōhōkai’s his office to Akasaka, where it would remain until the end of his life. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, 
p. 231. 
3 According to the preface of the first issue of Tōtairiku (June 1936) written by Miyake Setsurei, the title 
was chosen in order emphasize the party’s and the magazine’s focus on East Asian Affairs, where many 
Asian people still lived under the rule of a Western minority. See Miyake Setsurei, “Changing from Gakan 
to Tōtairiku” [碁癪に語惚碁覩哢憤語膏膃主], in Tōtairiku, June 1936, inside cover.  
4 With some minor changes, the party’s platform formulated in May 1937 was a continuation of the 
platform of the Kokumin Dōmei. See “Editorial: Thus the Tōhōkai pushes ahead” [蕁ルクス瑍覩苜善購莓晃
〕拷], in Tōtairiku, May 1937, p. 9.  
5 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial: Thus the Tōhōkai pushes ahead” [蕁ルクス瑍覩苜善拘晃〕拷], in Tōtairiku, 
May 1937, p. 7-8.  
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transforming the Tōhōkai into a mass party. He seems to have believed, for one, in the existence 
of a general historical pattern, according to which the era of liberalism was succeeded by the 
advent of social democracy; once that ideology’s “inherently faulty nature was exposed,” events 
would naturally bring “our [social nationalist] activities to the forefront.”6 Having identified this 
historical pattern, Nakano believed it would repeat itself in Japan, so his main task was waiting 
for nature to run its course.7  
Second, perhaps influenced by Ishiwara Kanji’s assumption that Japan needed at least ten 
peaceful years to prepare for the world’s “final war,” Nakano may have believed he had plenty of 
time to prepare the ground for political mass mobilization. The fact that the Tōhōkai’s efforts to 
transform itself into a mass party gained momentum only after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese 
war, which rendered a ten-year preparation period impossible, seems to support Nakano’s 
presumption that time was on his side.  
Whatever the reasons behind Nakano’s reluctance to apply himself fully to the task of 
making the Tōhōkai a mass party, during the first year of its existence, the party consisted of just 
its original members, its representatives in the Diet and the Tōtairiku’s editorial staff. The Diet 
contingent, which formed the Tōhōkai’s backbone, was comprised of the Nakano-faction’s nine 
members8 and three additional members who joined the party’s ranks after the 1937 election:  
Ono Ken’ichi,9 Mitamura Takeo10 and Aoki Sakuo.11  
                                                     
6 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス瑍だ哢妬膏稿貢髏別ª櫻琶], in Tōtairiku, June 1937, p. 6.  
7 Nakano was not alone in viewing the future of the Tōhōkai in such rosy colors. At around the same time 
the Japan Politics and Economics Research Institute came to a similar conclusion in writing about the party 
stating that Tōhōkai would become stronger in the future because it could rely on the support of industrial 
capitalist groups. See Japan Politics and Economics Research Institute [荳袿膕齠42喝ｫ!盻], “The 
Tōhōkai under Nakano Seigō: Policies, Internal Organization, and Main Members” [腎ǒ驟悩鳰惚ç厨膏
溝鵠覩苜善貢菟〚瑍膕ø刷塔グ36ト壬砿行厨P善満], (Tokyo, 1936), p.16. 
8 These were Nakano Seigō, Sugiura Takeo, Tanaka Kiyotatsu, Yutani Yoshinaru, Miura Torao, Watanabe 
Yasukuni, Ōishi Masaru, Baba Motoharu, and Kimura Takeo. 
9 Ono Ken‘ichi [恠ǒバーツ慎] (1886 – 1963), journalist and politician. 
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Most of the Tōhōkai’s Diet representatives were still traditional Japanese politicians. The 
power base in their electoral districts, the so-called “jiban” [丱ë], was comprised of important 
local figures (so-called “meibōka” [鞭衽广]) recruited from the provincial elites. Nakano himself 
owed his election to the Diet primarily to the support of Fukuoan elites, landowners, businessmen, 
and political leaders, rather than to the fact that he or his policies enjoyed nationwide support. 
Building a mass-based party meant circumventing these local power brokers, who acted as 
intermediaries between the voters on the periphery and party politicians at the center. The local 
meibōka, keen to keep their powerful positions, were not wholehearted supporters of a popular 
party.  
The Tōhōkai members who set out to establish a base outside their traditional 
constituencies soon found the task was easier said than done. In the party’s first year, only two 
members - Ōishi Masaru12 and Kimura Takeo13 - possessed popular constituencies independent 
from their traditional jiban, and in both cases each had been in place for a couple of years. Ōishi 
founded the 4,000-member Tosa Farmers’ Union [鷲双コ鴈G36遍], of which he later became 
president, in 1929. Kimura, likewise, founded and became president of the 2,000-member 
Yamagata Prefecture Farmers’ Union [愾檍0コ鴈G36遍] in 1933.14 The Tōhōkai’s membership 
surge from 1936 to 1937 – when enrollment more than doubled from 3,275 to 10,037 - was 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁驥啌] (1899 – 1964), former police man who had served in Manchuria before 
joining the Tōhōkai.  
11 Aoki Sakuo [⻗袍捜渣]  (1898 - ?), businessman and politician. 
12 Ōishi Masaru [哢0哢] (1878 – 1966) politician and farmer activist. 
13 Kimura Takeo [袍襁驥渣] (1902 – 1983) politician and farmer activist. 
14 For details about the Yamagata Prefecture Farmers’ League see Kimura Takeo [袍襁驥渣], “The Song 
of Komezawa Sonbin – an autobiography” [̶鼈稿骨鋼骨貢騁瑍60然], (Tokyo, 1978). For details about 
the Tosa Farmers’ Union see Ōishi Masaru [哢0哢], “Eighty years of Windy Springs and Rainy Autumns 
– the autobiography of Ōishi Masaru [蒟城┽聳都筆朮瑍哢0哢60然], (Kōchi, 1964). 
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mostly due to the influx of members from these two farmers’ unions.15 In fact, all the Tōhōkai 
members of Kōchi [Tosa] were originally members of Ōishi’s Tosa Farmers’ Union. Given that 
organic growth was taxing and time-consuming, other party members also sought to absorb 
already-existing parties, associations and unions into the Tōhōkai. Initially, at least, they had little 
success.16 
 
The Tōhōkai Position in the Diet 
With no mass base to speak of, the Tōhōkai’s activities were limited to the Diet’s floor, 
where members – in the words of the Seiyūkai-affiliated Fukuoka Daily - strove daily to 
“denounce thoroughly the powerlessness of the ruling classes…attack the idleness and lack of 
policy direction of the cabinet, point out the contradiction between the Seiyūkai and the 
Minseitō…and thus cut their way into the camp of the government or governing party.”17  
When Prime Minister Okada resigned over the February 26 incident, he was succeeded by 
Hirota Kōki, who inherited the difficult task of disciplining the rebellious army. To Nakano, who 
saw the February 26 rebellion as a genuine, if illegal, expression of the people’s desire for 
political reform, Hirota’s appointment was a scheme by Japan’s conservative forces to halt the 
winds of change blowing over Japan. Hirota’s cabinet was:   
 
“born out of the [February 26] incident, yet only their terminology is reformist…Their 
words speak of action but in reality the cabinet is stuck in deadlock. A windless state in 
politics is thus slowly becoming established. This windless state is, however, 
certainly…pregnant with change. It is the windless moment before the wind changes its 
                                                     
15 See Nagai Kazu [鵑棲北], “The Founding of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U]; in Shirin [別詒]; Vol. LXI, 
No. 4 July 1978 footnote 4 p. 133 (619). 
16 Nagai provides us with a detailed description of how this worked in the case of Yutani Yoshiharu 
bringing mass-organization under the umbrella of the Tōhōkai in Tottori. See Nagai Kazu [鵑棲北], “The 
Founding of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U]; in Shirin [別詒]; Vol. LXI, No. 4; July 1978. 
17 See “Trends among small parties” [恠善╀貢罰圃], in Fukuoka Daily News [┗慟荳荳范ⓥ] May 18, 
1936. 
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direction.” 18 
 
Nakano thus saw the Hirota administration, like the Papen and Brüning cabinets that 
preceded Hitler’s rise to power,19 as the calm before a storm. Hirota’s attempt to smooth relations 
with the Western Powers, in particular with England, likewise provoked criticism from both 
Nakano and the Tōhōkai. Even the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany 
displeased Nakano (who later would be one of Japan’s most vociferous supporters of the 
Tripartite Alliance), as it burdened relations with Russia. Instead of providing “a means to escape 
from the present predicament,” Nakano wrote, “in its result [the pact] has only intensified the 
crisis.”20 
When not criticizing the government, the Tōhōkai continued advocating policies similar to 
those championed by the Kokumin Dōmei. 21  The Tōhōkai, for instance, often acted as the 
parliamentary mouthpiece of the army reformers close to Ishiwara Kanji, who aimed to establish 
a “high-degree national defense state.”22 The party thus threw its support behind the reform 
proposals that Ishiwara Kanji submitted to the government in the second half of 1936. In the 
ensuing parliamentary debate, the Tōhōkai backed the army reformers’ calls for a large armament 
budget and economic controls. When neither Ishiwara’s reform proposal nor his five-year 
economic plan passed, the army withdrew its minister, effectively bringing the Hirota cabinet 
down in early 1937. The army’s reformers, and with them Nakano’s Tōhōkai, all had reason to be 
                                                     
18 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, April 1936, p. 6.  
19 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, November 1936, p. 9-10.  
20 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス] in Tōtairiku, January 1937, p. 2-5.  
21 See for example Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス] in Tōtairiku [覩哢憤] October, 1936, p. 2-3. 
22  Ishiwara’s proposal included plans to expand government controls over strategically important 
armament industries (e.g. the aircraft industry), plans to increase the office of the Prime Minister, and a 
plan for economic expansion called “Five-Year Plan for the Empire’s Income and Expenditures.” Ishiwara 
also considered the establishment of a dictatorial political party, which would replace all the other parties or 
at least dominate the Diet.  
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hopeful when Hayashi Senjūrō23 was appointed to form the next cabinet, because Ishiwara Kanji 
was to assist Hayashi in selecting the cabinet’s members. When the conservative opposition to 
Hayashi’s reliance on Ishiwara caused Hayashi to dismiss Ishiwara, however, Nakano and the 
Tōhōkai quickly turned against the Hayashi cabinet. 24  In the April 1937 issue of Tōtairiku 
Nakano wrote:   
 
“From its inception, the Hayashi cabinet has taken a form that betrayed its supporters. 
Those who placed great expectations in Hayashi - the forces that have pushed him to the 
forefront of the contemporary situation - were treated as complete strangers once the 
Hayashi cabinet had been established…Put differently, the Hayashi cabinet surrendered 
the role according to which it should have been the puppet of the reform forces and 
instead continued the tradition of the Saitō and Okada cabinets, becoming an heir to the 
forces maintaining the status quo…The crisis is thus left to ferment, with the risk that it 
will explode at some later stage.”25 
 
While Nakano’s support for the army reforms seemed total to the outside world - after 
listening to one of Nakano’s speeches, outspoken military critic and MP Saitō Takeo26 described 
Nakano as the “army spokesman”27 – it was not unconditional. As before, Nakano stressed that 
“national defense in the larger sense will be the subject of politics, while the military will be in 
charge of national defense in the narrow sense.”28  
                                                     
23 Hayashi Senjūrō [詒§筆ア] (1876 – 1943), army officer and politician. 
24 According to Nagai: “If things had worked out all right, the Hayashi Cabinet … could have been the 
Strong National Unity cabinet, which Nakano had hoped for. Or perhaps it is better to say, that it was this 
very Hayashi Cabinet which showed that a Strong Cabinet was impossible.” Nagai Kazu [鵑棲 j北], “The 
Founding of the Tōhōkai”, p. 138 (624).  
25  Nakano Seigō, “Editorial: the contradictions of the Hayashi cabinet” [蕁ルクス  : 詒塔隆貢¡ý] in 
Tōtairiku, April 1937, p. 2.  
26 Saitō Takao [艤I吏啌] (1870-1949), politician best known for an anti-militaristic speech held in the 
Diet in 1940. 
27 See the February 18, 1937 entry in Saitō’s diary. Saitō Takao [艤I吏啌], “The Diary of Saitō Takao” 
[艤I吏啌荳ヒ], ed. Itō Takashi [舛I吏], (Tokyo, 2009), vol. 2, p. 227.  
28 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial: Thus the Tōhōkai pushes ahead”, in Tōtairiku, May 1937, p. 9. 
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In practice, Nakano’s distinction led the Tōhōkai to take a contradictory position. On one 
hand, the party would criticize the government and the established parties for their inability or 
unwillingness to implement the army reforms necessary to establish a national defense state. On 
the other, whenever the government proposed a large military budget, Nakano and his followers 
would criticize them for ignoring the people’s economic needs. The party demanded that the 
burden of large military expenditures be fairly distributed so as not to put too much strain on the 
common people and that complementary economic controls be adopted to ensure the livelihood 
of farmers, workers and small business owners. When the Hirota Cabinet passed a military 
budget of unprecedented proportions, the Tōhōkai said, “they leave everything in the hands of the 
bureaucrats only protect the established capital, while on the other hand they intervene in the 
economy and thus obstruct the expansion of production.”29 In demanding both canons and butter, 
the Tōhōkai’s position was fundamentally contradictory. Being a small splinter group in the Diet, 
however, perhaps helped them get away with this sort of populist dichotomy.   
 
The 1937 General Election 
The February 1937 election was, at best, a moderate success for the Tōhōkai. The party 
entered the election with little preparation but its members harbored a great ambition to “become 
the core of the great political party that would be in charge of Japan’s future.”30 The major party 
platform items were cultivating national strength, implementing economic controls to expand 
productive capacity quickly, overcoming class struggle through totalitarianism, and protecting the 
livelihood of Japan’s farmers and workers. Of the 20 candidates the Tōhōkai put into the race, 
Nakano expected about 14 or 15 to succeed. In the end, only 11 (joined subsequently by a 
                                                     
29 See the Monthly Bulletin of the Special Higher Police [０㔾蠻况], December, 1936. 
30 See the Tōhōkai’s election platform and party manifesto in Nakano Seigō, “Editorial: Thus the Tōhōkai 
pushes ahead”, in Tōtairiku, May 1937, p. 9. 
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twelfth) did.31 Compared to the 1936 election, which Nakano’s followers had entered completely 
unprepared and in which they had gained 207,271 votes (corresponding to 1.9% of all votes cast), 
in 1937, they won only slightly more, claiming 221,445 votes (or 2.2% of the total).32 This made 
the Tōhōkai the Diet’s fourth-strongest party – even weaker than the Social Mass Party, which 
held 36 seats.33 Though Nakano was likely disappointed with the results,34 his public statements 
remained upbeat:  
 
“If the Tōhōkai, having been a practice-oriented think tank for many years, has 
succeeded in winning a total of 250,000 votes, securing a seat in the Diet for 11 of its 
members, five of whom won with the highest number of votes in their electoral districts, 
then self-respect demands that this be seen as a promise for the future in which we shall 
act as the core of the nationalistic reform camp.”35 
 
Nakano added that “the votes in the Diet are determined by the number of heads, but the 
trends within the Diet are influenced by the ideals and vitality of a minority. Have we not 
succeeded in doing that?” 36 Whatever disappointment Nakano may have felt, moreover, was soon 
assuaged by the fall of the Hayashi cabinet and, more importantly, by the prospect that the next 
cabinet would be formed by Konoe Fumimaro. 
                                                     
31 Nine of these had already been members of parliament before the election, and two were elected for the 
first time. Those re-elected were: Watanabe Yasukuni [喰シ┘れ] from Hokkaidō, Kimura Takeo [袍襁驥
渣] from Yamagata, Sugiura Takeo [襃④驥渣] from Aichi, Tanaka Kiyotatsu [譓腎掃け] from Shiga, 
Ōishi Masaru [哢0哢] from Kōchi, Baba Motoharu [㮈凅填齠] from Nagazaki, Miura Torao[申④よ渣] 
from Miyazaki, and Nakano from Fukuoka. Newly elected were: Aoki [⻗袍捜渣] from Yamaguchi, 
Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁驥啌] from Gifu, and Ono Ken’ichi [恠ǒバーツ慎] from Aomori. These eleven were 
joined in December by Yutani Yoshiharu [譿〞共同組合齠] from Tottori, who had first failed to be elected but 
then received a seat in parliament replacing a disqualified candidate from another party.  
32 See Nagai Kazu [鵑棲北], “The Founding of the Tōhōkai”, p.130. 
33 The Minseitō had lost 27 seats bringing its total down to 179 seats in the Diet. The Seiyūkai had gained 
3 seats bringing its total up to 175, while the Social Mass Party had gained 18 bringing it to 36. 
34 See Nakano Yasuo vol. 2, p. 242-45. 
35 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial: Thus the Tōhōkai pushes ahead”, in Tōtairiku, May 1937, p. 8.  
36 Ibid. but also quoted in Inomata, p. 374 – 76. 
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The Konoe Cabinet 
Nakano had good reason to believe that Ishiwara’s reformers, and even he himself, might 
be assigned important positions in the Konoe administration. Konoe’s political views, for one, 
were in many respects similar to Nakano’s. Konoe, like Nakano, had attended the 1919 Paris 
Peace conference and come away greatly disappointed. In subsequent years, Konoe spoke out 
continuously against the international order based on the Versailles treaty system and advocated 
its revision. And, like Nakano, Konoe favored internal reforms - though events revealed his 
commitment on this point was not as strong as Nakano might have wished.    
While the two men could not have been more different in terms of social background 
(Konoe came from an aristocratic court family), the overlap in their political views led them to 
deepen their personal ties over the years. Nakano had known Konoe since his student days (the 
first Chinese boarder that the Nakanos took on had stayed previously with the Konoe family) and 
met him again in Paris in 1919. Their relationship grew tenuous afterward, but after the 
Manchurian Incident it was revived through frequent meetings and political discussions, which 
often took place in Ishiwara Kanji’s presence.  
Nakano was thus gravely disappointed when neither he nor Ishiwara nor Itagaki Seishirō 
were included in Konoe’s first cabinet in June 1937. Nakano’s disillusionment was rendered even 
more painful when it was revealed that two of Nakano’s peers had won cabinet slots. Nagai 
Ryūtarō, who had been a member of the Minseitō’s Adachi faction but had stayed behind when 
Adachi and Nakano left the party in late 1931, became Minister of Communications. Kazami 
Akira, who had followed Nakano from Waseda into journalism and then later into the Minseitō 
and Kokumin Dōmei - but not into the Tōhōkai - was offered the position of Cabinet Secretary. 
According to Mitamura, when asked, Konoe explained his decision not to include Nakano as 
follows:  
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“Nakano is a fine and very knowledgeable man, but he has one fault. He cannot keep a 
secret. You cannot tell him anything secret, because he will reveal it immediately. If he 
were to become minister, he would not keep any of the cabinet’s secrets. He would leak 
them all. If he could only correct that one point, then he would indeed be a splendid 
politician.”37  
 
It is not entirely clear what indiscretion of Nakano’s Konoe was referring to, but it is likely 
that Nakano’s supposed inability to keep a secret was only part of Konoe’s reluctance. At least as 
important was the fact that Nakano had very little to offer to Konoe. By including Nagai, Konoe 
could hope to win the support of the Minseitō, at least in part. Nakano’s party, by contrast, was 
not only small but also ideologically committed to supporting Konoe’s reformist drive. Konoe 
had no need to pay for something to which he could already lay claim. Nakano, meanwhile, did 
not show his disappointment about not being included in Konoe’s cabinet. The two men remained 
on friendly terms and Nakano continued supporting Konoe’s reform agenda from the political 
periphery.  
 
War with China 
The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, only a month after Konoe’s accession 
to power, posed a great challenge to Konoe’s cabinet - one so great that it ultimately caused the 
administration to fall. The war in China also put an end to the cooperation between Nakano and 
Ishiwara, which had been the dominant alliance guiding Nakano’s activities over the past five 
years. Between the Manchurian and the Chinese Incidents, Ishiwara and Nakano argued that 
Japan should carry out internal reforms before taking international action. Only after Japan’s 
industries had been modernized and Manchuria’s resources fully integrated into Japan’s economy 
– a process Ishiwara believed would take about ten years – would the country be ready to wage 
war. Ishiwara thus tried everything in his power – an effort that was ultimately in vain - to de-
                                                     
37 Konoe quoted in Mitamura who obtained the information through an unnamed member of the cabinet. 
Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁驥啌], “Why did Nakano Seigō Committed Suicide?” [腎ǒ驟悩購奏膣60内浩
紅拘], (Tokyo 1949), p. 145. 
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escalate the Chinese conflict and have it settled through diplomatic negotiations.  
While Nakano did not oppose a diplomatic settlement, he argued that Japan’s vastly 
superior military power would let it settle the conflict quickly by force if Chinese resistance 
rendered a negotiated settlement unrealistic. Based on the experience of recent conflicts, Nakano 
predicted that war between China and Japan would follow one of two possible patterns. Given 
Japan’s military superiority, it could end quickly in China’s defeat, as had Italy’s war against 
Ethiopia. Alternatively, it could develop into a longer war by proxy, similar to the conflict in 
Spain, where competing powers supplied the local population with arms but did not get directly 
involved.38 Nakano’s reasoning, outlined in articles and speeches before and after the conflict 
broke out, wavered back and forth between these two lines of argument. His predictions hinged 
on whether or not the Powers would interfere on China’s behalf. In September 1936, Nakano 
wrote that if Japan should invade China:  
 
“America, which said it would come to help China, would not come. Russia, too, would 
not come. England would not come either. While they would all stay away, Japan and 
China would enter a full-blown war. China might put up a fight, but it is clear that in the 
end it would be defeated.”39  
 
Accordingly, Nakano believed that Japan could win a quick victory through a decisive 
blow against the Nationalist regime, which, in his eyes, lacked Chinese citizens’ loyalty.  Echoing 
the army hard liners, Nakano even went so far as to deny the existence of Chinese nationalism, 
because China had not yet developed into a “modern nation.”40  Throughout the fall of 1937, he 
                                                     
38 See Nakano Seigō, “The bandits in the Mountains and the Bandits in the Heart” [愾腎貢⊖膏氛腎貢
⊖] memorial address held on September 10, 1936 at the Japan Youth Hall on behalf of two journalists of 
the Tokyo Daily News killed in an anti-Japanese incident and reprinted under the title “The Pillar of East 
Asia: Japan” [覩┠貢腑讀伍荳袿 ], in “Collected Speeches by Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩鳰哢儲㌲滾], 
(Tokyo: Asakaze-sha [衲城だ], 1936),  p. 419.  
39 Ibid. p. 418.  
40 See Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, September 1937, p. 3. 
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predicted that the Chinese would soon sue for peace or, failing that, that the nation would 
collapse after Japanese forces took the capital, Nanking. 41 When the fall of Nanking in December 
1937 did not result in China’s unconditional surrender, Nakano argued that the conquests of 
Hankow and Hainan Island would finally make the Nationalist government “crumble.”42 The 
longer the Chinese nationalist regime under Chiang Kai-shek resisted Japanese occupation, 
however, the more Nakano came to believe that the Chinese government was kept in place by the 
Powers and that the war could become a protracted proxy conflict similar to the Spanish civil war. 
Accordingly, he came to believe Japan was not fighting against the Chinese but rather against 
foreign influences - first England and, in later years, also the USA, both working through the 
Nationalist government. Eventually, this perspective led Nakano to argue that ending the war in 
China would require Japan to confront England directly. 
While Ishiwara’s assessment of the Chinese conflict was vindicated by subsequent events, 
Nakano’s optimism was proven wrong. Japanese forces failed to bring down both the Nationalist 
government in Chunking and the communist regime in Yenan, and the war proved to be a 
crippling drain on the Japanese economy. In 1937-8, however, Ishiwara was alone in opposing the 
war’s escalation. Increasingly isolated, Ishiwara found that the war marked the beginning of his 
fall within the army. It also marked the end of his cooperation with Nakano.  
 
A New Start: Trip to Europe 
The break with Ishiwara was just one of many developments that caused Nakano to 
fundamentally reconsider his political position in the winter of 1937-8. Others included his 
                                                     
41 See for example, Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス] in Tōtairiku September, October and November 
issues of 1937. See also Nakano’s farewell address before leaving for Europe held November 11, 1937 
reprinted in December 1937 issue of Tōtairiku.  
42 See Nakano Seigō, “The one and only Way to Peace” [北霸香貢姪慎貢＊と], speech delivered at the 
Tōhōkai party rally held at the Hibiya Public Hall, on July 11, 1938, reprinted as “Strengthen our Foreign 
Policy” [徙咤楼ø惚樛泌皇国] in Tōtairiku, August 1938, p. 2. 
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exclusion from the Konoe cabinet; Nagai and Kazami’s inclusion in the same; and, finally, the 
outcome of the 1937 general election, which put Nakano’s political calculation into question. 
Following the Manchurian Incident, Nakano had cast himself as the legal representative of the 
radical reformist right. While Kita Ikki, Ishiwara Kanji, Itagaki Seishirō, and many of their 
followers sought to realize the reformist program through illegal, sometimes even terrorist, acts, 
Nakano sought to create a mass party that would gain enough influence to carry out the same 
reforms legally. When he saw how much popular sympathy the violent extremists won, however, 
he also had to acknowledge that the people would not cast their vote for a party that advocated 
achieving the same reformist aims through non-violent means. It was probably the sum of these 
setbacks, along with both intellectual curiosity and the hope for a new start, that pushed Nakano 
to travel to Italy and Germany in the winter of 1937-8. The trip gave him a chance to take a fresh 
look at politics and stimulated him to start anew upon his return. 
In his pre-departure radio addresses and speeches, Nakano stated that he traveled to Europe 
as an “envoy of the people” [楼鴈貢藻ò], not “bound by the policies of Japan’s government” 
but only by his “loyalty to the nation and to the entire people of Japan.” He boldly added that “the 
power of an individual is stronger than the power of the government.”43 Nakano described the 
trip’s aims as twofold. 44  First, he wanted to lend support to the peace maneuvers that Germany, 
through the offices of its ambassadors Dirksen in Tokyo and Trautmann in Nanking, was carrying 
out on Japan’s behalf in China. As it happened, developments in China - the Rape of Nanking and 
Konoe’s announcement of an irrevocable end to interactions with the Nationalist government – 
                                                     
43 Although Nakano did not travel as a representative of the Japanese government, he was equipped with a 
letter of introduction penned by Nakayama Yū and signed by Prime Minister Konoe. The letter is 
reproduced in Inomata p. 382-84.  
44 On the day of his departure, November 11, 1937 Nakano held an address on the Tokyo International 
Radio Station laying out the purpose of his voyage to Germany and Italy. The quotes are taken from 
Nakano’s farewell speech held November 11, 1937 at the Gunji Kaikan in Kudanshita, which is reproduced 
in Nakano Seigō, “Upon Departing” [頓え行59壕肱], in Tōtairiku, December 1937, p. 97-113, the quote is 
taken from p.102.  
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during Nakano’s travels rendered this first objective redundant. The reports he delivered after his 
return make no mention of it.  
Second, Nakano wanted to sound out both Italy and Germany on the prospect of expanding 
the Anti-Comintern Pact (signed between Japan and Germany in 1936, and joined by Italy in 
November 1937), into a more comprehensive military alliance. Nakano believed that if Japan 
forged a deeper alliance with Germany and Italy, the relationship might put a check on Russian 
and English support for China’s resistance against Japan.  
A crowd of 3,000 saw Nakano off on November 11, 1937 with a farewell party, speeches 
and a procession (complete with flag bearers and the Waseda marching band) that ended in three 
shouts of “Banzai!” at the Imperial Palace gates. Before leaving the country, Nakano held 
farewell speeches in Osaka, Kobe, Fukuoka, and Shimonoseki; during the trip, he addressed 
Japanese expatriate communities in Hong Kong, Singapore and Colombo. All told, some 30,000 
people are said to have listened to Nakano’s addresses before and during his journey to Europe. 
Traveling in the company of his secretary, Shintō Kazuma, and two interpreters, Kuroda Reiji45 
and Shimomura Nobusada,46 Nakano used the six weeks of sailing time to read, among other 
things, Mussolini’s autobiography (he had read Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” in its English translation a 
year earlier). After arriving in Italy in mid-December, Nakano used the offices of the Japanese 
embassy to obtain a meeting with Mussolini and Count Ciano, Italy’s Foreign Minister and 
Mussolini’s son-in-law. Since neither Mussolini nor Ciano left an account of the meeting with 
Nakano, we must rely on the descriptions Nakano gave upon his return to Japan. Clearly flattered 
by the opportunity to meet with Mussolini, Nakano recounted with much delight (and at some 
length) that the meeting had lasted much longer than originally planned and described  
Mussolini’s open, almost casual tone, contrasting it sharply with the fretful attention to 
                                                     
45 Kuroda Reiji [桛譓ぜ性] (1890琊1943), journalist, German expert and translator of various German 
books including Hitler’s “Mein Kampf.”  
46 Shimomura Nobusada [真襁袋┖] (1899 - ?), Fukuoka-born Diplomat. 
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diplomatic etiquette paid by the members of the Japanese embassy in Rome.  
As for the possible expansion of cooperation between the three countries, Mussolini agreed 
heartily with Nakano’s geopolitical views and offered Italy’s support in the struggle against China, 
while noting he believed Japan was unlikely to need help settling the conflict in the near term. 
Mussolini also shared Nakano’s desire to expand the Anti-Comintern Pact into a full-blown 
military alliance. At the end of their conversation, Mussolini said: “If Japan makes up its mind 
and rises, Italy will shake Japan’s hand. I don’t mean the Anti-Comintern Pact - I mean a full-
fledged military alliance or even an across-the-board political alliance.” When Nakano asked 
whether he could quote Mussolini on this, the Italian leader replied: “Tell Konoe and the leaders 
of the army and the navy that not only is this my intention but also that these were my very 
words.”47 
During the last days of December 1937, Nakano proceeded to Germany. Obtaining a 
meeting with Hitler proved much harder than it had been with Mussolini, and only after meeting 
with most of the other Nazi leaders in the course of January was Nakano finally received by 
Hitler in early February.48  German newspapers of the time left the visit largely unmentioned and 
any memos that may have been prepared by the German Foreign Service have not survived, so 
Nakano’s account is the only extant source of the meeting.49 According to his description, the 
meeting with Hitler seems to have been less amicable and open than the meeting with the Italian 
                                                     
47 Mussolini quoted by Nakano Seigō in “People, Stand Up! – returning from Italy and Germany” [࿖᳃
ࠃ⿠߈ߡ — ⁛દࠃࠅᏫࠅߡ], in Tōtairiku, April 1938, p. 32-33. 
48 Through the persistence of Army attaché (later ambassador) Ōshima Hiroshi [ᄢፉᶈ]  Nakano was 
able to obtain a meeting with soon-to-be foreign Minister Ribbentrop. Once Nakano had passed that hurdle, 
however, he was not only given the opportunity to meet with the entire Nazi leadership, including Goering, 
Goebbels, Himmler, Rosenberg, and many others, but also visit some strategic factories and finally also 
meet with Hitler himself on February 1st, 1938.  
49 The German Archives have no record of the meeting between Nakano and the Nazi leadership. See 
letter from the Bundesarchiv in Berlin to the author dated February 9, 2007. The second morning edition of 
the Frankfurter Zeitung of February 2, 1938, p. 2 mentions Nakano’s meeting with Hitler with seven lines: 
“Berlin February 1 (dpa). The Fuehrer and Chancellor received on Tuesday Nakano Seigō, Japanese 
Member of Parliament and leader of the ‘German-Japanese Comradeship’ in Tokyo.” This author was 
unable to do research in the Italian archives.  
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leader, but, as with Mussolini, Nakano met with Hitler for longer than had been scheduled.  
While Hitler offered no help against China, he made clear that “Germany’s attitude toward 
the Sino-Japanese Incident is rather simple. Germany has no territorial ambitions in the Far East.” 
Hitler wished only for the opportunity to trade in peace with a prosperous Far East. He also 
expressed his fear that the Chinese conflict might weaken Japan, which would not be in 
Germany’s interest because “ahead of Japan and Germany there is a formidable task [i.e. the 
revision of the post-WW1 international order] and in order to reach our objective we wish to have 
a strong ally in Japan.”50  
 
Back to Japan: Advocating Closer Ties with Germany and Italy 
When he returned to Japan in early March 1938, Nakano brought with him not only 
souvenirs including Mussolini’s and Ciano’s signed photographs, a bust of Hitler and a camera 
from Ribbentrop, but also the conviction that expanding the Anti-Comintern Pact into a wider 
alliance was necessary. He reported his impressions and the contents of his conversations with 
Mussolini, Hitler and other important Italian and German government figures first to Konoe, and 
then, through a series of lectures, talks and radio broadcasts, to a broader audience.51 Nakano’s 
message was that both Hitler and Mussolini were men of the people (he noted that both men rose 
from humble origins to the highest offices) who spoke simple, clear language devoid of deceit or 
calculation, and stressed that it took a man of the people such as himself, rather than Japan’s 
diplomatic elites, to understand such leaders.   
                                                     
50 Hitler quoted in Nakano Seigō “People, Stand Up! – returning from Italy and Germany”, p. 32-34. 
51 The days after his return to Japan were filled with relating his impressions to various people and groups. 
On March 7 he met with Prime Minister Konoe for one and a half hours, on March 8 he spoke on the radio, 
on the 11 he held a speech before a military audience, on the 13 he spoke at a Tōhōkai speech rally at 
Hibiya Public Hall, on the 14th he lectured the officers of the navy, and on the 16th before the army general 
staff. The contents of the speech at Hibiya Public Hall were subsequently published in the April 1938 issue 
of Tōtairiku under the Title “People Stand Up! – returning from Italy and Germany” [࿖᳃ࠃ⿠߈ߡ —
⁛દࠃࠅᏫࠅߡ] and in a pamphlet published separately under the title “Go Straight Forward” [߹ߞߔߋ
ߦⴕߌ probably a translation of the Italian “Avanti!”].  
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The most important insight that Nakano took away from his meetings with Europe’s fascist 
leaders was that Japan, Italy and Germany shared a common objective in revising the 
international order enshrined after WW1 in the League of Nations system. According to Nakano, 
the political will to “correct and overcome the unjust Versailles Treaty System that presently 
governs the world and to [instead] establish true justice in the world” provided a basis for much 
more than a “treaty for the purpose of common defense against communism.” Germany, Italy and 
Japan should:  
 
“reach out to each other in order to reconstruct today’s international order. At present, 
the world is being bullied by the status-quo faction, with England at the center and 
Russia, France and the vast USA acting as allies…The Versailles Treaty System 
governing the world at present is evil. The outcome of the Great War is evil. Correcting 
these wrongs is Japan’s responsibility as well as the responsibility of Germany and Italy, 
who have stood up in cooperation with Japan.”52 
 
Based on these findings and his own analysis of Japan’s role in international relations, 
Nakano - who only two years earlier had opposed the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern pact 
under the Hirota cabinet - now became a fervent advocate of closer ties among these three 
countries. He took on the cause with so much enthusiasm, in fact, that until the conclusion of the 
Triple Alliance in 1940 the project was among the most important items on the Tōhōkai’s foreign 
policy agenda.  
 
Re-launching the Tōhōkai as a Mass-Based Party 
The need for Japan to seek closer ties with Germany and Italy was not the only conclusion 
that Nakano drew from his voyage to Europe. He also seems to have been inspired personally. 
His son Yasuo recalled that the various setbacks Nakano had suffered before leaving for Europe 
had made his father nervous, even depressed. After his return, however, Nakano oozed self-
                                                     
52 Nakano Seigō “People, Stand Up! – returning from Italy and Germany”, p. 3-4. 
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confidence and vitality, as well as an overpowering will to act.  
Greatly impressed with the two fascist rulers and their regimes, Nakano had finally come 
to fully embrace the fascist model for his own party. As has been shown, in the first half of the 
1930s, Nakano advocated a stronger executive but did not yet exclusively commit to fascism as 
the only form in which such governance could be realized. As late as May 1936, he described 
“England’s Baldwin government and the Roosevelt administration in the USA” as examples of 
governments “engaging in strong politics, while even Mussolini’s regime in Italy or Hitler’s 
regime in Germany have engaged in a similar, if somewhat different, sort of strong politics.” All, 
in his eyes, had “acknowledged what needed to be done, taken leadership of the people, 
mobilized the passion of the entire people, and made this the foundation of their powerful 
politics.”53 After his trip to Germany and Italy in 1937, fascism became Nakano’s political model 
of choice for both Japan and the Tōhōkai. Nakano’s conversion to full-fledged fascism meant, 
among other things, giving the Tōhōkai the external appearance of a fascist party. Members were 
offered mass-produced (and hence low-priced) uniforms consisting of a dark navy blue shirt with 
a red tie, khaki-colored riding trousers, a black military cap, and an arm band inscribed with the 
Chinese character for “East” [覩].54 The Tōhōkai youth organization, Tōhō-Seinen-Tai [覩苜⻗朮
麗], was organized around paramilitary lines and members wore uniforms modeled on those of 
the German SS: a black shirt, black hat, and red arm band displaying the same Chinese character. 
Nakano also mimicked the European fascist parties in terms of activities, pouring his newly-
found energy into speech rallies, demonstrations, signature campaigns, and other forms of mass 
agitation. He even started lengthening his speeches to well over three hours in imitation of 
                                                     
53 Nakano Seigō, “Strong politics versus authoritarian politics” [樛陪膕齠拘樛闥膕齠拘], in Gakan, May 
1936, p. 2. 
54 Since clothing had become rationed, the relatively low price of the uniform made it an attractive buy in 
the eyes of many party members.  
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Hitler’s speech marathons.55 Nakano’s physical appearance changed so remarkably that his life-
long friend Ogata commented: “His black wanabe fascist uniform, the emblem resembling the 
Nazi Hakenkreuz [swastika] on his arm band and his trips to Europe - all that made me think he 
had gone crazy.”56 Despite these and other mocking comments, Nakano held on to the uniforms 
and rallies.57  
Most importantly, Nakano and his followers took up the project of creating a mass-based 
popular party with new energy. They followed the same approach they had used before, trying to 
incorporate already-existing mass organizations into the party. What was new this time were the 
large membership windfalls caused by the inflow of former left-wing activists whose 
organizations had been destroyed after the Popular Front Incident58 and who hoped to find a new 
home, as well as a shield against political oppression, in the Tōhōkai. Accordingly, most members 
who joined the party in 1938-9 came from one of two sources: the farmers’ movement (most 
often these recruits were former affiliates of the All-Japan Farmers’ Union [菟楼コ鴈36遍]) or 
the labor and citizen movements of the urban areas. Many of the left-wing activists who joined 
the Tōhōkai did not come alone but rather in groups, maintaining their relationships with the 
“comrades” of the organization to which they had formerly belonged. On occasion, entire unions 
entered the Tōhōkai.  
Absorbing already-existing organizations into its fold was a double-edged sword for the 
                                                     
55 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2 p. 335 and p. 360. 
56 Ogata, p. 23. 
57 When the manga writer, Kondo Hidezō, interviewed Nakano in 1942, he mocked him saying: “Ohhhh, 
so this is the symbol of your society. I see. It’s just the same as that of the Nazis. What do I make of that? I 
guess if I were a moderately intelligent person, I would have to dislike it simply on reasons of good taste.” 
Kondō Hidezō in Manga [煉逸], January, 1942 quoted in Inomata, p.  395. 
58 The term “Popular Front Incident” [斥鴈皚O征浅] does not refer to a singular incident, but rather to a 
number of activities and the state’s reaction to these. Following the outbreak of the war with China, various 
left-wing groups had organized a “Popular Front” against fascism. Subsequently the state suppressed these 
activities. Over 400 left-wing activists were arrested between December 1937 and February 1938 and left-
wing parties such as the Japan Proletarian Party [荳袿㏍﨡妬] were dissolved.  
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Tōhōkai. On one hand, it made for spectacular increases in the party’s size. Membership surged 
from 10,296 at the end of 1938 to 25,145 one year later. By the end of 1940 it reached 31,625.59 
Absorbing the labor unions also gave the party a more urban character. Apart from Nakano, in the 
1937 election the party fielded only candidates from rural areas and provincial cities, ignoring 
urban voters almost entirely. By 1942, roughly a quarter of the party’s votes came from one of 
Japan’s six urban centers, and Tōhōkai candidates from urban centers such as Tokyo, Kyōto and 
Hyōgo were elected successfully to the Diet.60 While the Tōhōkai could never claim to represent 
a major part of the Japanese people, by 1942 it could at least claim to be representing both rural 
and urban constituencies.  
Dramatic growth had also its drawbacks. The influx of many of former left-wing activists 
caused the Tōhōkai to become anything but an ideologically unified and homogeneous body. 
Many newcomers kept their left-wing ideas, as the Tōhōkai’s original party members never 
required that new entrants abandon contrary notions. Many unabashed left-wingers, in fact, 
joined hoping that the Tōhōkai’s nationalist character would shield them against police 
oppression while they continued pursuing their political aims. To them, the Tōhōkai was a little 
more than a cover or safe haven, and, as Arima has pointed out, the only ideological compromise 
they were asked to make was to “repaint” 61 [剏酷蠡恒鵠] their policies in such a way that their 
demands were no longer made in the interest of a particular economic class but rather in the 
interest of the nation as a whole.  
The division between the first-generation members, i.e. the MPs around Nakano, and the 
second generation of incoming left-wing activists was more than just ideological. The two groups 
                                                     
59 See Arima Manabu [衄㮈嶌], The Organization and Policies of the Tōhōkai [覩苜善貢36ト膏膕ø]; in 
Shi-en [別欝] Kyūshū Daigaku Bungaku-bu [枢攀哢嶌艙嶌グ], No. 114; 1977.3, p. 69. 
60 For an analysis of the geographical distribution of the Tōhōkai’s voters and how it compared to that of 
other parties see Nagai Kazu [鵑棲北], “The Founding of the Tōhōkai”, p.134-35. 
61 See Arima Manabu [衄㮈嶌], “The Organization and Policies of the Tōhōkai”, p. 69.  
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also differed in their approach to political mobilization – and here lay the potential synergies. 
Nakano and his first-generation followers hailed largely from prominent provincial families and 
had entered politics with the support of other influential provincial men. Though they had had 
some mass-movement experiences during the Kokumin Dōmei days, their approach to mass 
mobilization remained largely academic. Nakano, for example, asked one of his followers, 
Sekiyama Shigetarō [欄愾火啣ア], to study mass mobilization at the party headquarters through 
reading works by Hitler and Lenin, only to learn later that these theories were difficult to apply to 
Japanese reality.  
Through trial and error, Nakano came quickly to rely on the newcomers’ expertise. He 
leaned most notably on farmers’ movement activists such as Yutani Yoshiharu, 62  Inuamura 
Ryūichi,63 Awatani Yūzō,64 and Tanabe Osamu,65 as well as on labor movement activists such as 
Atariyama Kiyoshi 66   (formerly a member of the labor union of which Nakano had been 
president) and Makabe Takuo [*卮票啌]. Each brought a wealth of practical experience in mass 
organization and agitation.  
Not all those who joined the party after 1938 were “converts” [ゞ圃70] from left-wing 
organizations. The Tōhōkai also attracted many men who had never belonged to another political 
party, left-wing or otherwise, and who joined because the Tōhōkai’s slogans and policies 
genuinely impressed them. The Tōhōkai members of this third generation were largely younger 
and, unlike those of the other two generations, received their political formation in the Tōhōkai. 
What they lacked in political experience they made up for with youthful fervor.  
                                                     
62 Yutani Yoshiharu [譿〞コ齠] (1888 – 1958) businessman and politician from Tottori city.  
63 Inamura Ryūichi [I̊襁吏慎] (1898 – 1990) farmer movement activist.  
64 Awatani Yūzō [㍽〞濬24] (1897 - ?), farmer movement activist and politician.  
65 Tanabe Osamu [譓シ10/11] (1902 – 1980) farmer movement activist from Osaka.  
66 Atariyama Kiyoshi [橲愾拐] (1901 – 1980), labor activist. 
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Recruits of this third generation came from a diverse array of sources. The great majority 
were recruited into the Tōhōkai through its youth organization, which was centered on the 
Waseda chapter and led by Miyasaki Yoshimasa67 and Takao Shinji.68 Similar youth chapters 
were founded at all other major Japanese universities.69 A small minority of third-generation 
Tōhōkai – including former dorm students Shintō Kazuma, Hasegawa Shun, Chiba Masahira, and 
Nagata Masayoshi – joined because they knew Nakano personally. Personal connections also 
brought Shibata Tokuo [讒譓毫渣], the nephew of Nakano’s primary school teacher Shibata 
Fumishiro, to the party. This group, though small in numbers, proved to be most loyal. 
Demobilized army veterans comprised another source of new members; Satō Morio70   from 
Kurume City in Fukuoka, for instance, who had been injured while fighting in China, returned to 
Japan with a couple of shrapnel pieces in his body and was thereafter a strong advocate of 
England’s expulsion from Asia.71  
The relative size, influence, and representation of these three generations within the 
Tōhōkai remains unclear. If the Tōhōkai’s Tokyo chapter is representative of the whole, however, 
then at the height of the party’s expansion in the years 1938-41, second-generation left-wing 
“converts” comprised half the total, with third-generation members and a small minority of first-
                                                     
67 Miyazaki Yoshimasa [幟扣便膕] (1915 - ?), Tōhōkai member, later journalist.  
68 Sometimes the latter is also called Takatera Shinji [㔾徇袋饅]. 
69 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 369. 
70 Satō Morio [双I嶂赶] (? - ?), leader of the Tōhōkai Youth organization. 
71 Even though Nakano at one point expressed his hope that battle-hardened decommissioned soldiers 
would come to play an important role in a popular movement, similar to that they played in the German 
Nazi movement, this never happened, because full demobilization did not take place until 1945, and the 
few men who got discharged before that on account of some injury, quickly found employment in Japan’s 
overheated economy, leaving them little time to engage in politics. Accordingly the Tōhōkai could never 
draw from a large pool of brutalized and idle war veterans, which swelled the ranks of the Nazi movement 
in its early years. See Nakano Seigō, “Editorial: Youth and Training” [蕁ルクス瑍⻗朮膏ñ癩], in Tōtairiku, 
September, 1942, p. 8.  
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generation veterans accounting for the remainder.72 Nagai, who analyzed the occupants of the 
Tōhōkai’s most influential positions in the years 1937-41, has examined in detail these three 
generations’ respective influence within the party.73 He shows that, generally, the core group of 
original party founders was able to maintain control over the party’s top positions (occupying 
100%, 80% and 88% of the three highest-ranking positions in the years 1937, 1939 and 1941 
respectively), 74 as well as its platform and direction. While they remained dominant through 
control of positions such as secretary general [朸征憎] (occupied throughout the party’s existence 
by Nakano), Organization Propaganda Section Leader [36ト帶然グ憎 ] and Political 
Investigation Section Leader [膕鳩㌽谺グ憎], the first generation retired gradually from daily 
party business and handed these responsibilities over to younger members.  
In the lower-ranking positions, the second generation was generally better-represented than 
the third (in 1941, these two groups held 40% and 18%, respectively, of all open positions), but 
third-generation members’ rate of entry into influential offices grew faster between 1939-41 than 
that of the second generation. These lower-ranking positions (e.g. leading provincial party 
branches) gave officials much closer contact to party foot soldiers and voters, and thus provided 
an important channel of information from the electorate to the party leadership. The increasing 
presence and influence  of the second- and third-generation members within the party reflected its 
evolution from a traditional “Diet-Men Party” [共同組合満膕妬] to a “mass party” [哢テ膕妬]. 
                                                     
72 The assumption is questionable, for Tokyo was hardly representative of the country as a whole, but for 
lack of anything better statistics, this author has accepted Nagai’s guess and the assumptions that it is based 
on. See Nagai Kazu [鵑棲北], “The Development of the Tōhōkai”, p. 114. 
73 Ibid., p. 101. 
74 The nomenclature of the party’s offices changed over time but for simplicity’s sake we might say that 
the secretary general [朸征憎] had the function of president, while directors [G鳩] and councilors [℀共同組合
満] had a word in making important decisions [彗共同組合闥] without leading others directly. Direct leadership 
was exercised by the secretary general [朸征憎] and the section leaders [徨著グ憎] while the Permanent 
Secretaries [晝染朸征], Section members [徨著グ満], and the secretaries [朸征] were involved in 
executing the orders from above and taking care of day-to-day activities.  
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Still, the Tōhōkai’s success in creating a truly mass-based party was mixed. Membership 
and party chapters increased steadily throughout the second half of 1930s, with membership 
rising nearly tenfold to peak at 31,625 in 1940, while the number of party chapters increased 
almost fivefold to 114 in 1941 from 25 in 1936. Tōhōkai youth-affiliated groups also expanded to 
25 in 1941 from one in 1938. Only after the party’s voluntary dissolution in 1940 did membership 
and party chapters start declining.75 
Despite this spectacular growth, the Tōhōkai still fell short of Nakano’s professed aim of 
establishing a popular party strong enough to reform Japan’s political and economic 
establishment. With just 2.2% and 2.9% of total votes in the 1937 and 1942 elections, 
respectively, the Tōhōkai could hardly be said to be representing the people, or even an important 
part thereof. With just 12 seats the Diet after 1937 and only seven after 1942, the party’s ability to 
influence political developments was likewise very limited.  
Like fascist leaders elsewhere, Nakano could have tried to make up for the party’s lack of 
quantity by substituting operational quality. He could, for instance, have created a hard-line party 
nucleus that, like the Nazi’s SA, would serve as an instrument to influence politics outside legal 
channels. He opted, however, to concentrate his efforts more on legal political activities such as 
organizing rallies and issue-driven demonstrations.  
 
Nakano and the First Konoe Cabinet 
Given Nakano’s disappointment over not having been included in the Konoe cabinet, one 
might have expected him to be even more critical of the governing party than usual, but his 
overall attitude wavered between benevolent support and encouraging criticism. After he returned 
from Europe, Nakano outlined the qualified support he intended to give Konoe: “When it comes 
                                                     
75 See Nagai Kazu [鵑棲 j北], “The Founding of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U], p.133. Nagai compiled 
the table using the “Situation of Social Movements” [だ善ぉ罰貢◥齪] prepared by the Ministry of the 
Interior’s Police Bureau’s [塔鳩ÿ㍽胎悄 ]. The reports were prepared every year and the numbers 
contained show membership levels at the end of the respective calendar years.  
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to national unity, I would like to support the cabinet, but the mistaken policy of a cabinet needs to 
be corrected.”76 Nakano and the Tōhōkai enthusiastically supported Konoe’s hard-line stance vis-
à-vis China, voting in favor of the National Mobilization Law Konoe introduced into the 73rd Diet 
in the spring of 1938 and advocating continuously thereafter that Japanese forces occupy more 
Chinese territory.  
When Konoe reshuffled his cabinet in 1938 with the hope of ending the war in China, 
Nakano welcomed the move and saw the new cabinet members as “in line with our views”77 
(Nakano described the new Army Minister, Itagaki Seishirō, as “courageous without equal.”78). 
He maintained simultaneously, however, that the Tōhōkai would continue “supporting the effort 
toward national unity…commenting on the various policies, encouraging the government, 
criticizing it, and reprimanding it without slackening.” 79  Nakano did not, for instance, 
wholeheartedly support Konoe’s attempts to reach a non-military solution to the conflict on the 
mainland. Both Konoe’s move to negotiate a settlement through the offices of new Foreign 
Minister Ugaki and the establishment of a rival Chinese government under Wang Ching-wei 
came under critical fire from the Tōhōkai. Instead, Nakano backed the pro-escalation army hard 
liners, cheering them on when they got Japan involved in a border skirmish with the Soviet Union 
along the Mongolian border in the summer 1938. When the Japanese army one year later got into 
another border skirmish with Russia at Nomohan and was routed, Nakano likewise found few 
critical words and instead praised the “gallant display of the Yamato spirit.”80   
Nakano reserved his encouraging criticism especially for Konoe’s project to reorganize the 
                                                     
76 Nakano Seigō “People, Stand Up! – returning from Italy and Germany”, p. 49. 
77 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, July 1938, p. 2. 
78 Ibid., p. 3.  
79 Ibid., p. 4.  
80 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, December 1939, p. 2.  
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people and create a national supra-party that would subsume all other parties. Though Konoe did 
not realize this ambition during his first tenure, the possibility of a New Party served both as 
carrot and stick in his relations with the Diet. Nakano was critical of the idea, not because he 
disagreed with the notion of a single strong party to carry out national reforms. Far from it! 
Rather, as he said in a speech at the Tōhōkai national convention at the end of 1938, Nakano 
believed strongly that:   
 
“The people want some great personality to take charge of things. In exchange for their 
absolute obedience, they want some person of absolute trust such as Hitler or Mussolini 
to appear. If you take a look at the upper classes of Japan, however, there is no such 
person. There are limits to how great a single individual can be. Hitler, who leads the 
Nazis, and Mussolini, who leads the Fascists, are such great personalities. Our present 
Prime Minister Konoe is a person of uncommon wisdom. He does not, however, have 
an organization similar to that of the Nazis or the Fascists. He is not, therefore, in 
contact with the people’s feelings through such an organization. Moreover, he finds 
himself in a society that is cut off from the general masses…For a politician, not having 
a political organization means not having any roots in the people. No matter how grand 
such a person may be, at the end of the day he will never be more than a cut flower in a 
vase. It is as if you had brought a cut lotus flower and stood it onto your desk (laughter 
and applause). It has no roots. And since it has no roots it will wither away.”81 
 
Nakano’s message was clear: If Konoe wanted to create a new popular party, all he had to 
do was to call on the Tōhōkai, which had seen its ranks swell just recently, providing Konoe’s 
administration with the “roots” it needed among the people. Nakano and the Tōhōkai feared 
nothing more than the prospect that in “re-organizing the people,” Konoe might rely on some 
branch of the administration rather than on the Tōhōkai. Nakano would later see those fears 
realized in the form of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. At the end of 1938, only weeks 
before the Konoe cabinet resigned for failing to bring the war in China to an end, the Tōhōkai 
issued a declaration severely criticizing the bureaucracies’ mingling in the re-organization of the 
people:  
                                                     
81 Nakano Seigō, during a speech held at the Tōhōkai’s national convention of December 9, 1938 and 
reprinted in Tōtairiku, March 1939 also quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 366-68. 
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“The so-called proposal for the reorganization of the people…is a sacrilege against the 
noble readiness of the Japanese people to make sacrifices during this, our national 
emergency. It has the strong potential of perverting into a vain strengthening of 
bureaucratic controls, and we strongly oppose it and demand that Prime Minister Konoe 
earnestly revise his thinking.”82  
 
The fear that mobilization for war would only result in more powerful bureaucracies 
played an increasingly important role in Nakano’s thinking henceforth.  
The issue on which Nakano opposed Konoe most vehemently was, however, the Public 
Management of Electricity Bill [袞陪楼广à弴┃] introduced by the government into the 73rd 
Diet (December 1937 – March 1938) with the National Mobilization Law. Nakano had attacked 
the plan to put electric utilities under public control when it was first voiced by the Hirota 
cabinet’s Communications Minister more than year earlier, on the grounds that its passage would 
amount to:  
 
“theft similar to taking a water well dug by someone else…We strongly reject the bill, 
which aims to…become the standard applied in all of Japan’s industries, because within 
capitalism it represents the worst form of bureaucratic capitalism. It is a disguised form 
of National Socialism that destroys the entrepreneurial spirit of the private sector and 
lowers industrial productivity.”83 
 
Given Nakano’s usual populist stance, it is surprising that he opposed a bill that would 
have lowered consumers’ electricity prices. The sad truth is that Nakano was protecting the 
interest of his financial backers, Yasukawa Daigorō and Matsunaga Yasuzaemon from Fukuoka, 
who both held important interest in electric utilities. At least in this instance, Nakano was still 
talking like a traditional party politician, protecting his local backers rather than acting in the 
                                                     
82 The Tōhōkai’s resolution against Konoe’s plan to re-organize the people can also be found in Nakano 
Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス] in Tōtairiku, January 1939, p. 5. 
83  Nakano Seigō, “Clarifying Nakano Seigō’s Believes Concerning Private Ownership and Public 
Management of the Electric Power Industry”[袞陪鴈衄楼遊贐行徙浩腎ǒ驟悩鳰盻袋惚蕚穀拘行溝], 
(Tokyo: Electronic League News Agency [袞鴪ヾ遍＊袋だ], August 1936), p. 12 and following.  
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interest of the whole nation.   
 
The Failed Merger with the Social Mass Party 
In early 1939, when the first Konoe cabinet was succeeded by the cabinet of Hiranuma 
Ki’ichirō, Japan’s political world was shaken by the news that the Social Mass Party and the 
Tōhōkai were merging. The idea for the merger came out of a conversation between Nakano and 
Social Mass Party member Miwa Jusō,84 a man whom Nakano had known since 1922, when 
Miwa and Inamura Ryūichi had asked Nakano to hold a speech on non-interference in Russian 
affairs.85 Like Nakano, Miwa was of Fukuokan origins; the two men had attended the same 
Shūyūkan middle school.86  
Though at first blush the merger differed little from the Tōhōkai’s strategy of expanding by 
incorporating existing organizations, merging with the Social Mass Party (SMP) was a daring 
plan in terms of both its size and of the ideological gap between the two parties. Being the Diet’s 
third- and fourth-largest parties, respectively, the SMP and the Tōhōkai had in the past been 
natural competitors.  
A merger only became conceivable because the SMP made a major ideological move to the 
right in 1937-8. When the party was founded with a socialism-tinged platform in July 1932, it 
opposed imperialist wars. After the outbreak of war with China, however, the SMP came to 
support the government’s war effort; it endorsed, for instance, Konoe’s National Mobilization 
Law in the spring of 1938. Although the party’s organ, the Social Mass News [だ善哢テ范ⓥ], 
claimed this move to the right “was absolutely not a tenkō [ゞ圃]” and instead referred to it 
                                                     
84 Miwa Jusō [申ね徘呎](1894 - 1956), Fukuoka-born lawyer and politician.  
85 Nakano recorded the impressions of this first meeting in Tōhōjiron, August 1922.  
86 An account of the conversation is provided in Miwa Jusō [申ね徘呎], “Questions related to the Merger 
of the Tōhōkai with the Social Mass Party” [覩苜善膏だ哢妬貢遍弁黙主], part of a special feature 
“Remembering Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩惚畫康], in Japan and the Japanese [荳袿沸砿荳袿斥], January 
1956, p. 28 – 30. 
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euphemistically as a “development,” the shift gained momentum in the course of 1938 under 
party leaders Asō Hisashi87 and Kamei Kan’ichirō. In the fall of that year, Kamei and two SMP 
delegates visited Germany and returned to Japan with a rosy picture similar to Nakano’s.88 During 
the party convention of November 1938, members decided after a debate to support Konoe’s 
movement to establish a new party. Many observers skewered the SMP for a spineless conversion, 
but Nakano’s critique was one of the most sharp-tongued:  
 
“It is said that the Social Mass Party are ready to renounce themselves and establish the 
New Party. I must say that elegies as pitiful as this declaration are rare in recent 
times…Whatever their good judgment may be, and irrespective of the fact that they 
may have a good justification on the surface, their leaders are a shameless bunch of 
established party politicians. ... If this dream comes true, it will be their spiritual suicide 
and if it does not work out as they hope, they will be the laughingstock of the whole 
country.”89        
  
While perhaps spineless, the Social Mass Party’s move rightward also cleared the way for a 
rapprochement with the Tōhōkai. In fact, a number of the SMP’s provincial members and 
affiliated organizations preemptively left the party after its conversion and joined the Tōhōkai.90  
Sometime between writing the above article, in mid-1938, and early 1939, Nakano came to 
appreciate the potential benefits of a merger. The SMP’s 37 MPs (36 after Nishio Suehiro was 
expelled in 1940) and the Tōhōkai’s 12 would create a party with nearly 50 representatives in the 
                                                     
87 Asō Hisashi [朳﨟睡] (1891 – 1940), social activist and politician.  
88 The three SMP delegates to visit Germany were Kamei Kan’ichirō [瀬棲⎤慎ア], Itō Ushirō [舛I瀕
裂ア], and Kondō Takeo [デI驥渣]. The three men expressed their positive views about Nazi-Germany in 
various works. See Kamei Kan’ichirō “About Hitler’s Labor Policy” [砕最宰碕察貢隼朕膕ø行恣肱], 
(Tokyo, 1938) or Itō Ushirō, “Concerning the Racial Community of Nazi Germany: The road toward 
unifying all those working in industry and putting them into the service of the nation” [才債瑳″5鴈茘表
弁喪行恣肱 : 菟﨡釡斥惚慎喪泌浩,楼广喃接香貢ぐ購], (Tokyo, 1940).  
89 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, July 1938, p. 9. 
90 Examples include Inamura Ryūichi [I̊襁吏慎] and Nakamura Matashichirō [腎襁弗晋ア] from 
Niigata prefecture, Awatani Yūzō [㍽〞濬24] from Aomori prefecture, Tanabe Osamu [譓シ10/11] from 
Osaka and Nagao Tamotsu [憎悃衄] from Hyōgo prefecture.   
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Diet - still smaller than the two established parties, but clearly a force to be reckoned with.91 Once 
Nakano and Miwa accepted the merger as a possibility, they went a step further and also 
considered inviting the remainder of Adachi’s Kokumin Dōmei and the First Members of 
Parliament Club [¶慎共同組合満胆鉤グ] to join the merged party. These invitations, as well as the 
decision to create an entirely new “Totalitarian Reform Party” [菟喪厨コ卸范妬] (rather than a 
coalition of old parties), were the preliminary conclusions reached during secret talks held 
between representatives of both parties in early 1939.92 Aiming to heighten the party’s public 
profile and boost its influence, Nakano also hoped to attract well-known individuals such as 
Ogata Taketora, Tokutomi Sohō, Miyake Setsurei, and Tōyama Mitsuru.93  
Adachi showed interest in the proposal initially, but ultimately declined due to opposition 
from the National League’s junior members and from within his constituency in Kumamoto. The 
members of the First Members of Parliament Club also rejected the offer. The SMP was, however, 
able to convince the Japan Reform Rural Villages Association [荳袿卸范コ襁表共同組合善] to join.   
Talks between the Tōhōkai and the Social Mass Party progressed smoothly and on 
February 9, 1939, Nakano shook hands with SMP head Abe Isoo, an image that provided 
symbolic support for the merger. A meeting between high-ranking members of both parties 
followed, culminating in the issue of a joint declaration according to which both parties would 
                                                     
91 According to Miwa Jusō, of the Social Mass Party members involved in the negotiations, the potential 
of the merger was considerable. Long after the war, he stated: “I am not about to say anything great. But if 
at the time, the merger had succeeded and if this reformatory force had been formed and had been joint by 
the National League [under Adachi], then I believe that politics after 1939 would have taken a different 
direction. It would have been a different political situation if Nakano, Asō [Hisashi], Abe Isoo, a man of 
character, and then old Adachi Kenzō and Ogata Taketora, would also have participated in the new party.” 
Miwa Jusō [申ね徘呎], “Questions related to the merger of the Tōhōkai with the Social Mass Party” [覩苜
善膏だ哢妬貢遍弁黙主]; part of a special feature “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩惚畫康], in 
Japan and the Japanese [荳袿沸砿荳袿斥], January 1956, p. 30. 
92 In order to maintain secrecy the talks were held at Miyake Setsurei’s residence. The negotiators were 
Asō Hisashi and Miwa Jusō from the SMP and Yutani Yoshiharu and Sugiura Takeo from the Tōhōkai.  
93 These details are quoted by Miwa Jusō from a note hand-written by Nakano. Miwa Jusō [申ね徘呎], 
“Questions related to the Merger of the Tōhōkai with the Social Mass Party”, p. 28.  
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“set up preparatory committees with the aim of establishing a single totalitarian people’s party 
[ో૕ਥ⟵න৻࿖᳃᡽ౄ] based on a blood pledge of our comrades.”94 Over the next two weeks, 
this preliminary committee met several times, debating and sometimes even deciding such issues 
as the name, platform and policies of the party-to-be.  
The Japanese media’s reaction to the planned merger was mostly positive. The Tokyo Asahi 
opined that: “In the present political situation, it is like a breath of fresh air,”95 while the Yomiuri 
expressed “hope in the interest of rational reforms that this new party is off to a good start.”96 
Only the Tokyo Daily News highlighted potential problems:   
 
“When one looks at the history of the Tōhōkai and the Social Mass Party, one becomes 
aware that most of their members have always been forerunners of the intellectual 
fashions of our country. When democracy became fashionable, they were its 
forerunners, and when theories of the proletarians’ class struggle became fashionable, 
they were again the proletarians’ forerunners. Now that totalitarianism is sweeping 
through Japan, they turn around 180qand act as the forerunners of totalitarianism. We 
pay the greatest respect to those who are quick to grasp a political opportunity and the 
flow of the time, but when someone turns around too quickly, it can be interpreted as a 
weakness of the foundation of his beliefs…We are waiting with great interest to see 
what sort of policies a party that professes totalitarianism will offer us.”97   
 
 
The Merger’s Failure  
Despite all the declarations and preparations, the merger was called off only a week before 
it was scheduled to take place. The immediate reason behind this last-minute cancellation was the 
inability of the two parties’ leaders to decide who would head the new party. The SMP argued 
that since it held three times as many seats in the Diet as the Tōhōkai, the new party’s head 
                                                     
94 The joint declaration is quoted in Inomata p. 410. 
95 Tokyo Asahi News [᧲੩ᦺᣣᣂ⡞] February 10, 1939.  
96 Yomiuri News [⺒ᄁᣂ⡞] February 10, 1939. 
97 Tokyo Daily News [᧲੩ᣣޘᣂ⡞] February 10, 1939. 
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should be Abe Isoo, with Nakano serving as vice-president. Arguing that ideologically the SMP 
had converted to a position he had advocated for years, Nakano proposed instead that he take the 
presidential slot, with Abe serving as honorary president and Asō Hisashi as Secretary-General. 
The SMP offered a compromise solution according to which Abe and Nakano would serve 
concurrently as presidents, but Nakano also rejected this idea.  
As the leadership squabbles delayed a decision, those within the SMP who opposed 
merging organized their forces and voiced their criticism.98 Atop the leadership battle, this intra-
party conflict – and perhaps also some extra-party temptations99 – led SMP president Abe Isoo to 
call off the merger on February 21, 1939. Though those directly involved in the negotiations 
wished to continue for a short period of time, Nakano - in a characteristic fit of short-
temperedness - stopped all negotiations.100 On February 22, the parties issued a joint declaration 
stating that they “had decided that the time was not ripe [for a merger] and [that] while 
maintaining friendly relationships with each other, they would wait for a second opportunity at 
some future date.”101  
In the following days, Nakano sent letters to all involved in the failed merger explaining 
his motives for terminating the negotiations so late in the process. In his letter to Abe Isoo, 
Nakano described the whole affair as a “crime of haste,” adding that it would be his “last try” at 
working within the framework of established party politics. “From now on,” he vowed “to take 
an entirely different route to attain my aims.” He promised that the Tōhōkai would “hold up our 
                                                     
98 The Social Mass Party had itself been the creation of a merger between the Social Democratic Party [だ
善哢テ妬] and the All Japan Workers and Farmers’ Mass Party [菟楼迫コ哢テ妬]. Opposition to the 
merger with the Tōhōkai came from members formerly belonging to the Social Democratic Party, that is 
people such as Nishio Suehiro [O悃袰杰] and Matsuoka Komakichi [觚慟畔便].  
99 According to some accounts, Nagai Ryūtarō from the Minseitō asked Abe Isoo to postpone or even 
obstruct the conclusion of the merger. See Kawakami Taketarō ed. [齊疹深啣ア], “The Biography of Asō 
Hisashi” [朳﨟睡然], (Tokyo, 1958), p. 482. 
100 This at least is the explanation given in Asō Hisashi’s biography. See Ibid. 
101 Nakano quoted in Inomata, p. 414. 
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traditional spirit and walk our thorny path, appeal directly to the feeling of emergency in Japan 
and strive for the completion of the Imperial Way Totalitarian People’s Party [Œぐ菟喪厨コ楼鴈
膕妬].”102 As so often before, Nakano then left on a trip, this time to China, to distance himself 
both geographically and mentally from this political disaster.103 
 
Consequences of the Failed Merger 
And a disaster it was, even if, in retrospect, Ogata called the merger and its failure “all just 
a bit of excitement caused by the pressures of the times.”104 Inomata, similarly, played it down as 
a “tempest in a teapot.”105 Still, the failure dealt a serious blow to both parties.106 The SMP’s 
internal divisions deepened in the following months, contributing to the party’s breakup in March 
of 1940 over Saitō Takao’s anti-militaristic speech. The effect on the Tōhōkai, however, was 
probably even more devastating. Many party members criticized Nakano’s unyielding stance on 
the question of who would lead the new party, feeling that the proposals of the larger SMP were 
quite acceptable as a compromise. Nakano’s rash premature termination of the talks – apparently 
he did not even bother to inform those engaged in the negotiations when he broke them off - 
combined with his quick flight to China, leaving his followers to clean up the mess, convinced 
more than a few Tōhōkai members that Nakano did not look after his flock properly.  
Trying to calm the troubled waters, Nakano wrote letters to some of his party members 
                                                     
102 Letter dated February 25, 1939 from Nakano to Abe Isoo and Asō Hisashi; quoted in Inomata p. 414. 
103 According to Nakano, the alleged purpose of the trip was re-launching peace negotiations with the 
Nationalist regime under Chiang Kai-shek, an aim that failed completely. Instead of meeting Chiang Kai-
shek or any other representative of the Nationalist government, Nakano spoke to Japanese soldiers and in 
front of Chinese audiences (always fearing to become the victim of a terrorist attack). Nakano’s description 
of the trip can be found in Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, April, 1939, p. 7.  
104 Ogata, p. 170. 
105 Inomata calls it literally “a bubble floating on chaos.” Inomata, p. 415. 
106 See Miwa Jusō [申ね徘呎], “Questions related to the merger of the Tōhōkai with the Social Mass 
Party”, p. 28 – 30. 
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expressing regret about the mess he had created. He wrote variously that he “took full 
responsibility” for this “great disaster,” which he said was “born out of my fretfulness alone.” 
Still, he maintained that his decision to end the merger negotiations “was best for both sides.” 
Expressing fears that he might “have hurt the pure feelings of my obedient followers,” Nakano 
asked them “not to give in to [their] anger and just remain calm,” and promised that the Tōhōkai 
“would be able to make great leaps in the second half of the year.”107 Still, over the course of the 
following months, more than half of the Tōhōkai’s 12 MPs left the party. Only Ōishi, Sugiura, 
Tanaka, and Mitamura remained loyal to Nakano.  
Worse was to come. Before departing for China with 20 party members on March 1, 1939, 
Nakano gave a farewell address in which he declared: “Japanese politics are in a state of 
paralysis.”108 This statement, coupled with the fact that Nakano left Japan while the Diet was still 
in session, led to a parliamentary motion calling for Nakano’s expulsion from the Diet. If 
Japanese politics were indeed in a state of paralysis, Nakano’s enemies argued, why was he not 
attending the Diet session to do something about it? As calls for Nakano’s ouster got louder, the 
speaker of the lower house, Koyama Shōju,109 felt he could not ignore them. Accordingly, he 
summoned Nakano back to Tokyo, forcing Nakano to abort his China trip. After meeting with 
Koyama, Nakano resigned (much to his mother’s regret110) on March 27 from the Diet seat he 
                                                     
107 Nakano in a letter to Tōhōkai MP Yutani Yoshiharu dated March 23, 1939 quoted in Inomata, p. 416. 
108 Nakano’s complaint that Japanese politics were in a “state of paralysis” had first been voiced at the 
Tōhōkai’s First National Convention in December 1938 and repeated thereafter. Nakano Seigō, “On the 
Occaision of the First National Convention” [覩苜善¶慎憐菟楼哢善行59壕肱] in Tōtairiku, March 1939, 
p. 6. Nakano repeated the phrase in “Decide Japan’s Direction!” [荳袿貢罰圃惚麑巵皇国], speech held 
June 2, 1939, at the Seinen Kaikan in Tokyo, reprinted in Tōtairiku, July 1939, p. 12. 
109 Koyama Shōju [恠愾觚徘] (1876 – 1959), politician, journalist and manager of a news paper. Like 
Nakano, Koyama had gone to Waseda and worked as a journalist before entering politics eventually joining 
the Minseitō.  
110 According to Ōishi Masaru, Nakano’s mother, Tora, felt that the expulsion from the Diet was a blemish 
to the family’s name that could only be atoned for by harakiri. Though this may be somewhat of an 
exaggeration, it is understandable that she should have been unhappy about it. See Ōishi Masaru [哢0哢], 
“Eighty Years of Windy Springs and Rainy Autumns – the Autobiography of Ōishi Masaru” [蒟城┽聳都
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had held for 19 years.  
In a statement issued that day, Nakano emphasized that he did not “reject parliamentary 
politics as such” and said it was “necessary that some of my comrades have a seat in the house in 
order to carry the popular movement into the Diet.” Regarding his own political career, he said:  
 
“the recent failure [i.e. the Tōhōkai’s failure to merge with the SMP ] was the last 
disappointment with a Diet-centered party…I take all responsibility for it…Having 
taken stock of the situation, I resign my seat in the Diet and throw myself stark naked 
among the people.”111 
 
Until the next election in the spring of 1942, when Nakano was re-elected, he poured his 
energy into establishing the Tōhōkai as an extra-parliamentary political force. He was so 
successful that his biographers refer to the next three years as the Tōhōkai’s heyday. During this 
time, Nakano traveled across the country giving speeches and organizing rallies, strengthening 
the party’s local organization and becoming known throughout Japan in the process. Nakano’s 
endeavors introduced a new form of political organization into Japanese politics, one that relied 
on a nationwide organization, with new forms of financing and mass mobilization. Even in its 
heyday, the Tōhōkai was never an exactly accurate reproduction of European fascist parties, but it 
was certainly inspired by them.  
 
Promoting the Triple Alliance 
Thematically, Nakano’s mass agitation activities during the Tōhōkai’s heyday were 
grouped around three major foreign policy issues, which also defined his relationship - and that of 
the Tōhōkai -, to the Hiranuma, Abe and Yonai cabinets. The issues were: first, cementing a 
military alliance with Germany and Italy; second, and closely related, promoting the anti-British 
                                                                                                                                                             
筆朮 : 哢0哢60然], (Kōchi, 1964),  p. 323. 
111 Declaration made by Nakano on March 27, 1939 explaining his resignation from the Diet. Quoted in 
Inomata p. 418, as well as Ogata, p. 170-72.  
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movement of 1939-40; and third, advocating the southern advance, more specifically the 
conquest of French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies in 1940-1.  
Since his return from Europe in March 1938, Nakano had argued for an expansion of the 
Anti-Comintern Pact and contended that “Japan should conclude as speedily as possible a 
military alliance with Germany and Italy.”112 While the Anti-Comintern Pact had been directed 
primarily against the Soviet Union, Nakano wanted the new alliance to be directed primarily 
against England. On a superficial level, he aimed to contain Britain’s influence in China, which 
he believed was responsible for the Chinese Nationalist government’s tenacious resistance. On a 
deeper level, the trip convinced him that Japan, Italy and Germany shared a common interest in 
revising the international order of which England, France and the US were the main beneficiaries. 
Finally, establishing closer ties with Germany and Italy would weaken English, French, American, 
and Russian influence both across Asia generally and in Japan specifically. Nakano hoped to 
weaken the pro-British and pro-American forces while strengthening the pro-German forces, 
which included the Tōhōkai and himself. Accordingly, Nakano’s anti-British stance was but the 
reverse side of his insistence on a military alliance with Germany. As early as mid-1939, he 
stated: “The Triple Alliance and the Expulsion [of England from Asia] signal the construction of a 
new order and the destruction of the old: They are the two sides of the same coin.”113 
Nakano found himself in direct opposition to Prime Minister Hiranuma, who succeeded 
Konoe in early 1939 and sought an alliance with Germany directed mainly against Russia. 
Hiranuma’s cabinet was surprised when, after months of negotiating with Germany, it became 
known that Hitler had concluded a non-aggression pact with Russia in August of 1939. While 
Hitler’s revelation gave Hiranuma reason enough to resign, Germany’s surprise move did not 
                                                     
112 Nakano during a speech held at the Japan Youth Hall on June 2, 1939 “People Movement Comes First 
Statement” [楼鴈ぉ罰¶慎呵蕚] , quoted in Inomata, p. 423. 
113 Nakano Seigō in a speech titled “The Anti-British Movement and the Triple Alliance” [鮒ラぉ罰膏申
楼ヲ征弁ç], held Hibiya Public Hall, Tokyo, July 31, 1939 and reprinted in “East Asian People’s 
Convention” [覩盛鴈茘哢善], in Tōtairiku, September 1939, p. 115.   
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alter Nakano’s position, as he had advocated that the alliance be directed against England all 
along. Nakano praised Hitler’s decision as a strategy that freed Germany to move against Poland, 
France and England, and recommended that Japan similarly conclude a non-aggression pact with 
Russia to the north in order to be able to move south against the colonies of England, France and 
the Netherlands. 114  Nakano’s assessment was not, however, shared by Japan’s subsequent 
governments. Shocked by Hitler’s turnaround, neither the Abe nor the Yonai cabinets considered 
continuing negotiations with Germany on an expanded military alliance. Unwilling to give up, 
Nakano continued clamoring for closer ties with Germany, in part by mobilizing anti-British 
feeling within the population.  
 
The Movement against England  
Anti-colonial, and hence anti-British, strands had been present in Japan since the 
bakumatsu period and later came to form an important element of Pan-Asian thinking. England’s 
continuing military support for the Chinese Nationalist regime in the years after 1937 had revived  
latent anti-British resentments, leading in the years 1939-40 to an Anti-English Movement [簟ラ
ぉ罰刷鮒ラぉ罰] in which the Tōhōkai - thanks to its nationwide structure - played a leading 
role.115  The party’s activities took the form of demonstrations (often in front of the British 
Embassy, where angry crowds gathered and sometimes threw stones into the embassy’s 
compound), speech rallies and much-publicized meetings between Nakano and the English 
ambassador.  
The Tōhōkai often used international incidents as rallying points for popular indignation, 
which it then directed against Anglophiles and England’s representatives in Japan. Thus, in April 
                                                     
114 See Nakano Seigō, “The Unmovable Great Policy of Greater Japan” [哢荳袿秦罰貢哢苜ə], in 
Tōtairiku, October 1939, throughout but especially p. 4-9. 
115 Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 424. 
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1939, the authorities of the English settlement in Tientsin refused to extradite an assassin who had 
killed a pro-Japanese Chinese citizen. In response, the Japanese army sealed off the English 
settlement. While Foreign Minister Arita held talks with the English ambassador to resolve what 
came to be called the Tientsin Incident (these talks eventually produced a compromise according 
to which the English would not interfere with Japan’s military operations in China), the Tōhōkai 
organized a “Convention of the East Asian People to Destroy England” [纒ラ覩盛鴈茘哢善] at 
Hibiya Public Hall in late July. Attended by Pan-Asianists from across Asia, including Indian 
activist Rash Bihari Bose and representatives of independence movements from the Philippines, 
Indonesia and the Muslim world, this forum gave Nakano a stage from which to demand: 
“England should withdraw entirely from China! England should withdraw entirely from East 
Asia!”116 
Then, on January 21, 1940, a British destroyer stopped and searched the Asama-maru, a 
Japanese passenger ship 35 miles off the Japanese coast, arresting 21 German citizens on board. 
The Japanese public was outraged at this breach of international law and Nakano quickly 
exploited the chance to hurl another barb at England. On January 22, the Tōhōkai declared:   
 
“This must be called the greatest insult to Japan, a blasphemy against the Japanese spirit. 
This, finally, is the national disgrace that our government has invited by its flattering 
attitude toward England and America, yet it is not something the Japanese spirit will 
forgive.”117   
    
On January 23, Nakano visited Prime Minister Yonai and Foreign Minister Arita, 
demanding not only that the right of belligerency be applied to all English ships traveling to or 
from nationalist-controlled China but also that the captain of the Asama-maru be punished. On 
                                                     
116 Nakano Seigō in a speech titled “The Anti-British Movement and the Triple Alliance” [鮒ラぉ罰膏申
楼ヲ征弁ç], held Hibiya Public Hall, Tokyo, July 31, 1939 and reprinted in “East Asian People’s 
Convention” [覩盛鴈茘哢善], in Tōtairiku, September 1939, p. 113.  
117 Quoted in Inomata p. 426. 
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January 25, Nakano visited the British ambassador and filed a note of protest. To underline his 
visit’s importance, Nakano mobilized more than three hundred followers to demonstrate in front 
of the embassy compound. 
With time and practice, the Tōhōkai’s capacity for mobilizing its party members increased 
steadily, though the Party offered no compensation for demonstrators and members often had to 
travel to Tokyo from the neighboring provinces.118 The Tōhōkai’s ability to harness Pan-Asian 
and anti-British sentiment contributed greatly to its growth and overall strength.119 
 
Nakano’s Southern Advance 
The third theme with which Nakano sought to mobilize Japan’s masses was his version of 
the southern advance, directed mainly against the European Powers’ possessions in Asia. The 
defeat of the Japanese forces at the hands of the Red Army at Nomohan had shown that moving 
north, against Russia, was ill-advised. The southern advance, meanwhile, seemed more inviting 
than ever before, given developments in Europe. After overrunning Poland in the fall of 1939, 
Germany occupied Denmark and Norway in early 1940, followed by Holland, Belgium and 
Luxembourg in May. France surrendered on June 7, and though England held out, its days 
seemed numbered. In the eyes of many Japanese, the European Allies’ weakness made European 
colonies in Asia ripe for the picking.   
As early as April 15, 1940 (long before the fall of France), the Yonai government had 
declared that it would not exploit the war in Europe to expand Japanese influence in Asia. 
Nakano saw this declaration as weak-kneed submission to the imperial Powers for the sake of 
maintaining an outdated and decaying international order. In May 1940, he demanded that “the 
Japanese government prepare to occupy the Dutch East Indies for their security and then wait for 
                                                     
118 See Inomata p. 426.  
119 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2. p. 414-15. 
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a good opportunity to do so.” In the meantime, “Japan should secure the right for preferential use 
of the Dutch East Indies”120 to thwart any English or American ambitions in that direction. 
Two months later, after fall of France, the Tōhōkai demanded that Japan occupy not only 
the Dutch East Indies, but also French Indochina, again for its own security [胎火錨今刷胎姚錨
今].  Speaking publicly in July, Nakano said: “We should take French Indochina! We should take 
the Dutch East Indies! Not taking them is not an option!” 121 In what was to become a familiar 
refrain, Nakano reassured his audience that Japanese aggression against Europe’s colonies would 
go unchecked:  
 
“England has both its hands full preparing to fight against Germany, which is lurching 
across the English Channel. If the English are defeated, they will have to flee their 
home country and go all the way to Canada. How can they interfere in East Asian 
affairs? England has no power to resist and the Netherlands have been annihilated. Will 
America come? America won’t come.”122  
 
Even if the U.S. decided to take up arms in defense of Europe, Nakano posited, Japan 
benefited from a natural shield in the form of a chain of islands in the South Pacific, which were 
“unsinkable aircraft carriers” forming a Japanese “Siegfried line.”123  America, he concluded, 
“cannot stand up to Japan.”124 
                                                     
120 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス] in Tōtairiku, May 1940, p. 9. 
121 All quotes taken from Nakano Seigō at a speech rally in the Japan Youth Hall on July 2, 1940 
reproduced in Kōen [パスカル儲], vol. 476, under the title “Global Change and the Future Path of Japan” [膕鈐貢
哢哇悄膏荳袿貢〕と], quoted in Inomata, p. 427-28 as well as in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 452. 
122 Nakano quoted in Inomata p. 427 –28.  
123 The “Siegfried line” was a chain of German defense fortifications on its western border to France. Like 
its counterpart, the Maginot line, which protected the eastern border of France and which had proven 
absolutely useless in 1940 because the German armies had circumvented it by storming through the 
Netherlands, the Siegfried Line too, was to be rather ineffective in protecting Germany when the Allied 
Armies entered Germany in 1945. Very much the same can be said about that chain formed of unsinkable 
aircraft carriers mentioned by Nakano.   
124 Nakano Seigō at a speech rally in the Japan Youth Hall on July 2, 1940 reproduced in Kōen [パスカル儲], vol. 
476, under the title “Global change and the future path of Japan” [膕鈐貢哢哇悄膏荳袿貢〕と]; quoted in 
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Some of Nakano’s hopes were finally fulfilled when the second Konoe cabinet (July 1940 
– July 1941) replaced the Yonai administration. At the end of September, Japan concluded the 
Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy, and in April of the following year, Foreign Minister 
Matsuoka signed a Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union, freeing Japan to move south. At a rally 
in early October attended by the Italian and German ambassadors, Nakano argued that since 
French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies had become “lost articles with great value but no 
owner [㏍厨の唸☞],” 125 taking them was not a conquest but an act of liberation. Moreover:  
 
“Once we control the resources of the South Pacific, it will be of no concern to us even 
if America threatens to stop giving us petroleum. Will they finally exert economic 
pressure? If so, let’s see what they do if we in turn deny them deliveries of tin and 
rubber.”126  
 
Nakano’s strategic calculus implied that Japan needed to move quickly, for the more time 
elapsed, the stronger the US would be and the less time Japan would have to develop the newly 
acquired territories and integrate them into the Japanese economy. In his speeches, Nakano 
accordingly urged Konoe not to worry about American opposition but to “aggressively engage in 
action.”127 In an editorial in late 1940, he declared:  “Japan’s decisive battle lies to the south 
(applause). The task ahead of Japan is to grasp the Dutch East Indies.”128  
As time passed and Konoe remained inactive, Nakano’s pronouncements shifted from 
positive exhortations to act quickly to negative misgivings that it might be too late: “Japan missed 
                                                                                                                                                             
Inomata, p. 427-428 as well as Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 452. 
125 Nakano Seigō in his speech titled “Unleash the Power of the Triple Alliance” [申楼弁ç貢反陪̇凅
儲㌲善] held during a Tōhōkai-sponsored-speech rally at Hibiya Public Hall on October 10, 1940, quoted 
in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 484. 
126 Ibid.  
127 Nakano Seigō in Tōyō Keizai Shinpō [覩┠42喝范况], October 5, 1940. 
128 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, November, 1940, p. 6-7. 
 287 
its first chance in May and June of last year. We missed our second chance immediately after the 
conclusion of the Triple Alliance. Through the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty with the 
Soviet Union, we are now given a third chance.” And while Japan’s leaders hesitated, thinking: 
“Is this our chance? Is this our chance?” Nakano was sure that “opportunity has visited Japan 
three times and three times it will leave” unless Japan was ready to exploit it. On the same 
occasion, Nakano pointed out that if Japan had taken Indonesia in 1940 (as Nakano had argued 
then), it would have secured oil supplies by 1941.129  
Neither Germany’s unexpected invasion of Russia in June 1941 nor the Atlantic Charter 
declared by Roosevelt and Churchill in the same summer changed Nakano’s position in any 
fundamental way. Two days after Germany’s attack on Russia, Nakano maintained that: “The 
Triple Alliance should serve as the basis of Japan’s foreign policy with regard to all difficult 
situations.” He added that the war’s escalation in Europe should be matched by a similar 
escalation in East Asia, for “the Chinese war will not be decided in China. The only way to solve 
the China Incident is to transition the Sino-Japanese war into a war of liberation of East Asia.”130 
Nakano’s reasoning was that by directly attacking the Western colonial Powers, Japan would cast 
itself as an Asian liberator, thus appealing to Pan-Asian and nationalist feelings.131 For similar 
reasons, Nakano argued repeatedly for the abolition of the foreign concessions in Chinese 
territory.132  
                                                     
129 All quotes taken from Nakano’s speech “Popular Movement to Overcome the Crisis” [聟悄)ｹ楼
鴈ぉ罰] held at the Grand National Convention of May 1, 1941, reproduced in Nakano Seigō, “Tackling 
the Break Through of the National Crisis” [楼聟睛梅貢喪橲紅酷], in Tōtairiku, June, 1941, p. 29. 
130 Declaration issued by Nakano on June 23, 1941 while touring Hokkaidō, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 
2, p. 533-34.  
131 Thus in a speech held at the Tōhōkai’s Grand National Convention of May 1, 1941, Nakano had 
argued that the “Chinese problem will not be solved in China. If we wish to solve the China problem, …. 
we have to change the character of the Sino-Japanese war, and transform it into a Holy War to liberate East 
Asia. The solution of the Chinese problem lies in the liberation of East Asia.” Nakano Seigō, “Tackling the 
Break Through of the National Crisis” [楼聟睛梅貢喪橲紅酷], in Tōtairiku, June, 1941, p. 32. 
132 The abolition of the foreign concessions in China was a recurrent element in Nakano’s rhetoric in the 
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Nakano saw the Atlantic Charter issued by England and America in mid-August as a 
warning directed against Japan’s possible southern advance. He felt obliged to retort, which he 
did in a very popular September 17 speech entitled “In Reply to Roosevelt and Churchill.”133  
Nakano attacked England and America for their hypocrisy in denouncing Germany and Japan’s 
wars of conquest, given that imperial expansion had built the British and American own empires. 
Likening Japan to a lamb and England to lion, Nakano argued that the Anglo-Saxon Powers:  
 
“all say with one voice that countries can be divided into peace-loving nations and 
bellicose-aggressive nations. They say that the former are good and the latter are bad. 
They claim that rewarding good and punishing evil is the task of England and America. 
I cannot help being shocked at the crudeness of this argument. Gentlemen! Even a 
ferocious lion, after he has killed and eaten a piece of cattle, will rest peacefully for a 
couple of days. And even a peaceful lamb, during winter when food is scarce, will eat 
the bark of pine trees. According to their silly line of argument, which does not see 
beyond the present, the lion is peace-loving and the lamb is aggressive (applause).”134  
 
Maintaining his longtime position that the international order was fundamentally unfair, 
Nakano argued that Germany, and Italy and Japan had every right to fight the arrangement 
because “heaven certainly has not put a superior people on the face of the earth in order to starve 
them to death (applause).”135 Comparing Japan to a “mouse that, when driven into the corner by 
the cat, will bite,” 136  Nakano concluded that Japan’s main problem was a lack of resolute 
leadership in a situation in which time was of the essence. Expressing fears that “our efforts 
won’t be in time,” Nakano wondered: “Is there not just one man within the cabinet who will show 
                                                                                                                                                             
years 1939-41. See for example, Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス ], in Tōtairiku, June 1939, 6 and 
following.  
133 The speech was reprinted in a pamphlet which went through over one hundred reprints. Nakano Seigō, 
“In reply to Churchill and Roosevelt – Addressing the Japanese people” [作察砂索昏作宰刷債堺察債作
行ı恒伍荳袿楼鴈行胞更], in Tōtairiku, October 1941, p. 2-9.  
134 Ibid., p. 3 
135 Ibid.  
136 Nakano quoted (from Ibid.) in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 558. 
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as much will as Clemenceau, please?”137 He repeated his demand to strike south until the very 
eve of the Pearl Harbor attack. As late as December 2, 1941, Nakano said in a speech:  
 
“The Tōjō cabinet is about to make a decision. I hope that they will make that decision. 
If they don’t make it, we might have to watch the destruction of Japan passively. This 
crisis does not allow us to watch on silently, for the enemy has already entered our 
kitchen. Gentlemen, it’s time to stand up, isn’t it?”138 
 
Another rally with the same theme had been already planned for December 17, when, on 
the morning of December 8, Nakano was surprised by the news Pearl Harbor attack.  
 
The Tōhōkai’s Heyday  
These various activities, especially the anti-England movement and the mass 
demonstrations and speech tours, helped not only to expand party membership, but also to cement 
intra-party ties, enhance the party’s public profile and raise funds. Taking stock of his activities in 
January of 1940, Nakano wrote: 
 
“A year has passed in which usually once a week I would go to the countryside to hold 
a speech rally and then return to Tokyo. I have been in politics for roughly twenty years, 
but I have never experienced anything like the present, where the crowds in the 
provinces gather to listen to my speeches, then set up a preparatory meeting, then set up 
a party branch and thus expand our organization. [They take such actions] because the 
state of the world is pressuring them to do so…During one year of touring the country 
and holding speeches in the provinces, the Tōhōkai and its members have achieved 
great results. We have doubled if not tripled our party’s influence and intend to continue 
along the same lines this year.”139  
 
Nakano’s health suffered from his frenetic pace - speeches were particularly taxing, and in 
                                                     
137 Nakano quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 560. 
138 Nakano Seigō, “We Cannot Afford to Watch the Crisis Sitting on the Fence” [賓雍柞え溝鵠惚ロ江
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139 Nakano quoted in Tōhō Seikei Tsūshin [覩苜膕42＊袋], January 1, 1940 
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the summer of 1940 he underwent throat surgery140 - but he believed the membership surge made 
it well worth the trouble.  
The Tōhōkai’s popularity climaxed with the “Popular Movement to Break Out of the 
Crisis” [聟悄)ｹ楼鴈ぉ罰] of spring 1941. Relations with the U.S. were deteriorating: In 
October 1940, the US imposed an embargo on the export of scrap metal to Japan, while in August 
of 1941, following Japan’s occupation of southern French Indochina in July, the US stopped all 
oil deliveries to Japan. Against that backdrop, the “Popular Movement to Break Out of the Crisis” 
brought together familiar themes, including the southern advance and anti-British feelings. Its 
only innovation was an increased emphasis on anti-American rhetoric. Remarkably, however, the 
newly-packaged themes resonated strongly with the Japanese people.  
The movement’s initial kick-off meeting at the Japan Youth Hall on March 25 was 
followed by rallies on March 26, 27 and 30 that led to the Grand National Convention held on 
May 1 at the Ryōgoku Sports Arena in eastern Tokyo. Attendance at this event was of an 
unprecedented magnitude, certainly for the Tōhōkai but likely also for any other Japanese pre-
war party. 141 The party’s bulletin put the number of attendees at 180,000, which may be a bit of 
an exaggeration.142 The Dōmei-Shashin-Tokuhō may have been closer to the truth with its report 
that:  
 
“more than 100,000 attendees inundated the convention. Even before the official start of 
the meeting, the hall had exceeded its capacity, with the crowds that wished to enter but 
were unable to do so filling the streets and shouting and creating a stampede outside. 
This was the largest crowd the sports arena has seen since its construction.”143 
 
                                                     
140  See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 530. 
141 As elsewhere May 1, had traditionally been May Day in Japan. However in 1936 it was prohibited and 
replaced by the “Asian Prosperity and Public Service Day” [85盛喃鍍荳].  
142 Tōhō Jihō [覩苜蕁况] later changed to Tōhō-Seikei-Tsūshin [覩苜膕42＊袋], issue of May 15, 1941. 
143 Quoted in Inomata p. 447. 
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 While most of Japan’s big mainstream papers did not cover the event, the Kokumin 
Shimbun ran an article on its society page. Under the headline “Unseasonable Crowd: Strange 
Events in our Streets on Public Service Day,” the report read:  
 
“On the afternoon of May 1, Public Service Day, an unseasonable line of people 
creating a traffic jam could be seen around the Ryōgoku Sports Arena. These crowds 
wanted to attend the ‘Break Out of the Crisis Convention’….One line went all the way 
to the Shiohara bridge in Ryōgoku San-Chōme, while another line circled the Ryōgoku 
Sports Arena and ended at the Ryōgoku bridge that crosses the Sumida river…Beneath 
large banners raised on a scaffold that announced that Nakano Seigō would hold a 
speech rally, there were old men, youngsters, students, and even women shouting 
heave-ho, heave-ho and trying to enter the arena…At 6:30 p.m., the arena was packed 
to capacity; the shops interrupted temporarily their businesses.”144    
 
Some 3,000 Tōhōkai youth in party uniforms worked with the police all day to ensure the 
event passed without incident. They were largely successful.145  
When Nakano spoke again in September at Hibiya Hall criticizing the Atlantic Charter, the 
crowds were much smaller, but media coverage was better. While the three major dailies - the 
Tokyo Asahi, Tokyo Daily News and Yomiuri Shimbun - mentioned Nakano’s speech only briefly, 
the Miyako Shimbun,  Chūgai Shimbun,  Kokumin Shimbun, and the Teito Nichi-Nichi reproduced 
the speech in great detail. Even the English-language Shanghai Press mentioned the event, 
calling Nakano “president of the fascist Tōhōkai” and reporting that “this speech rally was similar 
to the speech rallies in Hitler’s early period. Nakano’s followers attending the speech wore black 
shirts and trousers, military gaiters and caps, as well as red neckties and swastika armbands.”146 If 
the crowds and the media coverage are any indication, Nakano and the Tōhōkai had succeeded in 
raising their public profile through their mass activities.  
                                                     
144 Kokumin Shimbun, May 2, 1941 (quoted in Inomata)  
145 Only one of the wooden admission gates to the arena was destroyed by crowds trying to push their way 
into the packed hall. 
146 China Press quoted in Inomata, p. 454. 
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These activities also opened up new avenues for party funding. Like other Japanese parties, 
the Tōhōkai had traditionally relied primarily on funding from the business world.147 Nakano, for 
example, counted among his Fukuoka financial supporters Yasukawa Daigorō, who had large 
interests in the electronic and coal industry, and Matsunaga Yasuzaemon, formerly Nakano’s 
political rival who had subsequently founded a successful electric utility company. Once Takagi 
Rikurō established contact with the Mitsui Zaibatsu, Nakano also received continued support 
from that side, channeled through Fujise Masajirō and Takuma Dan and, after the latter’s 
assassination, through Ikeda Seihin. 148 Nakano also received support from Yamashita 
Kamesaburō, 149  founder of Yamashita Shipping, and the spinning industry tycoon Tsuda 
Shingo,150 who also became a friend of Nakano’s.151  
As the party expanded its membership to the Japanese middle class and below,152 however, 
its leaders became aware of a potential new funding source. They began charging membership 
fees and admission fees (officially declared as cleaning-up cost) for rallies, usually 30 sen per 
person. Revenue also came from the sales of books, magazines and pamphlets. While this income 
never made the party independent of contributions from the business world, as Nakano might 
have hoped, it became an important second leg on which party finances stood and further 
increased the Tōhōkai’s claim to be representing the people.  
                                                     
147 How Nakano went about raising financial funds is described briefly in Komai Tokuzō [畔棲毫申], 
“A look behind the scenes of political fund raising” [膕齠∇ů貢鉤悋33], part of a special feature 
“Remembering Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩惚畫康], in Japan and the Japanese [荳袿沸砿荳袿斥], January 
1956, p. 18-21. 
148 Ikeda Seihin a.k.a. Ikeda Shigeaki [鷭譓癩櫃] (1867 - 1950), businessman and politician.  
149 Yamashita Kamesaburō [愾真瀬申ア] (1867琊1944), businessman, founder of the Yamashita Zaibatsu 
and financial backer of Nakano.  
150 Tsuda Shingo [┭譓袋捧] (1881琊1948), businessman with interest in textile manufacturing and 
financial supporter of Nakano’s. 
151 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 498-99. 
152 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 426. 
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Domestic Politics: The Hiranuma, Abe and Yonai Cabinets 
Though the Tōhōkai’s mass-movement activities revolved mainly around foreign policy 
issues, Nakano and Tōhōkai had not abandoned their domestic agenda. Foreign policy issues 
featured more prominently in the public eye because they proved to be a far superior instrument 
for mass mobilization and because Nakano hoped to use war and mobilization as leverage for his 
preferred domestic reforms. These domestic and foreign policy aims dictated Nakano’s attitude 
toward, and the Tōhōkai’s relationship with, the Hiranuma, Abe and Yonai cabinets. 
Hiranuma’s succession of Konoe as Prime Minister in early 1939 was a triumph for Japan’s 
conservatives and a setback for reformers, including Nakano. Not only was Hiranuma a career 
bureaucrat who staffed his cabinet with other bureaucrats, he also was known to oppose 
expanding the Anti-Comintern Pact into anything other than an alliance against communism. He 
also resisted domestic reforms along either socialist or fascist lines.  
While Nakano had taken a relatively benevolent stance toward Konoe, he showered 
Hiranuma with typical biting criticism. Nakano attacked Hiranuma for his unwillingness to 
expand the Anti-Comintern Pact into a military alliance directed against England153 as well as his 
lack of initiative at a time when “the soldiers at the front are lifting their heads and looking 
toward their country for political leadership, only to be disappointed by its absence. They all 
complain about this and say: ‘Just come to a decision concerning our policy.’”154 Continuing a 
theme he had developed under Konoe, Nakano distinguished between politics [膕齠 ] and 
administration [ネ膕], 155 deploring that “Japan’s politics in the midst of this emergency are 
                                                     
153   See Nakano Seigō, speech held June 2, 1939 at Seinen Kaikan, reprinted in “Decide Japan’s 
Direction” [荳袿貢罰圃惚麑巵皇国], in Tōtairiku, July 1939, p. 34. 
154 Ibid.  
155 Nakano Seigō in a speech held December 9, 1938 at the Tōhōkai’s national convention, quoted in 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 366. 
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bureaucratic politics devoid of any spiritual leadership of the people.”156 Nakano also dismissed 
any hope that Hiranuma would carry out domestic reforms, stating in a speech held in June 1939 
in Tokyo:  
 
“A cabinet that simply clings to power that is handed down from above cannot carry out 
truly strong politics (applause). The only ones who will cooperate with such a cabinet 
are the bureaucrats. They work for a monthly stipend and are passive, are they not? 
They don’t work on their own initiative…How can the Hiranuma cabinet possibly carry 
out reformist policies?” 157 
 
 
Like Konoe before him, Hiranuma was a cut flower without roots, the only difference 
being that “the lotus flower has been exchanged with the flower of a plum tree (laughter and 
applause). Yet, in an emergency, even a plum flower won’t do.”158  
Nakano’s criticism of the subsequent Abe (August 30, 1939 to January 16, 1940) and Yonai 
(January 16 to July 22, 1940) cabinets followed similar lines. He deplored both cabinets’ lack of 
political initiative with respect to domestic reforms and to expanding cooperation with Germany 
and Italy, as well as their servile attitudes toward England and America.  Nakano attributed both 
cabinets’ failings to his belief that neither Abe and nor Yonai were  rooted in the people of Japan, 
and that both accordingly relied on bureaucratic powers rather than political leadership.159 He 
thus welcomed Konoe’s second cabinet in the summer of 1940 as a revival of the reformist cause.  
 
                                                     
156 Nakano Seigō, speech held June 2, 1939 at Seinen Kaikan, reprinted in “Decide Japan’s Direction” [荳
袿貢罰圃惚麑巵皇国], Tōtairiku, July 1939, p. 34 
157 Ibid., p. 33-34. 
158 Nakano Seigō in his December 9, 1939 speech at the first national convention, quoted in Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 368. 
159 For Nakano’s criticism of Yonai see Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス] in Tōtairiku, February and 
March 1940.  
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The Second and Third Konoe Cabinets and Domestic Reforms 
After its formation, the second Konoe cabinet realized many of the foreign policy aims that 
Nakano had promoted for years, such as concluding the Triple Alliance in the fall of 1940 and 
signing a non-aggression pact with Russia the following spring. Nakano’s hope that Konoe would 
also move south and take the Dutch East Indies to secure Japan’s oil supply, however, was 
thwarted. Konoe’s second cabinet proved to be similarly disappointing with respect to domestic 
reforms.  
On July 6, several weeks before becoming Prime Minister, Konoe made his famous New 
Order Declaration [范喪韮呵蕚], the principal political aim of which was the strengthening of 
the Prime Minister’s powers to carry out domestic reforms and revisionist foreign policies. As 
Konoe called on Japan’s political parties to aid him in the establishment of a new supra-national 
party, Nakano  -  doubtless driven by the hope of realizing his long-cherished dream of a popular 
mass party - sought to put the Tōhōkai at the helm of the movement. The day after Konoe’s 
announcement, Nakano sent Konoe a letter saying that the PM-elect should not allow the 
remnants of the established parties to ruin everything and as such should invite only Adachi 
Kenzō, Suetsugu Nobumasa,160 Hashimoto Kingorō,161 and himself to form the new party. All 
other parties, Nakano predicted, would follow.  
Konoe did not heed Nakano’s advice entirely. The Prime Minister selected Nakano to sit on 
the new party’s preparatory committee, but the group’s members numbered 26. Nakano - together 
with Hashimoto from the Greater Japan Youth Party [哢荳袿⻗朮妬], Suetsugu, president of the 
East Asian Construction League [覩盛椥ルヾç ], and Kuzū Yoshihisa,162  president of the 
                                                     
160 Suetsugu Nobumasa [袰饅袋驟] (1880 – 1944), Navy Admiral.  
161 Hashimoto Kingorō [隱袿饐晴ア] (1890 - 1957), Fukuoka-born right-wing army officer and politician, 
who was involved in various coup d’états in the early 1930s.   
162 Kuzū Yoshihisa [た﨟㋞睡] (1874 – 1958), nationalist and politician who after the death of Uchida 
Ryōhei in 1937 had taken over the presidency of the Kokuryūkai.  
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Kokuryūkai - formed the committee’s right-wing faction. When the new party was realized in the 
form of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA), Nakano became one of its regular 
members, marking an important win for his domestic policy agenda. As Japan’s political parties 
rushed to dissolve and join Konoe’s party, 163 the Tōhōkai led them:  
 
“When you think about it using common sense, one cannot ride two horses at the same 
time. We cannot participate in a unifying movement that aims to overcome factions and 
divisions, especially not as a part at the very center of that movement, while on the 
other hand continuing to act as a political association called Tōhōkai.”164            
 
Accordingly, the Tōhōkai - which from 1936 to 1940 had existed as a political association 
[膕齠46だ] - was officially dissolved and in its place a cultural organization [艙泌練喪] called 
Shintō-sha [竭覩だ], or Eastern Awakening Society, was established.165 The switch from political 
to cultural society took place more in name, however, than in substance. The Tōhōkai’s offices in 
Akasaka were maintained and the cultural society continued many of the activities previously 
carried out by the party, such as publishing, sponsoring research, holding lectures, organizing 
rallies and symposiums, etc. The policies advocated in the society’s publications and during 
speech rallies were also identical to the party’s. Personnel continuity at the Tōhōkai’s core was 
also unbroken, as most of the former party staff and leading figures were in the Shintō-sha’s 
ranks. The only major break, in fact, was a decline in membership - a trend that continued 
                                                     
163 The Social Mass Party dissolved on July 6, followed by the Kuhara faction of the Seiyūkai on July 16, 
the Minseitō’s Nagai Ryūtarō faction on the 25th, Adachi’s National League on the 26th, the Seiyūkai’s 
Nakajima faction on the 30th, and finally on August 15, the remainder of the Minseitō. 
164 Nakano in a speech held at the Tōhōkai Convention on October 22, 1940, quoted in Inomata, p. 430. 
165 About the selection of this name, Nakano wrote: “These days people mostly use ‘Kōtō’ [85覩] to 
express the idea of arousal or awakening of the East, but I feel that the character Shin [竭] is more positive 
and more classic as a letter.” (Nakano Seigō, quoted in Inomata, p. 431). Nakano was probably also 
influenced by the Shintō Gakusha [竭覩嶌だ] founded by Nakano’s paragon Kaneko Sessai on the Asian 
mainland.    
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thereafter.166  
Nakano’s priorities as a member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) 
remained much the same as they had been when he ran the Tōhōkai. He continued advocating the 
southern advance, for instance. With respect to domestic politics, he became most passionately 
involved in two debates, both of which were related to the fundamental question of whether 
mobilization would be imposed from above by Japan’s bureaucracies or arise from below through 
the kind of mass movement to which Nakano aspired. On a fundamental level, this question 
dictated the debate over the nature of the IRAA that grew out of Konoe’s New Order Movement. 
On a more practical level, it informed the nature of the economic controls imposed by the 
Japanese state to harness the nation’s resources for war.  
The struggle over the IRAA’s nature came to a head over the question of whether the 
party’s prefectural heads would be appointed by the central bureaucracies, for example by the 
Ministry of the Interior, or elected from within the provinces. The bureaucrats within the IRAA 
believed the former option would expand their influence. Nakano, never a friend of expanding 
bureaucratic power, believed that:  
 
“The whole direction of the IRAA will be determined by the question of whether or not 
governors will be appointed to the provincial chapters, and thus I have done everything 
within reason to oppose this [bureaucratic appointment].”167      
 
Nakano continued:  
 
“The IRAA exists to cooperate with the government. Cooperation means lending one’s 
strength [to others], but not obeying them. What would happen if, by failing to 
understand this, the central members [of the IRAA] were to become sycophants, to 
become the spies of the central government; the local heads were to become governors; 
and the provincial patriots were to take on the airs of bureaucrats, serving as the hands 
                                                     
166 See Arima Manabu [衄㮈嶌], The Organization and Policies of the Tōhōkai, p. 69. 
167 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, April 1941, p. 3. 
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and legs of the governors? Right now, politics have vanished from Japan and thus only 
the bureaucrats are working. If the recently-established IRAA were to become a robot 
[i.e. a puppet] of the bureaucrats, and were used only for their sake, it would cause the 
already steaming-hot passion of the people to burst into flames, or entrap the entire 
people within a [bureaucratic] framework. If you think that in order to bring peace to 
the realm, it is sufficient to entrap the people, to shut them up, suppress them, drive 
them into poverty, and force them to endure [their fate], you are greatly mistaken. All it 
will do is to habituate them to the declining fortune of a ruined nation. Without exalting 
the passions of the people and fostering a voluntary spirit, even if it looks fine on the 
outside, the Japanese spirit will perish and Japan will be beset by troubles brought from 
abroad.”168    
 
While the battle between bureaucrats and reformers raged within the IRAA, Nakano 
continued traveling throughout Japan, giving speeches advocating the southern advance and 
attacking the bureaucrats. Despite his efforts, however, the IRAA’s provincial branch 
organizations ultimately came under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. This structural 
decision, more than anything else, caused Nakano’s alienation from the IRAA.  
As this battle about the IRAA’s fundamental structure continued, a more practical party 
debate centered around the Konoe cabinet’s announcement on August 1, 1940, shortly after its 
inception, of “a planned economy based on cooperation between the people and the government.” 
As the Planning Board bureaucrats prepared their proposal, Nakano submitted his 
counterproposal to the permanent executive council of the IRAA in the late fall of 1940. His 
“Basic Outline for Economic Reforms” attacked fervently the bureaucrats’ ideas as “empty and 
shallow idealism” or “left-wing totalitarianism in the guise of Imperial-way totalitarianism.”169 
Nakano declared that while the bureaucrats’ intention was to base economic activity on the 
principle of “self-annihilation for the sake of the nation” [賭┶喃鍍 ], his conception of a 
functioning economy was based on human nature – in other words, on the individual’s search for 
profit.  
                                                     
168 Nakano Seigō, “The Triple Alliance and Trends in Japan” [荳″舛申楼弁ç膏荳袿貢罰圃], quoted in 
Inomata p. 432. 
169  Nakano Seigō, “Basic Outline for Economic Reforms” [42喝卸范儼袿P今 ] in Far Eastern 
Economist [覩┠42喝范况], October – November, 1940. 
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“A controlled economy must necessarily move to a planned economy. Within the radius 
of this planned economy, economic principles will continue to work. The basis of these 
economic principles has to be human nature. Any claims from the bureaucracies that 
ignore this human nature are essentially empty and hypocritical in their motives.”170  
 
Ironically, Nakano, who had advocated economic controls since 1930, came to oppose 
them when they were introduced by Japan’s bureaucracies. As with Nakano’s opposition to the 
idea of putting the electric utility industry under public control in 1936-7, this turnaround was 
motivated as much by intellectual integrity and antagonism toward Japan’s bureaucrats as by the 
need to defend the economic interests of his financial backers.171 Despite his timely efforts, the 
Planning Board’s proposal eventually passed on December 7, 1940, further alienating Nakano 
from the IRAA.  
 
Leaving the IRAA 
In early 1941, while Nakano was busy fighting for the IRAA in the provinces, its 
constitutionality was questioned openly by former established party members in the Diet. In 
response to the Diet men’s accusation that the IRAA ran counter to the Constitution, both Prime 
Minister Konoe and Home Minister Hiranuma Ki’ichirō said the IRAA was not a political [膕齠
46だ], but merely a public, association [鍍征46だ].  At the same time, the government reduced 
                                                     
170 Nakano Seigō, Tōtairiku [覩哢憤], December 1940. 
171 Nakano’s financial backers duly expressed their gratitude. When he met with some representatives of 
the Kansai business community in Osaka, the Director of the Osaka Machinery Manufacturing, Hamazaki 
Terumichi [╈扣⒃ぐ], praised Nakano saying: “When Mr. Nakano published the permanent executive 
council’s proposal concerning the new economic system, the members of business community expressed 
their strong agreement. The reason why the proposal was so well received is that its argument is simple and 
clear, moreover realistic, and does not contain any worrying parts that would destroy the present structures. 
The fact that even Mr. Nakano says things like this has calmed my worries. Nakano is often called a fascist 
and mistakenly believed to be someone who does not care about the realities of economic life, but only 
about the applause that comes from the audience in the gallery. I myself have felt so until now. The fact that 
this same Mr. Nakano says things like that …. created peace of mind among the Osaka business community 
and stock holders and they no longer feel any need to worry.” quoted in Inomata p. 436.  
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the IRAA’s budget from 37 million to 8 million Yen. This was followed in February 1941, by a 
government’s promise to the Diet that the IRAA would be reorganized.  
For Nakano, having been defeated with respect to economic controls and the staffing of the 
IRAA’s provincial heads, Konoe’s weak defense of the IRAA and his ready surrender of its 
political nature was the final straw. Nakano resigned his permanent position within the IRAA on 
March 7, 1941. He simultaneously revived the Tōhōkai as a political association, making a full 
360-degree turn in less than a year. Nakano explained his move by saying that while serving on 
the IRAA he had felt like someone locked into a “cage,” forced to “bear [the] foolishness of 
having small, ill-educated children throwing sand and pebbles, or spitting saliva, at me.”172 More 
specifically:   
 
“The explanation of the minister of state in the Diet made clear that the highly political 
nature of the IRAA had been reduced and that it has been decided to make [the IRAA] 
entirely into an auxiliary organ of the government to transmit the will of the rulers to 
the people [巫牀鴈け]… While the IRAA should transmit the will of those above to 
those below [疹牀真け], it should also provide an opportunity to the Japanese people to 
contribute to the progress of national policy irrespective of their social standing. The 
government…is making every effort to unite the home front and the people, but if one 
were to really drum up the morale of the entire people and exalt it actively toward 
military capacity, one would require one large popular movement that draws from the 
will of the commoners and coalesces it into a highly political leading force.… I have 
[therefore] decided to leave the IRAA and revive the traditional [i.e. political] nature of 
the Tōhōkai. Together with my followers I will raise again the flag of the Tōhōkai and 
start all over within the bounds of the law.”173 
 
 
In private, Nakano expressed his regrets about having joined the IRAA more candidly, 
saying: “When I joined the IRAA, I told my followers at the Tōhōkai that Hitler would have 
refused to participate in such a movement, but since I was a Japanese subject, I could not afford 
                                                     
172 Nakano Seigō in a letter to Tokutomi Sohō dated March 6, 1941, quoted in Inomata p. 440.   
173 Nakano Seigō, “Resigning from the IRAA” [哢膕62⇨善惚服鵠貢ウ] in Editorial [蕁ルクス], Tōtairiku, 
April 1941, p. 9-10.  
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to hesitate and therefore accepted.”174  
Nakano’s decision to revive the Tōhōkai as a political association at a time when all the 
other parties had dissolved themselves caused a sensation and appeared in the editorials of 
various newspapers. On March 8, the Hōchi News welcomed the “return of the ‘real’ Nakano,” 
while the Chūgai Shimbun carried the headline: “The IRAA’s man of the people barks: A cage 
does not suit the character of a lion. Mr. Nakano is in a state of arousal.” According to the 
Kokumin Shimbun, Nakano’s resignation merely pre-empted the IRAA’s demise and was an act of 
retaliation against the IRAA’s regression. At the same time, the paper said, it was also Nakano’s 
declaration of war against the pro-America, pro-England and pro-status quo forces. The Miyako 
News concurred, while the Tokyo Daily News wrote mockingly that this sort of dramatic turn-
around was, in Nakano’s case, “something to be expected.” Most critical was the Yomiuri  
Shimbun, which predicted that the Tōhōkai’s re-launch as a political association could well 
“cause some headaches” in the future and compared Nakano to a spineless opportunist who “in 
the summer sells ice, and in the winter baked sweet potatoes.”175 
Twenty days after Nakano’s resignation, on March 27, 1941, all the IRAA members below 
Secretary General Arima also resigned. On April 2, the IRAA announced a complete 
reorganization. Nakano ridiculed the permanent council’s remaining members, saying that since 
the IRAA was neither against the cabinet’s policies nor an auxiliary institution aiding the cabinet, 
it should correctly be referred to as an “administrative adoration agency” [ネ膕ぜ宗教法人善].176   
After leaving the IRAA, Nakano re-launched the Tōhōkai’s mass-movement activities, 
which culminated in the already-mentioned Grand National Convention of May 1941 and his 
                                                     
174 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス] in Tōtairiku [覩哢憤], April 1941, p. 3. 
175 Hōchi Shimbun [况ö范ⓥ] March 8, 1941; Chūgai Shimbun [腎咤范ⓥ], March 8, 1941; Kokumin 
Shimbun [楼鴈范ⓥ], March 8, 1941; Miyako Shimbun [ジ范ⓥ], March 10, 1941; Tokyo Daily News [覩
静荳荳范ⓥ], March 8, 1941; Yomiuri Shimbun [ファラド呟范ⓥ], March 8 & 10, 1941, all quoted in Inomata, p. 
442. 
176 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, May 1941, p. 9. 
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very popular “In Reply to Roosevelt and Churchill” rally in September. Had he taken stock at the 
end of Konoe’s third term as Prime Minister in October of 1941, Nakano would probably have 
concluded that his efforts to create a popular mass party modeled on European fascist parties had 
produced only moderate success. Relying little on organic growth from within and mainly on 
incorporating already-existing mass organizations, the party had first experienced impressive 
growth, as state oppression drove left-wing organizations to seek shelter under the Tōhōkai’s 
nationalist umbrella. Party growth had, however, been obtained at the expense of ideological 
cohesion. The attempt to merge with the Social Mass Party in early 1939, moreover, marked the 
end of that pattern of growth. Subsequent attempts to catapult the Tōhōkai into preeminence -  
including jumping onto Konoe’s New Party wagon - also miscarried.  
Nakano’s attempts to influence Japan’s policies by marshalling public opinion through 
speeches, demonstrations and other mass activities also produced mixed results. Many of 
Nakano’s foreign policy aims (e.g. escalation of the war in China, the conclusion of the Triple 
Alliance and occupation of French Indochina) had been carried out by Japan’s successive 
governments. Although it would be too much to say that Nakano was responsible for these policy 
decisions, by stirring up public sentiment, he certainly influenced Japan’s political elites and 
governments and thereby cleared the way for these controversial policies. As one after another of 
the foreign policies Nakano advocated was implemented, he earned a reputation as something of 
a visionary. The domestic reform proposals he advocated, however, were left unrealized – or, 
worse still, as in the case of economic controls, domestic policies were imposed from above 
rather than spurred from below by a popular movement, as Nakano had hoped. This mismatch 
between achieved foreign policy aims and thwarted domestic reform ideals only became starker 
under Japan’s next Prime Minister, Tōjō.  
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Chapter Six: Fascism in Nakano’s Thoughts and Actions 
 
Introduction 
Historians of 1930s Japan have been divided over the question of whether Japan was 
fascist. Those who argue it was not contend, roughly speaking, that Japan – unlike Germany or 
Italy - did not have a mass party driven by a fascist ideology, that Japan lacked a charismatic 
leader similar to the Führer or the Duce, and that Japan’s constitution survived those years largely 
unchanged.1 Those taking the opposite position claim that, despite the constitutional continuity, 
Japan’s political climate became more authoritarian and repressive; that although there was no 
charismatic figure equaling Hitler or Mussolini there was, nevertheless, the unifying figure of the 
Emperor supported by the emperor-system ideology; and, finally, that  though there was no mass 
party, there was the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA), which at one point included all 
Japan’s  political parties. A third, more nuanced strain of thought - pioneered by post-war 
Japanese historian Maruyama Masao - proposes a synthesis according to which Japan was fascist, 
but its fascism – unlike those of Germany or Italy - was imposed by Japanese elites from above, 
even as attempts to launch anti-establishment or even revolutionary versions of fascism from 
below were suppressed or co-opted.2 
Nakano’s biography and his attempts to launch a fascist party in Japan do not – in fact, 
cannot – provide us with a conclusive answer regarding whether Japan was fascist. For one, the 
                                                     
1 Gavan McCormack, “Nineteen-Thirties Japan: Fascism?” in Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 14:2 
(April-June 1982), p.28 but also Peter Duus and Daniel I Okimoto, “Fascism and the History of Pre-war 
Japan: The failure of a Concept,” in Journal of Asian Studies, 39:1 (November 1979) 39-63, James B 
Crowly “A new Asian Order: Some Notes on Prewar Japanese Nationalism” in “Japan in Crisis”, eds. 
Bernard S. Silbermann and H.D. Harootunian (Princeton, 1974), p. 270 simply states “Prewar Japan was 
not a fascist country.”  
2 Maruyama argued that even though Japan did not have a European-style fascist movement that rose to 
power from below, the state (i.e. the bureaucracies) adopted fascist ideology and imposed “fascism from 
above”. He identifies three periods: The preparatory period (1919 – 1931), the period of maturity (1931 – 
1936) and the period of consummation (1936 - 1945). See Maruyama Masao, “Thought and Behaviour in 
Modern Japanese Politics”, ed. Ivan Morris, (London 1963), p. 25 – 83. 
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debate hinges not only, among other things, on the historical evidence but equally on how one 
defines fascism. The broader the definition, the more likely one is to conclude that Japan was 
fascist - and vice versa.  
Second, even if there were a definition of fascism on which all could agree, the evidence 
presented in this biography would still not provide a conclusive answer, simply because the 
biography of a single individual cannot yield conclusions that apply to the whole of Japan. The 
picture would look different, for instance, had Nakano’s Tōhōkai become the popular mass party 
he envisioned, and had he used it to reform the Japanese constitution. Then, the case for arguing 
that Japan had experienced fascism from below would be stronger. Ultimately, however, Nakano 
failed, so while he himself may be considered a fascist, neither he nor his party ever stood for a 
majority within Japan, let alone for the whole nation.  
Still, Nakano’s attempt to launch a mass movement modeled on the European fascist 
parties of the 1930s, with the aim of altering Japan’s constitution and reconfiguring international 
relations in East Asia, was perhaps the closest adaptation of European fascism in pre-war Japan. 
Nakano’s interpretation of fascism does, therefore, raise some important questions and hopefully 
also provides some satisfying answers.  
One question that guides us through this chapter is whether Nakano and his party really 
were fascist in substance or whether they were only imitating fascism without having grasped its 
essence. As Nakano introduced fascism to Japan, the ideology passed through two major filters 
that served to alter it from its European form. Nakano’s own understanding and misunderstanding 
of fascism, for one, distorted the ideology in important respects. He then had to adapt that 
already-altered understanding of fascism to Japanese realities, making important concessions 
along the way. The final outcome resembled fascism in many respects, but there are some 
important aspects of the ideology that that Nakano either failed to grasp or that he refrained from 
trying to apply to Japan. In this chapter, we examine how Nakano altered fascism as he attempted 
to transfer it from Europe to Japan, then analyze the extent to which Nakano and his Tōhōkai 
 305 
party may be considered fascist.  
 
Ignoring Fascism’s Ugly Side  
Present-day readers are likely to wonder how Nakano could fail to be revolted by the 
crimes committed in fascism’s name. Italian Fascism and, especially, German Nazism have taken 
the place of ultimate evil in the moral geography of modern (post-WW2) discourse. One 
therefore cannot help but wonder how someone as highly-educated and well-informed as Nakano, 
who resented racism and fought government oppression throughout the course of his life, did not 
see through the fascist propaganda. The easy answer is, as Muro Kiyoshi put it, that Nakano in 
the 1930s did not know what we know today.3 On its face, this interpretation is correct - as is 
Inomata’s statement that though Nakano may have known about the concentration camps, he did 
not know that they were death factories.4 After all, most of Nakano’s global contemporaries – 
many of whom had more intimate knowledge of Germany and Italy - also failed to detect 
European fascism’s murderous and racist nature. The fact that many others made the same 
mistake, however, does not explain Nakano’s embrace entirely, for a minority of his peers did 
indeed grasp fascism’s darker side fully. The question thus remains: Why was Nakano among the 
many who were fooled and not among the few who were not? Can his naïve perception of 
fascism be explained by a dearth of information, as Muro and Inomata have suggested? Or was it 
more a reluctance on his part to investigate the available information?  
The fact that information about fascism’s ugly side, and especially about Nazism, was 
available in Japan suggests strongly that Nakano chose to ignore the evidence. In the early 1930s, 
interested readers in Japan could find a large body of Japanese-language literature about fascism 
written by both foreign and Japanese authors. The available literature included various 
                                                     
3 See Muro Kiyoshi [ቶẖ], “Topple Tōjō – An Appraisal of Nakano Seigō” [᧲᧦⸛ߟߴߒ ਛ㊁ᱜ೰
⹏વ], (Tokyo, 1999), p. 16. 
4 See Inomata, p. 398. 
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translations of the major works written by European fascist activists and thinkers (Hitler’s “Mein 
Kampf” was translated at least ten times before the end of the war, 5 while Mussolini’s collected 
works appeared at least twice in Japanese6); propaganda publications of the Italian and German 
governments translated into Japanese;7 accounts of political conditions in Germany and Italy 
written by Japanese nationals who had visited or lived there;8 serious academic writing on the 
subject; as well as biographies,9 portraits,10 cultural histories,11 and satirical treatments in the 
form of theatre pieces, caricatures and comics.  
                                                     
5 The ten translations of Hitler’s Mein Kampf are: (1) čkubo Yasuo [ᄢਭ଻ᐽ㓶], trans. “My Struggle” 
[ࠊ߇㑵੎ ], (Tokyo: Mitsukasa Shobō [ਃ═ᦠᚱ ], 1938) (2) Hanaen Kanejō [⧎࿦౗ቯ ] and 
Komiyayama Bonzen [ዊችጊಠ⑎ ], trans., “Mein Kampf” [߹޿ࠎ࡮߆߻߲ ] (Tokyo, 1939) (3) 
Murobuse Takanobu [ቶફ㜞ା], trans., “My Struggle” [ᚒ߇㑵੎], (Tokyo, 1940) (4). Araki, Tokiji [⨹
ᧁᤨᰴ], trans., “My Struggle for Victory” [ᚒ߇ൎ೑߳ߩ㑵߭], (Tokyo, 1941) (5). Sakai, Ryūji [ဈ੗㓉
ᴦ], trans., “My Struggle” [૛ߩ㑵੎] (čsaka, 1941) (6) Mizuno Hiroshi [᳓㊁ብ], trans., “My Struggle” 
[ᚒ߇㑵੎] (7) Takayama Yōkichi [㜞ጊᵗศ], trans., “The development of My Struggle” [ࠊ߇㑵੎ߩዷ
㐿], (Tokyo, 1941) (8) Okuno Shichirō [ᅏ㊁৾㇢], trans. & ed., “The summary of Mein Kampf” [ⷐ⚂ࡑ
ࠗࡦ࡮ࠞࡦࡊ], (čsaka, 1941) (9) Manabe, Ryōichi, [⌀㍿⦟৻] trans., “My Struggle” [๋߇㑵੎], 2 vols., 
(Tokyo: Kōfūkan [⥝㘑㙚] 1942) (10) Itō Takeshi [દ⮮ᢩ], trans. & ed., “My Struggle” [ᚒ߇㑵੎], 4 
vols., (Tokyo, 1942-44). 
6 The two translations are: (1) Benito Mussolini, [ࡓ࠶࠰࡝࡯࠾࡮ࡌ࠾࠻], “Mussolini’s collected 
works” [ࡓ࠶࠰ࠖ࠾ో㓸], trans. & ed. Suzuki Ritaku [㋈ᧁ೑⽵], 10 vols. (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 
1935-6) and (2) Benito Mussolini, [ࡓ࠶࠰࡝࡯࠾࡮ࡌ࠾࠻], “The collected works of Benito Mussolini 
“[ࡓ࠶࠰ࠖ࠾ో㓸], trans. & ed. Yamamoto Sansei [ጊᧄਃ↢], 10 vols. (Tokyo: Kaizōsha [ᡷㅧ␠], 
1941). 
7 To mention just one example: Francesco Grossi, [ࠣࡠ࠶ࠪࡈ࡜ࡦ࠴ࠚࠬࠦ]; “The fascist state” [ࡈࠔ
࠶࡚ࠪ࿖ኅ]; compiled by the PR office of the Italian embassy [દᄥ೑੝ᄢ૶㙚ᖱႎቶ], (Tokyo, 1940). 
8 See Kondō Haruo [ㄭ⮮ᤐ㓶], “The Nazi Youth Movement – the Hitler Jugend and the Arbeitsdienst” 
[࠽࠴ࠬߩ㕍ᐕㆇേ ࡅ࠶࠻࡜࡯㕍ዋᐕ࿅ߣഭ௛ᄺ઀࿅] (Tokyo, 1938); Kondō Haruo [ㄭ⮮ᤐ㓶], 
“Nazism and Youth”[࠽࠴࠭ࡓߣ㕍ᐕ] (Tokyo 1943), but also Futara Kōtoku [࠾⨹⧐ᓼ], Germany rose 
[⁛ㅺߪ⿠ߜ޽߇ߞߚ], (Tokyo: Jitsugyō-no Nihonsha [ታᬺਯᣣᧄ␠] March, 1938).  
9 Ikeda Hayashinori [ᳰ↰ᨋ௾], “Hitler” [ࡅ࠶࠻࡜࡯], (Tokyo, 1933). 
10 For example Emil Ludwig, “Talks with Mussolini” [ࡓ࠶࠰ࠖ࡯࠾ߣ⺆ࠆ], published in the “Bulletin 
of the Japanese Readers’ Association” [ᣣᧄ⺒ᦠදળળႎ], (Tokyo, March 1933), vol. 149, p. 51-122. 
The abbreviated Japanese translation was prepared by Kurihara Furushiro [ᩙේฎၔ] from the English 
text: Ludwig, Emil; “Talks with Mussolini” (London, 1932). 
11 One example in this category is Sagara Morimine [⋧⦟቞ፄ], “The Spirit of the German People” [⁛
ㅺੱߩߎߎࠈ], (Tokyo 1941).  
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Much of the writing on fascism was positive, to be sure. Some was even laudatory. When 
such works were translated, parts thought to be offensive to a Japanese audience were frequently 
omitted. Most translations of Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” prepared before the war, for instance, did 
not include Hitler’s classification of Japan as a culture-bearing society, somewhere in between the 
culture-creating Aryan master race and the culture-destroying Jewish race.12  
But a vocal minority of critical texts had also been translated and published, at least in 
part, in Japan by the time Nakano traveled to Europe in the winter of 1937/38.  Among them were 
Francesco Nitti’s “Mussolini’s Terror Regime - My Escape from Italy”13 (Nitti had been Prime 
Minister of Italy before he fled the country to escape fascist oppression); Ossip Piatnitski’s “The 
Fascist Dictatorship in Germany;”14 Robert A. Brady’s “The Spirit and Structure of German 
Fascism;”15  Palme Dutt’s “Fascism and Social Revolution;”16 Oswald Garrison Villard’s “The 
German Phoenix;”17 “The Iron Fist in Germany,” published under the alias Nordicus;18 and the 
                                                     
12 See Miyake Masaki , “Hitler and Japan [砕再宰碕察膏荳袿]”, in History and People [髏別膏斥☞], 
vol. 3, no.9, p. 168.  
13 Francesco Saviero Nitti, “Mussolini’s terror regime and my escape from Italy” [冴再裟墾採游渊膕齠
膏舛啣肉㋸頓ヒ]; trans. Akaike Saburō [◇鷭申ア] from the English “Ex-Premier of Italy” (Tokyo, 1930). 
14 Ossip Piatnitski, “La Dictature Fasciste en Allemagne” [The Fascist Dictatorship in Germany] (Paris: 
Bureau d’Edition, 1934), translated into Japanese by Yoshida Ei’ichi [便譓豐慎], under the title “German 
Fascist Theory” [彩婚最刷斎困査砂冴ルクス], (Tokyo, 1936).  
15 Robert A. Brady, “The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism” [″5斎困査砂冴貢5/11【膏雍鏐], 
published in the “Bulletin of the Japanese Readers’ Association” [荳袿ファラド蟷表善善况], (Tokyo, November 
1937), vol. 205, p.1-122. The abbreviated translation by Kurihara Furushiro was based on the English text: 
Brady, Robert A., “The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism” (London: Gollanc, 1937). The English 
original was reprinted in 1971 by Viking Press, New York.  
16 A Cambridge-England-born Englishman of Indian origins, Dutt had been educated at Oxford, and in 
1920 joined the Communist Party, to become editor in chief of its organ the “Labor Monthly”. His treatise 
“Fascism and Social Revolution” (London, 1934) was translated into Japanese by Matsuhara Hiroshi [觚譜
嶷] and published under the title “Fascist Theory” [斎困査砂冴ルクス], (Tokyo, 1935).  
17  Oscar Garrison Villard, “The German Phoenix” [秦髞嘎″5], published in the “Bulletin of the 
Japanese Readers’ Association” [荳袿ファラド蟷表善善况 ], (Tokyo, June 1933), vol. 152, p.1-60. The 
abbreviated Japanese translation was prepared by Kurihara Furushiro [豸譜幣傚] from the English text: 
Garrison Villard, Oswald; “The German Phoenix” (New York, 1933). 
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“Brown Book of Hitler Terror,”19 edited and published by the World Committee for the Victims of 
German Fascism (of which Albert Einstein was president). These critical Western voices were 
flanked, moreover, by equally critical Japanese authors. Tabata Tamehiko’s [譓鉎♡檢] “A Study 
of German Politics and Economics”20 and the works of Imanaka Tsugumaro [責腎饅杶] 21 are 
just two examples.  
Given that Nakano was a lifelong avid reader, not only of the daily press, but also of 
books – particularly those on politics - and that he surrounded himself with intellectuals and 
scholars, it is highly unlikely that he never read any of these works or, at least, heard about them 
in discussions with his peers.22  The various crimes committed by the National Socialists by the 
end of 1933 (their first year in power), for instance, were listed in the “Brown Book of Hitler 
Terror.” The abridged Japanese translation contains 50 pages describing in detail tortures, 
concentration camps, murders, anti-Semitic violence, and state terrorism, as well as a critical 
assessment of the fire at the Reichstag. It still surprises the modern reader for being both 
shocking and shockingly long.   
                                                                                                                                                             
18 Nordicus, “Hitlerism – The Iron Fist in Germany” [砕察宰削鷺砂冴]; published in the “Bulletin of the 
Japanese Readers’ Association” [荳袿ファラド蟷表善善况], (Tokyo, April 1932), vol. 138, p.199. The abridged 
Japanese translation was prepared from the English text: Nordicus; “Hitlerism” (New York, 1932).    
19 World Committee for the Victims of German Fascism, “The Brown Book of the Hitler Terror” [砕宰碕
察添蜻膕齠], published in the “Bulletin of the Japanese Readers’ Association” [荳袿ファラド蟷表善善况], 
(Tokyo, January 1934), vol. 159, p.159-212. The translation was prepared by Oda Ritsu [恠譓歐] from the 
English text with the same title published originally in London in 1933. 
20 Tabata, Tamehiko [譓鉎♡檢], “A Study of German Politics and Economics” [″5膕齠42喝ｫ!],  
(Tokyo, January 1934).  
21 Imanaka Tsugumaro [責腎饅杶]; “A General Theory of Modern Dictatorships” [﨑千″23膕齠嶌鉐
ルクス] vol. 1; “The History of Modern Dictatorships” [﨑千″23膕齠別G㌲] vol. 2; “Theory of the Fascist 
Movement” [斎困再査砂冴ぉ罰ルクス] vol. 3; and “National Socialist Theory” [鴈茘ªだ善厨コルクス] vol. 4; 
(Tokyo, 1932). 
22 For example, after having had dinner with Kyosawa Kiyoshi in Rome at the end of 1937, the latter 
presented him with a copy of George Ward Prices‘s “I Know these Dictators” (New York, 1938). Although 
the book can hardly said to be critical, it shows that there was a lively exchange and debate on the nature of 
Fascism and Nazism among Japanese intellectuals. See Kiyosawa, Kiyoshi [拐鼈┡], “The Wartime Diary 
of Kiyosawa Kiyoshi”, translated by Eugene Soviak and Kamiyama Tamie, (Princeton, 1999), p. 99.  
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By reading Oswald Dutch’s “Hitler’s Twelve Apostles,” 23  Nakano could have learned 
that Gestapo chief Himmler, whom Nakano had met personally in Germany, was “cruel,” 
“capable of torturing someone to death or shooting him over a trifling problem,” and could go 
“sadistically berserk” [鬆ー╱蜻]. Nakano could also have heard about the corrosive effect the 
Gestapo had had on the fabric of German civil society: “Trust between relatives, let alone 
between friends, has been completely destroyed. Germans living in Germany or overseas cannot 
openly criticize the Nazi system, because they never know if the person they are talking to is not 
somehow related to the Gestapo.”24  
Having been a journalist and staunch critic of government misinformation, one would 
expect Nakano to have been more sensitive to the ways in which European fascist regimes 
trampled press freedom. Did he really not hear what Tabata had to say about the Nazi approach to 
civil society as early as 1934?:  
 
“The present authoritarian government has unified all institutions. Freedom has been 
destroyed, and in a matter of a few hours, the nation has been turned into a prison. The 
total control of the press, the radio and the film [industry] means that the people have 
been locked up utter darkness. Germans do not know what happens in their own 
country.”25 
  
In short, it was not as if Nakano’s move to the right and his adoration for European 
fascism took place in an environment that lacked information about European fascism’s darker 
sides. Why did he not put any weight on this disturbing evidence?  
 
                                                     
23 Oswald Dutch, “Hitler’s Twelve Apostles” [砕再宰碕察貢筆性藻歸] published in the “Bulletin of the 
Japanese Readers’ Association” [荳袿ファラド蟷表善善况], (Tokyo, August, 1940), vol. 238, p. 177-234. The 
abbreviated Japanese translation was prepared by Oda Ritsu [恠譓歐] from the English text: Oswald Dutch, 
“Hitler’s Twelve Apostles” (London, 1939). 
24 Ibid. All quotes taken from pp. 199 – 204. 
25 Tabata, Tamehiko [譓鉎♡檢]; “A Study of German Politics and Economics” [″5膕齠42喝ｫ!], 
(Tokyo, January 1934), p. 88. 
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Conviction or Convenience: Adapting Fascism to Japan   
In some instances, it may have been a genuine conviction on Nakano’s side that the 
negative information about fascism that made its way to Japan distorted the facts, and that the 
critical perspectives he heard were outweighed by more-positive information obtained elsewhere. 
For every critically negative opinion of fascism, in fact, there were many more positive ones. 
Though Nakano may have heard or read about descriptions of bureaucratic inefficiency in 
Germany, for instance, he likely preferred to give credence to the more numerous reports out of 
Germany stressing the Nazi regime’s uncomplicated and un-bureaucratic modus operandi. 
Nakano may likewise have genuinely believed that fascism did not destroy the individual but 
rather “energizes the total by respecting the individual.”26 Even his belief that fascism’s violent 
side was the exception rather than the rule may have been genuine, for the popular movement he 
launched in Japan refrained consistently from violence.  
In other cases, however, it seems that he consciously turned a blind eye to certain issues. 
The pervasive racist component in Nazi ideology and practice is but one example. Nakano knew 
the Nazis were generally racist and specifically anti-Semitic. When meeting Goebbels in 1938, 
Nakano asked whether the Nazis were not “a bit too extreme with their anti-Semitism,” but did 
not pursue the issue when Goebbels explained that “Jews are simply of an inferior race.”27 
Nakano had read Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” (probably in its English translation) both in 1936 and 
again on the way to Europe a year later. On the 1937 trip, Nakano traveled in the company of 
Kuroda Reiji, who prepared the first unabridged translation of “Mein Kampf” into Japanese. It is 
unthinkable that he did not read the sections detailing Hitler’s views on Asians’ racial inferiority, 
                                                     
26 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [ᤨ⺰], in Tōtairiku, January 1941.  
27 Nakano Seigō “People, Stand Up! – returning from Italy and Germany” [࿖᳃ࠃ⿠߈ߡ — ⁛દࠃ
ࠅᏫࠅߡ] , in Tōtairiku, April 1938, p. 35. 
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a race Hitler viewed as merely a “culture-bearing people.”28 He probably also knew that Nazi 
racism did not make an exception for Japanese. Reports of racist acts perpetrated against 
Japanese citizens living in Germany had reached and shocked Japan in the 1930s.29 So we are left 
to conclude that the same Nakano who, as a young man, was outraged at Western racism against 
Asians consciously ignored or simply played down Nazi racism in his later writings about 
fascism.  
There were also instances where Nakano clearly distorted the facts or changed his 
description of fascism to suit his political interests. Consider his rosy description of the Nazi spy 
network in 1941:   
 
“If the Nazis have placed their party members in all layers of society, then they have 
done so with the intention of using them like ears that will bring the needs of the people 
to the attention of those in power [真炒疹＊]. This is not a spy scheme with the purpose 
of oppressing the people, but a scheme that aims to protect the interest of the people, in 
cases where capitalists, provincial officials, or public groups abuse their position and 
power and take actions that are not in line with the Nazis’ original intentions …Only 
people who are kind to the people, who show both compassion and understanding, 
qualify to be hired for this sort of job. They must protect the interest of the people to the 
last, gather the simple and honest wishes of the people so that the power of the party 
may be used to realize those wishes as quickly as possible.”30  
 
Contrast that glowing report with the following piece, published in Nakano’s magazine in 
1936:  
                                                     
28  Hitler’s distinction between culture-creating people (Aryans), culture-bearing people (Asians) and 
culture-destroying people (Jews), does not seem to have upset Nakano, but it was addressed critically by 
other Japanese students of fascism, even if not as aggressively as one would wish. See Ishikawa Jujūrō [0
擺腿筆袞], “A Study of Hitler’s Mein Kampf – Critical Edition” [砕宰碕察碁罪婚策刷混策菜語ｫ!刷
矗弐ù], (Tokyo: Kokusai Nihon Kyōkai [楼墫行袿表善], May 1942), p. 623-630. (The work was initially 
published in three separate volumes between 1941-42) 
29 For example, in October 1933, German children beat up a Japanese 9-year old girl because she was not 
Aryan. The incident was reported in the Japanese news and caused the Japanese ambassador to file a note 
of protest with the German government. See Asahi News, October 20, 1933, p. 1 and Asahi News, October 
24, 1933, p. 1.  
30 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku [覩哢憤], January 1941, p. 6. 
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“The Gestapo open private letters and telegrams, and listen in on phone calls. They 
shadow foreigners. On occasion, the Gestapo suspect a member of the Nazi party [of 
treason] and even suppress the state police. They infiltrate the workers in the factories 
with spies. They even resort to such double-faced means as intentionally distributing 
communist writings among the workers and then arresting those who show interest. 
Since all the Germans live continually under the sharp eyes of the Gestapo, they will 
close the window, draw the curtains, and speak in a hushed voice before talking about 
the discomforts of daily life, such as the scarcity of bread. In fact, the Gestapo is no 
better or worse than the former GPU31 . It certainly does not add to the honor of 
Germany that it needs to have such a secret police.”32  
        
Nakano knew the truth of German fascism in 1936 and if one asks why he chose to forget 
by 1941, the simple and sad truth is that it suited his political interest. Having identified himself 
and his movement so closely with Fascism and Nazism after 1937, he had no interest in washing 
the Europeans’ laundry in public. It made more sense to cast fascism in a positive light, even if 
such a move meant becoming something of a fascist propaganda machine. While initially Nakano 
may have moved closer to fascism because it dovetailed with his political convictions, in later 
years his adoration of Hitler and Mussolini also became a self-interested and opportunistic 
exercise. By praising them, Nakano indirectly promoted himself. 
Finally, Nakano often had to alter important aspects of European fascism simply to suit the 
Japanese realities. That Nazi symbolism (e.g. the swastika) lost its allure within the Japanese 
cultural context and was therefore discarded by Nakano is straightforward. More interesting is the 
fact that the leadership principle so central to fascist ideology in Europe received relatively little 
emphasis in Nakano’s thought and action, simply because before long it would have brought him 
into collision course with the emperor ideology. Unlike the Nazis, who provided a whole set of 
new national symbols complete with their own interpretation of history, Nakano never challenged 
                                                     
31 The GPU (Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravlenye (=State Political Administration)) was the 
precursor of the KGB in Soviet Russia.  
32 World Topics [昨察作彩刷宰祭再魂瑳], in Tōtairiku, August 1936, p. 113-114. Since the article was 
published without naming its author, we do not know if it was penned by Nakano or somebody else. Given 
that Nakano was editor in chief of the magazine, however, means that he must have read and approved of 
the article.  
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the symbols of imperial Japan.  
 
 
Nakano: A Fascist?  
We turn now to the question of whether Nakano was Japan’s “only outright fascist”33 or 
whether he was, in the words of diplomat Shigemitsu Mamoru,34 only “imitating the Nazis [才債
瑳拘降黒]”35  without understanding what they were at heart. (The question of whether the 
Tōhōkai was a fascist party or only an imitation thereof is subsumed under the above.) The 
answer to this question relies on the definition of fascism employed, and one way of determining 
the answer would be to go through the many definitions of fascism put forward in the decades 
since fascist thought, movements and regimes have occupied scholars’ minds. Such an exercise, 
however, would go well beyond the scope of this work. The final result, moreover, would be 
predictable.  
In the end, the careful analyst is bound to conclude that, under one of fascism’s broader 
definitions – sometimes labeled “fascist minimum” 36 – and especially under those definitions 
                                                     
33 John Gunther, “Inside Asia” (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1938), p. 77. 
34 Shigemitsu Mamoru [ĩ甜ゆ] (1887 - 1957), diplomat and politician. 
35 Shigemitsu Mamoru [ĩ甜ゆ], “The Troubled Years of Shōwa” [蓖北貢罰頗], (Tokyo, 1952), p. 229. 
In the English-language translation prepared by Oswald White, the same phrase reads as Nakano Seigō, 
who “thought to be shielding himself from behind a mask of Nazi beliefs”. Shigemitsu Mamoru “Japan and 
Her Destiny – My Struggle For Peace”, trans. Oswald White, (New York, 1958), p. 313.  
36  The term “fascist minimum” was first coined by Ernst Nolte. See Ernst Nolte, “Three Faces of 
Fascism”, trans. Leila Vennewitz, (New York, 1963). The concept also underlies the works of George 
Mosse, “The Crisis of German Ideology” (New York, 1964) and A. James Gregor’s “The Ideology of 
Fascism” (New York, 1969). More recently, Joseph P. Sottile developed a definition of a fascism minimum 
based on a framework that includes all three Axis states, i.e. Germany, Italy, and Japan, and not 
surprisingly then arrives at a definition that is broad enough to include Japan’s experience. He concludes 
that “Generic fascism, the kind that united the Axis Powers, was essentially a revolutionary movement 
motivated by international conflict. Thus it is geopolitical in nature and praxis. … Fascism simply changed 
the focus of the revolutionary ideal by replacing class consciousness with national, or even biological, 
consciousness.” Joseph P. Sottile, “The Fascist Era: Imperial Japan and the Axis Alliance in Historical 
Perspective” in “Japan in the Fascist Era”, ed. E. Bruce Reynolds, (New York, 2004), p. 29. 
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derived from studying Italy, Germany and war-time Japan, Nakano was a fascist. As one moves 
from the broader definitions to the narrower, the temptation increases to qualify the conclusion 
that Nakano was a fascist with a kind of caveat - e.g., Nakano’s thought displays some, but not all, 
the characteristics of fascism as defined by scholar A, B or C. This exercise could be rendered 
even more complex by distinguishing between fascism’s accidental characteristics and its 
essential ones. The narrower the definitions became, the more often one would conclude that 
Nakano was not a fascist, because he did not display one or more essential characteristics of the 
very specific definition.37  
Rather than engaging in an exercise with such a predictable outcome, this chapter 
approaches the question of Nakano’s fascism differently, by delineating a list of traits scholars of 
fascism have deemed characteristic of fascist ideology, movements or regimes, and analyzing 
how well Nakano or the Tōhōkai can be said to have shared that particular trait. This approach, 
additionally, frees us from sticking sheepishly to definitions provided by others, enabling us 
instead to break such definitions down and to select those aspects that are relevant to Nakano and 
the Tōhōkai. Consider, for example, Renzo De Felice, whose study of Italian Fascism concludes 
that fascism was a uniquely Italian phenomenon and rejects the possibility of finding a common 
denominator in other movements.38  Since neither Nakano nor the Tōhōkai were Italian, one 
would have to conclude that they were not Fascist in De Felice’s sense, and in doing so would 
                                                     
37 The most obvious example of a narrow definition of fascism which would exclude Nakano and the 
Tōhōkai, would be that put forward by Renzo De Felice who sees fascism as a phenomenon unique to Italy 
and rejects the possibility of seeing fascism either as part of a larger totalitarian phenomenon or as a 
reactionary force against rising communism. Accordingly he denies the possibility of finding a common 
denominator to include other fascist movements. See Renzo de Felice, “Interpretations of Fascism”, trans. 
Brenda Huff Everett, (Cambridge, Ma, 1977), p. 41 and p. 55-56. Other narrow definitions of Fascism or 
Nazism have been put forward by George Mosse, “The Crisis of German Ideology”, (New York, 1964) 
who argued that Nazism developed in Germany and only in Germany due to social, political and cultural 
factors present only in Germany. Nazism was a “repudiation of European heritage” (p. 8-14); Walter 
Laqueur, “Fascism: Past, Present, and Future” (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) pp 13-15; and 
Roberto Vivarelli, “Interpretations of the Origins of Fascism,” in The Journal of Modern History, 63:1 
(March 1991), p.29 to mention but a few.  
38 Renzo de Felice, “Interpretations of Fascism”, trans. Brenda Huff Everett (Cambridge, MA, 1977), p. 
41. 
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miss the opportunity to examine those aspects of De Felice’s definition that resonate strongly 
with Nakano’s thought. One could make a strong case, for instance, that Felice’s notion that 
fascism was a revolutionary movement39  could also apply to Nakano’s interpretation of the 
ideology.  
For simplicity’s sake, we begin the discussion by listing the elements of fascist ideology 
that either do not apply to Nakano’s thought or that do so only peripherally. While fascism has 
been called a utopian movement, 40  for example, the same – with the possible exception of 
Nakano’s pan-Asian thinking - cannot be said of Nakano’s ideology. Nakano did have lofty 
political ambitions, but many were eventually realized - even if the actualization happened in a 
way Nakano never would have imagined. Equal access to markets and resources, which Nakano 
advocated during the 1930s as an alternative to separate autark blocs, has become the foundation 
of the post-1945 international economic order. Popular sovereignty has become the cornerstone 
of Japan’s post-war constitution, though it was imposed from above through the US occupation 
authorities and not won from below, as Nakano surely would have preferred.   
Some scholars have singled out Idealism and spiritualism - or, more negatively, anti-
rationalism and anti-materialism - as essential traits of fascism. In this analysis, fascism’s idealist 
element was, in part, a reaction to the materialistic outlooks of both liberalism and 
socialism/communism; cast as an alternative to these ideologies, fascism laid claim to a spiritual, 
anti-rational world view.41 Whereas liberalism and socialism claimed to have rational scientific 
foundations and appealed to reason as well as economic interest, fascism sought to appeal to 
                                                     
39 Ibid., p. 55-56. 
40 Alexander De Grand,  “Italian Fascism” (Lincoln, 1982). 
41 Gregor has traced the strong intellectual current running form Hegelian neo-idealism to fascism’s 
official philosopher, Giovanni Gentile. See A. James Gregor’s “The Ideology of Fascism” (New York, 
1969), p. 209-252.  
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emotion and non-economic needs, 42 or, more generally, to human nature’s irrational side.43 The 
dichotomy that characterized Western debate on these topics is absent from Nakano’s thought. 
While Nakano distinguished between emotion and reason, and between materialism and idealism, 
he never saw the need to decide in favor of one or the other. His speeches and writings were 
always a pragmatic mixture of emotion, reason, materialism, common sense, and idealism, all 
sprinkled with an occasional dose of spiritualism. When necessary, he could also be anti-
emotional, anti-rational, anti-idealistic, and anti-spiritual.  
In 1942, while praising the idealistic spirit of sacrifice that emboldened the soldiers 
fighting at the front, Nakano could thus simultaneously claim that the government’s stress on 
fighting morale was “conceptual frivolity,” for Japan could not win a war of attrition against a 
materially superior enemy by relying on the Yamato spirit alone. The industrial superiority of 
England, America and Russia – countries Nakano believed “control[led] the world’s resources” - 
was in Nakano’s mind a simple fact; anyone making a “materialistic calculation” would see that 
the Western Powers had “a point when they say that they have an advantage.” Nakano dismissed 
the government’s stress on the soldiers’ fighting spirit as propaganda, stating that “to speak 
lightly of spiritualism in these circumstances is abandoning one’s spirit. … It amounts to falling 
into frivolous idealism.”44 
This sober and practical approach to political questions also informed Nakano’s views on 
art, music and culture. Italian fascism and German Nazism often used aesthetics for political 
purposes, typically relying on some form of pompous pseudo-classicism stressing masculine, 
                                                     
42 Peter F. Drucker, “The End of Economic Man”, (New York, 1939), p. 129. 
43 George Holland Sabine, “A history of Political Theory”, revised by Thomas Thorson (Fort Worth, TX: 
Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1973). Some scholars have put the irrationality of fascism into question on the 
grounds that “there is nothing irrational in believing that history taught certain lessons” Roger Eatwell, 
“Toward a Generic Model of Fascism”, in Journal of Theoretical Politics,  April 1992, vol. 4,  no. 2 , p. 177. 
44 Nakano Seigō “To raise the realm alone” [啀真慎斥豪耕肱85鵠], in Tōtairiku, December 1942, p. 6 
and 10.  
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military, and martial values.45 Once in power, those regimes went through great efforts to control 
music and art, and used architecture, in particular, for their purposes. While there were similar 
tendencies in Japan, with some of Nakano’s contemporaries condemning swing and jazz music 
and other Western cultural imports, Nakano was simply indifferent.46 While Hitler spent his free 
time formulating architectural dreams which, if realized, would have turned Berlin into a 
megalomaniac Über-capital called “Germania,” Nakano had no interest in architecture. The house 
that Nakano built himself in 1932 was not known for its beauty. Although twice as large as the 
previous one,47 the house expressed Nakano’s rustic warrior aesthetics. A simple entrance gave 
way to an equally simple rectangular home with white walls and wooden floors. The only 
luxuries were three reception rooms to entertain visitors. An interior design magazine running a 
report on the house concluded it was a “dreary building” [鮴城蘆荒椥☞],48 an assessment shared 
by Nakano’s son Yasuo. 49 
Described often as a man whose interests focused exclusively on politics, Nakano simply 
had no views on music, visual art, literature, dancing, or architecture and therefore had no clue 
how any of these art forms could be used for political purposes. Nakano read so little non-fiction 
literature that his son found it necessary to record when he did.50 His children remember him as a 
brute, especially when compared to his wife, who was the source of urban and cultural refinement 
                                                     
45 On the role of aesthetics in European fascist movements and regimes see George L. Mosse, “The 
Fascist Revolution – Towards a General Theory of Fascism” (New York, 1999), p. 45-55.  
46 For the reactions of Japanese right-wing activists to the corrupting influences of Western music, art and 
literature see Christopher W.A. Szpilman, “Fascist and Quasi-Fascist Ideas in Interwar Japan, 1918-1941” 
in “Japan in the Fascist Era”, ed. E. Bruce Reynolds, (New York, 2004), p.89. 
47 The new house, located at Yoyogi was built on a plot of 510 tsubo (more or less 1,7000 square meters), 
and had 20 rooms on a surface of 120-30 tsubo (more or less 500 square meters).  
48 See “Visiting the Yūkōkyo” [㍎85悖稙Wヒ] in Hogaraka [袞], April, 1938. 
49 Nakano’s son, Yasuo, described the house as inelegant and tasteless [鮴城蘆] and reminiscent of a 
primary school.  
50 While recovering from surgery on his vocal cords in the summer of 1940, Nakano read Yoshikawa 
Eiji’s “Miyamoto Musashi”. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 530.  
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in their upbringing.  
Accordingly, neither the “glorification of masculinity and youth” nor “symbols often based 
on historical romanticism and mysticism,” both identified by Stanley G. Payne as characteristic of 
fascism,51 can be found in Nakano’s thought or in the symbolism used by the Tōhōkai. While 
Nakano supported students and ran a dorm, and the Tōhōkai had a youth organization, neither he 
nor the party glorified youth. He practiced jūdō, horseback riding and other martial arts, and 
while these activities have an aesthetic dimension, they remained private hobbies and never 
became part of a political program exalting masculinity. The symbols the party used (mostly the 
character for East [覩] on their flags, arm bands and uniforms) had no roots in any mystical past 
or romantic narrative. The uniforms were modeled on those of Europe’s fascist parties and 
therefore had no connection whatsoever to Japan’s history or myths.  
Two factors may account for Nakano’s failure to exploit symbolism more effectively by 
leveraging the rich imagery of Japan’s past. One may have been a lack of inventiveness, for it 
takes imagination to reinvent a past within which a movement’s symbols take on a meaning and 
power that can be harnessed for political ends. More importantly, however, the state had already 
established firm control over many of Japan’s national symbols by the time Nakano entered the 
political arena.  
The situation is similar with respect to Nakano’s attitude toward leadership was similarly 
timid - a far cry from the “leadership principle” many analysts believe is characteristic of 
fascism. 52  The Meiji founders had already established the unifying leadership figure of the 
Emperor, so any Japanese fascist would-be leader would have had to compete with this powerful 
symbol. Nakano never took up the challenge (although he might have done so if his party had 
been larger). Though he was the unquestioned leader of the Tōhōkai, Nakano quickly surrendered 
                                                     
51 Stanley G. Payne, “A History of Fascism, 1914-1945” (Madison, 1995), p. 7. 
52 Alexander De Grand, “Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany: The ‘Fascist’ Style of Rule” (London, 1995), p. 
84. 
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the role of national leader to Konoe and integrated the Tōhōkai into Konoe’s structure when the 
latter launched the new order movement. When Nakano left the IRAA in March of 1941, he 
observed rightly that the move had been a mistake, telling Tsukui Tatsuo,53 “I guess I was weak. 
Hitler would not have done it.”54  
Even within the Tōhōkai, Nakano did not seek to realize the fascist leadership principle. He 
allowed criticism from those around him and, on occasion, admitted to mistakes, thus making 
himself vulnerable. The differences in Nakano’s and Hitler’s leadership styles are nicely reflected 
in their respective attitudes toward horseback riding. While Nakano started riding later in life, 
embracing a challenge in his later years, Hitler refused to get on a horse on the grounds that it 
might throw him off.55 While Hitler, accordingly, attracted followers on whom he could rely one 
hundred percent, Nakano was more than once deserted by his followers (e.g. when Nakano left 
the Kokumin Dōmei, Kazami Akira did not follow; when Nakano abandoned the merger with the 
Social Mass Party, his followers left in droves).  
 Finally, it is impossible to trace the main source of Nakano’s imitation of European 
fascism to his having been influenced by any of the various fascist ideologues.56 Nakano claimed 
to have read Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” and Mussolini’s biography, but he did so only after he had 
already formulated most of the elements of his proto-fascist ideology.  As far as we know, he did 
not read any of the thinkers who originated fascist ideology, such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte, 
Italian neo-Idealist Giambattista Vico, Bertando Spaventa, Giovanni Gentile, the Vitalist Henri 
                                                     
53 Tsukui Tatsuo [┭睡棲a渣] (1901 - 1989), right-wing political activist. 
54 Nakano quoted in Inomata, p. 433. 
55 In his biography of Hitler, Joachim C. Fest write: “He was continuously tormented by the fear of 
appearing ridiculous or of loosing some of his authority due to a fauxpas. …He would not swim, or sit in a 
boat, nor would he mount a horse. … For him life was an everlasting parade before a giant audience.” 
Joachim C. Fest, “Hitler” (Frankfurt, 1973), p. 709. 
56 The genealogy of fascist thought was first described by Ernst Nolte. See Ernst Nolte, “Three Faces of 
Fascism”, trans. by Leila Vennewitz (New York, 1963).  
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Bergson, or the syndicalist Georges Sorel, even when their works were translated into Japanese.57 
Social Darwinism as set out by Herbert Spencer,58 which so greatly influenced Nazi ideology and 
appealed to some thinkers in Japan (e.g. Professor Kanokogi, who argued that “only nations that 
posses strong fighting spirit have the right to exist,”59 and General Ugaki Kazunari, who made 
frequent references to Spencer’s ideology in his diaries60) never entered Nakano’s discourse. 
While Nakano kept abreast of intellectual developments in the West and regularly made 
references in his writing to Western scholars and intellectuals, in his fascist period he seems to 
have been influenced mostly by the works of Carlyle, Friedrich List,61 and G.D.H., Cole, none of 
whom can be said to have been a forefather of fascism. Nakano’s move to the right was, in large 
part, a reaction to the crisis of the early 1930s, not a result of his having been exposed to fascist 
thought. In this respect, he followed a general pattern in Japan.62  
                                                     
57 Examples of translated works include: Giovanni Gentile, “The Philosophy of pure action” [⚐☴ⴕേߩ
ືቇ]; trans. Miura Hayao [ਃᶆㅺ㓶], (Tokyo: Hakuyōsha [⊕឴␠], 1939); Arturo Marpicati, “The 
political theory of the fascist party: Its movement and policies” [ࡈࠔ࡚ࠪౄ᡽ᴦ⺰ ߘߩㆇേߣℂ⺰], 
trans. Italo-German Culture Study Society [⁛દᢥൻ⎇ⓥળ], (Tokyo: Risōsha Shuppanbu [ℂᗐ␠಴ 
ㇱ], 1938); Alfredo Rocco, “The political theory of Fascism [ࡈࠔࠪ࠭ࡓ᡽ᴦℂ⺰]”, transl. by Nagasaki 
Tarō [㐳ፒᄥ㇢ ], (Nagasaki: Nagasaki Shobō [㐳ፒᦠᚱ ], 1933); ten works by Alfred Rosenberg 
including his “The Myth of the 20th century [ੑච਎♿ߩ␹⹤]” trans. Suita Junsuke [็↰㗅ഥ] and 
Kamimura Kiyonobu [਄᧛ᷡା], (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron-sha [ਛᄩ౏⺰␠], 1938); Robert Ley, “Oath to 
the Führer [ᜰዉ⠪߳ߩ⹿], trans. Mizuno Shōji [᳓㊁ᱜᰴ] and Nagai Toyotarō [᳗੗⼾ᄥ㇢] (Tokyo: 
Shinmin Shobō [ᣂ᳃ᦠᚱ], 1943); Gottfried Feder, “The theory of the German Third Reich” [⁛ㅺ╙ਃᏢ
࿖ߩℂ⺰], trans. Takayama Yōkichi [㜞ጊᵗศ]; Kurita Shoten [ᩙ↰ᦠᐫ], (Tokyo, 1941); and many 
others. 
58 On the role of Social Darwinism in European fascism see Stanley G. Payne, “Fascism, Comparison and 
Definition” (Madison, 1987), p. 12. 
59 Christopher W.A. Szpilman, “Fascist and Quasi-Fascist Ideas in Interwar Japan, 1918-1941” in “Japan 
in the Fascist Era”, ed. Bruce Reynolds (New York, 2004), p.77. 
60 See Ugaki Kazunari [ቝ၂৻ᚑ], “The Diary of Ugaki Kazunari” [ቝ၂৻ᚑᣣ⸥], ed. Tsunoda Jun [ⷺ
↰㗅], 3 vols. (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1970), vol. 1, p. 393. 
61 For example in Nakano Seigō, “Appealing to the People” [࿖᳃ߦ⸷߰], (Tokyo, 1929), p. 303. 
62  Szpilman argues that “the ideological responses described later arose in Japan as a result of the 
similarities of the postwar conditions with Germany and Italy, not as a result of direct fascist influences. 
These ideas were already present in Japan in the 1920s, long before Hitler rose to political prominence. It 
would therefore erroneous to assume that Japanese proponents of these [fascist] ideas were merely 
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Totalitarianism, Corporatism and the Third Way 
The case becomes more interesting with respect to Nakano’s understanding of 
totalitarianism. According to Arendt63 and Friedrich,64 fascism (like Stalinism and Maoism) is by 
nature totalitarian. Nakano seemed to espouse this notion in his rhetoric. He used the term 
“totalitarianism” [菟喪厨コ] first in the 1937 Tōhōkai party platform and thereafter regularly 
described the party as “totalitarian.”65 While Nakano understood, however, that totalitarianism 
had grown out of the European experience of total war as waged in the years 1914-8, he failed to 
understand that totalitarian actually meant “total” and implied total control by the state over the 
individual and all aspects of society. As late as 1942, Nakano stated that “totalitarianism does not 
destroy the individual. By paying respect to individuality, it moves the total.”66  On the same 
occasion, he paraphrased Hitler: “He [i.e. Hitler] states that a strong person will be at his or her 
strongest when he or she is alone. This is a cry for the sacred individual who has awoken to the 
true racial totalitarianism… Hitler…is a kind of individualist who upholds the value of the 
individual.”67 The reality that totalitarianism strives for total conformity and has no room for 
individuality was lost on Nakano.  
His understanding of totalitarianism was more akin to an expanded form of corporatism, 
                                                                                                                                                             
imitating European fascists.” Christopher W.A. Szpilman, “Fascist and Quasi-Fascist Ideas in Interwar 
Japan, 1918-1941” in “Japan in the Fascist Era”, ed. E. Bruce Reynolds, (New York, 2004), p.73-106. 
63 Hannah Arendt, “The Origins of Totalitarianism” (New York, 1951). 
64 Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew K Brzezinski, “Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy” (New York, 1956). 
65 For example, in March 1939 issue of Tōtairiku he described the Tōhōkai at the time as: “a totalitarian 
popular party based on the essence of Yamato spirit.” Nakano Seigō, “Editorial”[蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, 
March 1939 (also quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 265). Similarly in his letter to Social Mass Party 
president, Abe Isoo dated February 25, 1939, Nakano described the future Tōhōkai as: “an imperial way 
totalitarian popular party.” Nakano Seigō, letter to Abe, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 378. 
66 Nakano Seigō “To raise the realm alone” [啀真慎斥豪耕肱85鵠], quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 
676. 
67 Ibid., p. 669. 
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which according to many is also a defining characteristic of fascism.68 To Nakano, totalitarianism 
was the harmonization of different interests dividing the nation. Having described the Tōhōkai as 
a totalitarian party, Nakano elaborated:  
 
“This new party does not allow class struggle, but at the same time it does not allow 
privileged politics, factional politics or financial interest politics. Its spirit is popular 
assistance of the imperial rule [浸鴈ず62], popular participation in politics [楼鴈複膕], 
and the unity of rulers and ruled [甫鴈慎喪].” 69 
 
Totalitarianism could harmonize different interests because it had the totality of the people 
- the whole of the nation - as its object, unlike liberalism or socialism, which only stood for the 
interests of a party or a class. Accordingly, Nakano predicted the Tōhōkai would “abolish class 
privileges and class struggle.”70 As we have seen, this thinking was reflected in Nakano’s attitude 
toward the labor unions that joined the Kokumin Dōmei in the early 1930s. He was willing to 
support the workers’ class interest only insofar as it was in harmony with the interest of the nation. 
He could not, however, afford to hold the business world to the same high standard, because he 
depended on their financial contributions (as reflected in his opposition to Konoe’s move to put 
electric utilities under public management).  
A similar logic undergirded his critique of the democratic majority principle:  
 
“Totalitarianism goes beyond the numbers and looks at the essence (applause). It won’t 
do for a majority to gather their voices…The affairs of the others are my affairs, while 
my affairs are also the affairs of the others. The affairs of the people are my affairs. The 
problems of the nation are my problems. It is here that the arteries of the people run, 
                                                     
68 Thus Toni Smith writes that fascism was corporatist in that “it claimed to respect the rights of different 
sectors of the population so long as they respected their obligations to the state”. Toni Smith, “Making the 
World Safe for Democracy”, in Diplomatic History, 23, (spring 1999), p.180; see also Howard Wiarda, 
“Corporatism and Comparative Politics: the other Great ‘ism’ " (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). 
69 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial: The Tōhōkai’s Developmental Progress” [蕁ルクス瑍覩苜善貢̇悽ª〕頓], in 
Tōtairiku, March 1939, p. 4. 
70 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, May 1937, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 242. 
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where their breath is harmonized, their pulse takes the same rhythm, and their blood 
temperature reaches the same level. It is here that they become totally one and push 
forward together…I believe that once this has been refined and intensified we will have 
totalitarianism.”71  
 
In short, by totalitarianism Nakano meant total harmony of the people with the nation’s 
interest, and the absence of class warfare and partisan factionalism. He failed to see that, in 
practice, this would quickly lead to one-party dictatorial rule.  
In substituting national solidarity for social divisiveness and, especially, for class conflict, 
Nakano – along with many other fascists worldwide – saw totalitarianism  as a third way that had 
evolved out of the struggle between capitalist liberalism and socialism/communism. In his eyes, 
totalitarianism was not reactionary or regressive, but the synthesis that developed after the failure 
of liberalism and socialism: “Totalitarianism does not come before liberalism, but is a new 
system that comes after liberalism and communism.”72 Like fascism itself, Nakano’s thought was 
a reaction to the crisis of liberalism of the interwar years. 73  
With respect to corporatism and the belief that fascism offered a third way out of the 
struggle between liberalism and socialism, Nakano can be squarely placed in the fascist camp. 
With respect to totalitarianism, his position is less clear. Although his pronouncements on the 
relationship between the totalitarian state and the individual echo the views of fascist-ideologue 
Giovanni Gentile, which prescribe individual liberation through total identification with the 
nation state,74 Nakano’s actions in the last years of his life speak a different language (see next 
chapter). Furthermore, when Nakano said totalitarianism, he never meant control over the whole 
                                                     
71 Nakano Seigō in his speech at the first party convention, December 9, 1938 quoted in Nakano Seigō, 
Editorial [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, March 1939, p. 9.  
72  Nakano Seigō, “Politics that win the War.” [皚勢行蛤考膕齠], (Tokyo, 1943), p. 5. 
73 Ernst Nolte, „Die Krise des Liberalen Systems und die faschistische Bewegung“ (München, 1968), p. 
385. 
74 Joseph P. Sottile, “The Fascist Era: Imperial Japan and the Axis Alliance in Historical Perspective” in 
“Japan in the Fascist Era”, ed. E. Bruce Reynolds, (New York, 2004), p. 20. 
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of society, including education, leisure activities, the media, or the arts. He opposed, for instance, 
the government’s encroachment on the media. And, unlike Hitler, who went to great pains to 
educate the German public on what art was and should be, Nakano’s writings are free of aesthetic 
discussion. In the end, Nakano was too exclusively focused on politics to care about the true 
totality of society or the entirety of the citizens’ private lives.  
  
Nationalism, Racism and Pan-Asianism 
Fascism has often been described as a particularly rabid brand of nationalism.75 It has been 
argued that fascist nationalism was so extreme that it turned necessarily anti-internationalist (a 
fact that made the export of fascist ideology inherently difficult). Other writers have added that 
fascist nationalism was also racist, most obviously in the case of Nazi Germany but also in the 
case of Fascist Italy, though one could argue that Italy’s racism was a function of coming 
increasingly under Germany’s sway. 
Nakano was undoubtedly a patriot and nationalist, but love for his country did not lead him 
to ignore the virtues of other nations, let alone hate them for their otherness. While intellectuals 
around him engaged in mental acrobatics to argue for Japan’s uniqueness, Nakano countered 
soberly that Japan was not unique and that, even if it were, such uniqueness did not mean that it 
was superior in any way. Nakano countered the oft-repeated argument that Japan’s 3000-year 
history made it unique as follows:   
 
“The 3000-year history of Japan may be glorious, but every nation is proud of its 
history and 3000 years is not that long in the history of mankind. If you were to pride 
yourself on the length of your history, then every nation could look back at hundreds of 
thousands of years. Since the appearance of humanity, each nation has come a very long 
way.”76  
                                                     
75 Roger Griffin, for example, defines fascism as “form of populist ultra-nationalism”.  See Roger Griffin, 
“The Nature of Fascism” (London 1991), p. 44. 
76 Nakano Seigō, “Reflections in the Mirror of Manchuria and Korea” [噌靜貢2行萵浩肱] (Tokyo, 
Tōhōjiron-sha, 1921), p. 85-86. 
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To those who argued that Japan was superior because it had never been invaded, Nakano 
concurred that Japan had enjoyed a relatively sheltered and undisturbed history with no outside 
interference on account of being an archipelago.  He added, however, that having lived in “a 
paradise [鉤啀丱] does not mean that this produced characteristics that one ought to be proud 
of…The Japanese people may consider it dishonorable when other nations are conquered over 
and over again,” but they forget that such conquests often steeled a country’s character. Nakano 
cited Germany as a prime example of a nation that had developed a strong character through 
multiple invasions.77 
Nakano’s egalitarian attitude toward other nations and cultures did not change when he 
moved closer to fascism in the 1930s. The very fact that he sought to introduce and adapt fascism, 
a foreign ideology, to Japan, provides proof that he continued to believe that Japan could and 
should learn from the rest of the world. He also continued to be a convinced pan-Asianist, a line 
of thinking that is, arguably, a form of internationalism. When criticizing Tōjō’s leadership after 
the outbreak of the Pacific War, Nakano compared Tōjō not only to figures taken from East Asian 
history, but also to contemporary Europeans such as Clemenceau and, remarkably, to Japan’s 
arch-enemy, Churchill. In  mid-1942, after Japan’s initial victories seemed to confirm the 
country’s superiority, and some of Nakano’s opponents waxed sentimental about the uniqueness 
of Japan’s Emperor – some even going so far as to take this uniqueness as a guarantee for certain 
victory - Nakano reminded his compatriots that “Japan is not the only country to have great 
personalities. Some can be found also abroad; we therefore expose ourselves to danger if we 
become lax.”78 Nakano likewise framed his critique of Japan’s bureaucratic power grab as a 
comparison with Imperial Germany during WW1, the implication once again being that Japan 
                                                     
77 Ibid., p. 85-86. 
78 Nakano Seigō “To raise the realm alone” [啀真慎斥豪耕肱85鵠], quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 
680. 
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was not unique but rather shared a universal human experience. 
Racism, which forms such an integral part of the European fascist experience, never found 
its way into Nakano’s thinking.79 Unlike Nazi Germany, which regarded the people of conquered 
territories as inferior – and, in fact, had no qualms about exploiting them and actually planned to 
exterminate them in the long run - Nakano never put the value of human life into question. He 
believed the inhabitants of the territories conquered and governed by Japan were to be treated 
with respect and as equals.80 Reports of atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers upset him 
greatly and caused him to warn Japan’s leaders that such actions rendered the whole rhetoric of 
an East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere hollow.  
What then to make of the references to Judaism and anti-Semitism that crept into Nakano’s 
speeches in the course of the 1930s? This is truly one of the more vexing aspects of Nakano’s 
writing. When Nakano used the term “Jew,” he did so clearly in a derogatory sense, exploiting 
existing anti-Semitic prejudices that had made their way into Japanese intellectual and political 
discourse. In doing so, he engaged in what today would be labeled racist stereotyping. His insults 
were, however, not aimed at Jews directly.81 Nakano did not argue that Jews as a group or race 
were inferior to other groups or races, nor did he encourage their maltreatment, let alone their 
mass murder.  
Nakano applied the term “Jew” to Japan’s bureaucrats and war profiteers. When Minister 
                                                     
79 Some Japanese thinkers adopted racist ideas from German Nazism. Ikeda Shigenori (who held two 
German doctoral degrees) wrote several books on eugenics arguing that in order to survive as a race, Japan 
had to maintain its racial character, its racial purity. Another proponent of Eugenics was professor Nagai 
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W.A. Szpilman, “Fascist and Quasi-Fascist Ideas in Interwar Japan, 1918-1941” in Japan in the Fascist Era, 
ed. E. Bruce Reynolds, (New York, 2004), p.79-80. 
80 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 479. 
81 For a discussion of anti-Semitism theories in interwar Japan see Christopher W.A. Szpilman, “Fascist 
and Quasi-Fascist Ideas in Interwar Japan, 1918-1941”, in “Japan in the Fascist Era”, ed. E. Bruce 
Reynolds, (New York, 2004), p.81-85. 
 327 
Kishi asked in 1942 for the abolition of profit-making in Japan’s economy on the grounds that 
such thinking was foreign, Anglo-Saxon and “Jewish,” Nakano not only retorted that profit-
making had been a feature of Japanese economic life since long before the arrival of Western 
culture, but also gave his definition of what really constituted “Jewish thinking” [咲挫榊厨コ].82 
He began by stating: “In Japan, there are no Jews. It does not, therefore, make much sense to say 
that the Jewish elements within Japan need to be destroyed.” Nakano then developed a definition 
of Jewishness that he claimed was based on Hitler’s writings but which, in reality, bore little 
resemblance to the Nazi leader’s beliefs.  
At the risk of exaggerating, one is tempted to say that in his desire to present the Nazi 
ideology in a favorable light to a Japanese audience, Nakano cleansed it of its most overt racism 
and anti-Semitism. In Nakano’s reading, Hitler claimed that Germany lost WW1 because German 
bureaucratic and business elites were unable to rationalize and increase production. Economic 
controls were instead used by second-rate businessmen to create monopolies that resulted in 
inefficiencies. Based on this (flawed) understanding of Hitler’s description, Nakano said the 
“Jewish nature is to enjoy the sweet honey that comes from monopolistic privileged capital.” He 
thus defined “Jews” in economic terms, as a group of people who profited from war, rather than 
in religious - let alone racial - terms: “Those who break into politics with the help of corrupt 
means and say that they alone can enjoy war profits while the rest of people at large suffer 
hardships and make sacrifices - those, according to Hitler, are the Jews.”83 It is not clear if 
Nakano actually misunderstood the murderous nature of Nazi anti-Semitism or simply pretended 
to misunderstand. In either case, he did not promote it. While he regrettably chose to participate 
in the derogatory use of the term “Jew,” it is clear that he did not share Nazis’ murderous 
intentions.  
                                                     
82 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, November, 1942, p. 10-12. 
83 Ibid., p. 10. 
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One could conclude that with respect to nationalism, Nakano was not a fascist. Though 
strong, Nakano’s nationalism never perverted into racism, anti-internationalism, or an ideology of 
cultural or racial superiority. The only component in Nakano’s thinking that requires a disclaimer 
in this regard is the hierarchy implicit in his pan-Asian vision, which always put Japan at the head 
of any pan-Asian community. When Nakano had first encountered the Chinese revolutionaries 
living in exile and their Japanese supporters, he saw Japan as the teacher and China as a willing 
student – a viewpoint neither time nor events altered in subsequent years.  
In Nakano’s defense, it must be said that he believed Japan’s leading role in pan-Asian 
relations derived not from racial or cultural superiority, but simply from the fact that Japan was 
industrially and militarily more advanced and powerful. When lecturing in Beijing in 1925 on the 
relationship between Chinese and Japanese economic development, Nakano said China should 
first develop its natural resources (agriculture and mining) and then, as Japan abandoned light 
industry for heavier, China could take its neighbor’s place and move into light industry. Nakano 
called this developmental model a "harmonious flight formation of geese," a term well-known to 
students of post-war Asian economic development.84 To Nakano, Japan’s position at the helm of 
the Asian community was a natural outflow of economic and military reality, not a privilege 
based on innate superiority. 
To what extent was Nakano’s pan-Asianist talk about liberating the people of East Asia a 
genuine motive and to what extent was it merely a pretext for imperial expansion? Would he, for 
instance, have granted (or advocated granting) independence to the territories Japan occupied in 
the course of WW2? Given his proposal following the March 1919 Korean uprisings, according 
to which Korea should remain in the Empire and Korean citizens should receive the full rights 
accorded Japanese citizens, and, further, given the fact that Japan could hardly grant 
independence to territories such as Manchuria, China, or the Dutch East Indies after subsuming 
                                                     
84 Nakano quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 404. 
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their markets and natural resources within its economy, one is tempted to answer in the negative. 
Nakano is once more somewhat redeemed by the evidence that suggests he would have given the 
inhabitants of those territories rights equal to those of Japanese mainland citizens. Still, Nakano’s 
pan-Asianist views remain among his most contradictory. Though his official anti-imperialist 
stance did not prevent a rather imperialistic outcome (and would never have led to liberation or 
independence), such an outlook in and of itself does not make Nakano a fascist.   
 
Coercive Violence: Militarism and Revolution 
Several students have highlighted fascism’s militarist component, expressed through its 
uniforms and paramilitary party structure, the martial aesthetics of its art, and ultimately through 
the military expansion in fascism’s drive to empire.85 Others have added to this evidence the 
adoration expressed by some fascist thinkers both for war and for the ideology’s allegedly 
cleansing effect on society and its ennobling effect on the individual. 86 
Nakano, to be sure, was never an anti-militarist, let alone a pacifist. He did advocate peace, 
as long as it was based on justice,87 but made clear that he didn’t “like the hypocritical saying that 
when someone hits you on your right cheek, you should offer them your left. If someone hits you, 
I believe you should hit that person back thoroughly.”88 As a youth, he dreamt about a military 
                                                     
85  In his definition of fascism, Stanley G. Payne identifies imperial expansion as one of fascism’s 
characteristic goals, adding that the “militarization of politics” is characteristic of its style. See Stanley G. 
Payne, “A History of Fascism, 1914-1945” (Madison, 1995), p. 7. 
86 The idea that war was ennobling was promoted in Japan by Professor Kanokogi, who had studied 
philosophy at the universities of Columbia and Jena, and argued that war was a “efficient purifier of human 
detrious…brought racial improvement” and only nations that engaged in war had a chance to persist in the 
Darwinian struggle for survival.” Kanokogi quoted in Christopher W.A. Szpilman, “Fascist and Quasi-
Fascist Ideas in Interwar Japan, 1918-1941” in “Japan in the Fascist Era”, ed. E. Bruce Reynolds, (New 
York, 2004), p. 77. 
87 See Nakano Seigō, Speech held in the Diet on January 25, 1934 quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 797. 
88 Nakano Seigō, “The bandits in the Mountains and the Bandits in the Heart” [愾腎貢⊖膏氛腎貢⊖] 
memorial address held on September 10, 1936 at the Japan Youth Hall on behalf of two journalists of the 
Tokyo Daily News killed in an anti-Japanese incident and reprinted under the title “The Pillar of East Asia: 
Japan” [覩┠貢腑讀伍荳袿 ], in “Collected Speeches by Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩鳰哢儲㌲滾], (Tokyo: 
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career and when he attacked the armed forces during his liberal years, it was not because he 
opposed the military’s existence in principle, but rather because of bribery scandals or, most often, 
because of the military’s interference in politics (e.g. his attacks on Tanaka Gi’ichi). Even his 
later opposition to the Tōjō regime was not based on a principled opposition to the waging of war 
by a professional military establishment, but rather on disagreements regarding how this 
particular war should be waged.  
Nakano did, indeed, become much more pro-military in the 1930s, so much so that he was 
considered by some to be the army’s mouthpiece in the Diet. In that sense, he shares some of the 
responsibility for clearing the military’s way to power. Under Ishiwara Kanji’s influence, 
Nakano’s writings also acquired a military strategic component that they lacked previously. But 
however militarist such leanings, as well as the fact that he wore fantasy uniforms and that the 
Tōhōkai ran a para-military youth organization, may seem, Nakano cannot fairly be labeled a 
militarist. Throughout his life, including during his fascist period, Nakano upheld the belief that 
politics remained the prerogative of civilian politicians such as himself and that the military 
should not interfere therein. The Tōhōkai’s election platform of 1937 stated clearly that “national 
defense in the larger sense will be the subject of politics, while the military will be in charge of 
national defense in the narrow sense.”89  Following the Clausewitzian dictum that “war is a 
continuation of politics with different means,” Nakano never doubted that there was a place for 
military force in the political process, but he also never doubted that this place was within the 
framework of civilian government and should remain under its control.  
Finally, Nakano’s speeches and writings are entirely free from the notion - found often 
among fascist thinkers - that war could have any medicinal virtues, be they societal, national or 
individual. Nakano found the notions that war could make a man noble or correct social evils 
                                                                                                                                                             
Asakaze-sha [衲城だ], 1936), p. 375.  
89 See the Tōhōkai election platform in Nakano Seigō, “Editorial: Thus the Tōhōkai pushes ahead” [蕁
ルクス瑍覩苜善購莓晃〕拷], in Tōtairiku, May 1937, p. 9.  
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alien. War, accordingly, never became for him an end in itself, but always remained a means. He 
believed, in fact, that as far as possible war should be avoided. Even his support for the southern 
advance in the years 1939-41 was premised on the weakness of England, France, and the 
Netherlands, which Nakano believed gave Japan the chance to occupy their colonial territories 
without triggering a war. One reason Nakano later came to oppose Tōjō is that he never wanted 
Tōjō’s war.  
Fascism has been described as a revolutionary movement.90 Scholars disagree over whether 
this was a modernizing revolution91 or the betrayal of revolution, 92 but revolutionary promise was 
one of fascism’s many appeals – one that did not fail to work its charm on Nakano, who was a 
romantic revolutionary at heart. His admiration for Saigō Takamori, Ōshio Heihachirō and other 
rebels, his sympathy for the Chinese and later the Russian revolution, as well as for the Rice 
Riots of 1919 and the February 26 uprising, all attest to his penchant for siding with rebels. From 
early on, Yang Wang-ming’s philosophy supplied Nakano with a rough moral justification – and 
arguably even an imperative - for rebellion. Nakano expanded and refined this outlook into a 
more systematic form when commenting on the Rice Riots. Fascism’s revolutionary appeal hit 
Nakano on two levels. First, the ideology carried the promise of reforming domestic society so 
that hitherto excluded individuals could participate in politics. After returning from his European 
trip in 1938, Nakano did not tire of relating instances of people of humble origins rising to 
important positions in the state structure. Did not Mussolini, Hitler and many other Nazi leaders 
                                                     
90 Zeev Sternhell describes fascism as “a revolutionary ideology based on a simultaneous rejection of 
liberalism, Marxism, and democracy” and then adds that: “In its essential character, the fascist ideology 
was a rejection of ‘materialism’ (Liberalism. Marxism, and democracy being regarded as merely the three 
faces of one and the same materialistic evil), and it aimed at bringing about a total spiritual revolution.” 
Zeev Sternhell, “Neither Right nor Left: Fascist ideology in France” (Princeton, 1996) p. 27. 
91  A. James Gregor sees fascism as a modernizing revolution and fascist regimes as revolutionary 
movements. See A. James Gregor, “The Ideology of fascism” (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 7. 
92 The claim that fascism’s revolutionary promise was false was put forward mainly by left-leaning 
writers, in the context of communist interpretations of fascism. See for example Michael Parenti, 
“Blackshirts and Reds”, (San Francisco, 1997), p. 17.   
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come from society’s lower strata? Fascism seemed to replace family background, education and 
age with merit, competence and popular appeal as requirements for entrée into society’s upper 
realms. Nakano also fell for fascism’s mass activities, marches and rallies, which suggested a new 
form of mass political participation in politics – indeed, a new form of direct democracy. It is not 
difficult to see how Nakano, to whom the Meiji Restoration had been an unfinished popular 
revolution, came to see fascism as a means of finally achieving this unfulfilled aim. After 
liberalism and socialism failed, fascism seemed to Nakano to be the best way to integrate the 
masses into the political process. 
Fascism also carried the promise of revolutionizing the international order. Nazi Germany 
and Fascist Italy posed a real challenge to the post-WW1 international settlement. In a more 
general sense, the fascist Axis Powers could be seen as staging a revolution of the proletarian 
have-not nations against the status-quo haves. Nakano’s ally Kita Ikki introduced this distinction 
between have and have-not nations to Japan 93 and it is not difficult to see how it fit nicely with 
Nakano’s views on international affairs. Since witnessing the peace negotiations in Versailles, 
Nakano had opposed the international order. The distinction between have and have-not nations 
not only provided a strong rationale for his opposition but also highlighted the common interest 
Japan shared with Germany and Italy. Nakano’s foreign policy aims and proposals in the 1930s 
can be understood in this context. His support for the recognition of Manchuria in 1932-3, for 
Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, and for the war in China, as well as his advocacy 
for the Triple Alliance and the southern advance, all sprang from seeing Japan as a have-not 
nation locked in a struggle for survival against the resource-rich haves, namely England, France, 
America, and Russia. If this is taken to be the essence of fascism - as Sottile argues in 
formulating a fascist minimum94 – then Nakano must be called a fascist.  
                                                     
93 See Heinz Lubasz ed. “Fascism: Three major regimes” (New York, 1973), p. 134.  
94 Joseph P. Sottile, “The Fascist Era: Imperial Japan and the Axis Alliance in Historical Perspective” in 
“Japan in the Fascist Era”, ed. E. Bruce Reynolds, (New York, 2004), p. 24. 
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Conclusions 
All that being said, however, it remains difficult to classify Nakano categorically as a 
fascist. If fascism is seen as a corporatist third alternative to liberalism and socialism,  as a 
revolutionary movement that promised a more direct form of democracy through mass political 
participation (however hollow the promise ultimately was) and as a rectification of international 
injustices through aggressive imperial expansion, then Nakano was indeed a fascist. These 
aspects attracted him to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy and these aims were what he hoped to 
realize by introducing the European fascist model into Japan.   
If, on the other hand, one holds that fascism’s essential characteristics include utopianism, 
idealism, irrationalism, militarism, ultra-nationalism (with its anti-internationalist overtones), 
racism; the glorification of war, youth and masculinity; the leadership principle; and total control 
over all aspects of society and the individual, then Nakano was not a fascist.  
In which direction does this author lean? Key to an answer is Nakano’s attitude toward 
political coercive violence. While Nakano clearly fell for fascism’s revolutionary appeal, he 
ignored the brutality that characterized fascist revolutions in Europe. Nakano sought to imitate 
the legal and non-violent parts of Hitler’s rise to power (i.e. Hitler’s election in 1933), completely 
blocking out the violence that came before and after. In his writings, there is no mention of the 
street fights between Nazis and communists before 1933, or of the systematized Nazi acts of 
violence against Jewish citizens thereafter.  
Nakano’s failure to pay heed to the violent havoc fascism wreaked in Europe sprang not 
from an opposition to political violence on principle. In his 1919 piece on Ōshio Heihachirō’s 
rebellion, Nakano argued that violent illegal action was justified in certain circumstances, and he 
sympathized with and supported the right-wing activists who terrorized Japan in the first part of 
the 1930s. Likewise, he strongly advocated the use of military force against the Chinese 
Nationalist government in the years after 1937.  
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In his own actions (and those of the parties he led), however, Nakano was careful to stay 
within the limits of the law and not to resort to violence of any kind. From the Manchurian 
Incident until the end, he cast himself and his parties as the moderate alternative to violent right-
wing reform. By the time he came to be called a fascist in the early 1930s, he had also outgrown 
some of his personality’s more crude aspects. Dog fights, for instance, which he had enjoyed so 
much in his youth, no longer attracted him. As we shall see in the next chapter, even when driven 
into a corner by Tōjō, Nakano refused resort to terrorism as self- defense. The only act of political 
violence that Nakano carried out in the 1930s and 1940s, in fact, was to take his own life.  
 Nakano’s inability to embrace fascism’s violent brutality sprang from the same civility that 
caused him to reject fascism’s glorification of war, as well as its anti-rationalism, its racism and 
its appeal to the darker sides of human nature.95 As a result, the interpretation of fascism that he 
introduced in Japan in the 1930s was a sanitized and civilized version of Italian Fascism and 
German Nazism. Can fascism be civil? It is this author’s belief that it cannot be, because fascism 
is a breakdown of civilization that opens the gates to murderous barbarity. Accordingly, in the 
eyes of this author, Nakano’s rendition of fascism was far too civil to make him truly fascist.96 
                                                     
95 The positive evaluation of the use or violence has been identified as one of the essential characteristics 
by Payne in his definition of fascism. Stanley Payne, “Fascism: Comparison and Definition”, (Madison, 
1987), p. 3-21. 
96 Accordingly, if we agree with Kasza who in applying Payne’s framework to Japan, divided the Japanese 
right-wing of the 1930s into four categories: violence-oriented fascists, violence-oriented radical rightists, 
nonviolent conservative authoritarians, and nonviolent renovationist authoritarians, then this author would 
place Nakano in the Fourth (non-fascist) group. See Gregory Kasza, “Fascism from Below? A comparative 
Perspective on the Japanese Right, 1931 – 1936” in The Journal of Contemporary History, 19:4 (October 
1984), p. 608-609 and especially p. 625. 
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Chapter 7: Last Stand Against Tōjō 
  
Introduction 
After a life of zigs and zags, moving from liberalism to fascism, Nakano surprised his 
contemporaries in the last two years of his life with a final zag by returning to a viewpoint 
resembling his former liberal stance. Having spent much of the preceding decade advocating the 
southern advance and the need to escalate the conflict with China into a Greater East Asian War, 
Nakano after Pearl Harbor criticized the way in which the government conducted that war, the 
various laws the government passed in order to secure the public peace in Japan and, finally, the 
Tōjō government itself. Though some biographers have interpreted this shift in Nakano’s position 
as a return to liberalism, it would be more accurate to say that he arrived at a highly contradictory 
synthesis including elements from both his liberal and his fascist periods.  
Two factors drove Nakano’s intellectual shift. First, Nakano was aware of Japan’s 
increasingly dire military situation. Unlike the Japanese public, which was informed about 
Japan’s impressive string of victories in the months immediately following Pearl Harbor but kept 
ignorant of the setbacks thereafter, Nakano through his acquaintances and friends in the armed 
services learned relatively early on about the military setbacks at Midway and Guadalcanal. He 
also learned, through high-ranking contacts in the civilian bureaucracies, that Japan’s production 
increases fell far short of what was necessary to wage war against America and thus concluded 
fairly early that Japan would lose the war.  
The second factor was Nakano’s disapproval of how war itself was waged - particularly the 
Tōjō government’s use of war as a pretext to expand its power over the populace. Nakano 
believed the war’s purpose was liberating the people of Asia and emancipating those of Japan. 
While the war seemed to liberate Asia from Western colonialism, the various laws introduced 
under Tōjō clearly curtailed Japanese popular rights while expanding executive powers. This 
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expansion directly impacted Nakano, who was for the first time subjected to government 
interference in his speeches and writings. For example, in autumn 1941 censors blacked out 107 
lines in his “Reply to Churchill and Roosevelt.”1 Nakano’s alleged return to liberalism was thus, 
in part, a reaction to wartime authoritarianism.     
Nakano’s belief that Tōjō was leading Japan into a military disaster while establishing a 
dictatorship eventually brought Nakano into head-on conflict with the Prime Minister - a conflict 
that intensified and escalated over time and, in the end, led to Nakano’s destruction. The 
exchange of blows between these two men provides the overarching narrative of Nakano’s last 
years, but within that three themes can be identified 
First, as the conflict escalated, it became increasingly personal. Initially, Nakano had 
opposed and criticized the government’s policies, the bills it introduced into the Diet and the way 
in which Tōjō waged war, but not Tōjō himself. By mid-1943, however, Nakano was consumed 
with the idea of bringing Tōjō down. Tōjō retaliated in kind. Initially he attempted simply to 
silence Nakano’s criticism, and then even tried co-opting Nakano by offering him a government 
position, but ultimately Tōjō concluded it would be easiest to destroy Nakano altogether.  
Second, each exchange of blows weakened Nakano, as he lost one weapon after another. 
At the end of 1942, the government stopped granting him permission to speak in public, thus 
effectively putting an end to his activities as a public agitator. After January 1943, increasingly 
strict censorship effectively ended his writing career as well. Thereafter, the Diet remained the 
only forum in which Nakano could publicly express his criticism of and opposition to Tōjō and 
his government. Tōjō cracked down on this as well, however, by having Nakano arrested - and 
thus kept out of the Diet - in the fall of 1943. Nakano started out fighting the government tooth 
and nail, but, by the end of the fight, was left both toothless and nail-less.  
                                                     
1 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 565. The pamphlet in question is Nakano Seigō, “In Reply to Churchill 
and Roosevelt – Addressing the Japanese People” [作察砂索昏作宰伍債堺察債作行ı恒肱瑍荳袿楼鴈
行胞更], (Tokyo: Tōhōkai Publishing [覩苜善帶然グ], 1941). 
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Finally, as the conflict escalated, Nakano found himself cooperating with characters from 
the most unlikely quarters. In opposing Tōjō’s policies in the Diet, Nakano allied himself with 
Miki Bukichi and Hatoyama Ichirō,2 both long-time members of the established parties for which 
Nakano had shown little respect in the past. Nakano also worked with former Prime Ministers 
whom he had criticized severely  – including Konoe, Okada, Yonai, Hirota, and Wakatsuki – in 
his quest to topple Tōjō.3 He cooperated with Amano Tatsuo,4  a notorious right-wing leader and 
a co-founder of the Kin’nō-Makoto-Musubi-no-kai, who had spent time in prison for his 
involvement in the May 15 scheme. Finally, Nakano received support from the very group of 
people he had detested all his life: the bureaucrats. Planning Board members Tanabe Tadao and 
Hinoshita Tōgō, for example, concluded that Japan’s limited production capacity meant the 
country was in no position to win the war.  
 
Surprise at Dawn – Pearl Harbor: Nakano’s New Role  
Having become “the lonely wolf of politics”5 after his withdrawal from the Diet, Nakano 
did not know about the Imperial Conference decision in September 1941 to attack the United 
States, England and the Dutch East Indies if diplomatic negotiations with Washington failed to 
produce a satisfactory solution. As late as December 2, 1941, Nakano urged the Tōjō government 
to “make a decision” and strike south rather than “watching the destruction of Japan passively.”6 
Nakano had even planned another giant rally on the same topic for mid-December when, on the 
                                                     
2 Hatoyama Ichirō [嘿愾慎ア] (1883-1959) lawyer, politician, and after the war Prime Minister of Japan.  
3 Okada Keisuke’s warm reception of Nakano did not fail to impress the latter. Like Nakano, Okada had 
understood by 1943 that Japan had lost the war and supported Nakano in his struggle against Tōjō, in spite 
of all the differences that had existed between them in the past. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 713-14. 
4 Amano Tatsuo [啀ǒケ啌] (1892 – 1974) lawyer, and right-wing politician. 
5 Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 581. 
6 Nakano Seigō, “We Cannot Afford to Watch the Crisis Sitting on the Fence” [賓雍柞え溝鵠惚ロ江甲], 
speech held December 2, 1941, at Hibiya public Hall in Tokyo, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2. p. 583 
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morning of the 8th, he heard about the Pearl Harbor attack on the radio. Over the following days, 
amid news of military developments across Asia, it slowly dawned on Nakano that the Tōjō 
cabinet’s war went far beyond anything he himself had advocated in previous years. Instead of 
only taking French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies – “lost properties without owners”7 - 
which Nakano believed could have been done without drawing the US or the UK into a military 
conflict, Japan brought the war to its very doorstep by directly attacking them. The realization 
that Japan had sparked a conflict of such magnitude overwhelmed Nakano. When he called Ogata 
on the morning of December 8, his voice sounded unusually fragile, doubtful and insecure. 
Mitamura also recalled Nakano commenting after the attack: “We got into a quite a mess there.”8  
While personally still coming to terms with the event, on the outside Nakano showed 
resolve. The day after the attack, the Tōhōkai officially declared its support for the government’s 
decision to go to war.9 Nakano’s first public speech after Pearl Harbor – titled “After Victory, 
Fasten Your Helmet” - began with the words: “It moves my heart like nothing else that the Tōjō 
cabinet has made this grand decision, brought the ambition of the people and the military together, 
lit this bone-dry gunpowder and aimed the explosion against the US and England.”10 Nakano 
congratulated the Japanese military, saying “in terms of spirit we have already won” and crowing 
that the move had “proven that Japan is the immovable pillar of Greater East Asia.”11 Although 
Nakano warned that Japan should not relax after its initial victories, he was nevertheless 
                                                     
7 Nakano Seigō in a lecture on Tokutomi Hideyoshi held October 10, 1940 quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 
2, p. 479.  
8 See Ogata, p. 16 and Mitamura quoted in Inomata p. 460. 
9 The Declaration issued by the Tōhōkai (penned by Nakano) can be found in Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [
蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, June 1942, p. 3.  
10 Nakano Seigō, “After Victory, Fasten your Helmet” [蛤耕肱屠貢I惚S濠国], speech held December 
17, 1941 at Ryōgoku Hall in Tokyo, reprinted in Nakano Seigō, “This One Battle: How the People should 
Fight!”  [驢済慎皚: 楼鴈囁奏行皚閤高攻拘玠], (Tokyo: Tōhōkai Propaganda Department [覩苜善帶然
グ], January, 1942), p. 2. 
11 Ibid., p. 5 and 7. 
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optimistic about the military situation, believing that the islands of the Pacific would provide 
Japan with a defensive line of unsinkable aircraft carriers and that the resources of the newly 
conquered Dutch and French territories would enable Japan to fight a long-term war if 
necessary. 12  Most importantly, however, Nakano believed that the attack had fired up the 
emotions of various Asian independence leaders (some of whom were in the audience, including 
India’s Bihari Bose) who would come to support Japan’s war against the Western powers. 
Applause greeted Nakano’s line that “people from China and all over Asia stand up and shout 
‘Banzai’.”13   
 
The Shadows of War 
Nakano’s prominence allowed him to shield himself and his family from many of the war’s 
material aspects. Always a great meat lover, Nakano had long relied on the students of his dorm 
to bring him meat from Tokyo’s surroundings amid the food shortages that had become a feature 
of ordinary Japanese life well before Pearl Harbor. As foodstuffs became scarcer during the war, 
Nakano raised chickens and supplemented his diet with eggs; later still he kept goats for making 
cheese.14 Though some of Nakano’s beloved horses were requisitioned for the war effort and 
shipped to China, he kept enough to continue riding every morning. And when gasoline rations 
began, Nakano was able commute to the Diet in a horse-drawn carriage. Being wealthy also gave 
Nakano the ability to prepare for future air raids by building himself a house well outside the city 
center, which would be the likely focus of any aerial bombardment.15  
                                                     
12 See for example Nakano Seigō, “The General Election and the Tōhōkai” [Gぬ竕膏覩苜善], in 
Tōtairiku, April, 1942, p. 15. 
13 Nakano Seigō, “After Victory, Fasten your Helmet”, speech held at Ryōgoku on December 17, 1941, 
reprinted in Nakano Seigō, “This One Battle: How the People should Fight!”, p. 14. 
14 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 553 and p. 722. 
15 Nakano’s villa built earlier in the Tamagawa region west of Tokyo had been let to his sister Mura and 
her family after the early death of her husband. Nakano soon built another house for him and his family in 
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Some of the war’s other impacts - including the drafting of his sons, followers and party 
members - proved more difficult to mitigate. With his university curriculum shortened to three 
and a half instead of the usual four years, in the fall of 1942, Nakano’s third son, Tatsuhiko, was 
drafted into military service. A year later, in the fall of 1943, all the remaining men in Nakano’s 
once-lively household were drafted, including his fourth son, Yasuo, and the students then living 
at Nakano’s dorm. Nakano’s followers and many Tōhōkai members were likewise drafted into 
military service, creating labor shortages for Nakano’s political activities, despite the fact that 
some who returned from the front rejoined the party.16 
More vexing in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, however, was the war’s impact 
on Japan’s political climate. Nakano’s conception of a war meant to liberate the people of Asia 
and Japan seemed to have taken a wrong turn, as the government used the war as a pretext to 
expand its powers at the expense of those of the citizenry. Within a week of the Pearl Harbor 
attack, war euphoria helped the cabinet pass the “Temporary Law Regulating Free Speech, 
Publishing and Association” [クルクス頓∭滾善46だ̌59蕁焚S┃]. Nakano opposed the law 
privately, telling Parliament member and follower Mitamura to “beat this bill into a pulp,” but 
kept his public criticism more veiled.17 Speaking in mid-December, Nakano argued that Western 
legalism [┃齠厨コ] as a means of suppressing people was alien to Japan. In its place he 
                                                                                                                                                             
the same neighborhood. According to his son, this was motivated by Nakano’s experience of the German 
Zeppelin air raids on London during WW1. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p.  552-53. 
16 Two of the students staying at Nakano’s dorm actually fell while serving their country: Tachibana 
Masasuke [Uゑ驟赤] from Fukuoka fell in central China, while Koga Yasuo [幣✂框渣] fell in the 
fighting around Nomohan. Others returned from the war to join the Tōhōkai. Examples include Miyasaki 
Yoshimasa [幟扣便膕] who was drafted in 1941, but became active in the Tōhōkai student group after his 
return and Takadera Shinji [㔾徇袋饅] who worked as an editor for Tōtairiku after returning from the front. 
See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 428. 
17 Nakano quoted in Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁驥啌], “Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?” [腎ǒ驟
悩購奏膣60内浩紅拘] (Tokyo, 1949), p. 39. 
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proposed “moving from legalism to humanism, from a legalist nation to a moral one [ぐコ].”18 
Nakano’s criticism was too little too late. The law – under whose provisions Nakano himself was 
arrested in 1943 - passed in the 78th extraordinary Diet session. When Tōjō announced his next 
move aimed at strengthening his power – i.e., calling a general election for early 1942 and 
announcing that the government would financially support so-called “recommended” or 
“endorsed” candidates (selected by a committee headed by former Prime Minister Abe 
Nobuyuki) – Nakano decided to put forward a more determined resistance.  
 
Tōjō, the 1942 Election and the Yokusan-Seiji-kai 
It was common practice in contemporary Japan for an incoming government to call an 
election in hopes of gaining a favorable majority in the Diet. Endorsing specific candidates and 
supporting them financially (government-endorsed candidates received more than 5,000 Yen 
toward their campaign coffers), however, was almost unprecedented. When the government 
experimented with endorsements during the late 1941 Nagasaki city council elections, which 
served as a dry run for the 1942 general election,19 Tōhōkai member Mitamura Takeo severely 
attacked the practice in the Diet.20 On February 22, 1942 the Tōhōkai declared that while it would 
                                                     
18  Nakano Seigō, “After Victory, Fasten your Helmet” [蛤耕肱屠貢I惚S濠国 ], speech held at 
Ryōgoku on December 17, 1941, reprinted in Nakano Seigō, “This One Battle: How the People should 
Fight!”, p. 31.  
19 The Nagasaki City Council elections of July 1941 were carried out under the direction of the Head of 
General Affairs of Nagasaki province. A screening committee was set up and charged with recommending 
44 candidates. Then the committee was turned into a political party, the so-called “Society Dedicated to the 
Establishment of City Politics Assisting the Imperial Rule” [62⇨斃膕椥ル袗癩善] which supported its 
members (the recommended candidates) and exerted pressure on the twenty-two non-recommended free 
candidates to withdraw from the race. The nine who persisted were subjected to heavy interference in their 
election campaigns. See Nakatani Takeyo [腎〞驥赶], “A War-time History of the Diet” [皚蕁共同組合善別], 
1975, p. 80. 
20 After Nakano’s resignation from the Diet in spring 1939, the Tōhōkai’s parliamentary leadership had 
passed to Mitamura Takeo. Speaking in the 77th extraordinary Diet session, Mitamura Takeo commented 
critically on the practice of government-endorsed elections such as that in Nagasaki and warned that: “If 
we continue in this direction Japan’s constitutional politics will become extremely loose” and in fact would 
be the “end of constitutional politics” and usher in “a bureaucratic slave system.” Mitamura Takeo, speech 
in 77th Diet held on November 16th, 1942, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 599.  
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“continue to support the Tōjō cabinet’s decision to execute the Greater East Asian war” it also 
would “reject the recommendations made by the people around Abe Nobuyuki and declare that 
all our candidates will be recognized by our president Nakano Seigō.”21 In the next month’s issue 
of Tōtairiku, Nakano added that a government endorsement would be a “blemish to us,”22 thus 
making clear that the Tōhōkai would maintain its independence.23 In a letter to his former teacher 
of Chinese classics, Masuda Hiroyuki, Nakano remarked more candidly: “I cannot let it pass 
tacitly when the territory of our country expands every day while at the same time our people are 
reduced to slaves. … We should show ourselves at our best and rebuild a nation worthy of the 
fruits of wars.”24 
The Tōhōkai put 46 candidates into the race, of which Nakano hoped one third would get 
elected. Nakano formulated and published the party’s election platform in a polemic pamphlet.25 
He began by noting that Japan was fighting a long-term war, which - unlike short wars decided 
by the “value of arms” – would be decided by “political instruments on the home front.”26 
Nakano stated axiomatically that in order “to win the final victory … it is necessary to manifest 
the political power of the Japanese people,” for “only countries whose people manifest political 
                                                     
21 Tōhōkai declaration of February 24, 1942 quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 600. 
22 Nakano Seigō, “The General Election and the Tōhōkai” [Gぬ竕膏覩苜善], in Tōtairiku, April 1942, p. 
5. 
23 In addition to Nakano’s Tōhōkai the recommended election was also opposed by the Dōkōkai [弁誓善] 
to which Hatoyama Ichirō belonged. See Nakatani Takeyo [腎〞驥赶], “A War-Time History of the Diet” 
[皚蕁共同組合善別], 1975, p. 82. 
24 Letter from Nakano to Masuda, dated March 25, 1942 quoted in Inomata, p. 478-9. 
25 Nakano Seigō, “Politics that win the War.” [皚勢行蛤考膕齠] (Tokyo: Musashino Shobō [驥24ǒ蟷
蘯], July, 1943). Originally published under the title “The Tōhōkai Movement during the Greater East 
Asian War” [哢覩盛皚勢真貢覩苜善ぉ罰]), (Tokyo, March 1942).  
26 Ibid., p. 4. 
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power possess the power to resist, the power to forcefully attack.”27 In support of this general 
statement, Nakano pointed to the historical experience of WW1:   
 
“During the last great war in Europe, the Kaiser’s bureaucratic politics, which had no 
popular organization and no popular political power, were unable to win even against 
the liberalism of the US, England and France. Imperial Russia with its despotic politics 
had no stamina and provided us with an example of collapse.”28 
 
Nakano contended that Germany’s biggest mistake had been its authoritarian bureaucracy, 
which attached more value to bureaucratic expertise than to the wisdom of the people and, in 
doing so, imposed highly inefficient economic controls.29 Nakano fretted that, while Germany 
and Italy had learned from their WW1 mistakes, overcoming liberalism and socialism to 
eventually develop totalitarianism, Japan risked embracing liberalism with no redeeming 
conversion to totalitarianism. The fear that Japan would repeat Germany’s experience during 
WW1 became a dominant theme in Nakano’s writing in the following years. 30   Nakano’s 
pamphlet concluded:  
 
“Totalitarianism does not come before liberalism, but is a new system that comes after 
liberalism and communism. Having advocated the New Order [ᣂ૕೙], we must not 
regress a single step and return to either bureaucratic politics or despotic politics. 
Instead we must take a step forward and manifest the totalitarian political power of the 
people suited to our polity [࿖૕].”31  
 
                                                     
27 Ibid., p. 5. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid., p. 48-49. 
30 See Nakano’s critique of Japanese politics during the Pacific War were based on his understanding of 
Germany’s historical experience during WW1. On this point see Muro Kiyoshi [ቶẖ], Topple Tōjō – An 
Appraisal of Nakano Seigō [᧲᧦⸛ߟߴߒ ਛ㊁ᱜ೰⹏વ], (Tokyo: Asahi News Publishing [ᦺᣣᣂ⡞
␠], 1999), p.105-54.  
31 Nakano Seigō, “Politics that win the War.” [ᚢ੎ߦൎߟ᡽ᴦ], (Tokyo, 1943), p. 5.  
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In particular, Nakano criticized not only the economic controls introduced by Japan’s 
bureaucracies but also their heavy-handed approach to governing the newly conquered territories, 
which he believed could prevent those territories from becoming Japanese allies. In this context, 
Nakano described role of the Tōhōkai as follows: “To speak for those who cannot speak, and 
exert pressure on behalf of those who cannot do it themselves, with the aim of establishing justice 
in the realm - that is the sacred duty of which we are put in charge.” 32 The party’s platform, in 
short, was: Support the war but fight expansion of the bureaucrats’ power by demanding 
expansion of the people’s power.  
Over the coming weeks, Nakano threw himself into the election campaign with 
characteristic passion and perseverance. He toured the country giving well-attended speeches in 
the electoral districts of his fellow Tōhōkai candidates, which meant he could devote only two 
days to campaigning in his own electoral district in Fukuoka. While he still managed to be re-
elected with more votes than the other three successful Fukuoka candidates, the national election 
results were shockingly disappointing. 33 
The Tōhōkai’s vote tally rose to 345,519 (2.9% of all votes cast) in 1942 from 221,445 
(2.2%) in 1937, but only seven of the 46 Tōhōkai candidates were elected - less than half of 
Nakano’s goal.34 Even veterans such as Sugiura Takeo and Tanaka Kiyotatsu lost their seats. The 
party’s failure was due, in large part, to the fact that the Tōhōkai candidates had run without the 
                                                     
32 Ibid., p. 60. 
33 Ogata goes as far as stating that the election results were a “shock” to Nakano. Ogata, p. 176.  
34 The names of the elected Tōhōkai candidates were Nakano Seigō (Fukuoka), Nakamura Matashichirō [
腎襁弗晋ア] (Niigata prefecture), Honryō Shinjirō [袿今袋齠ア](Tokyo), Suzuki Shōgo [H袍驟捧] 
(Aichi prefecture), Ōishi Masaru [哢0哢] (Kōchi Prefecture), Wakugami Rōjin [蝕疹Ⓟ斥] (Okinawa 
prefecture), and Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁驥啌] (Gifu prefecture). For a list of all the candidates, their 
election districts, their previous experience and votes gathered, see Nagai Kazu [鵑棲北], “The Founding 
of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U]; in Shirin [別詒]; Vol. LXI, No. 4; July 1978; p.130-33. 
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government’s endorsement. 35  Many of the Tōhōkai’s candidates, moreover, had no prior 
experience in election campaigning, let alone strong constituencies in their electoral districts. 
Only seven of the Tōhōkai’s 46 candidates were veterans who had run for the Tōhōkai in the 
previous election,36 and of the remaining 39, just 19 had prior experience campaigning (for other 
parties), leaving another 22 brand-new to the process. With nothing akin to a jiban or electoral 
base in their home province, they relied instead entirely on the Tōhōkai-affiliated organizations 
for support.  
Following the election, Tōjō tried strengthening his already-firm hold on the Diet by 
establishing a single party called Yokusan-Seiji-kai [62⇨膕齠善, or “Imperial Rule Assistance 
Political Association”], meant to subsume all other political parties represented in parliament. 
Most, including parties lacking government endorsements, joined readily, but Nakano and the 
Tōhōkai refused initially. Even after one member left the Tōhōkai to join the Yokusan-Seiji-kai, 
and the remaining party members urged Nakano to concede, he retorted: “If you want to go, go 
ahead. I will stay behind alone and continue to fight from within the Tōhōkai.”37 Only after the 
government threatened to use the new Law Regulating Free Speech, Publishing and Association 
to deny the Tōhōkai’s right to exist did Nakano grudgingly give in by preemptively dissolving the 
party.  
Thus, the Tōhōkai abandoned its status as a political society and once again became a think 
tank dedicated to “fostering ideas that will become the foundation of Japan’s politics, pouring our 
                                                     
35 Compared with the performance of other non-endorsed candidates, the Tōhōkai did not so badly. With 
7 of 46 elected the Tōhōkai had a success rate of around 15% which is more or less the same as that of all 
other non-endorsed candidates, where 85 out of 551 were elected (again with a 15% success rate). By 
comparison, of the 466 endorsed candidates 381 won seats in the Diet yielding a success rate of around 
80%. 
36 The veterans who had run for re-election were Nakano Seigō [腎ǒ驟悩], Watanabe Yasukuni [喰シ┘
れ], Ōishi Masaru [哢0哢], Kimura Sakuo [袍襁捜渣], Tanaka Kiyotatsu [譓腎掃け], Mitamura Takeo [
申譓襁驥啌], and Sugiura Takeo [襃④驥渣].   
37 The reaction is recorded by Honryō Shinjirō and quoted in Inomata, p. 487-88. 
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energies into the raising of talent and cooperating with the execution of the Greater East Asian 
War,” leaving “all political questions to be dealt with by the Yokusan-Seiji-kai.”38 The party also 
changed its name to Eastern Brethren Society or Tōhō-Dōshi-kai [覩苜弁沒善]. After fighting so 
hard and paying such a high price to maintain its independence during the election, surrendering 
the Tōhōkai’s status as a political entity must have humiliated Nakano, who never had been a 
good loser. The party faithful also reacted negatively. Nakano tried soothing his followers’ 
dissatisfaction by explaining that the party’s spirit remained unbroken despite the change in its 
legal status:  
 
“The driving force behind the Tōhōkai movement is the Tōhōkai spirit, and this spirit is 
without color or shape, just like the wind of spring that fills everything between the 
heaven and the earth. It is an indestructible entity that you cannot cut with a blade and 
cannot control with might.”39  
 
In private conversations, however, Nakano’s assessment was much bleaker. Speaking to 
his follower Honryō Shinjirō,40 Nakano said: “It is said that ten years are full of ups and downs, 
but in my case it is more like ten years full of downs and yet more downs.” 41 And downhill it 
continued to go for the Tōhō-Dōshi-kai. Even though many of the core members remained active 
in the newly created think tank, the rank and file throughout the country left the party in droves. 
Over the course of 1942, party membership fell 159% to 9,875 from 25,547 as chapters dropped 
56% to 73 from 114.42   
 
                                                     
38 Nakano Seigō, Declaration issued May 23, in “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, June, 1942, p. 2.  
39 Ibid., p. 11.  
40 Honryō Shinjirō [袿今袋齠ア] (1903琊1971), German expert and politician. 
41 See Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku [覩哢憤], July, 1942. For the dialogue with Honryō 
see Nakano Yasuo vol. 2, p. 637. 
42 See Nagai Kazu [鵑棲北], “The Founding of the Tōhōkai”, p.133  
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The War’s Tide Turns 
Japan’s impressive string of victories during the Pacific War’s initial stages soon gave way 
to a series of setbacks. The naval engagement at Midway, where the Imperial Japanese Navy lost 
not only the backbone of its aircraft carrier fleet but also many of its best pilots, was the first 
major setback. But while Midway was a tragic tactical blunder, the outcome of the battles of the 
Coral Sea, and, later in the year, the disastrous Guadalcanal campaign, arose from Japan’s 
inferior strategic position. With command of the air increasingly dominated by America and 
Japan’s production capacity just a fraction of the US’s, supplying front-line Japanese soldiers 
with the arms to wage war became increasingly difficult. No matter how much the front-line 
soldiers tried to make up for shortages through self-sacrificing displays of the Yamato spirit, 
inferior weapon quantity and quality remained the single most important factor behind Japan’s 
deteriorating military situation and eventual defeat. Those in informed government circles 
realized sometime in 1942 that Japan would lose the war unless it could increase production of 
war-related goods dramatically. The government reacted to this challenge by increasing 
production, preparing the public for a long-term war of attrition and emphasizing the role of 
morale while restricting  news of military setbacks and defeats to a bare minimum. 
In contrast to the Japanese people, who were kept in the dark, Nakano, through his 
acquaintances and friends in the armed services, learned relatively soon about the military 
setbacks. The first severe blow to his initial optimism came early in the second half of 1942, 
when he learned about the battle of Midway’s outcome.43 By the time he heard about Japan’s 
Guadalcanal defeat, Nakano put the chances for a Japanese victory in the war at thirty percent.44 
From high-ranking bureaucrats Nakano also learned in early 1943 that the government’s attempts 
                                                     
43 According to Yasukawa Daigorō, Nakano’s financial backer, Nakano had come to the conclusion that 
the war was lost sometime after Midway. Yasukawa Daigorō [嶢擺¶晴ア], “One or two additional 
remarks concerning Nakano” [腎ǒ甫貢ヤ畫貢慎伍性], in Seigō-kai eds. [驟悩善], “Nakano Seigō is 
Alive” [腎ǒ驟悩購﨟攻肱広鵠], (Tokyo: Akane-shobō [巷拘講蟷蘯], 1954), p. 98. 
44 See Hasegawa Shun [憎〞擺戮]; “The Master and the Yūkōkyo” [纏﨟膏㍎85悖], in Ibid., p. 29. 
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to increase materiel production by imposing a vast array of economic controls under the National 
Mobilization Law had been insufficient to make a decisive difference in the war’s outcome. This 
led him to conclude that Japan could not win.45  During his last visit to his hometown of Fukuoka 
early in the summer of 1943, a sobbing Nakano told his former teacher and mentor Shibata 
Fumishiro: “Japan will lose this war!” 46  From this sprang the imperative to act, which in 
Nakano’s eyes meant informing both citizens and people in power about Japan’s precarious 
situation and convincing them to join him in opposing the war and the government that waged it.  
 
Sharing Information about the War 
Nakano’s greatest obstacle in trying to mobilize opposition to the war, Tōjō’s policies, and 
eventually to Tōjō himself was that few people around him knew what he knew and, accordingly, 
few shared his alarming conclusions. One of the recurring themes in Nakano’s speeches and 
writings during this period is a demand that the government inform the people. Nakano often 
cloaked these demands in analogy – praising, for example, how Hitler had informed the German 
people of the defeat at Stalingrad47 and pointing to the examples of Clemenceau48 , or even 
                                                     
45 According to some accounts Nakano wanted Japan to propose peace talks as early as February 1942 at 
the height of its military successes. In a meeting with Navy officer and Tōhōkai member Nakamura Ryōzō, 
Nakano said: “This is the [right] moment to stop the war. Japan should declare a cease-fire to the entire 
world. … Now [i.e. after our row of victories] they have understood our strength. Is that not enough? Japan 
should make clear that it has no territorial ambitions, and this is the only chance to settle this war.” Nakano 
quoted in Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁驥啌], “Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?”, p. 40-1. See also 
Mori Shōzō [迢驟24], “The Whirlwind of 20 Years” [茯城貢性筆朮], (Tokyo, 1968), p. 317. 
46 Nakano Seigō quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 722-23. 
47 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], Tōtairiku, April 1943, p. 4-6. 
48 Nakano’s high esteem for Clemenceau can be found throughout his work, e.g. Nakano Seigō, “In the 
Middle of the Storm of the Global Restoration” [身鈐ⅷ范貢挧行U考], (Tokyo: Tsuru Shobō [庾蟷蘯], 
June, 1942), p. 139-142. 
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Churchill49 and Petain, who had kept their citizenry informed of difficult situations.50 While Tōjō 
likely understood Nakano’s references, he certainly did not heed Nakano’s advice.  
Nakano therefore took up the task of informing the people himself. As talking or writing 
publicly about military developments, especially the outcomes of specific battles and campaigns, 
carried the risk of imprisonment, Nakano kept silent on these matters.51 That did not stop him, 
however, from speaking negatively about Japan’s dire military situation in general terms. In 
September 1942, Nakano wrote that “Japan will not be defeated, but subduing the enemy will not 
be so easy.”52 Two months later he said “even if we make extraordinary efforts in the long-term 
war, victory is not promised.”53 By December this tenuous pessimism had already become a more 
unequivocal “Japan is definitely in danger.”54 And when speaking to the students of his former 
high school in Fukuoka in the summer of 1943, he said:  
 
“Young men, limitless hardship waits along the way ahead of you. The honor of those 
who manage to shoulder this hardship, however, is also limitless. Japan will continue to 
experience difficulties for at least another 30 years from now. Luckily, you are young 
and have flexible minds. You have inherited the grand spirit of your forefathers. You 
must deal well with the coming difficulties. If you fail, Japan will fall. Don’t think – 
                                                     
49 Nakano’s opinion on Churchill can be found in Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], Tōtairiku, January 
1942 p. 12; November 1942, p. 11; and August 1943, p. 8.  
50 After learning about the defeat at Midway and noticing how the Japanese government kept quiet, 
Nakano wrote a piece on how well General Petain had dealt with France’s defeat against Germany in 1941, 
informing his country men of the situation and thus enabling the French nation to live through this dark 
hour. Nakano did not know of the French exile government under De Gaulle in London. See Nakano Seigō, 
“Editorial: Frank Advice to Japan’s Youth” [蕁ルクス瑍荳袿⻗朮行ミク溝], in Tōtairiku, July 1942, p. 2-3. 
51 Nakano once mentioned in his own house to two of his followers the little he knew of the outcome of 
the battle of Midway and Guadalcanal, and this was promptly included among the many charges made 
when he was arrested in the fall of 1943. 
52 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, September, 1942, p. 9. 
53 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, November, 1942, p. 7. 
54 Nakano Seigō in his last public speech held at Hibiya Public Hall on December 21, 1942 quoted in 
Inomata, p. 515. 
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even in your dreams – about riding opportunities and living an easy and happy life. You 
share your soul with the Gods.”55 
 
Nakano, however, was not content with simply making general comments about Japan’s 
gloomy situation. Two tactics helped him say more without risking censorship. First, he used 
historical analogy to explain Japan’s situation and warn against the dire consequences of 
incapable government. Second, he combined the information supplied by the government with 
common-sense analysis. The unpleasant conclusions he derived through these two methods were 
both revealing to his audience and threatening to the government.  
Nakano had often used historical analogies in his writings and speeches, but as war-time 
censorship became stricter, he perfected the art. His lecture series on Hideyoshi, held in the 
second half of 1942 at the Tōhō-Dōshi-kai’s private academy, the Shintōjuku, can be read as 
critique of contemporary Japan by historical analogy. In his description of Hideyoshi’s life, 
Nakano concentrated on the two Korean invasions and argued that military defeat had been a 
function not only of the guerilla war waged by the Korean population but also of Japan’s inability 
to supply its troops on the mainland properly. Likewise, Nakano used the fall of Osaka castle (the 
stronghold of Hideyoshi’s forces) as a metaphor to warn against Japan’s coming fall. Warning 
that the castle had fallen for political, not military, reasons, he noted: “When a country perishes, 
we remember only the moment when the country was destroyed militarily. But the fall of a 
country is not a matter of a single day - it springs from different origins.” It is unlikely that the 
analogies to contemporary Japan’s situation were lost on Nakano’s audiences, or on the 70,000 
who bought the lecture transcripts after they were published in the spring of 1943 under the title 
“Taikō Hideyoshi.”56 
                                                     
55  Nakano Seigō quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2 p. 724. 
56 Nakano Seigō, “Taikō Hideyoshi” [啣虜┵便], (Tokyo, 1943), p. 397-98. 
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Inspired by this success, Nakano prepared a second lecture series in 1943 on the topic of 
the Kenmu Restoration, which according to Nakano had failed because the Emperor Go-Daigo 
had surrounded himself with self-serving sycophants. Nakano’s interpretation has been read as a 
critique of the Imperial Diet’s role in supporting the Tōjō government’s establishment of almost 
dictatorial power over Japan. Nakano also employed historical analogy in his 1943 Asahi News 
New Year’s editorial, which so enraged Tōjō that it marked a tipping point in Tōjō’s efforts to 
censor Nakano. After the editorial’s publication, Tōjō had Nakano’s writing effectively banned.  
 
To Raise the Realm Alone 
Historical analogy, however, left the conclusions unspoken. To arrive at a more explicit 
critique, Nakano often supplemented his historical references with a common-sense analysis of 
information provided in the media. Nowhere did he do this more brilliantly than in a lecture held 
at his alma mater, Waseda, on November 10, 1942. Some consider this speech, titled “To Raise 
the Realm Alone,” Nakano’s masterpiece.57 It contained many elements he had already developed 
in his lecture on Hideyoshi, but, more important, it also contained his ideas on the economic 
dimensions of a long-term war of attrition - an issue over which he had clashed with Kishi 
Nobusuke, Minister of Trade and Industry in the Tōjō cabinet, just one month earlier.  
On October 10, 1942, Nakano, Kishi and a representative of the Ministry of Finance (the 
minister himself was sick that day) had attended a symposium organized by the Teito Daily News 
[旱ジ荳荳范ⓥ] on the execution of a long-term war. Nakano was scheduled to speak second, 
after the Ministry of Finance official and before Kishi, but when he tried to step down from the 
speaker’s stand to give the word to Kishi, the enthusiastic audience demanded that he “Speak 
more!” Some pleaded with him to “please continue” while others shouted “Who cares about 
                                                     
57 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 645 but also Inomata p. 498. 
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Kishi?” [應荒骨拘航康腔豪広広糠]. 58 Eventually, it was decided that Kishi would deliver his 
speech as planned, but that afterward Nakano would speak again, affording him the chance to 
listen to Kishi’s speech before shredding it to pieces. Fired up by the enthusiastic audience, 
Nakano spoke the entire evening until 10:30 p.m. Cheering crowds surrounded his car when he 
left the building. Realizing that he had touched a nerve, Nakano made economic controls the 
heart of his speech at Waseda a month later.59  
The starting point of Nakano’s Waseda speech was the contention that Japan was engaged 
in a long-term war – a feasible if undesirable position against a weaker opponent, but “absolutely 
not desirable” against stronger ones such as England or America.60 According to Nakano, the 
conflict was a war of attrition that “the US will win in the end, thanks to their superior production 
capacity.” 61 The conclusion that the war would be decided by the combatants’ economic and 
industrial strength, not by spirit, brought Nakano into direct conflict with Japan’s military and 
civilian bureaucracies, which increasingly stressed the role of morale in the war’s execution.   
Nakano had ridiculed spiritual mobilization when it was still a minor issue in 1939, 
writing: “Someone who feeds his wife and children and sends his son off to war does not feel the 
need to be ‘spiritually mobilized’ by a public official.”62 As Japan’s military leaders boasted 
about the infantry’s “human bullet” frontal attacks [Ⓧ槧] and Japanese pilots’ ramming tactics 
[喪橲紅酷皚ヘ] as examples of the Yamato spirit, Nakano countered:   
 
                                                     
58 All quotes taken from Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 635. 
59 A summary of Nakano’s speech can be found in the “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], Tōtairiku, November 1942, p. 
4-15. 
60 Nakano Seigō “To Raise the Realm Alone” [啀真慎斥豪耕肱85鵠], in Tōtairiku, December 1942, p. 5.  
61 Ibid., p. 8.  
62 Nakano Seigō, “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Tōtairiku, January 1939, p. 4-5. 
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“When the sword I wield meets the sword of the enemy and my sword breaks, what will 
happen? I cannot win on account of my spirit alone. … They say that we should thank 
our soldiers at the front, that we should think about our soldiers at the front, but it is not 
enough to merely say these emotional phrases. …We must also supply them with the 
newest quality weapons in ever greater quantities.”63  
 
Having debunked spirit as the decisive factor in a long-term war, Nakano then claimed to 
reveal the reasons behind the government’s stress on spiritual mobilization - obscuring the failure 
of their economic policies and their failure to increase armament production to the degree 
necessary:  
 
“What stands out these days is that the statements made by the authorities suddenly all 
have taken on a spiritual tone. … The Minister of Industry and Commerce, Kishi, says 
similar things. He has implemented almost all the directives possible under the purview 
of the National Mobilization Law. … And now he says: ‘All we need from here on after 
is spirit.’ The implication being that the people have insufficient spirit.” 64 
 
To which Nakano countered: “If the government … with its absolute power has carried out 
all its policies and the results are not as expected, then it is the government’s spirit that needs to 
be re-examined.”65  
Having let the air out of the government’s stress on spiritual mobilization, Nakano 
redirected his attention to the more pressing issue of economic and industrial mobilization and the 
government’s mistakes therein. His critique was twofold. First, he used examples from Japan’s 
lumber, produce and housing industries to show how government controls had produced 
inefficiencies and waste.66 Second, he took issue with Kishi’s ideological position, in particular a 
                                                     
63 Nakano Seigō “To Raise the Realm Alone” [啀真慎斥豪耕肱85鵠], quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 
681. 
64 Nakano Seigō “To Raise the Realm alone” [啀真慎斥豪耕肱85鵠], in Tōtairiku, December 1942, p. 9. 
65 Ibid., p. 10. 
66 Thanks to his frequent trips through Japan’s country side and thanks to his many party followers all 
over Japan, Nakano had access to information about the failed government’s policies in those three 
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statement made during the symposium a month earlier when Kishi had said that Japan’s war 
against England and America was simultaneously a war against capitalism, Judaism and the 
Anglo-Saxon ideology of profit-making. Kishi had contrasted these foreign ideologies with 
Japan’s ideology of serving the emperor and nation. Nakano retorted: “Long before being 
exposed to the influence of England and America, Japan knew profit-making,” listing the names 
of famous Tokugawa merchants to support his point. 67  He asked: “What is wrong with 
liberalism? Nothing is wrong with it. It is the decadence of liberalism that is wrong. It is 
absolutely all right to stand up against the oppression of a bad administration and assert the 
sacredness of the individual, and demand individual freedom.”68  
Then he launched a counterattack against the new bureaucrats in general, and Kishi in 
particular, denouncing them as socialists intent on creating an economic system that “combines 
the worst of liberalism with the worst of socialism.”69 Unlike liberalism, which if left unchecked 
would result in the most able businessmen creating efficient monopolies, heavy socialist 
interference in the economy would result in sub-par businessmen with good administration 
connections creating inefficient monopolies – far worse for the economy as a whole. Once again 
Nakano supported this point with Germany’s WW1 experience, and further claimed: “Socialism 
has evolved from liberalism. It is a form of politics that enslaves the stupid masses and kills the 
sacred freedom of the individual.”70  
Some writers have mistakenly taken Nakano’s defense of liberalism and capitalism as a 
signal of his rejection of Fascism and Nazism. Nakano continued to believe that fascism and 
                                                                                                                                                             
industries. Information on the lumber industry, for example, was supplied by Tōhōkai member Hirano 
Saburō [霸ǒ申ア] who ran a lumber business. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 666. 
67 Nakano Seigō quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 653. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 659. 
70 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 669. 
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totalitarianism (as he understood them) represented a third way, a synthesis evolved from 
liberalism and socialism, and that Japan should adopt these ideologies rather than the left-leaning 
socialist ideas of the new bureaucrats. Completely misunderstanding the nature of Nazism, 
Nakano told his student audience: “Hitler rejects social-democratic totalitarianism and is a kind 
of individualist who upholds the value of the individual.”71 Nakano added:  
 
“Totalitarianism does not destroy the individual. By paying respect to individuality, it 
moves the total. Social democracy suppresses individuality; it gathers people who 
spiritually and intellectually have no leg to stand on and with quantity tries to control 
quality.”72  
 
Having displayed such a tremendous lack of understanding of the Nazi totalitarian 
regime’s disrespect for the individual, Nakano recommended that the Waseda students read 
Hitler’s “Mein Kampf,” if possible in the original German version.73 One can only wish that he 
had done so himself more closely.  
Nakano ended his speech with a dire prediction about Japan’s future. Referencing an 
Imperial Navy officer’s quote that “this war is about eating or being eaten,” Nakano warned his 
student audience that “It is not just about eating. It is a war in which we may also be eaten. This 
is no joke.”74 A passionate appeal followed: “The giant ship of Japan is sailing through troubled 
waters. It is dangerous to load it to its full capacity with opportunists. Wake up! Stand up alone 
and pull the realm along [啀真慎斥宣肱85黒玠]. This is what I most sincerely hope from you, 
my dear students.”75  
                                                     
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 676. 
73 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 682. 
74 Nakano Seigō “To Raise the Realm Alone” [啀真慎斥豪耕肱85鵠], in Tōtairiku, December 1942, p. 8.  
75 Nakano Seigō quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 684. 
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Nakano’s Last Public Speech  
The speech at Waseda was not only Nakano’s best, but also one of his last (leaving aside 
speeches given in the Diet). He spoke publicly once more on December 21, 1942, 
commemorating the first anniversary of the outbreak of the Pacific War. Aware of the critical 
content of Nakano’s speech at Waseda in November, the authorities issued permission to hold the 
rally only after Mitamura Takeo had promised that “this time we won’t attack the government.”76 
The authorities warned, however, that any such attack would see the rally stopped and the 
audience dismissed. On the day of the rally, though the speech did not start until 1 p.m., queues 
of attendees started forming by 6 a.m. In the end, only 4,000 of the more than 10,000 wishing to 
hear Nakano were let into Hibiya Public Hall. Somewhere between six and eight thousand 
followed the speech over a speaker system outside.  
When preparing the speech - entitled “Formation of a People’s War Camp!” [楼鴈ª氣蛤
排惚46癩皇国玠] - Nakano had largely ignored the government’s warnings. The content roughly 
mirrored that of the Waseda speech, except that in adapting it to a non-academic audience, 
Nakano excised the more philosophical elements. In their place, he emphasized the strategic 
questions of increasing production, replacing transport shipping lost to enemy action, delivering 
war-related goods to the front lines, and the government’s information policy.77 Stylistically, the 
speech was also more pugnacious, and where the Waseda audience had listened silently, the 
Hibiya Public Hall crowd responded frenetically. Nakano ended the speech by proclaiming 
“Japan is absolutely in danger.” Describing the Tōjō government as a “slave system” and 
                                                     
76 Mitamura quoted in Inomata p. 512. 
77 Through Yamashita Kamesaburō, Tsuda Shingo and Hinoshita Tōgo Nakano had been informed about 
the staggering losses of Japan’s merchant fleet, the desolate state of its economy and the appalling 
consequences these two factors had for the lives of front-line soldiers.  
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demanding that the people “stand up”78 against it was, as Ogata put it: “a declaration of war 
against the Tōjō cabinet.”79  
Though the authorities had warned Nakano that they would interrupt the rally if he 
criticized the government (a direct phone line between the monitoring officers and the police 
station had been put up just for this purpose), faced with the hall’s bloodthirsty crowd they did 
not dare warn, let alone stop, Nakano. That does not mean, however, that the authorities remained 
inactive. Irritated by the speech’s content and alarmed by the crowd’s reaction, the government 
decided to withhold future public-speaking permits, thus ending Nakano’s public speechmaking 
and mass agitation.80 Nakano’s past political activities had rested on two pillars: his writing and 
his speeches. The government’s move clipped the latter and a clipping of the former followed 
soon.  
 
The New Year’s Editorial in the Asahi News 
At the end of 1942, the editors of the Asahi News approached Nakano to write the New 
Year’s editorial for the paper’s January 1 issue. After spending a week or so contemplating 
different ideas, he finally wrote the editorial on December 31 in about 40 minutes.81 Entitled 
“Wartime Prime Ministers” [皚蕁幤ùルクス], the piece outlined the characteristics Nakano believed 
necessary for a wartime leader:  
                                                     
78 Nakano Seigō quoted in Inomata p. 512-15. 
79 Ogata, p. 45.  
80 Mitamura who was responsible for obtaining the permits to hold speeches recalls how he was informed 
by the official in charge at the Ministry of the Interior that “in the future you are not to appear at public 
speeches or lectures. Especially you, Mitamura, and Nakano are not to appear. If you apply for the 
permission to hold a speech rally at which either you or Nakano appear, the permit will not be granted no 
matter where the speech is to take place. Let us be clear about this point. Moreover, any speech held under 
the auspices of the Tōhōkai, no matter where it is to be held, will not receive permission. We do not 
prohibit the activities of the Tōhō-Dōshi-kai and therefore it may continue in its present form….”  Quoted 
in Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁驥啌], “Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?”, p. 49.  
81 See Ogata, p. 46.  
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“The qualification for a wartime leader is absolute strength. War is the most violent 
form of struggle on a grand scale. In war, weakness is a sin. Countries are not destroyed 
through economics or through military defeat, but because the leaders lack self-
confidence and the people are confused about the natural course of events.”82  
 
Nakano elaborated: “In order to be strong, [the leader] must be loyal, moderate, honest, 
and magnanimous.”83 Since “there are limits to the strength of an individual,” Nakano continued, 
“for the Prime Minister to become really strong, he has to become one with the burning 
patriotism of the people, stirring it up at times.”84  Nakano illustrated his point with various 
historical examples, praising Clemenceau’s and Lenin’s determination to continue the war and 
condemning Germany’s leaders during WW1 for being out of touch with the people. Historical 
examples from Asia’s experience included Katsura Tarō, who led Japan during the Russo-
Japanese war of 1904-05 and, especially, Chu-ko Liang85 minister of the state of Shū during the 
Three-Kingdom Period, which Nakano dubbed “a classical example of a minister in a time of 
emergency.” Nakano wrote:  
 
“Chu-ko Liang led his soldiers like a god and looked upon the people like a merciful 
father. … He did not seek a false reputation, nor did he pretend to be a hero, but instead 
he mobilized the people on behalf of his lord. While carrying the entire responsibility 
for the nation, he avoided gaining glory … about himself he would only say: ‘The 
ministers of the former Emperor knew self-restraint.’ [వᏢ⤿߇⻯ᘕߥࠆࠍ⍮ࠆ] … 
He had self-restraint [⻯ᘕ], which is why in his private life he was pure and simple. 
                                                     
82 Nakano Seigō “War-time Prime Ministers”, [ᚢᤨቿ⋧⺰], Asahi News January 1, 1943, quoted in 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 697. 
83 Ibid. quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 699. 
84 Ibid., quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 697. 
85 Chu-ko Liang (Zhu-ge Liang) [⻉⪾੫] (181-234) also known as K’ung-ming (Kong-ming) [ሹ᣿], 
minister in the state of Shū [ⱍ] during the period of three kingdoms. The other two kingdoms were the 
state of Wêi (Wei) [
߉
㝵] and the state of Wu [
ߏ
ん?]. 
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…Since he was loyal, he had self-restraint, and since he had self-restraint he had 
integrity.”86  
 
Nakano then showed how these characteristics informed Chu-ko Liang’s actions and were 
reflected in his policies: 
 
“When he met defeat in war, he did not hide [the truth] from the people, but made 
everything from beginning to end public. Criticizing himself, he asked the realm for 
understanding and advice. It is recorded that paradoxically this lifted morale and made 
the people forget defeat. …While he had prepared himself for a long-term war, he 
thought of a hundred schemes and never let a chance slip by to decide the war in a short 
battle. … He displayed the same undefeatable character as Clemenceau or Foch.”87  
 
This was the content of the editorial that Nakano submitted to Ogata, who in turn passed it 
on to the censor’s office. Since Nakano had not directly mentioned, let alone criticized, either 
Prime Minister Tōjō or a member of his cabinet, the editorial was returned from the censorship 
office to the Asahi without any alterations or corrections. And yet when Tōjō read it on January 
1, 1943, he immediately called the Bureau of Information and had the sale of this issue of the 
Asahi News prohibited. It was too late, for by that time most of that day’s newspapers had already 
been delivered into readers’ hands, a fact that made the Asahi employees burst out in spontaneous 
shouts of “Banzai” when they heard about Tōjō’s reaction.  
Puzzled – or pretending to be puzzled - Nakano visited the Information Bureau’s 
censorship office to inquire why Tōjō had ordered the distribution freeze, but was unable to learn 
anything except that Tōjō had been furious. Ogata suggested that to “someone insecure about his 
ability for self-restraint and integrity, the text was like a dagger to the heart.”88 Indeed, it is not 
too difficult to understand how, given the strained relationship between Nakano and the Tōjō 
                                                     
86 Nakano Seigō, “War-time Prime Ministers”, [皚蕁幤ùルクス], Asahi News January 1, 1943, quoted in 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 699. 
87 Ibid., quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 699. 
88 Ogata, p. 112-13. 
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regime, the article could have been offensive, especially Nakano’s description of Chu-ko Liang. 
In Nakano’s description of the state of Shū of the Three Kingdom Period as “narrow and poor in 
natural resources” and later of Chu-ko Liang leading his country in a “long-term” war against the 
two enemy states of Wei and Wu, no contemporary reader would have missed the parallels with 
Japan’s situation in WW2. Likewise, when Nakano described how Chu-ko Liang, “did not hide 
[the truth] from the people when he met defeat in war but made everything from beginning to end 
public” and “criticizing himself, asked the realm for understanding and advice” which 
“paradoxically lifted morale and made the people forget defeat,” it was equally clear that Nakano 
was criticizing Tōjō’s handling of military information. Finally, Nakano told Ogata when 
submitting the editorial that he had been inspired by Chu-ko Liang’s concept of ‘self-restraint’ 
and that “the gist of the piece is that we demand ‘self-restraint’ from Tōjō.”89 Accordingly, Tōjō 
was right in assuming that Nakano had meant to criticize his government. The central question 
surrounding this New Year’s editorial is not whether it contained criticism, but rather why Tōjō 
chose to react in such a heavy-handed manner - and thus to lend credence to Nakano’s criticism. 
Whatever the answer, Tōjō’s reaction convinced Nakano that Tōjō’s regime had to be 
overthrown.  
 
End of Nakano’s Career as an Author 
Just as the government’s reaction to Nakano’s December 1942 speech had effectively 
killed his public-speaking career, the New Year’s editorial put an end to his published writing. 
The censors who had waved the piece through only to see it banned by Tōjō himself were now all 
too eager to ensure that Tōjō should never again catch them doing sloppy work. It therefore 
became increasingly difficult for Nakano to publish his monthly editorials in Tōtairiku without 
substantial parts being censored.  Editor Hasegawa Shun, who was in charge of shuttling between 
                                                     
89 Nakano quoted in Ogata, p. 46 and p. 112-13. 
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the editorial office and the censorship bureau with the magazine’s pre-publication drafts, recalled 
how on one occasion officials told him: “It has nothing to do with the text. We are not telling you 
to do this or that with the words and sentences. We have to obliterate Nakano as a human 
being.”90  
Nakano continued writing nevertheless, but the frustration at seeing his worked crippled by 
censors discouraged him from engaging in any major project. The publication of “Taikō 
Hideyoshi” – his 1942 lecture series at Tōhōkai’s academy - was Nakano’s last success as an 
author. Produced under difficult conditions as paper was becoming scarce due to the war, the 
book nonetheless went through several reprints, eventually selling 70,000 copies. This success 
encouraged Nakano to prepare his second lecture series on the Kenmu Restoration. Because of 
the government’s censorship, however, this second lecture series was not published during 
Nakano’s lifetime.91 The end of Nakano’s speechmaking and writing activities did not squelch his 
opposition to the government. In the first half of 1943, he concentrated on opposition in the Diet, 
and when that failed he focused on the Senior Statesmen scheme.  
 
The Special Amendment to the War-Time Criminal Law 
As the war dragged on throughout 1942, its consequences were felt not only in the form of 
food and other shortages but also in the form of ever-increasing government imposition on 
citizens’ lives. Frustration with these deprivations mounted in various corners of society and 
culminated in the spring of 1943, when the introduction of the “Special Amendment to the War-
Time Criminal Law [皚蕁馴征０迩┃膃驟贐]” provided a rallying point for the opposing forces 
in and out of the Diet. On the pretext of maintaining public peace during wartime, the 
                                                     
90 Hasegawa Shun [憎〞擺戮], “Politics and Human Beings” [膕齠膏斥侮]), (Tokyo, 1960),  p. 107. 
91 The lectures were published posthumously by the Nakano Seigō Society of Fukuoka as the first part of 
a series of selected works by Nakano. Nakano Seigō, “Nakano Seigō: Selected Works: History of the 
Kenmu Restoration” [腎ǒ驟悩ぬ滾瑍椥驥腎85咤別], (Tokyo, 1953).  
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government proposed an amendment to the wartime criminal law, itself passed only a year 
earlier, which would label (and criminalize) various forms of political opposition as interference 
in the conduct of the war, thus providing the government a powerful tool for dealing with 
opponents. 
One of the bill’s opponents outside the Diet was right-wing activist Amano Tatsuo, whom 
Nakano had known since his days at the Tōhōjiron, and with whom he grow closer in the coming 
months. With the intention of “speaking frankly to Prime Minister Tōjō,” Amano had written a 
highly inflammatory article attacking the proposed amendment as a government attempt to use 
the war as an excuse to expand its powers. Accordingly he demanded that this “bill to change the 
form of government should be called the ‘dictatorial military government bill’.”92  Amano’s 
outspoken criticism of Tōjō earned him the government’s enmity – the article was banned and its 
author arrested – as well as the respect and goodwill of Nakano, who approached Amano after the 
latter was released from jail.  
Opposition inside the Diet, where the bill was introduced in the second half of February 
and delegated to a deliberative committee, was even more spectacular. Nakano’s follower 
Mitamura Takeo, who served on the deliberative committee, questioned the bill for the better part 
of three days before rejecting it, saying “when a given cabinet tries to deal with opposition 
movements, or movements trying to disturb or change the policies of that cabinet, by using laws, 
then the government becomes like the bakufu … this law would make the cabinet inviolable.”93 
Tōjō attended the deliberative council in the days before it was scheduled to make its decision, 
but, despite his presence, 11 of its 20 members opposed the bill, six demanded that it be changed 
and only three supported it without qualification. Tōjō then dissolved the deliberative committee 
                                                     
92 All quotes taken from Amano Tatsuo [啀ǒケ啌]; “Japan’s Noble Cause under the Kokutai – the First 
Condition to Winning the Holy War” [荳袿楼喪疹貢哢コ鞭薙―ⓢ皚氣蛤貢¶慎P浅], in Ishin Kōron [
ⅷ范鍍ルクス], March 1943. 
93 Mitamura Takeo quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 708.   
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without taking a vote and put the bill directly to the lower house, causing an uproar. Diet 
members Nishio Suehiro [O悃袰杰] and Hirano Rikizō [霸ǒ陪申] gathered 171 signatures 
opposing the bill. 
 Nakano himself sought the support of Miki Bukichi, a former ally from his Minseitō days, 
and Hatoyama Ichirō, formerly affiliated with the Seiyūkai, in opposing the bill. Miki agreed 
immediately, but Hatoyama needed some persuasion, eventually saying: “In the end, we are the 
last survivors of constitutional government … all we can do is to fight that evil law.”94  
When the bill was scheduled to be discussed in the Diet that Friday, the three men took 
turns at the speaker’s stand, effectively blocking it. With Miki occupying the chairman’s chair, 
Hatoyama warned his colleagues that “the Diet has already stopped fulfilling its function. A Diet 
that is always in agreement [with the government] risks being a source of many evils.” Nakano 
followed, saying, “this government inside and out takes the shape of dictatorial politics, 
something that should be feared.”95 Tōjō’s supporters tried pulling Miki off his chair, but he held 
on - clawing his fingers into the table until about 30 like-minded opponents came to his aid. 
Miki’s resistance enabled him, Hatoyama and Nakano to hold out for three hours, and the session 
closed without a vote on the issue. 
Then, however, the parliamentarians left for the weekend – giving the government two 
days to have the military police ‘invite’ individual members of parliament to spend the weekend 
in a Japanese resort town, where they were convinced to vote in favor of the bill when the Diet 
met the following week. Before the bill was put to a vote on Monday, MP Mitsui Sakichi [噌棲
双便] climbed atop his chair and shouted: “Those who vote in favor for this law have been 
bought by the government in Hakone and Atami. Anybody who has been bought does not have 
                                                     
94 Having been a member of the Seiyūkai, Hatoyama had been subject to Nakano’s biting criticism more 
than once in the past, which may account for his initial reluctance in cooperating with Nakano. Hatoyama 
quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 709. 
95 Both quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 710. 
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the right to participate in the ballot. Get out!”96 When the vote was taken, however, there were 
only about 40 votes against it, enough to pass it in its original version. MP Sasakawa Ryōichi97 
wondered: “Where have all those 175 signatories gone?”98 While Tōjō won this battle, Miki, 
Hatoyama and Nakano soon got another chance.  
 
Tea-Serving Sycophants 
On June 15, 1943, the 82nd extraordinary Diet opened to discuss two government-
introduced bills, one concerning food shortages [㔟1/8B淺徙ø] and the other the control of 
businesses [征釡與喋].99 Nakano, Mitamura, Miki, and Hatoyama decided beforehand to use this 
occasion to launch an attack against both bills, the subservient Diet and the Tōjō cabinet itself. 
Hatoyama spoke first, arguing that since both bills directly impacted the lives of the people, the 
government’s plan to pass them within three days should be rejected and that normal procedures 
should be followed. Hatoyama’s request was rejected by Yokusan-Seiji-kai director Kokawa 
Gōtarō [恠擺シ啣ア].  
Nakano spoke next. After expressing his disappointment about Kokawa’s decision to reject 
Hatoyama’s motion, he launched an all-out attack on the Yokusan-Seiji-kai- dominated Diet:  
 
“When considering today’s political situation, the attitude of the leaders of the 
Yokusan-Seiji-kai as shown in the speech of Mr. Kokawa points to a fundamental and 
important problem in the running of the Diet. If you run the Diet according to the 
wishes of the government, then the Diet is all name and no content [衄鞭㏍帑]. 
Moreover, there is only one party in Japan’s Diet at present and that is the Yokusan-
Seiji-kai. If the leaders of this single party concentrate their minds entirely on moving 
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99 Nakatani Takeyo [腎〞驥身], “The War-time History of the Diet” [皚蕁共同組合善別] (Tokyo, 1973) p. 160-
63.  
 365 
according to the wishes of the government, then the Tōjō cabinet will turn entirely into 
a dictatorship and those in power will be surrounded by a gathering of tea-serving 
sycophants [15亞厨 ]. If so, even rulers with good intentions will be turned into 
insubordinate ministers and the country will perish. Japan’s problems are the tea-
serving sycophants of the political upper classes.” 100 
 
At this point, members of the house who felt - rightly - that an insult had been hurled at 
them rose in unison and stormed toward Nakano, who still stood behind the rostrum. Miki 
Bukichi, however, stood in their way, shouting: “Tea–serving sycophants, be quiet!”101 Miki 
repeated his words when the house members tried to shout Nakano into silence. Amid the fray, 
Mitamura, Nishio Suehiro and others came to the three rebels’ rescue, surrounding them with a 
protective wall of bodies.102  
In the end, the outcome of the three men’s defiant stance in the Diet was mixed. The press 
applauded them, writing that the tumultuous events were a “manifestation of the parliament’s true 
function and not bad by nature. This Diet has to reexamine its original function.”103 The two bills, 
however, passed as planned.  
The reaction among the rebel MPs also varied. Nakano withdrew from the Yokusan-Seiji-
kai in protest on June 21, followed by Hatoyama on the 22nd and four more members of 
parliament in the following days.104 Miki emerged from the experience convinced that further 
opposition against Tōjō was futile and potentially self-destructive. Accordingly, he prepared to 
retire to his native Takamatsu to avoid the backlash he was sure would follow their affront. 
Before leaving, Miki tried to convince Nakano to follow his example and go into hiding, or at 
                                                     
100 Nakano Seigō speaking to the Diet on June 17, 1943, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 728. 
101 Miki Bukichi quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 728. 
102 The dramatic scene is recounted in Nishio Suehiro [O悃袰杰], “The Political Memoirs of Nishio 
Suehiro” [O悃袰杰貢膕齠き蟷], (Tokyo, 1968), p. 17-25.    
103 “A Tribute to the Wind of the Gods” [范城⇌], in Asahi News, June 18, 1943.  
104  See Nakano Yasuo, vol., 2 p. 729. 
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least to keep a low profile, so he could fight another day. By now, however, Nakano’s 
determination to overthrow Tōjō had hardened him completely. When Miki warned Nakano that 
Tōjō might destroy him and he could end up like Yoshida Shōin, Nakano replied: “I will become 
like Yoshida Shōin. …You can become like Katsura or like Saigō Takamori; you may save your 
body and plan for the future, but Nakano Seigō is not a man to do such a lukewarm and cowardly 
thing.” 105  
Nakano’s determination to topple Tōjō meant he missed his last chance to achieve a sort of 
compromise with the Prime Minister when it presented itself in later weeks. Wishing to neutralize 
the threat Nakano posed, Tōjō made a feeble attempt to co-opt Nakano by offering him a 
government position. Through a middleman, Tōjō asked Nakano if he would be interested in 
becoming President of the Information Bureau, which, essentially, would have made him 
responsible for the government’s propaganda activities. Given Nakano’s oratory and writing 
skills, he might have gone down in history as Japan’s Goebbels had he accepted the offer. Instead, 
Nakano “told him [Tōjō’s middleman] straight and clear that the only way to find a compromise 
between me and Tōjō is for him to submit.”106 In retrospect, this was the final point at which 
some yielding on Nakano’s side might have softened Tōjō’s stance (and saved Nakano’s life). 
After Nakano rejected his offer, however, Tōjō was forced to find another way to ensure that the 
tumultuous scenes of the 81st regular and 82nd irregular Diet sessions would not be repeated when 
the Diet convened in the fall. As the carrot had failed, Tōjō tried the stick. In the interim, however, 
Nakano staged one final assault.  
 
                                                     
105 Conversation between Nakano Seigō and Miki Bukichi quoted in Miki Bukichi [申袍驥便], “Fight to 
the Death against the Tōjō Cabinet” [覩襭塔隆膏貢髞帰], part of a special feature “Remembering Nakano 
Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩惚畫康], in Japan and the Japanese [荳袿沸砿荳袿斥], January 1956, p. 14-16. 
106 Nakano Seigō quoted in Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁驥啌], “Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?”, 
p. 78. The entire episode is recounted in Kaneko Sada’ichi [ů岌巵慎], “Nakano Seigō as known by one 
soldier” [慎ヲ斥貢ö鵠腎ǒ驟悩], in Japan and the Japanese [荳袿沸砿荳袿斥]; 7 (4), April 1956, p. 
94-97. 
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The Senior Statesmen Scheme 
Nakano’s opposition to Tōjō thus far had been primarily directed against the Prime 
Minister’s policies, laws and, on occasion, ministers, but the Senior Statesmen scheme Nakano 
promoted in the summer of 1943 aimed directly at bringing down the Tōjō cabinet itself. Nakano 
hoped to achieve this by working through the Senior Statesmen [ĩ55], an advisory group 
consisting mostly of retired Prime Ministers that also included the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal 
[塔哢55] and the President of the Privy Council [誄廡派]. Though this group had no formal 
foundation in Japan’s constitution, the Senior Statesmen took over the role formerly played by 
the genrō, most importantly by suggesting Prime Ministers to the Emperor.  
Given their historical influence in a Prime Minister’s selection, Nakano hoped that the 
Senior Statesmen could also suggest that a Prime Minister retire. While this was without 
precedent and accordingly the chances of success were small, the scheme was not entirely 
without merit. Only a year later Tōjō was, in fact, brought down by the Senior Statesmen’s 
pressure. The alternatives open to Nakano, moreover, offered even less hope for success. A 
parliamentary vote of no confidence - which had brought down past governments - was 
unthinkable given Tōjō’s firm hold over the Diet. A military coup d’état was equally unlikely. 
And Nakano himself continued to dismiss terrorism as a means of achieving political aims. When 
one of his followers approached him with a plan to assassinate Tōjō, Nakano said: “Even if you 
kill Tōjō, there only will be a second and a third Tōjō to replace the first. Not only that, you will 
also provide the military with a pretext for imposing martial law. Therefore, you must not use 
terrorism.”107 Compared to these alternatives, the idea of having the Senior Statesmen pressure 
Tōjō to resign seemed an attractive, non-violent solution.  
                                                     
107 Nakano quoted in Nagata Masayoshi [鵑譓驟コ]; “Remembering my Beloved Teacher” [灌杳惚畫康
]; in Seigō-kai eds. [驟悩善], “Nakano Seigō is Alive” [腎ǒ驟悩購﨟攻肱広鵠], (Tokyo: Akane-shobō [
巷拘講蟷蘯], 1954), p.81-82. According to Mori Shōzō, Nakano dismissal of terrorism was not as outright 
as this suggests. Given his connections to the Genyōsha he may have at least considered terrorism at one 
point. See Mori Shōzō [迢驟24], “The Whirlwind of 20 Years”[茯城貢性筆朮], (Tokyo, 1968), p. 318. 
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The Decision to Act 
While it is unclear where the idea for the Senior Statesmen scheme originated, the catalyst 
for putting it into practice was a meeting in February 1943 attended by Nakano, Nakamura Ryōzō 
- a navy officer and the Tōhōkai’s advisor on naval affairs - and two officials from the Cabinet 
Planning Board, Hinoshita Tōgō and his superior Tanabe Tadao.  
Nakamura spoke first, relaying news of the defeat at Midway, during which many of the 
Navy’s most seasoned pilots had been lost, and continuing with a bleak assessment of Japan’s 
situation in the Pacific. Next to speak was Tanabe, who only recently had caused a major stir by 
writing an article highly critical of the government’s management of the wartime economy. 
Tanabe had concluded his article, which was immediately censored, by demanding: “If after a 
year [in power] the Prime Minister and the economic minister in charge of increasing production 
have failed to do so, we can even demand that they commit harakiri, just like a general who has 
been defeated in battle. We do not accept any excuses in this matter.”108 During the meeting, he 
noted that the government’s production plans were all based on figures “that were off by 20 to 
50%” and that hopes that “the resources gained in the south since 1943 would make it possible to 
increase armament production” were equally illusory. Tanabe doubted openly whether “the Tōjō 
cabinet was qualified to wage a modern war” and concluded that Japan was bound to lose this 
one. Even though Nakano knew of Japan’s dire situation before, having listened to their speeches, 
Nakano was visibly surprised and remained speechless for a while. Then he said: “Having heard 
you out, I cannot remain still. Let us rise to action and establish a strong political system.”109 
  
                                                     
108 Tanabe Tadao [譓シ泗渣], “Precondition for Increasing Productive Capacity”[﨟﨡陪匆樛貢撚糶], in 
Chūō Kōron [腎啅鍍ルクス], January 1943 quoted in Inomata p. 530. 
109 All the quotes are taken from Tanabe Tadao [譓シ泗渣], “The Death of Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩貢
髞]; in Tokyo News [覩静紘国酷], February, 1958. 
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Selecting Allies 
Nakano tried in the ensuing weeks to win allies for this cause, and succeeded in enlisting 
the already-mentioned Amano Tatsuo. A lawyer by training, Amano had earned some notoriety 
as a right-wing activist for breaking up strikes (notably a strike at his father’s musical instrument 
factory), as well as for his involvement in the 1933 Shimpeitai Incident and in the attempted 
assassination of Hiranuma in 1941.110 Cooperating with Amano thus exposed Nakano to the risk 
of being associated with right-wing terrorism and losing some respectability. As this was a 
liability in the eyes of the Senior Statesmen on whose cooperation the entire scheme hinged, 
some of Nakano’s followers advised him against cooperating with Amano. Nakano disregarded 
their advice both because he appreciated Amano’s genuine opposition to Tōjō and because, in the 
fight against the Prime Minister, Nakano needed all the help he could get.111 Amano thus became 
Nakano’s main ally in executing the Senior Statesmen scheme.  
Nakano and Amano tried recruiting other candidates to their cause, particularly Ōkawa 
Shūmei.112 Though he declined, they did win Matsumae Shigeyo,113 head of the civil engineering 
works department in the Ministry of Communications, whom Nakano had met when both served 
                                                     
110 Nakano had served as a witness in Amano’s court trial following the incident. His testimony can be 
found in “Contents of Nakano Seigō’s Testimonial concerning the Shimpeitai Incident” [腎ǒ驟悩鳰貢范
度麗征浅貢火ク塔廂], in Tōtairiku, September 1939, p. 117-121.  
111 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 714-5. The mistrust that Nakano’s followers felt toward Amano, was 
reciprocated by Amano’s followers feelings toward Nakano, whom based on his past track record they 
believed to be lacking perseverance and determination. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 722.  
112 Ōkawa Shūmei later recalled: “I was pressured passionately to agree [to cooperate] with the movement 
for the installment of General Ugaki [as Prime Minister]. One day there was a phone call from Nakano 
saying that he had gotten hold of a chicken and inviting me to eat it with him. When I went over to his 
place, it turned out to be an excuse for in reality he wanted to talk to me about establishing the Ugaki 
cabinet. Amano was also present, and even though they left nothing untried to convince me, in the end I did 
not agree [to cooperate]. Listening to Amano I was impressed by his rhetoric and passion. The reason why 
I did not agree was that I knew Ugaki well, and he simply was not the person to perform such a stunt as 
leading Japan into peace in opposition to Tōjō.” quoted in Inomata p. 566-67, quote taken from Ōkawa 
Shūmei [哢擺鳳蕚]; “My Impression of Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩貢貧〵]; in Kokuron [楼ルクス], October, 
1953.  
113 Matsumae Shigeyoshi [觚撚ĩコ] (1901 - ??), bureaucrat and politician. 
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in the IRAA and there found common cause in their opposition to bureaucratic management of 
the economy. Since the Pacific War’s outbreak, Matsumae had gathered the most talented 
engineers from different fields and ministries to conduct first-hand research by visiting factories 
nationwide to determine Japan’s actual production capacity. Matsumae’s findings, summarized in 
a 150-page report, were shockingly bleak: First, the armament plans published by the Tōjō 
government lacked any base in reality. Second, given Japan’s actual production capacity, the 
country could not possibly win the war.114 Third and finally, since Tōjō was unable to face these 
facts, he was unfit to lead Japan. Matsumae had his report mimeographed and distributed among 
the Senior Statesmen and the high-ranking naval officers. Upon learning of this report, Nakano 
visited Matsumae and convinced him easily to join the Senior Statesmen scheme. Thus, the group 
of conspirators – with Nakano, Amano, Mitamura, Tanabe, Hinoshita, and Matsumae at its core 
and others (e.g., Hatoyama Ichirō) ready to lend a helping hand from the fringes – was complete.  
As the ranks of the conspirators swelled, the outlines of their scheme started taking shape. 
Roughly speaking, the idea was to present the information gathered by Tanabe, Hinoshita and 
Matsumae to those Senior Statesmen known to be critical of Tōjō, in hopes that the findings 
would spur them into action. The statesmen would then confront Tōjō during the one of the 
group’s regular meetings, ask him to resign and propose General Ugaki Kazuo as the next Prime 
Minister. While the Senior Statesmen would work at the top of the political hierarchy, Nakano, 
Amano and their respective followers would prepare the ground for Tōjō’s fall by distributing 
information among Japan’s political elites that showed Tōjō’s incompetence.  
 Putting the plan into practice was more complicated. First, Nakano had to decide who 
among the Senior Statesmen could be approached. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Kido Kō’ichi, 
who had suggested Tōjō as Prime Minister in 1941, was dismissed immediately. President of the 
                                                     
114 A preliminary report prepared by Matsumae had been published under the title “Nihon Gijutsu-ron” [
荳袿砌ヘルクス] and the royalties from this provided the funds to expand and continue the research. A 
summary of his findings can be found in Matsumae Shigeyoshi [觚撚ĩコ], “Diary of the 2nd Class 
Private” [性̌度ヒ], (Tokyo, 1977), p. 17-23.  
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Privy Council Hara Yoshimichi [譜陽ぐ] and president of the Yokusan-Seiji-kai Abe Nobuyuki 
were also discounted, as they were considered to be favorably disposed toward Tōjō. In the case 
of Hiranuma, the situation was trickier. A staunch conservative himself, Hiranuma was known to 
take a critical view of Tōjō’s expansion of power, but both Nakano and Amano had alienated 
Hiranuma in the past. Nakano had insulted Hiranuma when the latter became Prime Minister in 
early 1939, calling him a “mummy of a horse from Korea” [衲靜㮈貢財婚碕].115 Amano had 
been implicated in the failed assassination of Hiranuma carried out by members of his Kin’nō-
Makoto-Musubi-kai. Accordingly, the conspirators focused their efforts on former Prime 
Ministers Konoe Fumimaro, Wakatsuki Reijirō, Okada Keisuke, Hirota Kōki, and Yonai 
Mitsumasa.  
 
Karuizawa  
The task of convincing the Senior Statesmen was to be carried out in Karuizawa, a resort 
town outside Tokyo where the upper classes spent the year’s hottest weeks. To this end Nakano, 
Amano, Hinoshita, Mitamura, and Matsumae left Tokyo at the end of July. Seeking to avoid 
raising the suspicion of the police or kempeitai, Nakano and Amano traveled with their sons, 
maintaining the appearance of a family outing. Soon, however, Nakano grew tired of worrying 
about the police and declared: “Unlike Amano and Mitamura, I am not good at paying attention 
to the military or the higher police and moving about like a spy.” Once they checked into their 
Hotel in Karuizawa, he went a step further, saying: “I don’t like to conspire in the shade [緋㌙], I 
like to conspire in the open daylight [蔽㌙].”116 Given that the scheme ultimately failed because 
                                                     
115 Nakano quoted in Inomata p. 568-9. 
116 Both quotes taken from Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 735. 
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Tōjō got wind of it (though it remains far from clear how this happened), one wonders if a more 
secretive approach would not have been more sensible.117 
Over the coming days, Hinoshita and Tanabe visited Konoe, Ugaki, and Hatoyama, while 
Matsumae visited Konoe. In each meeting, the conspirators presented their hosts with their 
findings on the state of the Japanese economy and their dire conclusions for the conduct of the 
war. They ended their presentation with a passionate appeal to inform the Emperor and have Tōjō 
dismissed. 118  Nakano appears to have been skeptical about whether the meetings would be 
sufficient to rouse the Senior Statesmen into action. At one point he expressed his doubts, saying:  
 
“They are useless, those guys. They are like those mechanical toys. If you don’t wind 
them up, they won’t move. When I stand in front of them and talk to them they make a 
face as if they understood, but when I meet them the next time, the spring is all 
unwound. Going around from one to the other in order to wind up the springs of these 
puppets is back-breaking.”119  
 
In spite of his doubts, Nakano and his fellow conspirators did not follow up their 
Karuizawa outing with further meetings and left it at that.  
 
Mitamura’s Pamphlet  
Hoping that Tōjō would be toppled at the Senior Statesmen’s next lunch meeting, which 
was scheduled for August 30, Nakano and Mitamura left Karuizawa for Tokyo and busied 
themselves preparing the political world for the coming cabinet change. With Nakano’s help, 
Mitamura wrote a pamphlet, two thousand copies of which were distributed to members of the 
                                                     
117 If the Monthly Bulletin of the Special Higher Police [０㔾蠻况] is any indicator the authorities did not 
know what Nakano and Amano were up to. Neither the July, August or September issue make any mention 
of Nakano’s activities in Karuizawa.  
118 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 736. 
119 Nakano Seigō quoted in Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁驥啌], “Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?”, 
p. 56. Nakano’s doubts were echoed by Tanabe who after having talked to Konoe for four hours was still 
unsure whether or not he had gotten his point across. See Inomata, p. 569. 
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upper and lower houses, all state ministers, the members of the Privy Council, all newspapers and 
other leading intellectual figures. The pamphlet denounced the Tōjō regime as a “bakufu-like 
entity” that had been brought into power through the Diet’s servile cooperation. Mitamura 
castigated the Diet for waiving its right to deliberate and called the tactic of waving the 
government’s bills through the body “suicide.” Making the case for a return to open 
parliamentary deliberations, Mitamura wrote:  
 
“No matter how superior a human being may be, he is never all-knowing or all-mighty. 
Accordingly, the policies of a government constituted of natural man are not necessarily 
perfect. It is only natural that sometimes it will get its timing wrong, make mistakes or 
embark in the wrong direction. The question is how can we ensure that misguided 
policies are as few as possible and that those few are corrected? … In order to ensure 
that the mistakes are few and corrected, we have to open the way for criticism. When 
you don’t have criticism, you won’t have self-reflection, and where you don’t have self-
reflection you won’t have improvement.” 120  
 
To escape police detection, the pamphlet’s 2,000 copies were printed in a single night on 
August 13 and shipped the next morning by mail. By the time the government banned the 
pamphlet, most copies had already reached their destination. Over the following days, Mitamura 
received more than 300 letters expressing sympathy with his views and encouraging him to carry 
on with his struggle.121 Bolstered by their success, Mitamura and Nakano took a break from direct 
agitation to watch the results of their work unfold.122  
                                                     
120  Mitamura Takeo, “The running of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association and the 
Constitution of the National Polity” [62膕ぉ遊膏楼喪畧┃], reprinted in parts in Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁
驥啌], “Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?”, p. 70-72. A summary can also be found in Monthly 
Bulletin of the Special Higher Police [０㔾蠻况], August 1943, p. 30-31. 
121 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 741.  
122 Nakano also attached some hope to the fact that Matsumoto Kenjirō [觚袿筑饅ア], one Nakano’s 
long-standing financial backers from Fukuoka and now head of the Coal Industry Control Association [0
＂67韮善], was to deliver a lecture to the Emperor on the impact of economic controls on Japan’s coal 
industry. Knowing Matsumoto’s dissatisfaction with the economic control regime imposed onto the 
industry, Nakano hoped that Matsumoto would use this opportunity to bring the Tōjō cabinet’s economic 
mismanagement to the Emperor’s attention. Matsumoto lectured before the Emperor on August 27, but 
failed to deliver the alarming message Nakano had hoped for. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 747.  
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Lunch with Tōjō 
Having been briefed, prepared and supposedly convinced of the need to topple Tōjō, the 
Senior Statesmen resolved to confront him during a lunch meeting on August 30. They did not 
know, however, that Tōjō had been warned by his mentor Kido of their intentions. Tōjō accepted 
the invitation, but instead of coming alone, he brought Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, Finance 
Minister Kaya, Navy Minister Shimada, and the President of the Planning Board Suzuki. Of the 
seven Senior Statesmen present that day (Wakatsuki, Okada, Hiranuma, Konoe, Yonai, Hirota, 
and Abe), only Abe continued to support Tōjō, but the contingent of serving ministers meant the 
pro- and anti-Tōjō forces were evenly matched with six on each side. Unprepared for such 
resistance, the Senior Statesmen did not progress far in their attack. Rather than driving Tōjō out 
of power, the meeting soon turned into a formal lunch.123 
Nakano and his followers, who spent the afternoon waiting for the first news of Tōjō’s fall, 
were shattered when they learned the Senior Statesmen lunch had yielded no tangible results. 
They realized gradually that it was only a matter of time until Tōjō retaliated against those who 
had dared to conspire against him. Mitamura at one point suggested to Nakano that they make 
preparations for their certain arrest and get “their stories straight.” Nakano replied: “Mitamura-
kun, you telling me these things is like practicing swimming on the dry land [鍗貢疹貢鵈く]. 
You and Amano can use these excuses, but I cannot do that. I have decided long ago what I will 
do if pressure is [applied to me]. I will not cause trouble to anyone, so don’t worry.” 124 While 
awaiting Tōjō’s retaliation, Nakano poured his energy into a second try at realizing the Senior 
Statesmen scheme, which he hoped would save Japan – and himself in the last minute. He had 
not gotten far when Tōjō struck.  
                                                     
123 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 743. 
124 Nakano Seigō quoted in Mitamura Takeo, “Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?”, p. 80 
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Tōjō Strikes Back 
On September 6, 1943, while attending a party organized by Nakano, Mitamura was 
arrested by the police. During the next weeks in custody, Mitamura was questioned by the 
Special Higher Police in relation to his mid-August pamphlet. He was then handed over to the 
kempeitai, which interrogated him regarding charges of breaking the wartime criminal law - 
specifically disturbing the government [楼膕哇頗二] - as well as charges that he had planned to 
assassinate Tōjō.125 Thanks to his experience with interrogations – Mitamura had worked as a 
police officer in the past – he was able to avoid incriminating himself or others, but he was not 
released until January of the following year.  
In retaliation against Mitamura’s arrest, Suzuki Naotora [H袍怱よ] and Koizumi Saburō 
[恠龜双驥ア] from the Tōhōkai’s Hongō [袿シ] chapter posted about 50 posters in various 
Tokyo locations that read: “Shoot English Planes, Shoot American Planes!” [ラ雍纒考高浩玠̶
雍纒考高浩], but which could also be read as an appeal to assassinate Tōjō (the characters for 
English planes could alternatively be read as Tōjō’s first name, Hideki.) Suzuki and other 
members of Nakano’s student dorm had devised the plan without Nakano’s knowledge. When he 
learned about it, he simply smiled, signaling his approval. After Nakano’s arrest, this poster 
incident was also held against him.  
 
The Mass Arrest of the Tōhōkai and the Kin’nō-Makoto-Musubi-no-kai 
In the early morning hours of October 21, 1943, the special higher police carried out mass 
arrests of members of the Tōhōkai, the Kin’nō-Makoto-Musubi-no-kai and the Dai-Nippon-
                                                     
125 According to Kokushō Teruo [楼﨟ぢ赶], then corporal with the military police, the authorities had 
found a document showing that after the fall of Tōjō, Nakano had intended to become the next Prime 
Minister. See Kokushō Teruo [楼﨟ぢ赶], in Weekly Tokyo [〔捺覩静], October 27, 1956. 
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Kin’nō-Dōshi-kai [哢荳袿帆Œ弁沒善] headquartered in Fukuoka. Across Japan, 319 leading 
members of these societies were arrested and detained in various prisons.126  
Though the Special Higher Police had monitored the societies for years, it had never seen 
any reason to arrest their members. The idea for the October 21 arrests came instead from Tōjō’s 
inner circle, perhaps even Tōjō himself, as a way to ensure that neither Nakano nor Amano would 
attend the upcoming Diet session scheduled for October 25- 26, lest the tumultuous scenes of the 
last sessions repeat themselves. 
The arrests were carried out on charges that the Tōhōkai had broken the wartime criminal 
law, specifically by disturbing the government [楼膕哇頗二 ]. Arresting a person on mere 
suspicion of having committed a crime, a so-called administrative arrest [ネ膕遲襦] was well 
within the law’s purview - at least for the many Tōhōkai members who were ordinary citizens. 
Nakano and Mitamura, however, were members of parliament and hence enjoyed a degree of 
immunity. Arresting a member of parliament was only possible when the Diet was not in session 
and required a proper warrant, which had to be requested by a public prosecutor and could be 
issued only by a judge. Being members of the government’s judiciary branch, public prosecutors 
and judges enjoyed independence from the executive branch, and, much to Tōjō’s frustration, the 
judges and prosecutors in charge of Nakano’s case reminded Tojo of that fact over the following 
days. Unfortunately for Nakano, not all members of the Japanese administration displayed the 
same degree of professional integrity.  
When Nakano was arrested early on October 21, he asked the police if they had a warrant. 
When he learned that they did not, Nakano surprisingly agreed to follow them to the police 
station anyway. In the following days, Nakano – perhaps unaware of the danger he was in - 
                                                     
126 Of those arrested roughly 110 belonged to the Tōhōkai. See Monthly Bulletin of the Special Higher 
Policy [０㔾蠻况], October 1943 issue, p.27 and March 1944 issue, p. 33. The following account of 
Nakano’s arrest, interrogations, and suicide is based primarily on Ogata, p. 176-218 and Nakano Yasuo, 
vol. 2, p. 775-813. 
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maintained this chivalrous attitude of cooperative friendliness with the authorities. He offered to 
tell his interrogators all he knew, if they only told him what they were interested in, and more 
than once offered fruits he had received from the outside world.127 At times, this friendliness took 
on arrogant overtones. Explaining his cooperative stance, for instance, Nakano said: “I am a 
politician and therefore there is no point in bullying low-ranking public servants.”128 Overall, 
however, the approach seems to have served Nakano well, for after three days of interrogation he 
had yet to make a confession or implicate himself in a crime.  
 
Nakano at the Kempeitai 
When on the evening of October 24 it became clear that Nakano, as a member of 
parliament, would have to be released the next morning when the Diet was scheduled to convene, 
Tōjō called an emergency conference at the Prime Minister’s residence. He invited chief 
prosecutor Matsusaka Hiromasa, 129  who first declined the invitation, feeling it would be 
inappropriate for a member of the judiciary to attend a conference of the executive. After being 
told that his superior, Minister of Justice Iwamura, would also be present, Matsusaka finally 
agreed. The conference was also attended by the Minister of the Interior, the superintendent 
general of the police, the head of the cabinet legislation bureau, the head of criminal bureau, and 
the head of the Tokyo kempeitai.  
Tōjō demanded that the judiciary issue a warrant to arrest Nakano at least for the duration 
of the Diet session. Matsusaka replied that he could not request a warrant against Nakano without 
incriminating evidence or, better still, a confession. Frustrated by Matsusaka’s rejection, Tōjō 
repeated his request more forcefully, saying: “In order to win this war, the prosecutor’s office 
                                                     
127 These are only a couple among many more instances in which Nakano, Mitamura and other Tōhōkai 
followers displayed a not-readily-explainable degree of compliance with the police. See Ogata, p. 179-83.  
128 Nakano Seigō quoted in Ogata, p. 180. 
129 Matsusaka Hiromasa [觚史杰膕] (1884 – 1960), lawyer and public prosecutor. 
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must press charges against Nakano and somehow keep him from attending the Diet.”130 Chief 
Prosecutor Matsusaka again stood his ground, repeating that he would need a substantial 
confession from Nakano before noon of the following day to arrest Nakano before the Diet 
opened. With this, Matsusaka left the meeting. Desperate for a solution, Tōjō asked the Chief of 
the Tokyo kempeitai if he would be able to obtain a confession from Nakano within the time 
given. The Chief answered in the affirmative.131  
Four hours after the meeting ended, early in the morning of October 25, Nakano was 
transferred from his cell at the Tokyo police station to the offices of the kempeitai, where he was 
interrogated for much of the morning. By noon, the prosecutor’s office received a call from the 
kempeitai saying Nakano had made a confession and that the protocol would be delivered 
sometime in the afternoon. How the interrogators pressured Nakano to make such a confession 
and under what conditions – if any - he agreed to do so remains unclear, though some conjectures 
have been made. In one of the farewell notes he wrote before committing suicide, Nakano gave 
some vague hints about what had gone on his mind during the kempeitai interrogation:   
 
“A decision of the moment  
words came one after another without stopping 
 …  
I made all sorts of absurd statements, but I did not cause trouble to anyone.” 
 
By and large this has been taken to mean that during the interrogations, Nakano made the 
momentous decision to kill himself. Once he had done so, he could comply with the 
interrogators’ demand for a confession while simultaneously protecting his followers and 
supporters. When Nakano was returned to the prosecutor’s offices in the late afternoon of the 
                                                     
130 Tōjō quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 792. 
131 A description of the entire meeting can be found in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 792. 
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same day, he seemed exhausted. The public prosecutor in charge of his case, Nakamura, [腎襁̈
肩啌] had “the impression that he had given up the fight out of sadness.”132  
 
The Mills of Bureaucracy 
With Nakano’s confession delivered to the public prosecutor, Tōjō may have concluded the 
issuance of the warrant was now a mere formality and that he had won the fight, but he was still 
in for a surprise. While the exact contents of the confession are unknown (the protocol of the 
interrogation was subsequently lost or intentionally destroyed in the war133), the prosecutors soon 
determined that they were hardly substantial enough to charge Nakano with the crimes the 
kempeitai hoped to pin on him, including lèse-majesté, attempting to overthrow the government, 
or spreading rumors concerning the war.134 
Accordingly, the public prosecutor, Nakamura, who was responsible for writing up the 
report requesting the warrant for Nakano’s arrest, was at a loss regarding what to write and the 
document was not completed until 8 p.m.135 Before submitting it to a judge, Nakamura’s boss, 
chief prosecutor Matsusaka, had its contents presented and discussed in the presence of more than 
                                                     
132 Nakamura quoted in Ogata, p. 193.  
133 Tatamiya tried to shed some light on what happened during the interrogations at the kempeitai by 
directly visiting and interviewing the kempeitai officers in charge, but the answers he got were evasive and 
far from satisfying. See Tatamiya Eitarō [譓譓幟ラ啣ア ], “Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩 ], (Tokyo: 
Shinjimbutsu Orai-sha [范斥☞鬱襷だ],1975), p. 236-251. 
134 Of the various charges brought against Nakano, the most substantial one was that of having spread 
rumors concerning Japan’s military situation. Specifically, Nakano was accused of having told two students 
of his at his house in February 1943 “without any knowledge on which to base this that there are 
disagreements between the army and navy in carrying out the operations of the Greater East Asia War and 
that these disagreements have led to the disastrous results of the fighting at Guadalcanal, causing tens of 
thousands of casualties. Thus the suspect has engaged in the spreading of rumors concerning the army’s 
and navy’s military affairs.” While it is probably true that Nakano did exactly that, the rivalries between the 
army and navy could hardly be called a rumor, as they were commonly known facts and a information 
dropped within the four walls of one’s home hardly amounted to the spreading of rumors. Quotes taken 
from the Public Prosecutor’s request for the issue of a warrant for Nakano’s arrest, quoted in Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 793. 
135 Nakamura report, quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 793. 
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half a dozen other prosecutors. Though the majority concluded that the contents of Nakano’s 
confessions were insufficient to request an arrest warrant, they decided that Nakamura should 
proceed anyway to appease Tōjō. Thus, the request was submitted to the night-shift judge, who 
studied the laws and regulations governing the arrest of members of parliament and came to the 
conclusion that no warrant could be issued. 136  He informed the prosecutors waiting in 
Matsusaka’s office by phone around 10:30 p.m.; the written rejection reached them ten minutes 
before midnight. The judge thus successfully fended off Tōjō’s attempt to use the executive 
branch’s power to interfere in the workings of the judiciary. It seemed that the slow-grinding 
mills of bureaucracy had served Nakano well.  
 
Raw Power  
While around noon on October 25 it had seemed that Tōjō had succeeded in keeping 
Nakano from attending the Diet session, it now appeared that Nakano had the upper hand. When, 
on October 26, Minister of State Ōasa [哢朳] attended a morning meeting at the Prime Minister’s 
residence, Tōjō said that the prosecutors had failed to obtain a warrant for Nakano’s arrest and 
then admitted defeat with the words: “I have lost against Nakano.”137 Ōasa understood this to 
mean that Tōjō had resigned and given up fighting Nakano.  
The struggle, however, had entered only a new phase - one in which legal issues such as 
the immunity of a parliament member no longer played a role. Some hours prior to the meeting at 
Tōjō’s residence, Nakano learned of the judge’s decision not to issue a warrant against him. 
Preparations were made to return him home as soon as possible. His household’s anxious 
members were told that he would return that night, but this never happened. As Nakano was 
                                                     
136 According to the judge there were two reasons. First, the arrest of a Diet member required the consent 
of the Diet, which could not be gotten before the next day. Second, the Diet would be legally in session the 
following day and hence the Nakano already enjoyed immunity. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 798. 
137 Tōjō quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 800 and Ogata, p. 205. 
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accompanied from the prosecutor’s office to the police station, the officer in charge made Nakano 
promise in writing that he would not attend the upcoming Diet session. Once they arrived at the 
station, moreover, Nakano was asked to spend the night there instead of returning home, under 
the false pretext that the police had been unable to contact his family.138 When Nakano left the 
police building the next day (October 26), he found the Head of the Tokyo kempeitai, who had 
pressed Nakano to confess the previous day, waiting in his car. Instead of bringing Nakano home, 
the officer took Nakano back to the kempeitai headquarters for further interrogation. 
Again, we do not know what exactly was said during the ensuing hours, but between 
educated guesses and conjectures the following foggy picture emerges. Nakano was informed 
that his release was only temporary and that interrogations would resume as soon as the Diet 
session ended. Whether Nakano was threatened again or whether the threats made the previous 
day were powerful enough to make him capitulate matters little. He seems to have given up 
resisting Tōjō and  apparently  offered, instead, to cooperate with the government in the future. 
Whether the interrogating kempeitai officer relayed Nakano’s offer to Tōjō is unclear, but such a 
step seems unlikely. The same Nakano who a couple of months earlier had defiantly rejected 
Tōjō’s offer to serve as chief of the information bureau now found himself asking for a second 
chance, only to be rejected with similar arrogance. If anything, Nakano’s proposal shows how 
desperate or naïve he was to think that he could still negotiate with Tōjō. Perhaps Nakano had 
forgotten one of his own lectures on the history of the Kenmu restoration:  
 
“When you are subject to political oppression, resisting it is the only thing you can do. 
If you submit, your opponent will only increase [the pressure]. The more vulgar he is, 
the more likely he is to do so. … Strong oppression has to be met with strong resistance. 
Appealing to mercy and asking for moderation is useless. People who work as the 
                                                     
138 Mitamura who as Member of Parliament was in the same position as Nakano, was similarly kept 
overnight. See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2 p. 799. 
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servants of power only seldom show compassion for people. Only fear will make them 
reflect on their ways.”139  
 
 
Returning Home 
Unlike the other Tōhōkai and Kin’nō-Makoto-Musubi-no-kai members, Nakano and 
Mitamura were “released” on the morning of October 26, because members of parliament could 
not be detained without a warrant. As we have seen, however, their release did not mean that they 
were allowed to move freely. Mitamura was accompanied by kempeitai officers to spend the next 
few days at a hot spring resort hotel before he returned to prison after the Diet session ended. 
Nakano was finally allowed to return home, albeit also accompanied by kempeitai officers.140  
Nakano arrived home shortly after 2 o’clock on the afternoon of October 26. He introduced 
his family to one of the kempeitai officers with the words: “This is Mr. Kokushō [楼﨟] from the 
kempeitai. He will be watching over me for the next three days. During these three days, tell 
anyone who calls me or visits me that I am on a trip, for I must not meet or talk to anyone. Only 
relatives are exempt.”141 Clearly, the kempeitai wanted to ensure that Nakano would keep his 
promise and not attend the following days’ deliberations in the Diet. As before, Nakano tried to 
make the work of his guards as easy as possible by cooperating with them and respecting the 
restrictions they imposed. Before setting out to write some notes in the evening, Nakano asked 
                                                     
139  Nakano Seigō, “History of the Kenmu Restoration” [椥驥腎85別ルクス], (Tokyo: Seigō-kai [驟悩善], 
1953), p. 125. 
140 When the police officers released Mitamura on the morning of October 26, 1943, he had every 
intention of attending the Diet session. It was only when no less than four police officers suggested that he 
“take some rest at a hot spring” for otherwise he would put them “in a tight spot [稿黒購賂鵠], that 
Mitamura agreed to follow them. He then was asked to sign a paper saying that he had voluntarily decided 
to go to take a vacation, which he did after being told that Nakano had done the same. Over the following 
days, he was accompanied by at least one police officer at any point in time (Yes, even when going to the 
bathroom). Mitamura Takeo, “Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide”, p. 15-16. 
141 See Inomata, p. 683. 
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the officers for permission.142 When in the course of the day, first his riding instructor and later 
the head of the Tōhōkai Hongō chapter, Suzuki Naotora, came to visit, Nakano told them to leave 
at once. His friend Ogata was likewise told he could not visit Nakano for the time being. Some 
evidence, however, suggests Nakano did try to make two unauthorized phone calls during the 
day.143  
Once home, Nakano made every effort to return to some sort of normality while keeping 
his suicide preparations secret. He spent the rest of the afternoon and evening doing things one 
would expect of someone who had just spent the better part of a week in jail. He first went to see 
his mother and talked with her for 90 minutes, trying to calm her worries. When he had a moment 
alone with his son, he told him: “It’s over. This time I have won. Tōjō has tried out various tactics 
but they all led to nothing. Now he is mine.”144 Then he took a long bath, during which he shaved 
and dyed his hair. This was followed by an early, but for wartime Japan also lavish, dinner 
(somehow the students of his dorm had organized some beef, crabs and other delicacies to 
celebrate the occasion). Having eaten well, Nakano got up and lingered in the doorway, taking 
one last glance at his family sitting around the dinner table before retiring to his room. 
Though his brother remarked that Nakano had behaved somewhat oddly that evening, no 
one sensed that he had resolved to kill himself. Nakano did everything to maintain that illusion. 
Though he knew he would not sleep that night, he asked the maid to lay out his futon. He also 
                                                     
142 Though casual in tone, Nakano’s statement:  “I want to write something. I cannot show it to you, but it 
is not a letter.” must be seen as his requesting the permission to write. Nakano Seigō quoted in Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 809. 
143 Nobody in Nakano’s house noticed him making the calls, but the daughter of Honma Ken’ichirō [袿侮
畧慎ア] subsequently claimed to have received a call by Nakano asking to speak to her father. Since the 
latter was traveling through Japan at the time, she could not help Nakano. See Inomata p. 688 quote taken 
from Honma Ken’ichirō “Evict the Bureaucrats” [巫追ヤ膠], (Tokyo, 1952). Likewise, Mitamura’s wife 
said to have received a call from someone claiming to be Nakano and wishing to speak to Mitamura on an 
urgent matter. See Mitamura Takeo, “Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?”, p. 17-18. In either case, 
Nakano’s attempt to make contact with the outside world failed.  
144 Nakano Seigō quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 807. 
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asked her to fetch the one sword the police had failed to confiscate earlier that week under the 
pretext that he wished to polish it. To ensure that he would not be disturbed while preparing his 
suicide, Nakano said he intended to be reading until late and asked all members of the house to 
go to bed early and not to worry or come into his room if they heard any noises or saw that the 
lights were still on at a late hour. In passing, he told one of the students staying at the dorm to tell 
Mitamura “not to follow my example.” When the puzzled student asked what Nakano meant, he 
replied with a smile: “He will understand when you tell him.”145  
Once in his study, he completed his suicide preparations. He wrote 13 notes to family, 
friends and followers, which may be considered his testament. Apart from the one note 
mentioned above, which gives us some idea of what happened during the kempeitai interrogation, 
most of the others are of little interest. In one he expressed gratitude “to the Gods that I was given 
this last opportunity (to come home and say my farewell and find one last sword).” In another he 
bid his children farewell with the words: “As for my sons Tatsuhiko and Yasuo, I feel unlimited 
love and affection for you. Struggle through this war and live your lives.” Others carried only the 
names of the persons to whom they were addressed, without any other message, as if he trusted 
these people would understand even without words. These notes Nakano enclosed in an envelope 
with the instruction that they be given to his mentor, Tōyama Mitsuru.  
Having written these official notes, Nakano also penned a couple of more casual ones, 
which he left on his desk. In these he addressed more practical matters: He asked that someone 
take care of his horses, thanked his driver and the family’s maids for their services, and told his 
family that they could refurbish the ceiling in his room if they wished. Finally, he left some notes 
that described the very act of his suicide, namely that the tip of the sword was blunt and that 
therefore he had tried to sharpen it using his pocket watch, “but to no avail. So I will tuck in my 
belly and try not to make a mess of it.” Nakano wrote that he was about to die with a calm smile: 
                                                     
145 Nakano Seigō quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 806. 
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“Looking on Japan, I become a Buddha.” This was followed by a request to his family: “Please 
do not be sad.” Nakano killed himself performing traditional seppuku - that is, by cutting his 
belly. To shorten the agony, he then also cut his carotid artery. His last note was comprised of 
four characters written on the back of his visiting card: “A cut at twelve o’clock [苳筆性蕁],” 
indicating the time of his first incision.146  
 
Reaction to Nakano’s Suicide 
As Nakano had done much to hide his intention to commit suicide from his family, the 
discovery of his dead body early in the morning of October 27 – by the maid Suzu, who found 
him after following a trail of paper leading from the kitchen to his room – came as a great shock 
to his family and friends. Even the two kempeitai officers who had spent the night in the room 
beneath Nakano’s seemed surprised. After they reported the news to their superiors, the officers 
were told they could return to headquarters given that there was no more work to do (though 
according to Ogata there were still civilian-clad police officers around the house when he arrived 
there immediately after hearing the news).147 Prime Minister Tōjō was among the few people not 
to be shocked by the news. In fact, he seemed rather relieved. On October 27, Tōjō told Ōasa 
Tadao, Minister without portfolio: “Nakano killed himself. It was good that we released him from 
prison. If he had killed himself at the kempeitai or at the Special Higher Police, what a mess that 
would have been. It would have taken more than just one cabinet. It was good to send him home 
according to the law.”148 
                                                     
146 For a discussion of the notes see Inomata, p. 715-19 or Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 800-812.  
147 See Ogata, p. 39. It seems that police officers continued to swarm around Nakano’s residence for a 
number of days. Komai Tokuzō then Member of Parliament recalls how after hearing the news in the Diet 
on October 28: “I went to Nakano’s house, where I met Ogata and Kazami. They told me: ‘You can’t stay. 
The place is swarming with kempeitai and police officers in civilian clothing. Don’t say anything.” Komai 
Tokuzō quoted in Inomata p. 742. 
148 Tōjō quoted in Inomata p. 800 but also in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 803. 
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These initial reactions were followed by universal admiration for the way in which Nakano 
had committed suicide. The fact that he had performed traditional seppuku as practiced by the 
warriors of old, that he had done so without an aide to cut off his head in order to shorten the 
agony, that he had used a blunt sword, and finally that he had done all this without crying out and 
waking up those around him, earned Nakano immediate and lasting respect. When Ogata 
informed Nakano’s mother of her son’s suicide, he ended by saying, “Nakano has cut his belly 
and died. It was a wonderful end [帑嘒W征嘑蠱袗嗸叄垗圚唶嗃 ].” 149  Tōyama, who had 
accompanied Ogata on this task, added: “Because of your good parenting, Nakano has executed a 
wonderful death. This is a result of the way you brought him up.”150 Kazami Akira shared this 
view151 and Ishiwara Kanji, upon hearing of Nakano’s suicide, stated: “Nakano was a God.” [ਛ
㊁ำߪ␹ߛߞߚࠃ].152 A positive assessment of Nakano’s seppuku survived the passage of time 
and even post-war Japanese commentators unanimously approve of his method.153  
 
                                                     
149 Ogata Taketora in “Nakano and Filial Piety” [ቁሶਛ㊁ำ] in Seigō-kai eds. [ᱜ೰ળ], “Nakano Seigō 
is Alive” [ਛ㊁ᱜ೰ߪ↢߈ߡ޿ࠆ], (Tokyo: Akane-shobō [޽߆ߨᦠᚱ]; 1954) p. 50-51. 
150 Tōyama quoted in Ibid., p. 51. 
151 Nakayama Yū recalls that Ishiwara Kanji greatly respected Nakano for having committed suicide in 
such a noble way. See Nakayama Yū [ਛጊఝ]; “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [ਛ㊁ᱜ೰ࠍᙘ߁], in 
Kyōtsū no hiroba [౒ㅢߩᐢ႐], September 1952, p.50. Kazami Akira described Nakano’s death as a 
“grand end.” Kazami Akira, The Diary of Kazami Akira [㘑⷗┨ᣣ⸥], (Tokyo, 2008), p. 225.   
152 Ishiwara Kanji quoted by Nakano Yasuo in Hinoshita Tōgo [ᣣਅ⮮๋], “The way of the Lion: 
Nakano Seigō” [ₑሶߩ㆏ ਛ㊁ᱜ೰], (Tokyo, 1986), p. 44. 
153 Tanabe Tadao wrote approvingly that “Nakano chose the death of a Japanese samurai [ᣣᧄᱞ჻].” 
Tanabe Tadao [↰ㄝᔘ↵], in Tokyo News [᧲੩ߛࠃࠅ], February 1958. Comparing Nakano’s suicide to 
that of Tōjō , who attempted to shoot himself and Konoe who took sleeping pills, Aochi Shin wrote in 1955 
how positively Nakano’s suicide contrasts with the other two and concluded that “Within Nakano’s life, his 
seppuku is his masterpiece.” See Aochi Shin [㕍࿾᥄], “Nakano Seigō”, in Chisei [⍮ᕈ], February 1955, 
p.150 and 159.  
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Reasons for Nakano’s Suicide 
While the manner of Nakano’s suicide has met with unanimous admiration in Japan, the 
puzzling question of why he committed it has not been answered satisfactorily.154 The epitaph 
written by Tokutomi Sohō on the first anniversary of Nakano’s death reads: “Nobody knows 
why.” [斥土済奏膣座作窄ö作70㏍査].155 The fact that Nakano’s suicide was a political act, 
and that therefore the motives and intentions guiding it were politically relevant, was recognized 
immediately by all involved – including Tōjō, who tried to suppress media coverage of the event. 
The political relevance of Nakano’s suicide has resulted in continued interest in his motives, 
producing a stream of explanations that can be separated into two groups.156  
The first school of thought holds that Nakano killed himself because he felt both 
responsible for Japan’s military predicament and powerless to do anything about it. This is how 
most of Nakano’s friends and benevolent observers explained his suicide when they heard the 
news without knowing all the details. Thus, after learning of Nakano’s suicide, journalist 
Kiyosawa Kiyoshi [拐鼈┡] wrote in his diary:  
 
“I hated him. It was his ideas that led to the outbreak of the war. Faced, however, with 
his suicide, I felt like forgiving him. … He had publicly stated that once the war broke 
out, America would submit right away. That was, however, a mistake. Has he 
                                                     
154 Even those who put forward different explanations all agree that in the end the suicide remains an 
enigma. See for example, Aochi Shin [⻗丱藹], “Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩] in Chisei [ö淤], February 
1955, p. 151.  
155 Quoted in Inomata, p. 760 but also in Ogata, p. 17. 
156  Among the less convincing ones, this author counts an explanation by Nakano’s horse-riding 
instructor, Lieutenant Yūsa [え双] who argued that: “If a famous sensitive horse is put together with a bad 
horse over a long period of time, it will die in anger. Nakano was among humans like a thoroughbred horse 
among horses, and hence could not bear to spend much time with impure people.” Yūsa quoted in Inomata 
p. 754 but the same explanation has also been credited to Ogata see Kiyosawa, Kiyoshi [拐鼈┡], “Diary of 
Darkness” [蛟桛荳ヒ ], (Tokyo, 1990), p. 129. Equally unsatisfactory is an explanation based on a 
statement by Nakano who asked what he would do if he were sentenced to serve a prison sentence 
answered: “I have one leg. For someone missing a leg, being thrown into prison will cause hardship. So I 
will kill myself by cutting my belly.” Nakano Seigō quoted in Inomata p. 754.   
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committed suicide after having self-examined [his responsibility]? If that is the case, it 
would be grand indeed.”157  
 
While Kiyosawa still expressed doubts, Prince Higashikuni was more certain of Nakano’s 
motives: “He felt that with all his power he had to help Japan somehow to break out of this 
deadlock, and yet he realized that he could not do this. I guess that he killed himself because he 
felt acutely responsible for this [Japan’s situation].”158 Many subscribed to this explanation in 
subsequent years, including Ōkawa Shūmei, 159  Tanabe Tadao 160  and most of Nakano’s 
biographers.161 Good evidence supports it. Nakano was aware of Japan’s increasingly difficult 
military situation and he also admitted: “I feel entirely responsible.”162 It is likewise clear that all 
of Nakano’s attempts to alter the course of events were frustrated.  
Still, this only partially explains Nakano’s suicide. The feeling of responsibility combined 
with helplessness was a dominant motif throughout his last eighteen months and accounts for his 
criticism of the military and civilian bureaucracies’ role in managing the war effort, as well as for 
his escalating opposition against Tōjō. It also explains his suicide, but only from a personal angle. 
We must also include external factors, especially the pressure exerted by Tōjō through the 
kempeitai, which took various forms.  
                                                     
157 Kiyosawa, Kiyoshi [拐鼈┡], “Diary of Darkness” [蛟桛荳ヒ], (Tokyo, 1990), p. 102-04. 
158 Higashikuni Naruhiko [覩睡へ⁶檢] in “War Diary of a Court Noble” [慎Œ茘貢皚勢荳ヒ], (Tokyo, 
1957), p. 122.  
159 Ōkawa Shūmei [哢擺鳳蕚] wrote: “There are probably many important reasons why Nakano killed 
himself, but the feeling of responsibility for Japan’s defeat in his heart was probably an important factor.” 
Ōkawa Shūmei in Kokuron [楼ルクス], October, 1953. 
160 Tanabe Tadao wrote that Nakano “felt spiritually responsible for the war. … and tried to apologize to 
the emperor.”  Tanabe Tadao [譓シ泗赶], in Tokyo News [覩静紘国酷], February 1958. 
161 See Ogata, p. 11 and 18, Inomata, p. 757 but also Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 734. 
162 Nakano Seigō quoted by Nakayama Yū [腎愾釘], “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩惚畫康], 
in Kyōtsū no Hiroba [努＊貢杰凅], September 1952, p. 50.  
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First, it was made clear to Nakano that after the Diet session ended, the interrogations 
would resume. Through one of the officers guarding him at his house, Nakano learned that the 
kempeitai planned to bring him to a hotel after the Diet session was over, where his thought was 
to be “converted.” The prospect of further interrogations threatened Nakano in two ways. First, 
the kempeitai may have known or found some of the skeletons hidden in Nakano’s political past 
and could have used these either to indict Nakano or, at least, to attempt to destroy his political 
standing permanently. The kempeitai was following clues about contributions Nakano received 
from the German ambassador Ott in the time leading up to the conclusion of the Triple Alliance, 
as well as a monthly payment of 5,000 Yen that Nakano is said to have received from General 
Sugiyama, then head of the army general staff. This genuinely worried Nakano. On the day of his 
arrest, he handed all the cash he had in his house – some 300,000 Yen – to his son, with the 
instruction to give it all to Ogata. He added: “I don’t have a bad conscience about this money. 
The only thing I worry about is the 5,000 Yen I received from the General Staff.” 163 
Second, Nakano - who thus far had confessed “without causing trouble to anyone” - may 
have feared that he might crack in future interrogations and implicate those who had cooperated 
with him in the Senior Statesmen scheme. This has been argued by Kazami Akira, who received 
support from Adachi Kenzō, writing: “A polished man like Nakano would … certainly talk if 
arrested.”164 Killing himself was perhaps the only way to protect his supporters and allies in the 
struggle against Tōjō. 
Rumors persist, additionally, that the kempeitai drove Nakano into killing himself. This is 
what Matsumae Shigeyoshi, one of Nakano’s aides during the Senior Statesmen scheme, believed 
when he wrote: “Nakano was not the kind of person to lightly choose to kill himself simply out of 
anger. I cannot help thinking that it was their plan [i.e. the plan of the people around Tōjō] to 
                                                     
163 Nakano Seigō quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 789. 
164 Both quoted in Inomata, p. 755. 
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force him to commit suicide. At first sight his death is a suicide, a killing out of anger. However, 
there was another violent force on the outside exercising pressure on him to kill himself.”165 
Indeed, the kempeitai officer responsible for interrogating Nakano on October 25 and 26 boasted 
after the war – in a drunken stupor – that “it was me who killed Nakano.”166 Ogata claims that, in 
that sense, Nakano was killed by Tōjō.167 
One is left wondering how the kempeitai could have pressured Nakano to take such 
extreme action. The threats of ongoing interrogations and of exposing Nakano’s financial sources 
were real but not necessarily sufficient. The threat of sending his remaining two sons to a front 
from which they would not return, however, may have made Nakano pliable. This, according to 
many accounts, is what must have happened.168 Or perhaps it was as the NHK radio show, the 
“truth box” [*ùè], claimed after the end of the war:  
 
“The last note that Tōjō sent Nakano more or less said the following: ‘You are a 
samurai, therefore I will give you the opportunity to kill yourself like a samurai. If you 
don’t put an end to your life by yourself, we will take care of it as we see fit.’.”169  
 
Presented with this choice and threatened with the prospect of both his sons being killed on 
some far-off island may ultimately have been enough to drive Nakano into suicide, especially 
since he himself does not seem to have feared death. Nakayama Yū after the war recalled Nakano 
                                                     
165 Matsumae Shigeyoshi [觚撚ĩコ], Diary of the 2nd Class Private” [性̌度ヒ], Tokyo, 1977, p. 158. 
166  Kempeitai officer, Yokata Ryōji [裂苜ユーロ性 ] quoted in Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 805. The 
interrogations at the kempeitai were carried out by Yokata Ryōji and Ōnishi Kazuo [哢O北赶]. It was 
Yokata who claimed to have driven Nakano into suicide, while Ōnishi later maintained that he was 
innocent. See Hosaka Masayasu, “Why Nakano Seigō was Driven into Suicide” [腎ǒ驟悩購荒硬60鮴行
ヤ広ス合黒紅拘瑱] in Gentlemen [㌒甫玠], October 1983, p. 211. 
167 See Ogata, p. 48. 
168 Even more recent scholarship converges on this point. See Yagami Kazuo, “Konoe Fumimaro and the 
failure of Peace in Japan, 1937-1941” (London, 2006), p. 138. 
169 Quoted in Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁驥啌], “Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?”, p. 101. The 
radio broadcast was made on January 18, 1946.  
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saying: “Death is not a big problem to me. My wife and children are just on the other shore of the 
Tama River, playing, eating their bentō boxes and shouting: ‘Daddy, come over here quickly!’ 
That is how I feel about it.”170 
 
Nakano’s Funeral and the Meaning of His Death 
To those Nakano left behind, it became immediately clear that his death - like his life - was 
full of political meaning that now could be manipulated for political gain. Upon hearing about 
Nakano’s suicide, MP Saitō Takao predicted the news would “deal a considerable shock to all 
quarters.”171  The Tōjō regime shared this view and quickly ordered that media coverage of 
Nakano’s suicide be kept at an absolute minimum. By and large the newspapers complied with 
the order, and even Nakano’s former employer, the Asahi News, was very matter-of-fact in its 
report.172 A laudatory article written by Nagai Ryūtarō was subjected to so much editing that 
Nagai eventually refused to have it published under his name.173  Thereafter, the government 
made every effort to erase the memory of Nakano. 
                                                     
170 Nakayama Yū [腎愾釘], “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩惚畫康], in Kyōtsū no Hiroba [努
＊貢杰凅], September 1952, p. 46. 
171 See the October 27, 1943 entry in Saitō’s diary. Saitō Takao [艤I吏啌], “The Diary of Saitō Takao” [
艤I吏啌荳ヒ], ed. by Itō Takashi [舛I吏], (Tokyo, 2009), vol. 2, p. 507. 
172 Among Japan’s news papers, the Asahi News evening edition of October 27, 1943 gave most space to 
Nakano’s suicide giving it the greatest headline: “Mr. Nakano Seigō commits harakiri using a Japanese 
sword last night.” The article then stated in a matter of fact tone: “At six o’clock on the morning of October 
27, at the Nakano residence in Shibuya-ku Honchō, the maid discovered the body of Nakano in front of the 
family shrine on the second floor. Dr. Maeda, chief of the Maeda hospital in Akasaka was called, but there 
was nothing he could do. The Yoyogi police station immediately sent a report to the Tokyo District 
Attorney which then dispatched head detective Matsuhiro and detective Nomura to the scene. After 
examining the body and the site they came to the conclusion that around midnight of the October 26, 
Nakano had killed himself by first cutting his belly and then his cartoid artery with a Japanese sword. There 
was a farewell note. The grief-struck Nakano family was soon visited by Mr. Nakano’s brother Hidehito, 
his son Tatsuhiko, corporal of the 15th eastern army corps, Mr. Tōyama Mitsuru and Nakano’s father-in-
law, Mr. Miyake Setsurei.”  
173 See Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁驥啌], “Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?”, p. 4.  
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Among Nakano’s supporters and Tōjō’s opponents, the texts, acts and events that sought to 
keep Nakano’s memory alive – such as his funeral – thereby became rallying points for 
expressing hostility toward Tōjō. The first forum in which this happened was, of all places, the 
Imperial Diet. After all the work and effort Tōjō had gone through to ensure that Nakano would 
not trouble him during the 83rd Diet session, it was ironic that Nakano’s death should first come 
to haunt him in that very session. On the 28th of October, career bureaucrat Katsu Masanori,174 
formerly affiliated with the Minseitō and also a Fukuoka native, motioned that a message of 
condolence be issued. Thus, Tōjō - who had succeeded in banning all positive references from the 
newspaper reports on Nakano - now was forced to sit on the government’s bench and listen to 
Katsu’s laudatory description of Nakano’s life and achievements, namely his literary talents, the 
broadness of his intellectual horizons and his “great contributions to the expansion of the popular 
will and the development of constitutional politics.” Katsu described Nakano as “incorruptible, 
resolute and equipped with an indomitable fighting spirit and outstanding aspirations for the 
government of our country. He tackled all affairs with passion.” Katsu finished his speech 
expressing his “deep respect,”175 and his motion passed after great applause, which was both an 
acknowledgement of Nakano’s achievements and a criticism of an embarrassed Tōjō.  
Nakano’s funeral followed. Before his death, Nakano had once told his lifelong friend 
Ogata: “Even if I were to die, I don’t think that that many will come.”176 As Ogata set out to 
organize the ceremony – the fifth time he helped bury a member of the Nakano family177 - he was 
determined to turn the funeral into a grand event, attended by as many people as possible so as to 
make it a symbolic posthumous victory of Nakano over Tōjō. Having restricted the media 
                                                     
174 Katsu Masanori [蛤驟畧] (1879-1957), bureaucrat and politician. 
175 For the text of Katsu’s speech see Inomata p. 742. 
176 Nakano Seigō quoted in Ogata, p. 242. 
177 In the preceding years, Ogata had been in charge of the funerals of Nakano’s father, his wife and his 
two eldest sons. See Ogata, p. 15-16. 
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coverage of Nakano’s death, the government now tried to torpedo Ogata’s efforts.178  Ogata 
recalls:  
 
“The government … tried to keep the number of attendees as small as possible. … They 
arrested all those Tōhōkai members who wanted to attend the mourning ceremony at 
the provincial train stations from which they wanted to depart. Then, they broadcast the 
news that the reason for Nakano’s suicide was a case of lèse-majesté. The military as 
well as the student groups were told by the police that therefore it was prohibited for 
them to attend the funeral. … They also tried to intimidate me because I was in charge 
of preparing the funeral.”179  
 
It was only when it became clear that Ogata would prevail – in the end, more than 20,000 
people attended the ceremony in central Tokyo on October 31 – that Tōjō decided to stop 
working against Ogata and made an attempt to capitalize on the event. Through his secretary, 
Hoshino, Tōjō inquired if the funeral committee would accept a wreath and some money for the 
bereaved family if it came from Tōjō. Ogata put an end to this by wondering aloud: “We will 
accept any wreath that comes with kind intentions, but isn’t it somewhat strange to ask 
beforehand whether a wreath will be accepted or not?”180 Snubbed, Tōjō never sent the wreath 
and prohibited the display of the over 30 notes of condolences that had been sent in from all over 
Japan.  
Of the many who wished to speak at the service, only Tokutomi Sohō was allowed to do so 
- and only after expending great effort to persuade the Minister of the Interior. In his speech, 
Tokutomi praised Nakano’s achievements and contributions to the nation, his passion, 
determination, patriotism, and sincerity, but skirted the issue of Nakano’s suicide and the 
                                                     
178 According to Matsumae, Ogata was threatened from various sides not to get too involved in the funeral 
preparations as this would hurt both the Asahi News and himself. See Matsumae Shigeyoshi [觚撚ĩコ], 
“Diary of the 2nd Class Private” [性̌度ヒ], (Tokyo, 1977), p. 230-32. 
179 Ogata, p. 51. Ogata told Prince Higashikuni more or less the same thing when the two men met on 
December 14th, 1943. See Higashikuni Naruhiko [覩睡へ⁶檢] in “War Diary of a Court Noble” [慎Œ茘
貢皚勢荳ヒ], (Tokyo, 1957), p. 122. 
180 Ogata, p. 50. 
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government’s role in it. Instead he stated simply that “Nakano has performed a grand suicide” 
and that “he must have had his reasons to believe that this was the right thing to do.” Only toward 
the end of the speech did Tokutomi drop a veiled warning to Tōjō, expressing his hope “that the 
things I left unsaid will be told by another person some other day.”181  
The November 1st edition of the Asahi News described Nakano’s funeral as a “fulfilling 
end and an adornment to Nakano’s life.” In the days following the funeral, people continued 
lining up to light incense at his grave. Journalist Kiyosawa Kiyoshi noted in his diary on 
November 1 that, “wherever you go, Nakano’s death is the talk of the day.”182 Satisfied with the 
massive attendance at Nakano’s funeral, Ogata rejoiced: “Nakano has vanquished Tōjō!”183 
During the weeks and months following Nakano’s death, things calmed down somewhat. 
The Tōhōkai was dissolved and while charges were pressed against some, most of those who had 
been arrested were released. In the end, only two served prison sentences.184 Nakano’s father-in-
law, Miyake Setsurei, re-launched the Tōtairiku magazine in October 1944 under its former title 
Gakan (the same title it had carried until 1936). He continued to publish it until the editorial 
offices were destroyed in the March 1945 air raid.185    
As long as Tōjō was in power, only Tōyama Mitsuru – protected by his age and his 
connections to the underworld - was able to publicly address the topic of Nakano’s death. In late 
                                                     
181 Tokutomi Sohō quoted in Inomata p. 743-44. 
182 Kiyosawa, Kiyoshi [拐鼈┡], “Diary of Darkness” [蛟桛荳ヒ], (Tokyo, 1990), p. 106. 
183 Ogata, p. 51. 
184 In order to make peace with Tōjō, Shintō and Mitamura informed the Minister of the Interior of the 
voluntary dissolution of the society in March of 1944. Of those arrested, only Nagata, Mitamura, Nagatani, 
Kiyomizu, Sugiura, Takagi were charged and tried mostly with breaking the law regulating free speech, 
publishing and association. Nagata, Sugiura, and Takagi where punished with fines ranging 50 to 100 Yen 
while Kiyomizu was sentenced to a half year in prison. Mitamura was still on trial when the Tōjō cabinet 
fell in the fall of 1944. He was later found guilty and imprisoned in Sugamo. Most of those who were not 
charged were released before the end of the year 1943, some to then be drafted into the army. See Monthly 
Bulletin of the Special Higher Police [０㔾蠻况], March 1944 issue, p. 33; April 1944 issue, p. 33, 
November 1944 issue, p. 34. 
185 See Monthly Bulletin of the Special Higher Police [０㔾蠻况], October 1944 issue, p. 24. 
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1943, Tōyama published a laudatory article on Nakano, comparing his seppuku to that of 
Takayama Hikurō 186  and likening the Tōjō regime to a “Shōwa-bakufu-like-entity.” He 
postulated that, just as Takayama had tried to overthrow the bakufu through his seppuku, 
Nakano’s suicide was a denial of the Tōjō regime.187  
Writing about Nakano became less risky after the fall of the Tōjō cabinet in October 
1944. In the final article published during his long political career, Ōtake Kan’ichi questioned the 
role of the Diet in both Nakano’s death and Japan’s disastrous situation. Ōtake concluded that 
“the loss of authority of the Diet was the most serious matter of the day. The crime committed by 
the members of the Diet deserves [to be punished] by ten thousand deaths.”188About Nakano’s 
suicide and Tōjō’s role in it, he wrote:  
 
“There was no scarier enemy than Nakano, once you had made him your enemy. He 
would put fear into the hearts of ogres small and big alike. That is why the small and 
big ogres first of all wrested his writing brush from his hand, then tried to bind his 
tongue before putting him under arrest. That is the reason why, in order to communicate 
with the Emperor and the people, Nakano had only the means of suicide.”189  
 
                                                     
186 Takayama Hikokurō [㔾愾檢枢ア] (1747 - 1793). Samurai from Kōzuke domain and early activist for 
the cause of imperial restoration during the Tokugawa period, Takayama was put under arrest by the 
bakufu in Kurume, Kyūshū where he committed suicide.  
187 Tōyama Mitsuru, in Dainichi [哢荳], December 15, 1943 quoted in Inomata p. 752. 
188 Ōtake Kan’ichi [哢w⎤慎], “Performing one’s Duty as Member of Parliament” in Gakan, October 
1944.  
189 Ibid.  
 396 
Conclusions 
  
Introduction 
This dissertation’s conclusions fall into two parts. In the first part, we address the question 
of why fascism from below, failed in Japan by examining the case of Nakano’s Tōhōkai. Though 
Nakano’s failure to launch a fascist movement in pre-war Japan can be explained in part by 
factors external to Nakano’s life and activities, such as social, economic and political trends in 
interwar Japan as well as international dynamics and entanglements, these will receive only 
passing mention because they lie without the focus of this dissertation. Instead, we shall 
emphasize those factors intrinsic to Nakano, his understanding of fascism and the nature of the 
Tōhōkai. In the second part we look at how Nakano’s story has been treated in post-war Japan, as 
well as how his legacy has been used and abused by various political players to their advantage.  
 
Why Fascism from Below Failed in Japan: The Case of Nakano’s Tōhōkai 
A biography of Nakano Seigō cannot give a conclusive answer to the question of why 
Japan did not have fascism from below. Among all the pre-war right-wing societies in Japan, 
however, Nakano’s two proto-fascist parties were the ones that most closely resembled European 
fascism, so examining his failure sheds significant light on the larger question of why fascism 
itself failed to take hold in Japan.  
 
General Explanations 
Nakano’s failure to create popular mass movements modeled on European fascism, be it 
through the Kokumin Dōmei in the early 1930s or the Tōhōkai in the time thereafter, has as much 
to do with Nakano himself as with pre-war Japanese society.  
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When first introducing the distinction between fascism from above versus fascism from 
below in the context of Japan’s pre-war history, Maruyama Masao proposed some general 
explanations of why the latter failed in Japan, including the facts that Japan had never had a 
bourgeois revolution and that it lacked a strong labor movement which could be captured by the 
fascist parties.1 Despite the allure of such general claims, the extent of their accuracy remains 
debatable. One could equally point, among other things, to the fact that Japan did not go through 
the agony of total war in the years 1914-8, and therefore did not experience the wholesale 
uprooting of individual lives and the brutalizing of millions to fertilize the ground on which the 
seeds of fascist ideology could thrive thereafter. 2  However, these grand arguments clearly go 
beyond the scope of the present study and are mentioned here only for the sake of completeness.  
More to the point is fact that Nakano’s aim to create a popular mass party – that is, a party 
that would be based on power structures different from those established through the Meiji 
political settlement and that would eventually replace them - was fundamentally flawed. For one, 
Japan’s traditional power channels, which ran from the provincial villages via the jiban to elected 
representatives in the provincial assemblies and the Diet at Japan’s political center, proved to be 
much more flexible, adaptable and hence lasting than Nakano supposed.3 Accordingly, Nakano’s 
view that this arrangement needed to be reformed through a national mass-based popular party 
was shared by only a few others. As it turned out, this small band of believers was not strong 
enough to dent the existing system. If European fascism can be said to have thrived on the 
weakness of post-WW1 democracies, then Nakano’s project can be said to have been shattered 
by the robustness of the Meiji political system. As will be shown, Nakano never sought to create 
                                                     
1 Maruyama Masao, “The Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism” in Thought and Behaviour in 
Modern Japanese Politics, edited by Ivan Morris, (Oxford, 1963). 
2 On this point see for example Deutsch, Karl W.; “Social Mobilization and Political Development”; in 
The American Political Science Review, Vol. LV, no. 3, September 1961; pp. 493-514.   
3 See Toni C. Smith, “The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan”, (Stanford, 1959), p. 201-125 
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a party that would compete with the state’s monopoly on violence or its nationalist ideology. 
Since the existing political structures were strong and Nakano’s challenge thereof was relatively 
weak, the Tōhōkai almost never became the target of the state’s repression.  
 
Lack of Violence 
In addition to his general explanations for Japan’s failure to embrace fascism from below, 
Maruyama also noted that Japan’s radical fascists failed to seek some sort of mass base.4 He 
contends that fascism from below ceased to be a challenge to the state with the suppression of the 
February 26 uprising in 1936,5 and that fascism thereafter was installed largely from above, with 
radicals providing merely the stimulus.  
Maruyama’s analysis, however, overlooks Nakano’s attempt to create a mass movement, 
which only took off in earnest after 1936 and climaxed in 1939-41. Maruyama correctly 
highlights an important feature of Japan’s pre-war right-wing movements, namely the divorce of 
radical fascist groups that resorted to violence but did not try to build a mass base from the more 
moderate fascist groups that sought to build a mass base but rejected violence as a means to 
political ends. Nakano’s Tōhōkai clearly belonged to this latter group. The radical right-wing 
societies that, through their acts of terrorism, played such an important role in the years up to 
1936 did indeed lose significance after the suppression of the February 26 uprising. Had all major 
attempts to cultivate fascism ended then, Maruyama’s analysis might be sufficient. But it was 
after 1936 that Nakano’s non-violent mass movement come to the forefront.  
We have examined various explanations for Nakano’s rejection of violence as a political 
tool. Perhaps Nakano, who was a roughneck during his youth, grew soft with the years. The loss 
of his first-born son and his wife, in particular, seem to have made him generally gentler. 
                                                     
4 Maruyama Masao, “The Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism”, p. 52, 73, 76, and 80.   
5 Ibid., p. 33 and p. 65 and following.  
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Alternatively, perhaps Nakano simply failed to understand that European fascism owed its 
success to, among other things, its embrace of violence. As we saw in Chapter Six, the 
interpretation of European fascism that Nakano introduced to Japan was so sanitized of its violent 
aspects that this author contends it was no longer fascism. Or it may be, as Gregory Kasza 
suggested, that in pre-war Japan violent acts and mass organization were seen “as mutually 
exclusive strategies,” 6  because violent acts fell out of favor with the public after the 1936 
uprising. If so, abandoning violent tactics was the price Nakano had to play in order to clear the 
way for creating a mass movement. It was probably a combination of these factors that lead 
Nakano to maintain a non-violent stance in his political activities. 
From beginning to end, the Kokumin Dōmei and later the Tōhōkai cast themselves as the 
legal branch of the right-wing reformist movement. Whatever the radical right-wing reformists 
sought to achieve by violent means, Nakano proposed achieving through the legal channels laid 
out in Japan’s constitution. Nakano hoped to rise to power just like Hitler in the 1933 election, 
but he ignored the role that illegal violence played in Hitler’s rise before and after 1933.  
Nakano’s decision to forgo violence had important implications for his success. On the 
plus side, it may have made the Kokumin Dōmei, and later the Tōhōkai, more acceptable to a 
larger part of the electorate. Kasza correctly points out that the Tōhōkai was the most successful 
of the right-wing parties in creating a mass base, receiving more than two percent of the popular 
vote in 1937 and almost 3 percent in 1942.7 On the other hand, having a reliable paramilitary 
force of thugs at his disposal would have given Nakano the means to influence politics more 
directly, by threatening opponents, protecting allies, breaking up strikes, etc. As it was, Nakano’s 
                                                     
6 Kasza writes that “those pursuing violent tactic like the young officers and their civilian collaborators 
shunned a mass base, while those beginning to contemplate a mass movement did so out of disenchantment 
with terrorism. There is lacking the fascist amalgam of mass movement engaging simultaneously in legal 
and illegal methods to win power, the relative novelty which caught so many of Europe’s established 
political elites by surprise.” Gregory J. Kasza, “Fascism from Below? A comparative Perspective on the 
Japanese right, 1931-1936” in Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 19, No. 4, October 1984, p. 619. 
7 See Ibid., p. 621. 
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main influence on politics was the Tōhōkai members who held a seat in parliament – a contingent 
that dwindled to 12 after the 1937 election and just seven after 1942. Throughout Nakano did not 
have much weight in the political world.  
The violent struggle that had been crucial to the European fascist parties’ development 
could also have provided the otherwise heterogeneous Tōhōkai with a sense of direction, a 
common bonding experience and some sort of martial ésprit de corps. Nakano acknowledged this 
missed opportunity during a June 1939 speech: “A party that does not struggle does not have a 
real organization. It has no spiritual strength. It has no cohesion. It has no discipline. Even the 
Fascist and the Nazis perfected their organization only after having struggled.”8 Though he had 
experienced first-hand how the demonstrations in front of the British Embassy had both fueled 
the Tōhōkai’s growth and cemented its cohesion, and though he clearly knew that struggle 
(especially violent struggle) could energize a party, he failed to advocate that the party embrace 
violence. The Tōhōkai, as a result, never gained the notoriety of the NSDAP, and, despite its 
uniforms, in its spirit the party did not become martial.  
Finally, by renouncing violence, Nakano also gave up a measure of protection. He failed to 
learn an important lesson from his mentor, Tōyama Mitsuru, who in his youth gained a bad 
reputation for allegedly ordering the assassination of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ōkuma 
Shigenobu, in 1899 or for organizing violent interference in the 1892 general elections. Mitsuru 
was rumored ever after to have powerful connections to the Japanese underworld and plenty of 
young followers willing to lay their lives on the line. A reputation such as Tōyama’s might have 
protected Nakano during his conflict with Tōjō.   
 
                                                     
8 Nakano Seigō, speech held June 2, 1939 at Seinen Kaikan in Tokyo, reprinted in Nakano Seigō “Decide 
Japan’s Direction” [荳袿貢罰圃惚麑巵皇国], in Tōtairkiku, July 1939, p. 14.  
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Repression 
Raising the question of violence as a means to achieve political ends leads naturally to a 
discussion of state violence, though such political repression played a far larger role in Nakano’s 
suicide than in the Tōhōkai’s ultimate demise. Leaving aside an assassination attempt against 
Nakano during a speech tours in February 1941 (because the assassin’s identity, and on whose 
orders he acted 9, remains unclear) repression by the Japanese state only played a real role at the 
very end of Nakano’s life. Throughout its existence the Kokumin Dōmei was not even monitored 
by the Special Higher Police in charge of keeping an eye on radical societies and parties. When 
the Tōhōkai was first mentioned in their monthly reports in 1933, it was the society’s Sendai 
chapter founded indirectly by Ishiwara Kanji, not the think tank led by Nakano. Only from 1936-
7 onward did Nakano’s Tōhōkai appear regularly in Special Higher Police reports, but even then 
there was no mention of it being a threat to public peace that required action on the state’s part.  
State repression came to play a role only in the last two years of the party’s existence, by 
which time the Tōhōkai was already in decline. Membership and party chapters began declining 
long before Nakano’s arrest, with membership sliding to 9,875 by the end of 1942 from 25,547 
the year before and party chapters falling to 73 from 114, over the same period.10 Nakano’s 
decision to join the Yokusan-Seiji-kai in the late spring of 1942 and the Tōhōkai’s change in 
status from political party to cultural society were the main reasons for the falloff. The state’s 
increasingly stiff repression of Nakano - which included censorship of his writings, an effective 
                                                     
9 During one of his speech tours in February 1941, while in Hiroshima, Nakano fell ill with pneumonia. 
He cancelled the speech scheduled for that evening and retired to his room in the Yoshikawa Inn in front of 
Hiroshima station. However, then he switched rooms with his assistant and Tōhōkai youth leader Nagata 
Masayoshi. During the night a thug entered the hotel, intending to kill Nakano but stabbing and severely 
wounding Nagata instead. A container filled with gasoline at the site of the crime suggests that the assassin 
had intended to burn down the hotel in order to destroy all evidence after the murder. Since the police was 
never able to find the culprit, his motives remain in the dark, but most biographers suspect that he was 
acting on behalf of an extremist right-wing organization. Greatly intimidated, Nakano would henceforth 
move about only in the company of body guards. 
10 Source: Nagai Kazu [鵑棲北], “The Founding of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U]; in Shirin [別詒]; Vol. 
LXI, No. 4, July 1978, p.133. 
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ban on his public speaking, and, eventually his arrest -  in the last year of the Tōhōkai’s existence 
was more a coup de grace to an already weak and disintegrating body than the main reason for 
the party’s decline. 
Finally, it should be recalled the state’s organs required repeated prodding from Tōjō and 
his associates to start clamping down on Nakano and the Tōhōkai. The censorship bureau waved 
through Nakano’s January 1, 1943 editorial without any corrections; only afterward did they start 
censoring Nakano’s writing in earnest. While the Special Higher Police had monitored Nakano’s 
Tōhōkai for years, years of inactivity suggests they never would have arrested Nakano or any 
Tōhōkai leaders on their own. The Special Hither Police only moved to arrest Nakano after Tōjō 
pressured them to do so, though they remained unsure of the charges. The judiciary first refused 
and then stalled to the very last minute to comply with Tōjō’s wish to have Nakano locked away. 
In short, the state left the Tōhōkai unmolested for most of its existence, and state organs exercised 
repression only reluctantly during the Tōhōkai’s escalating conflict with the Tōjō regime. Though 
important in explaining Nakano’s suicide, political repression can hardly account for the failure 
of Nakano’s fascist mass movement during the preceding 11 years.  
 
Ideological Weaknesses  
As discussed in chapters four and five, the Tōhōkai’s ideologically heterogeneous nature, 
which was a direct result of party leaders’ decision to expand membership by incorporating 
already-existing mass organizations, was one of the factors that weakened the party. Growth was 
bought at the expense of ideological uniformity, resulting in structural weakness. 
Another sort of ideological weakness stemmed from Nakano’s decision to introduce a 
foreign ideology into Japan, a project which had always been a double-edged sword, but 
especially so in the case of fascism. On one hand, ever since the opening of Japan in the mid-19th 
century, the West had been viewed as a champion to be emulated. Western ideas, technologies 
and fashions were powerful levers for social, economic and cultural change within Japan. 
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Traveling to the West and gaining first–hand knowledge of Western ways lent authority and the 
aura of modernity to at least two generations of Japanese reformers. Having lived in the West 
remained an important condition for rising to the most influential positions in Japanese society. 
Nakano’s trip to Europe in his twenties and his later travels to Germany and Italy thus followed a 
well-established pattern of importing the latest European ideas into Japan.  
On the other hand, Nakano’s attempt to import European fascism came at time when Japan 
was emancipating itself from Western influences in multiple ways. Importing an ultra-
nationalistic European ideology presented something of a contradiction while the state promoted 
replacing foreign words with Japanese ones and even Nakano argued that non-Asian powers 
should be expelled from Asia. This opened Nakano to criticism not only from pure-Japanists but 
also from conservatives such as Hiranuma, who in May 1942 wrote:   
 
“How will the war of ideologies develop from here onward? Japan is always eager to 
imitate the West, especially people of standing, politicians and so-called scholars. For a 
time they imitated democracy and internationalism, and more recently they admired 
England and America before finally coming to adore the Nazis. Then they say that we 
too have to build such a thing [i.e. movement], but this contradicts our national polity 
[楼喪].…Now, however, they have forgotten this and are trying to imitate the Nazis. 
Democratic thought is cast away while German dictatorial thought is brought into the 
country. It is called National Socialism and is not so distant from Soviet Communism. 
They both run counter to Japan’s national polity and both will only lead to harm.”11  
 
Foreignness was not fascism’s only drawback. Unlike liberalism, socialism, or 
communism, which can transcend domestic arenas to appeal to global audiences, Fascism and 
Nazism were bound inherently to their nation of origin. Much of their contents are nation-
specific, leading later scholars to deny the existence of generic or universal fascism. Italian’s 
fascism vision of the Roman antiquity, or Nazism’s narrative of Germanic heroism, cannot be 
transferred to other nations. Nakano wisely never tried to bring those aspects of fascism to Japan, 
                                                     
11  Hiranuma Ki’ichirō Editorial Committee [霸齡萌慎ア憐将ôY㈡埣満善Y], “Retrospective of 
Hiranuma Ki’ichirō” [霸齡萌慎ア憐将ô], (Tokyo, 1955) p. 77-78.  
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but, more importantly, he also never attempted to formulate a Japanese counterpart to these 
poignant historical narratives. The lack of strong national symbols and strong historical narratives 
is the third major ideological weakness of Nakano’s interpretation of fascism.  
As we have seen, Nakano’s interpretation of fascism lacked a number of aspects that were 
important to the European originals. The glorification of youth and masculinity is one. An equally 
glorified version of the nation’s past and a strong leadership figure (leadership principle) 
comprise two others. While Nakano might have succeeded without glorifying youth or 
masculinity, but the Tōhōkai’s lack of control over powerful symbols of national identity and its 
lack of a unifying charismatic leader were crucial components of its failure. Nazism’s power 
rested to a substantial extent on the fact that the ideology had created a set of symbols of national 
identity over which it maintained control; long after it gained power, the Nazi regime spent 
considerable energy controlling the symbols it created an effort to dictate to the populace what it 
meant to be German. There was no comparable effort on Nakano’s or the Tōhōkai’s side to create 
powerful symbols of national identity through which political power could be exercised.  
Two explanations have been offered to account for this failure: First, perhaps Nakano 
lacked the will or imagination to engage in this sort of manipulation. Tōhōkai party members 
wore an arm bind with the character “East” [覩] on it, but this theme was not developed by the 
party in any way similar to the way in which the Nazis use the swastika. Second, and likely far 
more important, most of Japan’s powerful national symbols were under the firm control of the 
state. Unlike the Nazis (and to a lesser extent  the Italian Fascists), who thrived in a secular state 
that had abandoned national symbols – leaving a vacuum to be filled by others - the Japanese 
state kept a firm hold of the nation’s historical narrative and symbols, as well as its vision of the 
future and unifying figures such as the Emperor. Nakano or any other aspiring fascist would thus 
not only have to had to create an alternative to the state’s powerful symbols, but would then also 
have had to challenge and compete with the state. Taking such aggressive steps in the 1930s, as 
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the state was strengthening its grip over such symbols as it prepared for war, was difficult at best 
and dangerous at worst.  
Nakano’s reluctance to challenge the state’s symbols is perhaps best illustrated by his 
lukewarm attitude toward the Emperor. Unlike many of his contemporaries, especially on the 
right-wing of the political spectrum, who placed the Emperor at the center of their ideological 
constructs, Nakano placed little weight on the supreme leader and rarely mentioned him.12 While 
other right-wing activists waxed sentimental and got teary-eyed when discussing the Emperor, 
Nakano maintained a refreshingly sober and rational outlook on the few occasions he touched 
upon the subject.  
In his liberal democratic years, Nakano’s position on the Emperor had been moderately 
critical, which - given how the genrō used the Emperor to shield themselves from public criticism 
and Nakano’s exposure to republican thought at Waseda - was almost to be expected. Nakano did 
not mind the imperial institution, but took issue with the way it was used to obstruct the path 
toward constitutional government. When the leaders of the first movement to protect the 
constitution, in particular Ozaki, were accused of committing lèse-majesté -for in demanding that 
Prime Minister Katsura resign even though he had been charged with forming the cabinet by the 
Emperor himself -Nakano came to Ozaki’s defense. In doing so, he allowed a glimpse of his 
views on the constitutional position of Emperor and people:  
 
“The thought that the monarch is some super-human deity was common in the barbaric 
ages of all the powers of this world. To put forward this sort of argument in the 
enlightened 20th century, however - that is, to argue that the monarch is somewhat 
different in kind from the people, is actually a violation of the monarch’s dignity 
…Since the Emperor is a member of the same human species, it must be anticipated 
that sometimes he will, just like any other human, make a mistake in his decrees…Even 
in our empire, we cannot exclude that in the next 10 million years there will never be an 
                                                     
12 If we accept Kasza’s statement that the “one feature common to all rightist groups of the early 1930s – 
whether Japanist, national socialist, or agrarianist – … was the centrality of the Emperor in their 
ideological doctrines”, then Nakano and the Tōhōkai were clearly the exception to the rule. Gregory J. 
Kasza, “Fascism from Below? A comparative Perspective on the Japanese right, 1931-1936”, p. 621. 
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unenlightened or at least mediocre monarch…If monarchs were never to commit any 
mistakes, then…the minister’s duty to counsel [テᒠߩછ one of the duties of 
ministers under the Meiji Constitution] the Japanese Emperor would be an empty word. 
No matter how you look at it, anyone counseling the Emperor does so on the 
assumption that the Emperor too can fail, just as the idea of providing advice [to the 
Emperor] assumes that he too has shortcomings…Ozaki has said what no one else dares 
to say and thus prepared the way for our grand constitution.”13    
 
Six years later, following Germany’s defeat in WW1, Nakano attacked the bureaucrats’ 
interpretation of the Meiji Institution along German lines (i.e. their contention that the Meiji 
Constitution had been written on the German model as opposed to the more liberal English 
model), which Nakano believed ran against the will of Emperor Meiji as expressed in the Charter 
Oath. If Japan wanted to avoid ending up like defeated Germany, the interpretation of the 
Constitution had to be changed, giving more importance and power to the people. In Nakano’s 
own words:   
 
“If you wish to restore the nation’s fate by bowing to those outside, you must look at 
global trends and begin to work on great internal reforms…If you want to realize this, 
you must first correct the interpretation of the Constitution. The spirit of the Meiji 
Restoration is crystallized in the five articles of the Charter Oath and the Meiji 
Constitution is nothing but a means to expand the spirit of the beginning of the Meiji 
era. Among those who drafted the Constitution, however, the intention was to base it on 
the example of the Prussian constitution. They studied the tricks of Bismarck with the 
hope of controlling the entire realm. Unfortunately, we must deplore that the 
bureaucratic interpretation of the imperial Constitution did not stay close to Emperor 
Meiji’s plan…Germany, which clung to the Prussian constitution, making it the basis of 
its nation’s organization, is in a terrible situation today. If our nation does not take 
warning from the example of its precursor, the spirit of the Jinmu foundation of our 
country, we cannot hope to gain immortality of 1000 years. The imperial household is 
sacred and should not be violated. Therefore the imperial household is above politics 
and society, and is without responsibility [ή⽿છ]. In other worlds, the cabinet answers 
to parliament. By answering to parliament, it also answers to the people. And by 
answering to the people, it also answers to the Emperor [࿖᳃ߦኻߒߡ⽿ߦછߕࠆߪޔ
ᄤ⊞ߦኻߒߡ⽿ߦછߕࠆᚲߥࠅ]. In the end, the unity of sovereign and subject [ำ
⤿৻૕] is the spirit on which our nation was established and the principal aim of our 
                                                     
13 Nakano Seigō, “Letter addressed to Ozaki” [ภၴߦ⥝߰ࠆᦠ], in “Shichi-Kin, Hachi-Tate” [৾ᠶ౎❑
], (Tokyo, 1913), p. 166 and following.  
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constitution.”14  
 
Nakano’s statements are interesting not so much for what he said as for the things left 
unsaid. One could argue that by stating that the Emperor is above politics and society, Nakano 
was also saying that the Emperor has no role in politics; by making him “without responsibility,” 
Nakano was also divesting him of power. By stating that the cabinet answers to the people, and 
then to the Emperor (in that order), Nakano challenged one of the foundations of the Meiji 
constitutional setting, namely the location of sovereignty. Unable to change the wording of the 
constitution (which clearly made the Emperor sovereign), he sought to change the interpretation 
and make the people sovereign, at least de facto. As Nagao rightly notes, Nakano believed the 
nation [楼] was not the Emperor, but the Japanese people.15 
Did Nakano’s position toward the Emperor change during his fascist period? Had Nakano 
been serious from the beginning in creating a fascist movement, he should have tried to create an 
ideology, movement and, eventually, regime that created an alternative power structure and 
would be able to either integrate the powerful symbol of the Emperor or replace it (though it is 
hard to imagine how the latter could have been achieved). Nakano could have followed the 
example of Italy, where Mussolini co-existed with the King (following Germany’s example was 
impossible. Hitler entered the political void left by the Kaiser’s escape to the Netherlands, while 
Nakano had to acknowledge the reality of the Emperor). Nakano, however, did nothing of the 
sort.  
Initially, Nakano maintained his moderately critical stance toward the imperial institution. 
Nakano Yasuo notes correctly that one of the major differences between Kita Ikki’s 1919 plan for 
                                                     
14 Nakano Seigō, “Witnessing the Peace Conference” (Tokyo: Tōhōjiron-sha, 1919), p. 238-42. See also 
Nakano Seigō “Why the nation’s difficulties are not taken into consideration” [奏糠楼聟行褐壕洪鵠], in 
Tōhōjiron, June 1919.  
15 Nagao Ryō [憎悃は], “Moving peoples’ souls” [鉧网斥惚罰拘溝], (Tokyo: Hara Shobō [譜蟷蘯], 
1998), p. 294.  
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national reconstruction and Nakano’s 1933 counter-proposal (which was nevertheless modeled on 
Kita’s original) is that Nakano continued to reject imperial sovereignty, if not explicitly, then by 
omission.16 In Nakano’s “Principles for a Plan for National Reconstruction” [楼广膃△セ逸ⅻ今
], the words for “Emperor” [啀Œ] and “Empire” [Œ楼] do not appear once; instead, he uses less 
laden synonyms such as “kunshi” [甫岌]. The state council that Nakano proposed would:  
 
“serve the emperor and carry out the wishes of the people. The emperor’s army is, 
however, simultaneously the people’s army and stands on the foundation made up of the 
masses. Thus both state affairs and military affairs are based on the people. The military 
barracks are a miniature copy of society, and the morale of the troops is a reflection of 
the people’s spirit. The state council should thus unify state and military affairs through 
the people.”17 
 
As the proponents of Emperor ideology became ever louder, however, Nakano became 
more timid in his pronouncements. At times, he even supported the more authoritarian 
interpretations of the Emperor ideology. When, in early 1935, the Japanese right launched an 
attack on Professor Minobe’s “Emperor-as-organ theory”, which for years had been the accepted 
mainstream interpretation of the constitution, Nakano took the issue up in March and May 1935 
Gakan editorials.  
Starting out with a historical analysis of alternative interpretations of the Meiji 
Constitution, Nakano first identified autocratic theories of Hozumi and Uesugi that Nakano 
claimed had been used by the Meiji Oligarchs to strengthen their position. The more moderate 
Minobe interpretation had similarly been used by liberal politicians not only to legitimize their 
rise to power in the Taishō years, but also to defend it against the reformist challenge of the mid-
1930s. Nakano believed this made these liberal politicians into reactionaries, or “reactionary 
                                                     
16 See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 748. 
17 Nakano Seigō, “Outline Plan for National Reconstruction” [楼广膃△セ逸ⅻ今], (Tokyo, 1933), p. 
213.  
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liberals” hiding behind Minobe’s interpretation. The right-wing attack against these reactionary 
liberals, was, according to Nakano, not a return to former oligarchic despotism. Instead:  
 
“The movement to destroy the ‘Emperor-as-organ theory’ does not amount to a theory 
for interpreting the Constitution but an overflow from the spirit of reconstruction 
thundering through our age.”18  
 
In the end, Nakano neither came to the defense of Minobe’s emperor-organ theory nor 
rejected it as contrary to Japan’s constitution or the Kokutai. Though he never fully subscribed to 
the Emperor ideology – his pronouncements in later years, even in the midst of the Pacific War, 
read more like reluctant lip-service to the dominant trends of his time. He never challenged the 
Emperor ideology, either directly or by trying to establish himself or Konoe as alternative 
symbols of leadership. As we have seen in chapter five, rather than aiming to integrate the state 
into his version of fascism, he ended up integrating his version of fascism into the state. When 
Konoe launched the IRAA, Nakano dissolved the Tōhōkai and joined its ranks.  
 
Timing 
As crucial as Nakano’s ideological weaknesses were in condemning his fascist efforts to 
failure, timing, that is to say the sequence of events unfolding around Nakano and his timely or 
not so timely interaction with them, also played a role. While European fascist movements had 
developed into fascist regimes before WW2 broke out, Nakano’s fascist party was still only a 
budding movement (if that, and a far cry from being a regime) when Japan entered the war with 
China that escalated into the Pacific War. Nakano was aware of this fundamental difference in 
timing when he wrote in 1939:  
 
                                                     
18 Quoted in and translated by Oates, p. 64; Quote taken from “Editorial” [蕁ルクス], in Gakan [癪に] May 
1935, p. 7. 
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 “In Germany and Italy, the national reforms were completed before these two countries 
overcame the foreign crisis. In the case of Japan, however, the nation is confronted with 
a crisis at a time when soft parliamentary politics, democracy, liberalism, hedonism and 
egoism have not been reformed, and the challenges of genuine reform politics are given 
serious thought only by a small minority. Because of this, Japan has confronted the 
crisis without politics, and it was the Yamato spirit who late in the crisis finally 
displayed its glory.”19  
 
If in 1939 Nakano confined his observations to noting differences between Germany’s, 
Italy’s and Japan’s experience, two years later he expressed fear that his and the Tōhōkai’s efforts 
would come too late to influence Japan in any significant way: 
 
“I am sad. I fear that our efforts won’t be in time. I fear that we will fall in the course of 
the hard struggle. After our country’s situation becomes more difficult, however, and 
after we have fallen, I hope that there will step forward from the ranks of the Tōhōkai 
Youth Group a figure who is equal to Hitler in his best years. This is my earnest desire 
(applause). However, that will happen only in the far-off future. And if there is no Hitler 
today, than I wish at least for another Clemenceau.”20 
  
The timing of many events (e.g. the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, etc.) were beyond Nakano’s control, but there were many instances where he could freely 
determine the timing and still managed to get it completely wrong. Consider the relative leisure 
with which he approached the task of re-launching the Tōhōkai as a mass movement in the 18 
months leading up to the outbreak of  war with China (i.e., between Nakano’s departure from the 
Kokumin Dōmei and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident that led to war between Japan and China). 
While the Tōhōkai was officially re-launched as a political party in mid-1936, it was not until war 
with China erupted  that Nakano became fully committed to making it a popular mass-party, and 
                                                     
19 Nakano Seigō in a speech held at the first Tōhōkai national convention on December 9, 1938 reprinted 
in “On the Occasion of the Tōhōkai’s First National Convention” [᧲ᣇળ╙৻࿁ో࿖ᄢળߦ⥃ߺߡ], in 
Tōtairiku, March, 1939, p. 8. 
20 Nakano Seigō, “In Reply to Churchill and Roosevelt – Appealing to the Japanese People” [࡞࡯࠭ࡧࠚ
࡞࠻ޔ࠴ࡖ࡯࠴࡞ߦ╵߃ߡ ᣣᧄ࿖᳃ߦ๔ߋ], speech held September 13, 1941 reprinted in “In the 
Middle of the Storm of the Global Restoration” [਎⇇⛽ᣂߩ፲ߦ┙ߟ], (Tokyo: Tsuru Shobō [㢬ᦠᚱ], 
June, 1942), p. 142.  
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it was only after his return from Europe nine months later that he engaged in a full-scale 
expansion of the party along the lines of the European model. He thus spent somewhere between 
18 and 30 months idling rather than building a party. Granted, Nakano could not have foreseen 
the outbreak of the war with China, and perhaps he indulged in Ishiwara’s belief that Japan would 
need another 10 years of peace before entering a war, but he nonetheless missed a chance to 
prepare himself for a crisis during a period of relative tranquility.  
Nakano’s clumsy timing stands out most perceptibly when it comes to the choice between 
compromising or taking a stand. With the benefit of hindsight, the number of occasions where 
Nakano should have compromised to attain his aim (the merger with the Social Mass Party stands 
out as an example) is matched only by the number of occasions when he should have taken a 
stand (against entering the IRAA, for instance, or on opposing the National Mobilization Law). 
Rather than becoming better at such judgment calls with time and experience, moreover, Nakano 
seems to have gotten worse. It was thus pointless to oppose the Tōhōkai’s entry into the 
Yokusan-Seiji-kai in the spring of 1942, only to give in less than 3 months, just as it was ill-timed 
to reject Tōjō’s offer to work in the Information Bureau in the summer of 1943, only to ask Tōjō 
through his henchman Yokata to be used in some other function the day before his suicide.   
 
Conclusion 
The failure of Nakano’s attempt to introduce a fascist mass movement in pre-war Japan 
can be accounted for only by a complex combination of factors.  Japan’s political situation and 
the absence of certain conditions that set the stage for fascism’s growth in Europe - such as an 
existing mass-movement culture, a bourgeois revolution and the experience of total war, -provide 
debatable yet powerful explanations. Unfortunately, a biography of Nakano does not lend itself to 
either confirm or reject these general explanations.  
If we focus on Nakano’s life and the development of the two proto-fascist parties launched 
under his leadership, the following factors stand out in explaining Nakano’s failure from. The fact 
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that state repression played such a small role suggests that Nakano’s failure was due not so much 
to the strength of the state’s system as it was to the weakness of Nakano’s challenge. In addition 
to the fact that the Tōhōkai simply failed to gain massive support during elections, the party’s 
feebleness was a function of both its ideological weakness and its rejection of violence. If one 
accepts the notion that fascism in Europe grew like a cancer from within the liberal democratic 
state; that the fascist ideologies invented a set of alternative nationalist symbols as well as an 
alternative narrative of the nation’s glorious past and an equally glorious alternative vision of the 
nation’s future, all of which exerted a seductive power  over the national psyche; and if one 
further accepts that fascist movements competed with the state, not only in terms of ideology, but 
also by challenging the state’s monopoly on violence and that in so doing, the fascist movements 
became a state within the state  before the fascist regimes ultimately supplanted the state, one 
holds the key to understanding why Nakano’s adaptation of this model to Japan failed. While he 
dared to question the state intellectually in his speeches and writings, on occasions even 
challenging the sacredness of the Emperor, he did not dare to challenge it politically – aiming to 
be a state within the state and eventually aspiring to become the state. Of course one could 
speculate that he might have become more courageous had he had more support, but that would 
go beyond the scope of a historical account.  
 
Nakano Seigō Remembered 
One may rightly wonder if it would not have been more fitting to start this section with a 
different caption, one that reading “Nakano Seigō Forgotten,” for his name and life have been 
largely forgotten by contemporary Japanese. Apart from historians and non-academics interested 
in the history of the early Shōwa period (often gentlemen who were young boys in those years), 
most contemporary Japanese associate nothing with Nakano’s name. Even graduates of Waseda 
University - which, thanks to hosting the country’s largest collection of Nakano’s works, has 
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become somewhat of a center for Nakano-related studies - often do not know anything about him, 
his life, his party, or the role he played in pre-war Japanese politics.  
This should not come as a surprise. Nakano was most active and prominent during a period 
of Japanese history (before and during WW2) that later generations of Japanese call the “dark 
valley” and would rather not revisit. By introducing fascism to Japan, moreover, and advocating 
the Triple Alliance with the European fascist powers, Nakano became partly responsible for 
associating Japan with fascism and making Japan an accomplice of Nazi crimes. Even if his 
opposition to Tōjō was somewhat redeeming, Nakano occupies one of the darkest corners of the 
dark valley, and who can be blamed for not wishing to bring light to it?  
More important than the desire for national amnesia, however, is the fact that in spite of his 
many achievements as a journalist and politician, Nakano failed to bring the major projects of his 
life to fruition, and in many ways remained a second-rate figure in Japan’s political arena. 
Comparing Japanese politics of the 1930s and 1940s with a play, one might say that Nakano was 
often a critic, sometimes the scriptwriter, almost always on stage, but hardly ever the main actor 
and never the director. He had many connections, some influence, little prestige and even less 
power and while he was present at some of the most fateful turns in Japanese history, he almost 
invariably failed to shape the course of history according to his ideas. The only instances when he 
was able to influence history – the conclusion of the Triple Alliance and the southern advance – 
in retrospect turned out to be grave mistakes that Japanese citizens have preferred to forget, 
together with the people responsible.  
Even those who kept Nakano’s memory alive in the years after his death, and especially 
after the end of the war, found it convenient to remember only certain parts while forgetting 
others. This, too, should not come as a surprise, for history is patient and defenseless. It does not 
object when people use and abuse it for short-term gain, selecting evidence to suit their needs and 
ignoring the rest. After all, we remember historical figures not for their sake, but for our own. 
Why should the memory of Nakano be different?  
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As we have seen, the struggle over Nakano’s legacy started the moment he killed himself 
and continues to this day. Remarkably, Nakano’s colorful, contradictory life opened the door to 
equally colorful and contradictory interpretations whose evolution over time was not without its 
own zigs and zags. The two poles of the interpretation spectrum are in fact so different that one 
would not be faulted for wondering if there were not one but two Nakano Seigōs.  
 
Nakano the Liberalist 
In Japan’s immediate post-war period, with fascism utterly discredited and democracy 
vindicated (communism also experienced a brief revival in Japan, until with the onset of the Cold 
War the occupation authorities decided Japan would be better off without it), most who 
remembered Nakano chose to remember his liberal period or his opposition to Tōjō while trying 
to distance themselves from Nakano’s infatuation with fascism.  
These exercises in historical surgery took various forms. Some tried to play down the 
relevance of Nakano’s fascist years or their own relationships with him during that time. After the 
war Miki Bukichi thus wrote: “At the time, it seems that Nakano was seen by many as a 
nationalist [楼0/3ルクス70], but he was nothing of the sort. He was a constitutionalist [U畧厨コ貢斥] 
through and through, and therefore opposed the Tōjō military cabinet.”21 Nakano’s infatuation 
with fascism was often described as some sort of abnormality, while his opposition to Tōjō 
showed the “real Nakano”. Nakano’s life-long friend Ogata went a step further, dismissing 
Nakano’s praise of fascism as a “betrayal” [哇㌲膃ルクス] and a sign of insanity: “To me, who 
knows [Nakano’s] normal self, his imitation-fascist uniforms, the armbands modeled upon the 
‘Hakenkreuz’ [災佐策魂咋婚最 swastika] and his tour to Germany and Italy all look like the 
                                                     
21 Miki Bukichi [申袍驥便], “Fight to the death against the Tōjō cabinet” [覩襭塔隆膏貢髞帰], part of a 
special feature “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩惚畫康], in Japan and the Japanese [荳袿沸砿
荳袿斥], January 1956, p. 12. 
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deeds of a madman [瓸攻☞控浩紅].”22 Ogata also stressed that he himself had influenced 
Nakano toward democracy in the 1920s and noted that to preserve political differences from 
harming their friendship in the 1930s, the two men agreed to talk only about horses.23  
Others have gone a step further, arguing that Nakano was never really a politician at heart 
(and if so, then only a lousy one24), but rather a scholar25 or an artist.26 These claims are easily 
dismissed. While Nakano saw himself always as an educator as well as a politician, and while 
there were moments in his life in which he may have regretted embarking on a political career – 
when visiting Fukuoka for the last time in the summer of 1943, for instance, he told his former 
teacher Shibata that he wished to dedicate his life solely to education in the future – in the final 
analysis he never abandoned politics. Whatever educational activities he undertook were always 
an addition to his political works. Moreover, with the possible exception of the martial-arts 
instruction offered at his dorm, his educational outreach was always political in content.  
Indeed, throughout his life Nakano was a politician through and through, showing little 
interest in anything that lay outside the realm of political affairs. With the exception of his private 
family life and hobbies (e.g. jūdō and later horseback riding), his thoughts circled around politics 
and politics alone. In his writings, one searches in vain for aesthetic, epistemological, scientific, 
                                                     
22 Quotes taken from Ogata, p. 21 & 23. 
23 See Ogata, p. 42. 
24 See Ogata, p. 23.  
25 This argument is put forward by Inomata (see p. 307-08) who points out that Nakano was too learned 
for a fascist while Ogata Taketora writes: “In the end, his life was the life of a scholar [黛ぐ70] and this 
shows in his writings.” Ogata, p. 9. 
26 Sugimori Kōjirō described Nakano as an artist: “By birth, Nakano was suited to be a politician. He was 
extremely suited for that profession. There is no need to describe his talents for this occupation in detail. In 
addition to his political acumen, Nakano also had large amount of artistic talent. His artistic talents were 
consciously concentrated in his political work which may be the reason why he never displayed his artistic 
vein. It is extremely rare that someone excels in both political acumen and artistic talent. Since it is rare it 
is also very significant.” Sugimori Kōjirō [襃迢杁饅ア]; “At the used book store” [幣袿悋行肱], part of a 
special feature “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩惚畫康], in Japan and the Japanese [荳袿沸砿
荳袿斥], January 1956, p. 9 – 10. 
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artistic, or metaphysical considerations made for their own sake. Those who knew Nakano agree 
that: “Nakano liked to discuss politics until late into the night” [啀真貢哢征惚テラ耕肱午午午].27 
Colleagues, in fact, found discussing any other topic impossible. Honryō Shinjirō, professor at 
Waseda who was in Berlin at the time of Nakano’s visit in 1938, recalled:  
 
“At the time I took him [i.e. Nakano] out to play. Yet, when I took him to a concert he 
snored, at the cinema he fell asleep, at the cabaret he yawned, saying ‘what’s so funny 
about women lifting their legs?’ Whenever the conversation turned to politics, however, 
whether domestic or international, any subject would do. First his eyes would light up. 
Then he would forget time and place, and talk with great animation. I was very 
surprised. This person had not a single interest outside of politics.”28 
 
Given the difficulty of trying to play down Nakano’s fascist period or his stature as a 
politician, most followers have taken a different approach to dealing with his zigzagging 
biography by played up the non-fascist periods before 1931 and, especially, his opposition to 
Tōjō after Pearl Harbor. Among the many popular books and articles written by Nakano’s former 
followers and associates, we do not find a single one dealing specifically with Nakano’s 
infatuation with Hitler. There are, however, countless publications dealing with the reasons for 
his suicide, which reflects the fact that Nakano’s devotees sought to benefit from the redeeming 
qualities of his final years and his suicide.29 Anyone wishing to launch a career in politics or in 
                                                     
27 Nakayama Yū [腎愾釘]; “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩惚畫康], in Kyōtsū no Hiroba [努
＊貢杰凅], September 1952, p. 46. 
28 Honryō Shinjirō quoted in Inomata p. 391. 
29 Examples include but are not limited to: Kimura Ki [袍襁鯢], “Nakano Seigō’s Last Drama” [腎ǒ驟
悩貢蠱歙貢盂蟠], (Tokyo, 1946); Miki Bukichi [申袍驥便], “Fight to the death against the Tōjō cabinet” 
[覩襭塔隆膏貢髞帰], part of a special feature “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩惚畫康], in Japan 
and the Japanese [荳袿沸砿荳袿斥], January 1956, p. 10 – 16; Tanabe Tadao [譓シ泗渣], “The death of 
Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩貢髞]; in Tokyo News [覩静紘国酷], February, 1958; Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁
驥啌 ], “Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?” [腎ǒ驟悩購奏膣60内浩紅拘], (Tokyo 1949); 
Mitamura, Takeo [申譓襁驥啌], “A Record of Warnings: the 20th Anniversary of Nakano’s Suicide” [㍽癧
貢ヒô瑍腎ǒ驟悩60内性筆鳳朮行橲紅耕肱], (Tokyo, 1963); Nakano Yasuo [腎ǒ┘渣],  “The Two 
Enigmas Surrounding Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩貢性考貢デカ], in Jinbutsu Ōrai [斥☞鬱襷], December 
1956; Hosokawa, Takaichirō [21擺吏慎ア],  “Learn from Nakano Seigō’s Suicide” [腎ǒ驟悩貢60内行嶌
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public life simply found it much more advantageous to be associated with Nakano the democrat 
who had fought Tōjō’s militarism rather than with Nakano the fascist who had facilitated the 
military’s rise to power.  
The meetings of the Nakano Seigō Society [驟悩善]30 that commemorated the anniversary 
of Nakano’s death serve as a microcosm of how Nakano’s legacy was used. The meetings were 
attended by Nakano’s family, friends or followers, such as Ogata Taketora, Tokutomi Sohō, 
Mitamura Takeo, etc., who often shared an anecdote concerning Nakano and then speculated 
what Nakano would do if he were still alive.31 In doing the latter, they used the revived Nakano 
as a mouthpiece to voice their own views about contemporary political affairs, and manipulated 
Nakano’s memory to serve their respective purposes.  
Inatomi Ryōbito, who by 1953 had become a MP for the Socialist Party [だ善妬], thus 
celebrated Nakano – who as early as 1932 had advocated allegedly socialist policies designed to 
better the lot of Japan’s workers and farmers – as an “ally of the weak” [榴攻豪貢貢帽苜]. The 
implication was clear: Inatomi suggested that he and the Socialist Party were the rightful heirs to 
Nakano’s legacy, as he had always argued that “a politician should not stand above the people, 
                                                                                                                                                             
高], in Ronten [ルクス♧]; 18(2), 1999.5 pp. 42-43; Narahashi Wataru [醵隱喰]; “I Will Cut my Belly and Die” 
[㊢謎耕肱髞衡貢紘], part of a special feature “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩惚畫康], in Japan 
and the Japanese [荳袿沸砿荳袿斥], January 1956, p. 31 - 32; Watanabe, Yukio [喰グネ赶], “The 
Enigma of Nakano Seigō’s Suicide” [腎ǒ驟悩貢60麑貢デカ], (Fukuoka, 1996).  
30 The Seigō-kai or Seigō Society was a body founded shortly after the war, composed mostly of former 
friends and followers of Nakano Seigō. The society’s main activities included the organization of lectures 
(often commemorating Nakano’s life and death) and the publication of books by and on Nakano. Thus in 
1953, on the tenth anniversary of Nakano’s death, the Society published Nakano’s last lecture series held in 
the spring and summer of 1943 on the subject of the Kenmu Restoration.  Nakano Seigō, “History of the 
Kenmu Restoration” [椥驥腎85別ルクス], (Tokyo: Seigō-kai [驟悩善], 1953).  
31 In 1954, the Seigō society published a collection of commemorative speeches by various of Nakano’s 
friends and contemporaries held the previous year. The title of the book, “Nakano Seigō is Alive”, 
expresses well the nostalgic tone of these essays, which by and large give a positive description of Nakano. 
Seigō-kai eds. [驟悩善], “Nakano Seigō is Alive” [腎ǒ驟悩購﨟攻肱広鵠], (Tokyo: Akane-shobō [巷拘
講蟷蘯], 1954) 
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but struggle with the people.”32 Tokano Takeshi, MP and member of the Socialist Party’s left-
wing faction, wrote in 1954 in a similar vein, stressing the fact that Nakano was influenced by 
G.D.H. Cole’s version of Socialism and adding wrongly: “Nakano’s patriotic passion in later 
years made him commit the mistake of becoming a fascist. Even after having met with Mussolini 
and Hitler, however, he never had much esteem for either of these two people.”33 Tokano went as 
far as calling Nakano a “revolutionary who would not submit to the established powers.”34  
While the socialists thus cast Nakano as revolutionary fighting for the weak, his more 
right-leaning associates emphasized a different picture. The case of Mitamura Takeo and his 1949 
“Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?” illustrate the point well. Originally a policeman, 
Mitamura joined Nakano’s Tōhōkai and worked his way up through various positions to become 
Nakano’s right-hand man. Like Nakano a member of parliament, Mitamura was arrested in 1943, 
but unlike most other Tōhōkai members he actually served a term in prison. Purged from public 
office in the immediate post-war period, he was re-elected to the Diet in 1955 as a Liberal 
Democratic Party member. Throughout his later career, Mitamura remained one of Nakano’s 
most outspoken and uncritical fans, often casting himself as the manager of Nakano’s inheritance. 
Highly nostalgic for the Tōhōkai, Mitamura on occasion wrote things such as: “I wait for the flag 
of the Tōhōkai to fly again.” 35   Though Mitamura conceded that, with hindsight, some of 
Nakano’s “actions and propositions would have to be criticized” (supposedly he was referring to 
Nakano’s infatuation with Hitler and Mussolini), he added that Nakano’s actions in his last years 
                                                     
32 Inatomi Ryōbito [I̊廬₃斥], “An Ally of the Weak” [榴攻豪貢貢帽苜], in Seigō-kai eds. [驟悩善], 
“Nakano Seigō is Alive” [腎ǒ驟悩購﨟攻肱広鵠], (Tokyo: Akane-shobō [巷拘講蟷蘯]; 1954) p. 14. 
33 Tokano Takeshi [盡箆驥]; “Nakano Seigō’s merciful prayer” [腎ǒ驟悩貢濾巡], in Seigō-kai eds. [驟
悩善], “Nakano Seigō is Alive” [腎ǒ驟悩購﨟攻肱広鵠], Tokyo, Akane-shobō [巷拘講蟷蘯]; 1954; p. 
40. 
34 Ibid. p. 36. 
35 Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁驥啌]; “The Spirit of Eternal Camaraderie”[弁沒鵑睡貢网], part of a special 
feature “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩惚畫康], in Japan and the Japanese [荳袿沸砿荳袿斥], 
January 1956, p. 21-24. 
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showed the “real Nakano,” whom Mitamura believed was “a thorough antimilitarist [蘖購氈枡浩
紅ヲ淚孛広腔巷耕紅午] Aligning himself with the pro-democratic euphoria that swept Japan in 
the post-war period, Mitamura concluded that Nakano’s “ghost is probably smiling in his grave, 
as three thousand years of…autocratic feudal government have perished” and “a democratic 
revolution has dawned.”36  
Nakano thus became a socialist revolutionary to some and an anti-militarist democrat to 
others.37 Similarly, when the NHK radio program “The Truth Box,” authorized by the Occupation 
Forces, labeled Nakano as “one of the best [蠱豪釘黒紅] individualist politicians [鐸斥厨コ膕齠
广 ] that modern Japan has brought forward,” adding that “he belongs to the school of 
individualist politicians who have been raised in Japan’s political world since the early days of 
Meiji,” the accolade said less about Nakano than it did about the occupation authorities’ desire to 
identify some sort of democratic tradition of resistance in war-time Japan upon which to build a 
democratic post-war future.38 There was, in short, a shared political interest in post-war Japan that 
Nakano be remembered as someone who had fought militarism and Tōjō rather than someone 
who had facilitated the latter’s rise to power, that he be remembered as a democrat rather than a 
non-violent authoritarian.  
                                                     
36
 Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁驥啌 ], “Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?” [腎ǒ驟悩購奏膣60内浩
紅拘 ], (Tokyo, 1949) except the quote concerning Nakano’s antimilitarism which is taken from page 26, 
all other quotes are taken from the preface. 
37  In his first book about Nakano, Inomata (Nakano’s former publicity aid and youth activist) also 
describes Nakano as an anti-militarist. See Inomata Keitarō [㊝退舁啣ア ], “Nakano Seigō and the 
Japanese Militarists: a Struggle for Life and Death” [腎ǒ驟悩膏荳袿ヲ淚瑍廏棒貢麑帰], (Tokyo: 
Society for the Spread of the Democracy [鴈厨韮柤藺沸善], 1951). 
38 The program on Nakano was the first of the “Truth Box” [*ùè] series broadcast by NHK. The 
sequel on Nakano was broadcast on January 18, 1946 and can be found quoted at length in Mitamura 
Taeko [申譓襁驥啌], “Why did Nakano Seigō Commit Suicide?” [腎ǒ驟悩購奏膣60内浩紅拘] (Tokyo, 
1949), p. 5-8. Mitamura in turn quoted from Sōgō Press [G遍菜削瑳だ∭ ], High Command of the Allied 
Forces, Private Information and Education Bureau, Radio Broadcasting [ヾ遍ヲ蠱㔾変占グ鴈侮炒况臙
に悄Y碕沙梱膠ョ], “The Truth Box”[ *ùè] “The truth is like this” [*ù購拘康紘],  No. 1, p.3-4.  
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The role that Nakano’s legacy played in post-war Japanese society can therefore be 
compared in some ways to the role played by the conspirators around von Stauffenberg in 
Germany. In both cases, the desire to find some sort of nationally, or at least individually, 
redeeming act of resistance among what otherwise appeared to have been ocean of murderous 
insanity, led people to idealize and embellish the memory of Nakano’s and Stauffenberg’s 
struggle against their respective dictatorial regimes.  Both men’s resistance against the dictators 
of their time caused later generations to lionize them as precursors to modern-day democrats, 
which neither was.  
Accordingly, Ōya Sōichi39 was right to note in 1952: “It is somewhat strange to argue, as 
many did after the war, that just because they were disliked by Tōjō, Nakano and Ishiwara Kanji 
were anti-militaristic heroes.”40 As has been shown in chapter seven, even when opposing Tōjō, 
Nakano did not return to the liberal democratic views he held in the 1920s, but held onto fascism 
and totalitarianism as a third way that evolved from liberalism and socialism and transcended 
both. Believing fascism and totalitarianism to be ideally suited to the business of waging war, 
Nakano in 1943 did not want to return to a more liberal Japan but rather hoped to become more 
like his conception of either Germany or Italy.  
Nakano was not the “anti-militarist” Mitamura, Inomata and others made him out to be. He 
did not oppose the war itself, and in fact explicitly expressed his support for the war even as he 
criticized the government’s policies. When it comes to allotting responsibility for the war it is 
therefore correct to see Nakano and Tōjō as “accomplices” [栓侮航康浩 ] rather than 
                                                     
39 Ōya Sōichi [哢嵶呎慎] (1900 – 1970), commentator and critic.  
40 Ōya Sōichi, “A lively group of characters in the middle of a storm” [挧貢腎貢斥☞八珍], in Economist 
[昆唆済財瑳宰], March 20, 1952; special Edition commemorating the 30th anniversary of the magazines 
foundation [迩宕伍罵捺申御朮ヒ洸], p. 24.  Ōya’s comment was echoed by Maruyama Masao criticizing 
how after war, “even outright fascists came back as ‘democrats’ simply because they were opposed to 
Tōjō.” Maruyama Masao, “The Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism” in Thought and Behaviour in 
Modern Japanese Politics, edited by Ivan Morris (Oxford, 1963), p. 75-76. 
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opponents.41 Let it be clear: As the army settled into the saddle of power, people such as Nakano 
held the stirrups! Accordingly he bears some responsibility for the war and its outcome. 
 
Nakano the Fascist 
Years passed before the biased positive treatment Nakano’s legacy received from his 
followers and associates was balanced with the memory of his fascist years. Maruyama Masao 
was probably not thinking specifically about Nakano when he wrote that one should remain 
“critical toward those out-and-out fascists who came forward after the war posing as democrats 
on the sole grounds of having opposed Tōjō.”42 Once the word was out, however, professional 
historians followed his advice and subsequent academic research focused almost exclusively on 
Nakano’s fascist period, almost as if to provide a counterweight to the one-sided image given in 
earlier popular accounts.43 While the academic writing may have been a necessary correction of 
the popular memory, it was equally one-sided – only in a different direction.  
Time’s passage and the increasing distance between Japan and its painful war memories 
also opened the door to unconventional interpretations of Nakano’s life. Among the more 
harmless (but nevertheless misguided), we find comparisons of Nakano to Mishima Yukio that 
                                                     
41 Historical Research Association, eds. [髏別ｫ!善Y], “History of the Pacific War” [啣霸┠皚勢別], 
5 vols., (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shimpō-sha, 1954), vol. 4, p. 107. 
42 Maruyama Masao, “The Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism” in “Thought and Behaviour in 
Modern Japanese Politics”, edited by Ivan Morris, (Oxford, 1963), p. 34.  
43 See Kanechika Teruo, “Nakano Seigō and Fascist Thought” [腎ǒ驟悩膏斎困査砂冴淞熾] three-part 
article published in The Waseda Journal of Political Science and Economics [莨I̊譓膕齠42喝嶌癲グスーム], 
part one, no. 196, pp. 37-62, December 1965; part two, no. 232, pp. 1-20, October 1972; part three, no. 
234, p. 1-23, August 1973; Arima Manabu [衄㮈嶌], “The Organization and Policy of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜
善貢36ト膏膕ø], in Shi-en [別欝], Kyūshū Daigaku Bungaku-bu [枢攀哢嶌艙嶌グ], No. 114, 1977.3, p. 
61-85; Nagai Kazuo, “The Foundation of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U]” in Shirin [Journal of History], 
vol. 61, no.4, pp. 106-141, July 1978; Nagai Kazuo, “The Development of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢̇悽]” 
in Shirin [Journal of History] vol. 62, no.1, pp. 98-133, January 1979; Itō, Takashi; “Nakano Seigō and the 
Tōhōkai” [腎ǒ驟悩膏覩苜善] in “The Politics of the Showa period – Continued” [蓖北袗貢膕齠—94攻
], (Tokyo, 1993).   
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hinge on little more than the fact that both were considered right-wing and both killed themselves 
by committing seppuku.44  
Other interpretations were not as harmless. As die-hard fascists who went into hibernation 
in the immediate post-war period timidly broke their self-imposed inactivity and silence, a 
younger generation of neo-fascists gathered around them and launched new right-wing 
organizations. Some sought to mis-appropriate Nakano’s memory for their purposes. A certain 
Ushijima Tokutarō45, editor of “Jasco” [沙堺瑳唆], the organ of a racist student organization by 
the name “Japan Student Conference” [荳袿嶌﨟善共同組合], relaunched a magazine recycling the 
name of the Tōhōkai’s organ Tōtairiku. 
The most bizarre interpretation comes from the National Socialist Japanese Workers Party 
[楼广だ善厨コ荳袿迫朕70妬 ], often also written in German as “Nationalsozialistische 
Japanische Arbeiterpartei” (NSJAP). As the NSJAP’s name and acronym suggest, its founders 
aimed to be the Japanese counterpart to the NSDAP, the German war-time Nazi party.46 Founded 
in 1982, the NSJAP sees itself in the tradition of the “Japanese National Socialists, Turanists47 
and anti-Semitists” that they trace to the thought of the Yūzonsha, Kita Ikki, Akamatsu 
                                                     
44 Nagao Ryō [憎悃は], “Moving the Souls of People” [鉧网斥惚罰拘溝], (Tokyo: Hara Shobō [譜蟷蘯
], 1998). 
45  Ushijima Tokutarō [⬆搖毫啣ア ] (1951? - ?), right-wing activist and editor of a racist student 
magazine called “Jasco” [沙堺瑳唆]. 
46 All quotes are taken from the English-language section of the NSJAP web-site at www.nsjap.com  
which however is no longer online in 2010 (last accessed in fall 2005). Should the reader feel that some of 
the English quotations are awkward, this author would like to assure him, that they are indeed awkward in 
the original – grammatical or spelling mistakes were not corrected.  
47  According to the NSJAP, “Turanism” or “Turanianism” are anthropological theories according to 
which the Japanese, the Hungarian, the Finish and the Estonians races all have their origin in a “Turanid 
race” which they claim is supported by “DNA analysis as well as linguistic relationship among their 
languages. Thus, Turanism / Turanianism calls for the solidarity of the Turanians”. Before the war the 
Turanist movement in Japan established organizations such as the “Alliance of Turanian People” (TURAN
鴈茘弁ç) in 1921 and the “Turanian Society of Japan” (荳袿最碕策表善) in the early 1930s.  
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Katsumaro, the Society of International Politics and Economics (SIPE 楼墫膕42嶌善48) founded 
by General Shiōden Nobutaka49, General Ōshima Hiroshi (war-time ambassador to Germany), 
Shiratori Toshio (war-time ambassador to Italy), Karl Haushofer (German geo-politician), and 
Nakano Seigō. The party’s aim “to restore the new non-hereditary system of the Shōgun”, 
establishing in the economic sphere a “corporatistic autarky against international capitalism and 
communism” and preserving “the tradition and price [sic!] of our fatherland”50. Although it is 
highly doubtful that Nakano would have approved of the NSJAP’s activities, the party 
nonetheless traces its origins to him and modeled their flag upon the Tōhōkai flag. 51 Fortunately, 
this interpretation of Nakano remains a fringe phenomenon.  
 
                                                     
48 Among others, SIPE published “Research on International Secret Powers” (楼墫╄廡皚陪貢ｫ!) and 
the “Jewish Research” (咲挫榊ｫ!) 
49 According to the NSJAP, General Nobutaka Shioden also contributed articles to “Der Stürmer” a 
German-language Nazi-paper.   
50 Their Platform reads: 1. We should establish a moral state as a national community on the basis of the 
idea of National Socialism. 2. We should exclude the internationalism which runs counter to the national 
polity of Japan and should demand a leading autocratic regime over Japan. 3. We should recover our self-
determination of the real independent nation and should protect our fatherland and our folk from foreign 
powers which are conspiring to have a (sic!) control over the world. 4. We should reconfirm the excellence 
of Japanese race, preserving the purity of our blood, and contribute to freedom of the world. (again see 
www.nsjap.com).    
51 The party is also concerned with saving Japan’s racial homogeneity, which is threatened by “foreigners 
… especially from Asian Continent, Africa and so on… Southeast Asian prostitutes carrying AIDS, Iranian 
drug dealers, Chinese robbers, North Korean communists, and Blacks…”. However, (according to the 
NSJAP) the greatest threat to the Japanese nation are the Jews who “control” the Federal Government of 
the USA. While “there are few Jews themselves and there are no Jews in the Japanese government of today 
…. the Jewish corporations are invading the country …. Besides, they have succeeded in taking over the 
Imperial Household of Japan.” Freemasonry is another threatening power which has taken over the 
Imperial Household (Emperor Akihito, Crown Princess Masako, Prince Mikasa are all Freemasons 
according to the NSJAP.) while “the number of Freemasons in the Diet has been getting larger since the 
end of WW2”. The party maintains relations with neo-Nazi organizations in other countries, especially in 
Germany, with which it has established a “New Axis”. The activities of the NSJAP include demonstrations 
in front of the Israeli and American embassies, support of neo-Nazis abroad (mainly Germany but also the 
USA), military training of its members, putting ads in national newspapers, and offering volunteers to fight 
on the side of Iraq during the First Gulf War. (again see www.nsjap.com). 
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Nakano, Liberal and Democrat and Fascist  
The second generation of Nakano’s biographers finally tried, in the latter half of the Shōwa 
period (1965–91), to bring the many contradictory sides of his career together in their accounts. 
As opposed to Ogata’s biography of Nakano written in 1951, these writers (including Nakano’s 
son Yasuo and some of Nakano’s followers), not only covered the whole of Nakano’s life but 
also devoted a commensurate amount of pages to Nakano’s fascist period (although his suicide 
still received disproportionate emphasis). 52 While these accounts mentioned Nakano’s fascist 
period, however, they failed to integrate and reconcile it with what came before and after. Nakano 
the liberal, anti-militarist democrat and Nakano the militarist fascist had finally made into the 
same book(s), but they remained juxtaposed against one another without being worked into one. 
Accordingly, the many contradictions in Nakano’s character and political positions remained 
unsolved. To some extent this may be a simple reflection of the fact Nakano, like most people, 
was himself contradictory and the various sides of his personality cannot be resolved into a 
harmonious whole. . To some extent, however, it is probably due to the fact that the second 
generation of biographers was still too close to Nakano to see not only his contradictory sides, but 
also that which unified them.  
Perhaps it is a coincidence that the first successful attempt to integrate Nakano’s 
contradictions and find unifying continuities had to wait until after the end of the Shōwa period, 
when Muro Kiyoshi, a professor at Waseda University, published his interpretations of Nakano’s 
                                                     
52 After Ogata’s 1951 work on Nakano, the first to attempt a biography of Nakano’s life was Inomata, 
Keitarō, “The life of Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩貢﨟㌧], (Nagoya, 1964). The work (often quoted in the 
forgoing pages) gave due attention to Nakano’s thought and activities in the 1930s. It was followed by the 
two-volume biography by Nakano’s son, Nakano Yasuo, “Nakano Seigō: The Politician” [腎ǒ驟悩膕齠
广], 2 vols., (Tokyo, 1971) which likewise deals with Nakano’s fascist years head on. The same goes for 
later biographies. See Tatamiya, Eitarō [譓譓幟ラ啣ア ], “Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩 ], (Tokyo: 
Shinjimbutsu Orai-sha [范斥☞鬱襷だ],1975) and Hinoshita, Tōgo [荳真I捧], “The way of lion: Nakano 
Seigō” [㍎岌貢ぐ腎ǒ驟悩], (Tokyo, 1986). 
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life.53 I am greatly indebted to Muro’s work and hope to have shown in the previous pages that, 
while spectacular, dramatic and often seemingly contradictory, the volatile movements of 
Nakano’s life were often not as stark as the labels would suggest. His attitude toward the military 
was fairly constant, even if it led him to oppose Tanaka and Tōjō while supporting Ishiwara. 
While the former earned him the label anti-militarist, the latter caused him to be called the army’s 
mouthpiece.  
Some of the discontinuities in his career seem superficial when viewed against the many 
continuities that span his life, such as his worship of charismatic figures; his desire to integrate 
the Japanese people into the political process through a mass party; his anti-colonial pan-Asianist 
stance; his dislike for England and attraction to Germany; his revolutionary romanticism; and, 
finally, his deep dislike for Japan’s established elites, especially the bureaucrats. If we ignore for 
a moment the fact these continuities still leave some irreconcilable contradictions in Nakano’s 
words and actions and focus on the broad strokes of this otherwise confusingly agitated picture, 
what do we see?  
Nakano was a challenge to the existing order, the status quo and the political settlement 
reached after the Meiji Restoration. On one level, the unifying theme of Nakano’s life was a 
dream of a popular mass party that would sweep away the Japanese political establishment to 
finally realize and complete the unfulfilled populist aspirations of the Meiji Restoration expressed 
in the Charter Oath. Fascism for Nakano was just another means of achieving that overarching 
aim.  
Nakano’s opposition to the established order – during both his liberal and fascist periods – 
also follows a larger pattern of political opposition that can be traced back to the Meiji 
restoration. His life Nakano’s can be read as part and extension of that tradition. Some of the 
most formidable challenges to Japan’s domestic political order had presented themselves often in 
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combination with demands for a hard-line in foreign affairs. Such was the Restorationist 
challenge of the bakumatsu years, which rallied anti-bakufu opposition under the slogan “Revere 
the Emperor, expel the barbarians”. The samurai who swelled the ranks of the Satsuma rebellion 
under Saigō Takamori, were frustrated over their loss of status, but officially rebelled over the 
question of invading Korea. The Meiji Freedom and Popular Rights activists demanded not only 
a constitution and a parliament but also a hard-line stance vis-à-vis the Western Powers and the 
revision of the unequal treaties. The popular will expressed by some rally organizers during the 
Hibiya riots demanded not only tax cuts and the freedom to assemble, but also hegemony in 
Asia.54 The riots themselves had been triggered by what many considered the unsatisfactory 
outcome of the peace negotiations ending the Russo-Japanese War. In each instance, a 
compelling if superficial logic led agitators to combine foreign policy issues with domestic ones - 
namely that if the people “were to pay for empire and die for it, their voice should be respected in 
politics”55 A deeper contradiction remained, of course, in demanding less taxes, more canons and 
more butter simultaneously.  
Despite all the contradictions of Nakano’s life, it is possible to see his as one possible 
continuation of this pattern of opposition. What makes Nakano’s position peculiar is his stress on 
the importance of a mass movement. At the risk of oversimplification, Nakano’s life slogan could 
have been “Expel the barbarians (from East Asia) and revere the people”. His reaction to the 
Versailles Treaty negotiations or, more generally, his criticism of Japan’s government for being 
too servile toward England and America was combined with a call for universal suffrage and the 
extension of citizens’ rights to the Empire’s subjects in Korea. He continued along the same lines 
during his fascist period, combining a hard-line stance in foreign affairs, especially against 
England and America, with a push for more participatory mass politics at home. His political 
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contradictions were thus also continuous. While advocating hard-line foreign policies vis-à-vis 
the powers and the establishment of an autark national defense state, he opposed higher taxes, the 
inflationary effects of ballooning military budgets and the imposition of economic controls 
through Japan’s bureaucracies. In October 1942, while deploring the state’s infringement on civil 
rights after the outbreak of the Pacific War and making a stance for freedom in front of the 
students of Waseda University, Nakano also said: “The freedom of the Japanese people is the 
freedom to voluntarily serve the Emperor. It is the freedom of martyrdom.”56  
Politically, Nakano’s challenge was never a formidable one to Japan’s established elites, as 
he was not very skilled at gaining, holding and exercising political power.  Nakano during most 
of his career was ignored by the establishment, or, at best, perceived as a nuisance. When Tōjō 
eliminated Nakano, it was not because Nakano threatened the established order, but because he 
had come to defend that order against Tōjō’s attempt to alter it. The intellectual challenge that 
Nakano posed was thus much stronger than the political one, though the strength of his ideas 
became visible only in the post-war period, when many of his aims have not only been realized, 
but have come to be accepted as natural traits of modernity. In international affairs, the post-war 
period saw the process of de-colonization and the establishment of an economic order that, at 
least nominally, aims to give all nations free access to the world’s resources and markets. 
Likewise, Japan’s domestic politics are characterized by popular mass parties, female suffrage 
and popular sovereignty (as opposed to the Meiji Constitution that placed sovereignty with the 
Emperor). Each innovation lies at the foundation of Nakano’s thought.  
What is important is not why Nakano failed to make his challenge more appealing, why he 
failed to realize his program of modernization or whether he would actually have realized his 
aims had his mass movement become a force in Japanese politics during his lifetime (or whether, 
like so many populists before him, he would have betrayed the people once they had swept him 
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into power). What is important is that Nakano failed. His failure has at least two grave 
implications for modern Japan.  
First, the failure of fascism from below in Japan ensured that the country missed one more 
chance for discontinuity. This missed opportunity becomes clear by contrasting Japan’s 
experience with that of Germany, where - as Dahrendorf pointed out - the social structure had 
been shaken up by the stress of mobilization for WW1, by defeat and revolution after that war, by 
the interwar crisis and the rise of Nazism and mobilization for WW2 before defeat and 
occupation after 1945 resulted in a final breakdown of the socio-political structure.57 Along the 
way, the upheaval unseated and replaced important elements of Germany’s elites. Defeat in 
WW1 sent the monarchy into exile and reduced the influence of the army and aristocracy. The 
interwar crisis hollowed out the middle-class, while the Nazis, once in power, systematically 
annihilated the Jewish population along left-leaning intellectuals and political activists as well as 
other minorities. The aristocracy took a final blow after July 1944. After Germany’s defeat in 
1945, the Allies disposed at least partially of the Nazi leadership. Only the non-Jewish staffs of 
Germany’s bureaucracies and its business community survived the first half of the 20th century 
with some semblance of continuity.  
Japan’s history, by contrast, displays more continuity, which may be due either to the fact 
that the stress experience was weaker or that its socio-political structure was stronger. Japan 
would have markedly different in innumerable ways had a popular mass-movement as imagined 
by Nakano taken power and reformed Japan from below, but one obvious difference that bears 
mentioning is that the people, once emancipated (even if only superficially in Nakano’s sense), 
would have become responsible for politics. Accordingly, it would have been impossible to put 
all the blame for Japan’s disastrous entry into WW2 on Japan’s military, as has often been done 
in popular accounts of the war. 
                                                     
57 See Ralf Dahrendorf, “Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland”, (München, 1968).  
 429 
Second, the failure of Nakano’s idea of reforming Japan from within through a popular 
mass-movement meant that some of these reforms were carried out after Japan’s humiliating 
defeat by the US occupation forces. The people of Japan were given a new democratic 
constitution, in which they were made sovereign. Mitamura speculated that Nakano’s “ghost is 
probably smiling in his grave, as three thousand years of…autocratic feudal government have 
perished” and “a democratic revolution has dawned.”58  I wonder, however, whether Nakano 
would actually have smiled. Would he not, instead, have pointed out the irony of the fact that the 
Meiji Constitution had been handed down by Emperor Meiji, while the post-war constitution had 
been handed down by the U.S. occupation authorities? Perhaps Nakano would even have joined 
the regrettably large chorus of the many right-wing voices describing Japan’s present constitution 
as something alien shoved onto the country from above [抗浩考杭穀黒紅畧┃]? And as to the 
idea of ‘making the people sovereign’, would he not have replied that there was no need for that, 
because the people are always and had always been sovereign, and that no constitution has either 
the power or the right to make or unmake such sovereignty? Would Nakano not rather deplore the 
fact that to this day, the Japanese people have failed to truly claim the sovereignty?  
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 449 
“The Compass Needle of our Global Policy” [癪控身鈐膕ø貢窩ə], Hibiya Public Hall, 
Tokyo, June, 1933 
 
“Indicator of National Reconstruction” [楼广膃△貢窩閹], Hibiya Public Hall, Tokyo, 
November 2, 1933 (reprinted in Collected Speeches by Nakano Seigō [腎ǒ驟悩鳰哢儲㌲
滾], Tokyo, Asakaze-sha [衲城だ]; 1936, p. 1-95) 
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Biographical Appendix 
 
Biographical Sketches of Key Figures in Nakano’s Life 
 
 
Abe Isoo [嶢グつ渣] (1865 - 1949), social activist. Born in Fukuoka, Abe entered the 
Dōshisha in 1879 and studied at the Hartford Seminary in the US from 1891 to 1894. Back in 
Japan, he entered the Unitarian Church and edited its organ the Roku-Gō Zasshi [砥遍癲グスーム]. 
Between 1899 and 1926 he taught at Waseda University, where he also founded the baseball club. 
While teaching at Waseda, Abe became also politically active. Having been influenced by 
socialist thought during a five-month study at the University of Berlin, he participated with 
socialists Kōtoku Shūsui [杁毫┽鵈] and Kinoshita Naoe [袍真怱鷦] in the foundation of the 
Socialist Research Society [だ善厨コｫ!善] in 1898. In 1900 this became the Socialist 
Association [だ善厨コ表善] with Abe serving as its president. In May of the following year, he 
founded, together with Kōtoku and Katayama Sen, Japan’s first socialist party, the Social 
Democratic Party [だ善鴈厨妬], which was prohibited two days after its foundation. Abe 
opposed the Russo-Japanese war from beginning to end, taking a Christian position within 
socialism. He founded the Japanese Fabian Society together with Ishikawa Sanshirō [0擺申裂
ア] in 1924 and the Social Democratic Party in 1926. When, following the Manchurian Incident, 
party secretary Akamatsu Katsumaro attempted to change the party’s position to that of National 
Socialism, Abe objected fiercely. He likewise never warmed to the idea of merging the party with 
Nakano’s Tōhōkai. Maintaining his socialist and anti-military stance, Abe in 1940 left the Social 
Mass Party, which succeeded the Social Democratic Party. After the war, he founded the Japan 
Socialist Party [荳袿だ善妬]. (For Nakano’s relation with Abe see Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 
471-2, vol. 2, p. 371-79.) 
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Adachi Kenzō [嶢けバーツ24] (1864 - 1948), politician and head of the Minseitō faction to 
which Nakano belonged in the late 1920s. Born in Kumamoto Province, Adachi studied at the 
Seiseikō [喝娯梗康] under Sassa Tomofusa [双娯仏蘯]. After finishing his education, he spent 
some time in Korea, where he published the Korea News [衲靜蕁况] and the Seoul Gazette [熔傚
范况]. In 1895, he was allegedly involved in the Minbi Assasination Incident and arrested, but he 
was never put on trial. Starting with the general election of 1902, he was elected a total of 14 
times to the Diet, a feat that earned him the nickname “God of Elections” [ぬ竕貢【鐶]. After 
belonging to the Imperial Party [旱楼妬], the Daidō Club [哢弁胆鉤グ], and the Central Club 
[腎啅胆鉤グ], he participated in the formation of the Rikken Dōshi-Kai [U畧弁沒善] and, in 
1916, in the foundation of the Kenseikai [畧膕善]. He served as Minister of Communications in 
the Katō and Wakatsuki cabinets. During the same period, he contributed to the merger of the 
Kenseikai [畧膕善] with the Seiyū-Hontō [膕仏袿妬], leading to the formation of the Minseitō 
[鴈膕妬]. Within the Minseitō, Adachi led Nakano’s faction, which opposed the bureaucratic 
faction led by Egi Tasuku [鷦袍62]. In 1929, Adachi was made Minister for the Interior in the 
Hamaguchi Cabinet. After the Manchurian Incident, Adachi (at Nakano’s urging) became 
involved in the Movement for a Cooperation Cabinet between the Minseitō and the Seiyūkai. 
When the project miscarried, Adachi and Nakano left the Minseitō to found the Kokumin Dōmei, 
or National League [楼鴈弁ç]. Adachi became President and led the party until 1940, when it 
was dissolved to join the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, in which Adachi served as a 
consultant. In 1942, Adachi withdrew from politics. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 371-73, 429-38, 
531-34, 555-559, and especially p. 620-648. For Adahi’s views on Nakano see Adachi Kenzō [嶢
けバーツ24], “The Autobiography of Adachi Kenzō” [嶢けバーツ2460粉然], Tokyo, 1960, p. 268-69.) 
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Akao Bin [◇悃膾] (1899 - 1990), right-wing activist and politician. Born in Nagoya city, 
Akao did not finish middle school. A socialist in his young years, he tried in vain to establish a 
commune on Miyake Island. In 1921, he joined the Tōkai Farmers’ League. Accused and then 
imprisoned for violently soliciting contributions for the union, Akao converted [ゞ圃] in 1925. 
Influenced by Mussolini, Akao aimed for an Emperor-centered nationalism. With the help of 
Tsukui Tatsuo, he established the National Construction Society [椥楼善], in which he first 
served as secretary and later as president. In 1942, he was elected to the Diet without the 
government’s endorsement. It was during that time that he and Nakano drew closer to one another 
in their opposition to Tōjō. After the war, he was purged from public office. In 1951, he founded 
the Greater Japan Patriotic Party [哢荳袿犢楼妬] and served as its president. In the post-war 
period, he was known for his vociferous rearmament, pro-American and anti-Soviet stances, as 
well as for his frequent arrests and public speeches. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol, 1, p. 651 and vol. 2, 
p. 707 and 726.)       
 
Akashi Motojirō [蕚0填性ア] (1864 - 1919), Army officer. Born as the second son of a 
former samurai of the Kuroda-han in Fukuoka, Akashi entered the Shūyūkan and from there 
proceeded to the Army War College, graduating in 1899. A gifted linguist, he is said to have 
mastered, English, French, and Russian and to have had a reasonably good understanding of 
German. After the turn of the century, he spent time in Europe, serving as military attaché to the 
embassy in France and Russia. According to some rumors, Akashi is said to have met with Lenin 
in Geneva during the Russo-Japanese war and been responsible for channelling army funds to 
Russian revolutionaries with the intention of weakening the Russian home front.  From 1910, 
Akashi served as the chief of the military police or kempeitai under Governor Terauchi (who also 
was Akashi’s father-in-law) in Korea. It was in this capacity that he crossed paths with Nakano. It 
was perhaps their common background (Fukuoka, Shūyūkan alumni and connections to the 
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Genyōsha) that made Nakano take an immediate liking to Akashi, who was the only official in the 
colonial administration to receive a positive treatment in Nakano’s reports from Korea. In 1915, 
Akashi became commander of the 6th Division and, in 1918, the 7th governor of Taiwan. He died 
in 1919 while visiting his hometown, Fukuoka. (For Nakano’s description of Akashi see Nakano 
Seigō, “The Governor General’s Policies” [GS膕齠ルクス] in “Manchuria and Korea as I saw 
them” [癪控に紅鵠噌靜], Tokyo, 1915, p. 51 but also Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 130-146.)     
 
Akita Kiyoshi [┽譓拐] (1881 - 1944), politician. Born in Tokushima Prefecture, Akita 
graduated from Nihon Hōritsu Gakkō (today Nihon Daigaku) in 1901. Through an introduction 
by Akiyama Teisuke [┽愾巵ず], he entered the Niroku Shimpō [性砥范况だ]. Elected as a 
representative in parliament in 1912 for the first time, he was subsequently re-elected 10 times. 
He joined Inukai’s Kakushin Club and later advocated merging with the Rikken Seiyūkai, which 
earned him the label of a schemer. In the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident, he participated 
with Nakano in the movement for a cooperative cabinet [表陪塔隆ぉ罰] that did not ultimately 
materialize. In 1934, he left the Seiyūkai, resigned from his position as Head of the House of 
Representatives [テ派共同組合憎] and became a vociferous advocate for the abolishment of the 
established parties and the creation of a new political movement. Thereafter he moved close to 
Konoe Fumimaro and participated in the new party movement. Akita became councilor in the 
first Konoe cabinet, Minister of Health and Welfare in the Abe cabinet and Minister of Overseas 
Development [禺ÿ] in the second Konoe cabinet. From 1942, he served as advisor to the 
Imperial Rule Political Association [62⇨膕齠善将黙]. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p.397-99, and 
vol. 2, p. 416-17.)     
 
Akiyama Teisuke (Sadasuke) [┽愾巵ず] (1868 - 1950) politician and journalist. Born in 
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Okayama prefecture, Akiyama graduated from the faculty of law of Tokyo Imperial University in 
1890 and initially worked as a bureaucrat. He founded the Niroku Shimpō [性砥范况] in 1893 
and gained some fame for attacking the Mitsui Zaibatsu. First elected to the Diet in 1902, he gave 
up his seat during the Russo-Japanese war because he was suspected of being a spy. He 
maintained friendly relations with Sun Yat-sen, Miyazaki Tōten and Chiang Kai-shek, making 
him a political power broker who wielded behind-the-scenes influence on Chinese policy 
(Akiyama’s sobriquet was “the old man of Kōjimachi”). After the outbreak of the second 
Sino-Japanese war in 1937, he tried to facilitate negotiations of a localized settlement through 
Miyazaki Ryūsuke but was arrested by the kempeitai (military police). During the Konoe 
administration, Akiyama (who had always been close with Konoe) worked with Akita Kiyoshi 
and others for the New Party Movement under Konoe. Akiyama participated in the movement to 
unite the right wing and form a new party, but in mid-1938 his good relations with Chiang 
Kai-shek prompted rumors that he was actually a paid spy of the Chinese nationalist government. 
In August 1938, Home Minister Suetsugu had him placed under police surveillance. (See Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 57, 356 and 370.) 
 
Amano Tatsuo [啀ǒケ啌] (1892 - 1974), lawyer, right-wing politician, activist in the 
national socialist movement. Born in the city of Hamamatsu of Shizuoka-ken, Amano graduated 
from the faculty of law of Tokyo Imperial University. In 1926 Amano earned some notoriety for 
breaking up strikes (notably one at his father’s musical instrument factory). In 1927, Amano was 
one of the central founders of the All Japan Comrades of National Rising Society [菟荳袿85楼弁
沒善] that opposed the Shinjinkai [范斥善]. In 1929, he and Maeda Torao [撚譓よ渣] founded 
the Patriotic Workers and Employees Party [犢楼帆迫妬]. In 1933, he was involved in planning 
the Shimpeitai Incident [【度麗], a terrorist incident that aimed to bring about a Shōwa 
Restoration [蓖北ⅷ范]. In 1941, he was implicated in a plot to assassinated Hiranuma [霸齡楼
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鳩ù‘纒征浅], but he was pardoned in 1942. Nakano’s junior by seven years, Amano had 
known and been friends with Nakano since the days of the Tōhōjiron. Like Nakano, Amano had 
also opposed the amendment of the Wartime Criminal Law. In early 1943, he published an article 
so critical of Tōjō in the Ishin Kōron that the sale of the magazine was prohibited. On that 
occasion, he was also arrested and interrogated by the police. In the course of 1943, he 
cooperated with Nakano in the Senior Statesmen scheme to overthrow Tōjō. In the post-war 
period, Amano continued to be active in the right-wing circles. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 
741-44 and vol. 2, p. 708-15, and p. 735-49.)    
 
Aoki Sakuo [⻗袍捜渣] (1898 - ?), politician and member of the Tōhōkai. Born in 
Yamaguchi prefecture, Aoki graduated from Hitotsubashi University and first worked in business 
and finance before entering local and then national politics. Joining the Tōhōkai around 1936-37, 
he was first elected to the Diet? in 1937 but failed to be re-elected in 1942. (See Nagai Kazuo, 
“The Foundation of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U] in Journal of History [別詒], July 1978, vol. 
61, no.4; p. 130-34 and Nakano Yasuo, vol.2, p. 245 and p. 372.)    
 
Asō Hisashi [朳﨟睡] (1891 - 1940), social activist and politician. Born in Ōita prefecture, 
Asō graduated from the faculty of law of Tokyo Imperial University in 1917. He then worked as a 
reporter for the Tokyo Daily News and earned some fame with a series of articles supporting the 
Russian Revolution entitled “From Peter to Lenin.” In 1918, he participated in the foundation of 
the Shinjinkai at Tokyo Imperial University. In October of 1920, he got involved in the mining 
labor movement. After participating in various socialist organizations and parties, Asō became the 
general secretary of the Social Mass Party [だ善哢テ妬] created in 1932. From this time onward, 
Asō advocated a socialist revolution carried out in combination with the military. Elected in the 
February 1936 and April 1937 elections, Asō supported full-scale war with China, thus changing 
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the fundamental direction of the Socialist Mass Party after 1937. In 1939, he was involved in the 
failed attempt to merge the Social Mass Party with Nakano’s Tōhōkai. When the Social Mass 
Party broke apart over the question of excluding Saitō Takao [艤I吏啌] for his anti-militarist 
speech in the Diet in February 1940, Asō became head of the committee succeeding Abe Isō [嶢
グむ渣]. In the same year he participated actively in Konoe’s New Party Movement. During 
Konoe’s second cabinet, Aso served as member of the preparatory committee of the New 
Structure but soon thereafter became ill and died. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 355-385)  
 
Atariyama Kiyoshi [橲愾拐] (1901 - 1980), businessman and secretary of the Japan 
Labor League [荳袿迫朕G弁ç]. Atariyama first met Nakano during the latter’s presidency of 
the Communications Union, of which Atariyama was a member. He later joined Nakano’s 
Tōhōkai. (See Nagai, Kazuo; “The Development of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢̇悽] in Journal of 
History [別詒], January 1979, vol. 62, no.1; p. 101 and Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 425.)   
 
Awatani Yūzō [㍽〞濬24] (1897 - ?) popular movement activist and politician. Born in 
Aomori prefecture into a merchant family, Awatani embarked on a career in agriculture in 1919. 
Around the same time he also started to publish a Japanese poetry magazine. From 1926 onward, 
he became active in the farmers’ movement and in 1928 participated in the foundation of the 
Aomori chapter of the All-Japan Farmers’ Union [菟楼コ鴈36遍], becoming the chapter’s head 
in 1929. In 1935 he was arrested but not prosecuted for breach of the Peace Preservation Law. 
After the dissolution of the All-Japan Farmers’ Union in 1938, he saved the organization by 
transferring it to the Aomori Prefecture Workers and Farmers’ Union [⻗迢0帆迫コ鴈36遍] 
joining the Japan Farmers’ League [荳袿コ鴈ヾç] and thus bringing it under the umbrella of the 
Tōhōkai. In 1939, he was arrested again and imprisoned for 8 months. In the same year, he also 
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participated in the foundation of the East Asian League Association [覩盛ヾç表善]. After the 
war, Awatani co-founded the Japan Farmers’ Union and became one of its central committee 
members. In 1953, he was elected to the Diet as a member of the Socialist Party. (See Nagai, 
Kazuo; “The Development of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢̇悽] in Journal of History [別詒], 
January 1979, vol. 62, no.1; p. 101 and Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 425.)        
 
Baba Motoharu [㮈凅填齠] (1902 - 1968), politician and member of the Tōhōkai. Born in 
Nagasaki prefecture, Baba studied at Tokyo Imperial University and then worked as a lawyer 
before serving on the Nagasaki City Assembly. First elected to the national Diet in 1936 
(subsequently re-elected 10 times), he joined Nakano’s Tōhōkai and as a member of that party 
was re-elected in 1937, but not in 1942. After the war, he served as Minister of Construction in 
the third Hatoyama cabinet in 1955. (See Nagai Kazuo, “The Foundation of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜
善貢癩U] in Journal of History [別詒], July 1978, vol. 61, no.4; p. 130-34 and Nakano Yasuo, 
vol. 2, p. 245.) 
 
Baba Tsunego [ċ文琿震] (1875 - 1956), journalist and political commentator. Born in 
Okayama prefecture, Baba studied at Dōshikai [弁沒善【嶌貊] and then studied politics at the 
precursor to Waseda University. He withdrew before graduating in order to work for the Japan 
Times. In 1909, he traveled to the US, where he worked as editor of the Oriental Review, a 
magazine aimed at introducing Asia to a Western readership. In 1913, he returned to Japan, 
where he first worked again for the Japan Times and then for the Kokumin Shimbun until 1924. It 
was for the Kokumin Shimbun that he covered the Paris Peace Conference, an experience which 
greatly increased his interest in politics. After his return in 1919, he participated in the foundation 
of the Reconstruction League [邂氎蒸z] (of which Nakano also was a member) and became 
active in the universal suffrage movement. In 1926, Baba participated in the foundation of the 
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Social Democratic Party [合名会社洩鍗ˠ詣] and subsequently acted as an advisor to the party. During 
the WW2, Baba was prohibited to write or publish due to his liberal and anti-militaristic views. 
After the war, he was elected to the House of Peers, but also worked as the head of the Yomiuri 
Shimbun, a position he held until 1951. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 216, 283, 338-42 and 396 
as well as vol. 2, p. 230 and 251.)   
Bose, Rash Bihari (1886 - 1944 or 1945), leader of the Indian Independence movement. 
Bose escaped from India in 1915 and fled to Japan, where he was sheltered by Tōyama Mitsuru, 
as the Japanese authorities wanted to extradite him to England. When, upon returning from 
England in 1919, Nakano visited Tōyama, he also met Bose for the first time. During the WW2, 
Bose collaborated with Japan as president of the Indian Independence League [婚策彩″Uヾç]. 
In July 1939, Bose spoke at the Tōhōkai national convention. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 
720-26, and vol. 2, p. 412-15 and 589.)   
 
Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897 - 1945), Indian politician and prominent member of the 
independence movement, opponent of Gandhi. Bose tried to achieve Indian independence during 
WW2 with German and Japanese help. He cooperated with the Japanese army’s operation in 
Imphal (north-eastern India), which ended in a disaster. Bose died in an accident in Taiwan. (See 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 719.)  
 
Cole, George Douglas Howard (1889 - 1959), economist, political scientist, historian and 
writer of detective novels. Born in Cambridge England, Cole studied at Oxford, where he was 
drawn to socialist thought and joined the Fabian Society. He became a conscientious objector 
during WW1. While campaigning against conscription, he met his future wife, Margaret Postgate 
with whom he would write many detective novels. After working as a journalist for the Guardian, 
he became a professor of economics at University College, Oxford, in the mid-1920s. In addition 
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to his detective novels, Cole authored numerous works on history, politics and economics. Much 
of Cole’s work, but especially “The Next Ten Years in British Social and Economic Policy” 
(London, 1929), influenced Nakano in the formulation of both his privatization proposal of the 
Japanese telecommunications network and his economic interventionist policies during the 1930s. 
The Japanese translation of the book, prepared by Shimizu Motohisa [拐鵈填徘] and published 
in 1931 under the title “State control of the Economy,”[42喝貢楼广67韮] (Tokyo, Senkura 
Shobō, 1931) owed its existence to Nakano, who  approached Senkura Publishing and 
recommended that the book be translated into Japanese for a wider audience. The translation also 
contained a preface by Nakano. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 576-84, and 801-809.) 
  
Dan Takuma [歪惞そ] (1858 - 1932), Japanese businessman and director of the Mitsui 
Zaibatsu. Born into a samurai family in Fukuoka, he was adopted in to the Dan family at age  12. 
Like Nakano, he entered the domain’s Shūyūkan middle school. In 1871, together with Kaneko 
Kentarō (who was to become a life-long friend and Dan’s brother-in-law), he joined the Iwakura 
mission to the West. Dan stayed in the US to study and eventually graduated from MIT with a 
concentration on mining. Upon his return to Japan, Dan taught mining engineering at Tokyo 
Imperial University. From 1884, he helped the government in developing the Miike Coal Mine. 
When the mine was sold to the Mitsui Concern in 1888, he transferred there, becoming head of 
the Mitsui Miike Coal Company. Partly thanks to Dan’s efforts and competence, the company 
soon become the cash cow with in the Mitsui conglomerate. This facilitated Dan’s rise to the 
Zaibatsu’s top in 1914. Dan was assassinated on March 5, 1932 by right-wing nationalists during 
the League of Blood Incident [スç練征浅]. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 654-62, 770 and vol. 
2, p. 339.) 
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Egi Tasuku [鷦袍62] (1873 - 1932), politician. Born in Yamaguchi prefecture, Egi 
graduated from Tokyo Imperial University’s faculty of law in 1897. In the same year he was 
adopted by Egi Kazuyuki (also from Yamaguchi), a bureaucrat and Minister of Education in the 
Kiyoura cabinet. Egi started his career as a bureaucrat, rising quickly through the ranks and 
eventually serving as cabinet secretary in the 3rd Katsura cabinet. Egi participated in the 
foundation of the Dōshikai (later Kenseikai, then Minseitō) and within these parties was one of 
the central figures of the bureaucratic faction He served as chief cabinet secretary in the second 
Ōkuma cabinet and the Katō Kōmei cabinets. In 1916, he was selected to sit in the upper house. 
Instrumental in the formulation of the universal suffrage law, Egi became Minister of Justice in 
the Katō cabinet. He continued to serve in this position in the first Wakatsuki cabinet, but was 
forced to resign over the Bokuretsu Incident. Within the Minseitō, Egi’s bureaucratic faction 
opposed Adachi’s pure-party faction, to which Nakano belonged. Egi died while serving again in 
the second Waktasuki cabinet but died of disease. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 371, 400, and 
552.)  
 
Eguchi Sadae [鷦塀巵躇] (1865 - 1946), businessman and politician. Born in Kōchi 
prefecture, Eguchi studied at the Tokyo School of Commerce (覩静㔾盲 ) (present-day 
Hitotsubashi University), and after graduating stayed there as a teacher/lecturer. In 1891, he 
entered Mitsubishi trading company, where he served in different positions before becoming 
president in 1920. It was around this time that Eguchi became a member of Nakano’s Tōhōkai 
think tank. In 1931, Eguchi served as vice-president of the South Manchurian Railway, but he 
was removed from that post in 1932 by the Inukai cabinet because of his affiliation with the 
Minseitō. In 1932, Eguchi was appointed to the house of peers. (Nakano Yasuo, vol, 2, p. 610 and 
p. 710.) 
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Féng Guózhāng [肉六渹] (1859 - 1919), Army general and politician in early republican 
China whom Nakano met in China in 1918. Born into a peasant family in Hebei province, Zheng, 
though gifted, was unable to complete his education due to lack of money and therefore became a 
professional soldier. Attracting the attention of his superiors, Feng was recommended to the 
Military Academy. Protected by his mentor Yuan Shikai, Feng rose through ranks, but broke with 
Yuan when the latter sought to become emperor. Feng served the Nanjing government, opposing 
Yuan. Nakano met with Feng during his trip to China in 1918. During the meeting the two men 
started discussing Communism and the debate got so heated that Feng had Nakano kicked out of 
his quarters. 
 
Fujise Masajirō [I㌫膕饅ア] (1867 - 1927), businessman and Nakano’s financial backer. 
Born in Nagasaki, Fujise entered Mitsui Trading Company in 1885 and was posted to Hong Kong 
and Shanghai. He later branched out into the textile industry. Fujise was a member of Nakano’s 
Tōhōkai think tank around 1920. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 219, 235, 499 and 607.)   
Furuya Yoshitaka [笑寳笳瓤] (1879 - 1945), politician and member of the Kokumin 
Dōmei. Born into a typical meibō-ka family in Gifu prefecture, Furuya studied law at Meiji 
University. Running for election as a non-affailiated candidate in 1915, he was immediately 
elected to the Diet and continued to hold a seat there until the end of his life (with the exception 
of the period 1928-32, after he lost the election of 1928). He first joined the Rikken Dōshikai, 
then the Kenseikai/Minseitō. He served as parliamentary vice-secretary of the Minisitry of the 
Interior in the second Wakatsuki cabinet (1931). Following Adachi and Nakano, he left the 
Minseitō in 1932, but he soon returned to the Minseitō. After the dissolution of the parties, he 
served in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. Furuya was killed during the March 10, 1945 
air raid.   
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Gorai Kinzō [晴襷饐△] (1875 - 1944), journalist and expert on Germany. Born in Ibaraki 
prefecture, Gorai studied at Tokyo University before studying abroad. He later worked as 
journalist, eventually becoming editor at the Yomiuri News and professor at Waseda and Meiji 
University, making himself a name as a student of fascism. He supported Nakano during the 1930 
election campaign. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 531.)   
 
Hakoda Rokusuke [è譓 砥ず] (1850 - 1888), activist of the Freedom and Popular 
Rights Movement and co-founder of the Genyōsha. Born in Fukuoka as the second son of Aoki 
Zenpei, a samurai, Hakoda was later adopted into the Hakoda family. While studying at the 
Ginseng Field school of Takaba Osamu, he met Tōyama Mitsuru and Shintō Kiheita. In 1874, he 
participated in a revolt in Saga prefecture and in 1876 in the revolt of Hagi, for which he was 
imprisoned in Yamaguchi prefecture. After his release from prison, together with Tōyama Mitsuru, 
Shintō Kiheita and Hiraoka Kōtarō, he founded the Kōyōsha [圃蔽だ], later renamed Genyōsha. 
Among the society’s members, Hakoda perhaps more than any other became active in the 
Freedom and People’s Rights Movement, so much so that Itagaki Taisuke said about him: “As 
long as Rokusuke is there, the South East is safe.” Hakoda took on leading roles in national 
organizations such as the Patriotic Society [犢楼だ] and the League for the Establishment of the 
Parliament [楼善袗癩弁ç]. In 1879, he went to Tokyo to submit a petition for the establishment 
of a parliament and the revision of the unequal treaties to the genrō. Following Hiraoka, Hakoda 
served as the second president of the Genyōsha. Often a man of few words, Hakoda became 
talkative when he drank - and he drank a lot. His death is surrounded by some mystery, as some 
claim that he died due to heart failure while rumors persist that he committed harakiri to protest 
the Genyōsha’s shift from popular rights [鴈闥] to government’s rights [楼闥]. (See History of 
the Genyōsha [仼┠だだ別] edited by Genyōsha History Editorial Committee [仼┠だだ別Y㈡
善], Fukuoka, 1992, Seinan Kiden [O評ヒ然]; 1969 and Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 39-52.) 
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Hanaya Tadashi [ゑ〞驟] (1894 - 1957), Army officer and member of the Tōhōkai think 
tank in the 1920s. Born in Okayama prefecture, Hanaya graduated from the Army War College. 
Under Ishiwara Kanji, he was involved in the planning leading up to the Manchurian Incident of 
1931. From 1939 onward, he served as military advisor to the puppet state of Manshūkoku. Later 
he became commander of the 55th regiment. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 768.) 
 
Haraguchi Hatsutarō [譜塀二啣ア] (1876 - 1949), Army officer, politician and member 
of Nakano’s Tōhōkai. Born into a samurai family in Fukuoka, Hatsutarō was later adopted into the 
Haraguchi family. Ten years Nakano’s senior, he went to the same Shūyūkan in Fukuoka but from 
there continued on to the Army Military Academy and later War College, graduating with 
excellent grades in 1907. He served as military attaché in London, participated in the siege of 
Tsingtao in 1914 and later in the Siberian intervention. Haraguchi was a member of Nakano’s 
Tōhōkai think tank around 1920. Serving as military attaché in the US, he was greatly impressed 
with that country’s industrial strength and henceforth opposed any notion of waging war against 
the USA. After retiring from active service in 1930, Haraguchi ran successfully for election in 
1932 and subsequently was reelected 4 times. Acting as a spearhead against the IRAA in wartime 
Japan, he incurred the wrath of Tōjō Hideki. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 235 and 645 as well as 
vol. 2, p. 129-245.)  
 
Hasegawa Kōtarō [憎〞擺甜啣ア] (1888 - ?), journalist and capital markets expert. Born 
in Shizuoka prefecture, Hasegawa graduated from Waseda University in 1914 and from there 
embarked on a career in journalism, working, among others for the Hōchi News [况ö范ⓥ] and 
the Kokumin Shimbun. After the war, he established himself as an expert on Japan’s capital 
markets, writing books on the history of the stock exchange. Hasegawa was a member of 
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Nakano’s Tōhōkai think tank.     
 
Hasegawa Shun [憎〞擺戮] (1912 - ?), journalist, politician and Nakano follower. Born 
into a poor farming family in Miyagi prefecture, Hasegawa stayed at Nakano’s dorm while a 
student at Waseda University. After graduating in 1932, he entered journalism, first working for 
the Newspaper Association [范ⓥヾ遍だ] and, from the fall of 1935 onward, as editor of the 
Kyūshū Nippō in Fukuoka (a job he got with Nakano’s recommendation). After Nakano sold the 
paper to the Yomiuri Shimbun, Hasegawa joined the editorial staff of Tōtairiku and was also 
responsible for advertising sales. Later Hasegawa joined Nakano’s Tōhōkai and there worked in 
organizing the party’s youth organization. Following the failed attempt to overthrow Tōjō, 
Hasegawa was imprisoned with Nakano in the fall of 1943 but unlike Nakano, who was released 
after several days, Hasegawa stayed in prison for 144 days. Elected to the Diet for the first time in 
1953, Hasegawa served for a total of 12 terms. He also served as Minister of Labor in the Tanaka 
and Miki cabinets, minister of transport in the Nakasone cabinet and president of the Japan 
Bereaved Association [荳袿の茘善]. (See Hasegawa Shun [憎〞擺戮] “The master and the 
Yūkō-kyo” [纏﨟膏㍎85悖], in “Nakano Seigō is alive” [腎ǒ驟悩購﨟攻肱広鵠], edited by 
Seigō-kai [驟悩善], Tokyo: Akane-shobō [巷拘講蟷蘯], 1954, but also Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 
663-4 and vol. 2, p. 693,707, and 784.) 
 
Hatoyama Ichirō [嘿愾慎ア ] (1883 - 1959), politician, one of the few Japanese 
politicians to oppose the Imperial Rule Assistance Association during WW2. Born in Tokyo as the 
son of lawyer and politician Hatoyama Kazuo [嘿愾北啌], Hatoyama followed his father’s 
footsteps, first working in the latter’s law office and serving as a member of the Tokyo City 
Assembly before being elected to the national Diet in 1915. He served as cabinet secretary under 
Tanaka Gi’ichi and as Minister of Education in the Inukai and Saitō cabinets. During WW2, he 
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opposed the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the Tōjō cabinet, which brought him to 
cooperate with Nakano. After the war, he founded the Japan Liberal Party and was about to form 
a cabinet when he was purged from public office. In 1954 he was more successful, forming a 
coalition cabinet between the Japan Democratic Party and the Liberal Democratic Party. (See 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 408-11, p. 628-32, p.766-68 and 709-10 as well as vol. 2, p. 12-16, and 
p. 726-38.)    
 
Hatta Yoshiaki [౎↰ཅ᣿] (1879 - 1964), politician and financier. Born in Tokyo, 
Hatta graduated from the engineering department of Tōdai in 1903. After working for the 
Imperial Railway Bureau, he entered the Ministry of Communications, rising to the position of 
Vice-minister by 1926. Hatta later held ministerial portfolios in the first Konoe, Hiranuma and 
Tōjō cabinets, while at the same time serving as president of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce. 
During the war, Hatta tried to establish a wartime transport and telecommunications structure. 
Later he served as president of Imperial Petrol, and by the end of the war was an advisor to the 
Cabinet. Banned from public office by the occupation authorities, he later served as president of 
several industrial organizations.   
 
Hayashi Gonsuke [ᨋᮭഥ]㧔1860 - 1939㧕, diplomat. Born into a samurai family in Aizu 
domain, Hayashi entered the domain school, Nisshin-kan, at the age of seven. When in the 
following year both his father and grandfather died in the restoration wars, he became family 
head (in spite of his young age) and participated in the defence of besieged Wakamatsu castle 
against the imperial troops. The family fell on hard times after the restoration until Hayashi found 
a mentor in Kodama Sanefumi from Satsuma, who put him through school in Tokyo and took him 
to Satsuma, where young Hayashi witnessed the Satsuma Rebellion firsthand. After graduating 
from Tokyo Imperial University in 1887, Hayashi entered the Ministry of Foreign affairs, serving 
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in, among others, Shanghai, London, Seoul, and Rome. For his contribution to relations between 
Korea and Japan he was awarded the rank of baron in 1911. In 1916, he was made envoy to 
China, an appointment Nakano criticized strenuously. In 1920, he became ambassador to England 
and in the following year represented Japan at the League of Nations. After resigning from his 
ambassadorial duties in England in 1925, he stayed in that country to accompany Prince Yasuhito 
(the younger brother of The Shōwa Emperor) back to Japan following the death of the Taishō 
Emperor. In his latter years, Hayashi served as advisor to the Privy Council. (See Nakano Yasuo, 
vol. 1, p. 238-46, and p. 283-84.)   
 
Hayashida Kametarō [詒譓瀬啣ア] (1863 - 1927), bureaucrat and politician. Born as the 
son of a samurai serving the Kumamoto-han, he graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 
1887. In the same year he entered the Ministry of Justice. Elected to the Diet in 1920, Hayashida, 
like Nakano, was initially a member of the Mushozoku Club and then joined the Inukai’s 
Kakushin Club in 1922. In 1925 he founded the Shinsei Club.   
Higashi Norimasa [覩猫驟] (1886 - ?), journalist, China expert and founder of the 
Tōhōjiron magazine for which Nakano worked from 1917 to 1923. Born in Kyoto in 1886, the 
same year as Nakano, Higashi entered Waseda University, graduating in 1905 - the same year as 
Nagai Ryūtarō. Following his interest in China, Higashi initially tried his luck in the shipping 
business operating the Tōshō Yōkō [覩萪┠ネ] line between China and Japan, but his company 
failed after only three years in 1911. Thereafter he began work as a journalist for the Jiji News 
[蕁征范ⓥ] and, in 1912, he started his own Chinese-language newspaper, the China Daily [腎m
荳况], with support from Ōkuma Shigenobu. Simultaneously Higashi also conducted research 
and published reports on Chinese affairs. After the China Daily ran into political difficulties for 
its coverage of the third Chinese revolution, Higashi decided to start Eastern Affairs, or Tōhōjiron 
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[覩苜蕁ルクス] the first issue of which appeared in September of 1916 - shortly after Nakano’s return 
from Europe. Nakano contributed regularly to the magazine thereafter. With Higashi’s 
deteriorating health, Nakano took on an ever more important role in running the magazine until 
its failure in 1923. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 214, 219, 235, 259, 266, and 422.)  
 
Hinoshita Tōgo [荳真I捧] (1908 - ?), Nakano’s follower and author of a biography on 
Nakano. Born in Fukuoka, Hinoshita frequented the Shūyūkan before going on to study 
economics at Tokyo Imperial University. He later worked in the research division of the 
Manchurian Railway and the Research Bureau of the Planning Board. In 1943 he participated in 
Nakano’s scheme to overthrow the Tōjō cabinet. After the war, Hinoshita became a professor at 
Senshū University, Takushoku University and Aoyama University. (See his “The way of the Lion 
– Nakano Seigō” [㍎岌貢ぐ琊腎ǒ驟悩] Tokyo, 1986 as well as Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 
715-16, 736-38 and 750.)  
 
Hiraoka Kōtarō [霸慟⑥啣ア] (1851 - 1906), political activist, coal baron and Member 
of Parliament. Born in 1851 as the second son of the samurai in Fukuoka, Hiraoka - also known 
by his pen-name, Genyō [仼┠] - attended the domain’s school, the Shūyūkan and Takaba 
Osamu’s Ginseng-Field School. In 1875, together with Hakoda Rokusuke, he joined the 
Rectifying Aims Society [é沒だ] founded by Takebe Koshirō [驥グ恠裂ア] in imitation of the 
Risshisha [U沒だ] of Kōchi. When, inspired by the Satsuma rebellion of 1877, 850 samurai of 
Fukuoka rose in revolt, Hiraoka followed their call and eventually joined Saigō’s army, where he 
served in the staff office. After the suppression of the Satsuma rebellion, he was imprisoned in 
Tokyo for one year. Upon his release he joined the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement. 
Together with Hakoda Rokusuke, Shintō Kiheita, and Tōyama Mitsuru, he founded the Kōyōsha 
[圃蔽だ], which subsequently was renamed Genyōsha. Hiraoka served as the first president of 
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the society. At around the same time, he also entered the coal business, making a fortune 
operating the Chikuhō [ºϕ] coal mines of northern Fukuoka prefecture, then Japan’s largest. 
The money thus earned supported the varied activities of the Genyōsha, notably operations on the 
Asian mainland, as well as the society’s organ, the Kyūshū Nippō [枢攀荳况] founded in 1898. In 
1984, Hiraoka was elected to the Diet and reelected six times. He was a cofounder of the 
Kenseitō [畧膕妬]. In 1903, he joined the Comrades’ Society Against Russia [徙顳弁沒善] 
advocating a hard line against that country. Hiraoka died of heart failure in 1906. Hiraoka’s 
nephew, Uchida Ryōhei, founded the Amur River Society [桛a善 ], which became the 
Genyōsha’s branch for affairs on the Asian mainland.  (See History of the Genyōsha [仼┠だだ
別] edited by Genyōsha History Editorial Committee [仼┠だだ別Y㈡善], Fukuoka, 1992,  
Seinan Kiden [O評ヒ然]; 1969 and Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 47-56 and p. 220-21.) 
 
Honda Kumatarō [袿哘ⅶ啣ア] (1874 - 1948), diplomat. Born in Wakayama prefecture, 
Honda studied at the Tokyo Law Institute [覩静┃嶌派 today’s Chūō University] but left school 
before graduating. He entered the Foreign Ministry and participated in the peace negotiations at 
Portsmouth following the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. Honda served as a diplomat in 
Switzerland, Australia and England, and between 1923 and 1926 as ambassador to Germany. 
After retiring from the service in 1926, he came to be known as a hard-line commentator on 
foreign affairs, severely criticizing the Shidehara diplomacy. In 1940, he served once again as 
ambassador, this time to the Wang Ching-wei puppet regime established by the Japanese 
government in China. Prosecuted as a war criminal after WW2, Honda was purged from public 
office. Honda first met Nakano while the latter was posted as a news correspondent to Korea in 
1913-14, later became a member of the Tōhōkai think tank and greatly influenced Nakano’s 
views on foreign affairs. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 208-12, 666, and 685 as well as vol. 2, p. 
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211, 271, 335, and 416.) 
 
Honma Ken’ichirō [袿侮筑慎ア] (1889 - 1959), nationalist activist. Having studied 
Chinese at Tōyō Kyōkai Senmon Gakkō (present-day Takushoku University), Honma first 
worked as a translator and later as a spy for the army on the Chinese mainland. In 1928, he 
established a private school in his native Ibaraki prefecture. Implicated in the May 15 incident, 
Honma was imprisoned for four years. In 1939, he established the Makoto-Musubi-Society, 
which cooperated with Nakano’s Tōhōkai in opposing Tōjō. After the end of the war, Honma 
published his “Evict the Bureaucrats,” [巫追ヤ膠] (Tokyo 1952) in which he also described his 
connection with Nakano. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 651-58 and p. 741-420.) 
 
Honryō Shinjirō [袿今袋齠ア] (1903 - 1971), politician and member of the Tōhōkai. 
Born in Tokyo, Honryō studied at Waseda and later in Europe. He met Nakano during the latter’s 
visit to Berlin in 1937-38. Greatly impressed by Nakano’s interest in politics, upon returning to 
Japan, Honryō entered the Tōhōkai. He later served as head of the IRAA’s propaganda bureau. In 
1942, he was elected to the Diet as a member of the Tōhōkai. In the post-war era, he became an 
advisor to the Japan Democratic Party [荳袿鴈厨妬] and director of the Japan Rugby Association 
[荳袿碕些砦察表善]. (See Nagai Kazuo, “The Foundation of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U] in 
Journal of History [別詒], July 1978, vol. 61, no.4; p. 130-34 and Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 
496-615.) 
 
Huang Xing (Huang Hsing) [杻85] (1874 - 1916), Chinese revolutionary. Along with Sun 
Yat-sen, cofounder of the United League (Tongmeng Hui or T’ungmeng Hui) and leader of the 
overthrow of the Manchu Qing (Ch’ing) dynasty in 1911. As a student in Tokyo from 1902 to 
1903, Huang met a number of anti-Manchu activists. Returning to Hunan, he founded the 
 490 
Huaxing Hui (Hua-hsing Hui Society for the Revival of China). After a failed uprising he 
returned to Tokyo where, through Miyazaki Tōten, a Japanese sympathizer with the Chinese 
revolutionary cause, he was introduced to Sun Yat-sen. In 1905, they formed the Tongmeng Hui. 
In 1913, Huang and Sun led an unsuccessful revolt against Yuan Shikai, who became president of 
the new Chinese republic after the 1911 revolution and whose rule became increasingly 
authoritarian. Forced to flee to Japan, Huang broke with Sun over the latter’s insistence on an 
oath of personal loyalty from all members of his newly organized (July 1914) Chinese 
Revolutionary Party. Nakano met Huang while a student at Waseda. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, 
111-113, and vol. 2, p. 381-83.) 
 
Idei Seishi [梗哀vφ] (1892 - 1975), professor. Professor of economics at Waseda 
University, who contributed articles to the Kyūshū Nippō after Nakano took over the management 
of the paper in 1928.  
 
Ikebe Sanzan (鷭シ申愾) (1864 - 1912), journalist and Nakano’s boss at the Asahi News. 
Counted together with Tokutomi Sohō and Kuga Katsunan among the three great journalists of 
Meiji Japan, Ikebe was born in the city of Kumamoto in the province of Higo (present day 
Kumamoto prefecture) as the son of a samurai in the service of the Kumamato domain. His father 
had joined the forces of Saigo Takamori during the Satsuma rebellion and following its 
suppression had been executed. Ikebe entered Keiō University, but could not graduate for lack of 
money. After a stint as journalist with the newspaper Japan [荳袿], he traveled to Europe. After 
his return, he worked as editor-in-chief of the Osaka and Tokyo Asahi News. There he was 
instrumental in bringing Natsume Soseki into the paper, and is often credited with having laid the 
groundwork for the paper's later success. Covering a broad spectrum of topics, Ikebe gained 
profile through his pro-war stance before and pro-government stance during the 
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Russo-Japanese War. He left the Tokyo Asahi in October 1911 and died one year later in 1912. 
(See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 85-86, 105-06, 115, and 142.) 
 
Inamura Ryūichi [I̊襁吏慎] (1898 - 1990), farmers’ movement activist and politician 
(and elder brother of Inamaura Junzō [I̊襁抅申], also a politician). Born in Hokkaidō, Inamura 
graduated from the Hokkai middle school in 1918 and from the faculty of politics and economics 
at Waseda University in 1923. At Waseda, he joined a leftist student group, the Kyōmin-kai [蝣鴈
善]. Already before his graduation he had became active in the farmers’ movement (e.g. he 
co-founded a tenant union in Niigata). In 1922, he organized a rally on recognizing of Soviet 
Russia at which Nakano was invited to speak. The speech ended in a brawl described by Nakano 
in the August 1922 issue of Tōhōjiron. Inamura later entered the Japanese Communist Party and, 
in 1926, the Workers’ and Farmers’ Party [迫朕コ鴈妬]. Like many other left-wing activists, he 
was arrested on March 15, 1928. In 1932, he joined the Japan Socialist Party [荳袿だ善妬], with 
which he stayed until 1937, when he broke with the main faction of the party in order to found 
the Niigata chapter of the Japan Farmers’ League [荳袿コ鴈ヾç], subsequently affiliated with 
Nakano’s Tōhōkai in 1940. After the war, Inamura was purged from public office by the US 
occupation forces, but in 1955 he made his reentry into politics, founding the Japanese Socialist 
Party [荳袿だ善妬] and serving four periods as a member of parliament (affiliated with the Japan 
Socialist Party).  He withdrew from politics in 1969. Inamura also wrote a short essay on Nakano. 
(See Nagai, Kazuo; “The Development of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢̇悽] in Journal of History 
[別詒], January 1979, vol. 62, no.1; p. 101 and Nakano Yasuo, vol., 2, p. 337 and p. 425.) 
 
Inatomi Takato [I̊廬₃斥] (1902 - 1989), farmers’ activist, politician and Tōhōkai 
member. Born in Fukuoka, Inatomi graduated from Waseda University. In 1916, he participated 
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in the foundation of Greater Japan Farmers’ Union [菟荳袿コ鴈36遍弁ç] and became actively 
involved in tenant farmer disputes. Subsequently he belonged to the social democratic faction 
within the farmers’ movement. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war he joined the Tōhōkai 
and ran as that party’s candidate but failed to be elected in 1942 election. After the war, he 
participated in the formation of the Socialist Party. First elected to the Diet in 1946, he was 
subsequently re-elected 10 times. (See Nagai, Kazuo; “The Development of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜
善貢̇悽] in Journal of History [別詒], January 1979, vol. 62, no.1; p. 101, 130-34.)  
 
Inui Shinbei [ н鑄兼ǖ] (1862 - 1934 ), businessman. Born in Hyougo prefecture into a 
house of sake brewers, Inui started a financial business in Kobe and later made a fortune 
in shipping during the Russo-Japanese War and WW1. According to Tanaka Gi’ichi, the money 
that Tanaka used to bribe members of the coalition supporting the Kenseikai cabinet under Katō 
Kōmei in 1925-6 came from contributions made by Inui and not from secret army funds, as 
alleged by Nakano. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 411 and p. 413.) 
Ishida Kazuto [Gヨ声勿] (1903 - 1979), judge. Born in Fukui prefecture, Ishida gradated 
from Tokyo Imperial University and became a judicial officer in 1927. In September 1943, he 
presided over a case concerning the attempted assassination of Hiranuma, in which Nakano made 
a court appearance as a witness. Ishida protected Nakano against interference from the kempeitai, 
enabling him thus to speak publicly for a last time. After the war, Ishida rose through the ranks of 
the judicial system, serving as judge in various courts. Known as a conservative, Ishida often 
fought for the freedom and independence of the courts. After his retirement, Ishida served as 
president of the All Japan Kendō Association. (For Nakano’s last public appearance in court see 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p.784.)  
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Ishiwara Kanji [G初 洑46] (1889 - 1949) army officer, Nakano’s political ally in the 
early 1930s and, with Itagaki Seishirō, one of the chief architects of the Manchurian Incident. 
Born into a samurai family in Yamagata prefecture, Ishiwara graduated from the Army Military 
Academy in 1909 and the Army War College in 1918. Between 1922 and 1925 he studied 
military history and strategic studies in Munich and Berlin. Influenced by Nichiren buddhism, 
Ishiwara developed the idea that a golden age would follow a period of world-wide conflict, in 
which Japan would fight at the head of Asia. Posted to Manchuria in 1928, Ishiwara started to 
plan the separation of that territory from China and eventually orchestrated the Manchurian 
Incident (with cooperation of Itagaki Seishirō), which provided Japanese forces with the pretext 
to occupy the whole of Manchuria and eventually establish a separate puppet state. This earned 
Ishiwara and Itagaki great popularity at home, and it was from around this time that Nakano 
associated with them. Since Ishiwara‘s action had been carried out without orders from Tokyo, he 
feared that he would be severely punished for it, but his popularity - especially among right-wing 
forces - protected him, and in the end he was rewarded and given the command of the fouth 
regiment in Sendai. In Sendai, Ishiwara also established a chapter of Nakano’s Tōhōkai, at that 
point still a mixture of think tank and political party. In 1935, Ishiwara was made Chief of 
Operations of the Army General Staff, and in that position formulated a strategy according to 
which Japan should establish a national defense state. This would form the foundation for 
building an economic and military block with China and Manchuria. Based on that, Japan could 
then wage war against the Soviet Union. Once the Soviet Union had been vanquished, Japan 
should move on to liberate the Western colonies in Asia, which would put the country in a 
position to confront the United States. In 1937, Ishiwara was posted to Manchuria and there 
discovered that the Japanese puppet state he had helped bring about was a far cry from his ideals 
of Asian brotherhood. He severely criticized the commanding officers and confronted 
commander-in-chief Tōjō Hideki, who subsequently became Ishiwara’s nemesis. As a result, he 
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was relieved of his duties and he returned to Japan. Although increasingly on the fringes of power, 
Ishiwara continued to write, publish and speak about strategic questions. The break with Nakano 
came over the Sino-Japanese War. While Nakano favored escalation of the conflict, Ishiwara 
opposed it. After publicly stating that Tōjō should be exectued, Ishiwara was retired from active 
service. He returned to his native Yamagata, where he continued to write and studied on 
agriculture. After the war, Ishiwara was not tried as a war criminal, probably because he had 
opposed Tōjō, the war against China and the attack on Pearl Harbor. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, 
p. 561-63, 610-12, 666-96, 714-23, and vol. 2, p. 83-88, 112-126, 143-45, 200-279, 333-353, and 
501-03.) 
Itagaki Seishirō [觜倡欟裂ア ] (1885 - 1948), army officer and architect of the 
Manchurian Incident (with Ishiwara Kanji). Born in Iwate prefecture, Itagaki graduated from the 
Army Military Academy in 1904 and then fought in the Russo-Japanese war. After graduating 
from the Army War College, he served as military attaché to the Japanese embassy in China 
(1924-6), on the Army General Staff, and then again as commanding officer of an infantry 
regiment of the Guandong army in China. As chief of that army’s intelligence section he 
cooperated with Ishiwara Kanji in orchestrating the Manchurian Incident, which provided the 
pretext for the occupation and separation of Manchuria from China. After the establishment of 
Manshūkoku, he served as military advisor to the puppet state. After the outbreak of the 
Sino-Japanese war in 1937, Itagaki took a leading part in various military campaigns in 1937-8. 
In 1938-9, Itagaki served as Army Minister in Tokyo, but returned to China from 1939-41. Made 
partly responsible for the defeat of Japanese troops at Nomohan against the Soviet Red Army, 
Itagaki was posted to command the Chosen in Korea. Itagaki was still commander of the Chosen 
army at the end of the war, when it was called upon to support the defense of Singapore and 
Malaya. Convicted as a class-A wartime criminal, he was hanged in 1948. (See Nakano Yasuo, 
vol. 1, p. 666-67, p. 734-35, as well as vol. 2, p. 337-53, 411-419, and 502.)  
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Itō Masanori [舛I驟毫] (1889 - 1962), journalist and commentator on military affairs, 
especially the Japanese Imperial Navy. Born in Ibaragi prefecture, Itō attended Keiō University 
before working at the Jiji News [蕁征范ⓥ]. He met Nakano in Paris in 1919 when covering the 
Peace Conference and after that the two men maintained friendly relationships. Itō frequently 
contributed articles to Nakano’s magazines and on occasion would support him during election 
campaigns. As a journalist, Itō earned fame for his scoop of the termination of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1921. He is best known for his bestselling history of the Japanese 
navy’s fate in WW2, titled “The End of the Combined Fleet”. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 216, 
280, 535, and 688.) 
 
Itō Ushirō [舛I瀕裂ア] (1894 - 1974), labor activist and politician. Born in Nagasaki 
prefecture, Itō joined the labor movement as a Hokkaidō coal miner. In 1923, he returned to his 
native province and became active in the northern Kyūshū labor movement. He later joined the 
Social Mass Party. As member of a delegation of that party, he traveled to Germany on a tour of 
inspection in 1938 and came back with a rosy picture of conditions in Nazi Germany, which 
contributed to the Social Mass Party’s shift to the right. After that he was a member of the 
Socialist Party and was elected to the Diet in 1946. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 355.) 
 
Izu Tomito [舛ϐ廬斥] (1888 - 1978), jouranlist. Born in Kumamoto prefecture, Izu's life 
ran in many ways parallel to Nakano’s. He too attended Waseda University and later worked at 
the Asahi News. He was Adachi Kenzo's secretary when the latter served as Minister of 
Communications. When Nakano took over the Kyūshū Nippō in 1928, Izu was one of the 
permanent staff members. In 1940, he became the president of the Kyūshū Daily News [ 枢攀荳
荳范ⓥ] and in 1942 of the Kumamoto Daily News [ⅶ袿荳荳范ⓥ]. In 1953 he established 
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Kumamoto Radio. 
 
Kagesa Sada’aki [檬双┖蓖] (1893 - 1948), military officer and member of the Tōhōkai 
think tank in the 1930s. Born in Hiroshima, Kagesa graduated from the Army War College and 
from early on became one of the Army’s specialists on Chinese affairs, serving on the general 
staff and as military attaché in Shanghai. He orchestrated the establishment of the Japanese 
puppet regime in China under Wang Ching-wei in 1943, becoming that government’s military 
advisor. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2., p. 50.)  
 
Kamei Kan’ichirō [瀬棲⎤慎ア] (1892 - 1987), socialist politician, known for his good 
looks and the fact that he spoke seven languages. Born in Kanagawa prefecture, Kamei graduated 
from the faculty of law of Tokyo Imperial University in 1917 and then entered the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. After serving in Tientsin, China and New York as Consulate General, he retired 
from the Foreign Service in 1926 to become a politician. He ran as a candidate of the Social 
Democratic Party [だ善鴈テ妬] in the 1928 general election and won a seat in the Diet (he was 
subsequently re-elected 3 times). In 1932 he joined the Social Mass Party [だ善哢テ妬]. From 
early on he maintained good relations with the military and in 1934 he contributed to the writing 
of the army pamphlet “Kokutai no hongi to sono kyōka no teishō.” He supported Konoe’s New 
Order Movement, and in 1938 Konoe put him in charge of creating a new mass party. In 1938, 
Kamei was part of a Social Mass Party delegation that traveled to Germany and came back with a 
positive picture of Nazi Germany that greatly contributed to the party’s shift to the right. Kamei 
was also involved in the talks leading up to the failed merger between his party and Nakano’s 
Tōhōkai. In 1940, he became president of East Asian Affairs in the IRAA. In 1942, he advocated 
an end to the war, was imprisoned for 8 months and was then put on probation for one year. After 
the war he was initially excluded from public office. Following his rehabilitation, he joined the 
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right-wing of the Socialist Party [だ善妬] but he had lost his influence by this time. (See Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 471, vol. 2, 354-58, 370, 380, and 385.) 
 
Kaneko Kentarō [ů岌↙啣ア] (1853 - 1942), bureaucrat and politician. Born into a 
samurai family of the Fukuoka domain, he entered the domain’s school, Shūyūkan, in 1863. On 
account of his outstanding grades, the domain’s authorities allowed him to travel to Tokyo for 
further study in 1870. In 1871, he joined the Iwakura mission to the West. While the mission 
continued onto Europe, Kaneko was left in the US, where he enrolled at Harvard University to 
study law. After graduating in 1878, he returned to Japan. From 1886 onward, he participated in 
the drafting of the Meiji Constitution under Itō Hirobumi. In addition to various ministerial 
positions, Kaneko also served as member of the House of Peers, secretary of the Privy Council 
and head of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. He also founded Japan Law University (today’s Nihon 
Daigaku). 
 
Kaneko Naokichi [ů岌ö便] (1866 - 1944), businessman and member of Nakano’s 
Tōhōkai think tank in the 1920s. Born in Kōchi Prefecture into a family so poor that he could not 
attend primary school, Kaneko started working at an early age. In 1886 he left for Kobe and 
found employment with Suzuki Iwatarō, specializing in sugar. After Suzuki’s death, he took over 
the management, together with Yanagida Fujimatsu [讎譓廬吩觚], and expanded the company’s 
operations to Taiwan. Drawing closer to Gotō Shimpei, then governor general of Taiwan, Kaneko 
was able to secure monopoly sales rights for camphor, which became the cash cow for the 
company’s business. The abundant funds enabled Kaneko to expand the business into a global 
trading company with over 50 affiliated companies. Known as Suzuki General Trading House [H
袍G遍盲だ盲枷], the concern was counted among the Zaibatsu like Mitsui or Mitsubishi. 
During WW1 Kaneko made great profit in cornering the iron market, but after the war his 
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fortunes declined, culminating in near- bankruptcy during the Shōwa financial crisis of 1927. 
Attempts to rebuild the company thereafter and return it to its former greatness failed. He gained 
national attention for his active role in the conclusion of the Japanese-American Iron Exchange 
Agreement [荳̶uU誓絋表巵] and is also remembered for having developed the artificial silk 
and synthetic ammonia industries. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 89, 235, 438, and 696.)         
 
Kaneko Sessai [ů岌聶艤] (? - ?), educator. Most of what we know about Kaneko Sessai 
we know through Nakano. Kaneko was born in Fukui prefecture, where he studied under 
Hashimoto Keigaku [隱袿蘆憑] before going on to Western studies under Nakamura Keiu [腎襁
舁嶄] in Edo (present-day Tokyo). Subsequently, he worked as a proofreader at the Hokumon 
News [疲著范ⓥ] in Hokkaidō, then moved to Taiwan and lived there for nine years. Following 
the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, he traveled to the mainland and served as a translator 
and interpreter for the Japanese forces. At the end of the war, he vowed to build “a spiritual Japan 
in Manchuria” to which end he established in Dalian the “Rescue-the-East-School” [Shintō 
gakusha 竭覩嶌だ] (accepting both Japanese and Chinese students) and the Far Eastern Daily 
[Taitō Nippō┘覩荳况], a newspaper aimed at furthering Sino-Japanese understanding. After 
Kaneko’s death, the running of his school and newspaper were taken over by Nakano’s former 
university roommate, Abe Shingen [植グ*ク].(For a short biography of Kaneko see Nakano 
Seigō, “Expressions of the soul” [网惚鋪晃], Tokyo, May, 1938, p. 294-96, and Nakano Yasuo, 
vol. 1, p. 305-315, 335, 359, 388, 392, 407, 609, 611-12, 643, 672-73, 760 and vol. 2, p. 252, 271, 
476, and 758.)   
 
Kangyū Tsuneo [Ǎ⬆独啌] (1894 - ?), politician. Born in Fukuoka, Kangyū graduated 
from the department of political economy at Waseda University in 1920. In 1923, he went to 
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study in Germany. He later worked in the ministries of Communication, Finance, and Agriculture 
and Forestry. Originally a member of Nakano’s faction in the Minseitō and Kokumin Dōmei, 
Kangyū was to run and lose against Nakano in the 1942 election. (See Nagai Kazuo, “The 
Foundation of the Tōhōkai” [᧲ᣇળߩᚑ┙] in Journal of History [ผᨋ], July 1978, vol. 61, 
no.4; p. 115 and Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 531, p. 642-46.)    
 
Katō Tokunari [ട⮮ᓼᚑ] usually known as Katō Shisho [มᦠ] (1830 - 1865), samurai 
of the Fukuoka-han and the center of Sonnō Jōi activism within the administration of the same 
domain during the Bakumatsu era. During the first punitive expedition against Chōshū, he 
advocated the dissolution of the expedition army. He advanced to the position of karō [ኅ⠧] in 
1865. When the Tokugawa-loyalists got the upper hand, he was forced to resign and then commit 
ritual suicide [seppuku]. Katō was among the Genyōsha activists. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol, 1, p. 
46, 52, and 184.)   
 
Katsu Masanori [ൎᱜᙗ] (1879 - 1957), bureaucrat and politician. Born in Fukuoka 
prefecture, Katsu studied at Tokyo Imperial University, and then entered the Ministry of Finance. 
He was elected to the Diet for a total of six periods starting in 1928, first as a member of the 
Minseitō. He served as Minister of Communications under the Yonai cabinet. It was Katsu who 
on the day after Nakano’s suicide motioned that the house issue a note of condolence. (See 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 432.)    
 
Kawatsu Susumu (also Kawatsu Sen) [ᴡᵤ᥻] (1875 - 1943), economist. Born in Tokyo, 
Kawatsu graduated from Tokyo Imperial University and then became a lecturer, professor and 
eventually faculty head there. As an economist, he was known for his work on social policy and 
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marginal utility in pricing goods. He was a member of Nakano’s Tōhōkai think tank in the 1920s. 
(See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 235.)    
 
Kazami Akira [ 城Wd ] (1886 - 1961), journalist, politician, and Nakano’s 
acquaintance. Born in Ibaraki prefecture into a family of farmers, Akira enrolled at Waseda in 
1905 where he met and befriended Nakano and Ogata. Kazami and Nakano were born on the 
same day, studied the same subjects at Waseda and shared a strong interest in Chinese affairs. 
After graduation their lives would run parallel courses, even if they were not continuously close 
to one another. Like Nakano, Kazami first worked as a journalist at the Tokyo Daily News, but 
soon left and became temporarily a broker. Later he returned to work at the Osaka Asahi and at 
the Kokusai Tsūshin [楼墫＊袋], then became editor-in-chief of the Shinano Mainichi Shimbun 
[袋‥鯱荳范ⓥ]. In his editorials he took a stance in favor of universal suffrage and the 
socialist labor movement. Like Nakano, Kazami entered politics via journalism, first running for 
election in 1928 (when he failed to be elected) and again more successfully in 1930 as a 
candidate of the Minseitō. Once in parliament, he joined the Minseitō’s Adachi faction, of which 
Nakano was also a member. When Adachi and Nakano left the Minseitō at the end of 1931, 
Kazami followed them and in 1932 participated in the establishment of the Kokumin Dōmei. 
When Nakano left the Kokumin Dōmei at the end of 1935, however, Kazami stayed behind. 
While both continued to agree on many political issues of the day, the paths of Kazami (who 
was re-elected four times before the end of the war) and Nakano grew more distant from 1936 
onward, mainly because Kazami advanced to positions of power while Nakano chose to remain 
on the fringe. In 1937, Kazami served as Cabinet Secretary in the first Konoe cabinet, where he 
tried without success to work against the expansion of the war in China. He became Minister of 
Justice in Konoe's second cabinet (1940). Like Nakano, Kazami belonged to the reformist camp 
at the time, supporting the New Structure Movement and later serving in the IRAA. Neither 
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Nakano nor Kazami were nominated in the 1942 'recommended' election, but whereas Nakano 
managed to get elected anyway, Kazami chose not even to run and withdrew entirely from 
politics thereafter. Having been barred from public office by the occupation authorities following 
the end of WW2, Kazami re-entered politics only in 1952, serving as an MP first unaffiliated but 
later joining the left wing of the Socialist Party (1955). During his last years, Kazami was active 
in the peace movement and several international friendship societies such as the Sino-Japanese 
Society for the Recovery of Friendly Relations [荳腎刷荳裟楼誓憐殱楼鴈善 ] and the 
Committee for Cooperation between Asia and Africa [坤沙坤蠉坤斎鷺混ヾ昴埣満善]. (See 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 83-87, 192-94, 339-42 as well as vol. 2, p. 251-58, 279-81, 358-61 and 
444-45.) 
 
Kikuchi Ryōichi [95鷭Y慎] (1879 - ?), lawyer and politician. Born in Aomori prefecture 
(his father had been a member of parliament), Kikuchi studied Law at Tokyo Imperial University 
and then entered a career in journalism. First elected to the Diet in 1915 (?). He was a member of 
the Yamaji faction within the Kokumin Dōmei. 
 
Kimura Eiichi [袍襁Å斃 sometimes misspelled Å慎] (1879 - 1947), diplomat and 
member of Nakano’s Tōhōkai think tank in the 1920s. Born in Shimane prefecture, Kimura 
attended Tokyo Imperial University and first worked for Sumitomo Bank before entering the 
Foreign Service, attending the Paris Peace (1918) and Washington (1922) Conferences. 
Subsequently he served as head of the Asia department and ambassador to Czechoslovakia. He 
resigned from the Foreign Service in 1930 and worked as a director for the Manchurian Railway. 
(See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1. P. 235.) 
 
Kimura Ki [袍襁鯢] (1894 - 1979), novelist and literary critic, who wrote a play on the 
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last part of Nakano’s life. Born in Okamoto prefecture, Kimura studied English literature at 
Waseda, then worked as an editor. In 1925, he co-founded the Meiji Culture Research Association. 
In 1928, he studied in London and upon his return lectured at Meiji and Rikkyō Universities. He 
also joined the Japan Fabian Church and the Japan Famer and Labor Party [荳袿迫コ妬]. Kimura 
made himself a name as student and critic of Meiji literature. In 1978, he received the Kikuchi 
prize. In 1946, Kimura wrote a play entitled: “The last days of Nakano Seigō – a shishi” [癶鵠沒
吩 : 腎ǒ驟悩貢蠱歙], Tokyo: Kōeinkai, 1946.    
  
Kimura Takeo [袍襁驥渣] (1902 - 1983), politician and member of the Tōhōkai. Born in 
Yamagata prefecture, Kimura studied political economy at Meiji University graduating in 1926. 
He served on the municipal council of his native city of Komezawa-city and on the Yamagata 
provincial assembly before being first elected to the Diet in 1936. A member of the Neutral Club 
[腎U胆鉤グ], he subsequently joined the Tōhōkai, running successfully as their candidate in the 
1936 and again in the 1937 elections. Kimura acted as liaison between the Tōhōkai and Ishiwara 
Kanji’s Tōa Renmei. Having left the Tōhōkai after the failed merger with the Social Mass Party, 
he was re-elected during the recommended election of 1942. After the war, Kimura continued to 
hold a seat in the Diet, participating in the foundation of the Japan Liberal Party (1945). Holding 
minor positions in the second Saitō cabinet, he became Minister of Construction in the first 
Tanaka cabinet. (See Nagai Kazuo, “The Foundation of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U] in Journal 
of History [別詒], July 1978, vol. 61, no.4; pp. 130-34 and Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 572, vol. 2, p. 
245 and 710.) 
 
Kishi Mamoru [應ヤ] (1881 - ?), politician and member of the Yamaji faction within the 
Kokumin Dōmei. Born in Urawa-city, Saitama prefecture, Kishi graduated from English 
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department of the Tokyo University of Foreign Languages and then worked at various renowned 
European Hotels. First elected to the Diet in 1928 as a Minseitō candidate, he served as secretary 
to the Minister of Overseas Affairs between 1929 and 1931. He left the Minseitō in 1931 with 
Adachi and helped in establishing the Kokumin Dōmei. In later years he occupied various 
government positions in the Atami-city and Shizuoka prefecture. He also worked for the 
English-language magazine Nippon. 
 
Kiyose Ichirō [拐㌫慎ア] (1884 - 1967), politician and lawyer. Born in Hyōgo prefecture, 
Kiyose studied at Kyoto Imperial University. He was first elected to the Diet in 1920 and 
subsequently re-elected 14 times, serving as Vice-president of the Diet from 1928. In 1925, 
Kiyose and Nakano submitted a motion opposing the Peace Preservation Law. Kiyose was a 
member of the IRAA. Following the war, he was the chief defensive lawyer of Tōjō Hideki 
during the Tokyo trials. He served as Minister of Education in the third Hatoyama cabinet and 
became president of the Diet in 1960. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol, 1, p. 391, 472, and 633.) 
 
Kiyozawa Kiyoshi [拐鼈┡] (1890 - 1945), foreign affairs commentator. Born in Nagano 
prefecture, Kiyozawa studied at a Christian school and visited the US in 1906, later becoming a 
reporter for a Japanese paper. He returned to Japan in 1918, working at different newspapers 
including the Asahi News. In 1929, he established himself as an independent critic, mainly 
commenting on foreign affairs. Following the Manchurian incident, Kiyozawa did not (like many 
other intellectuals) convert or grow silent but rather became a sharp critic of the increasingly 
ideological foreign policies proposed in Japan. In 1937, he met Nakano in Europe and presented 
him with George Ward Prices‘s “I Know These Dictators” (New York, 1938). His wartime diary, 
“Diary of Darkness” [蛟桛荳ヒ], describing the political, diplomatic and social developments in 
wartime Japan was published in 1954 and became very popular. In it he discusses how much he 
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disliked Nakano’s views on politics. 
 
Koizumi Matajirō [恠龜弗饅ア] (1856 - 1951), politician. Born as the son of a 
steeplejack in Kanagawa Prefecture, Koizumi twice enrolled in the Military Academy (first Navy, 
then Army) without having his parents’ consent. Both times his father brought him back home, 
eventually convincing him to follow the family’s business while also serving as head of a squad 
of firefighters in Yokosuka. In order to mark that decision, he had a giant dragon tattooed over the 
length of his body and later was known as the “tattooed minister” [渡黒匯哢55]. He entered the 
Kaishintō [膃〕妬] in 1887. In 1889, he started working as a journalist for the Tokyo-Yokohama 
Newspaper [覩静闢╈鯱荳范ⓥ]. In 1903, he was elected to the prefectural assembly and, in 
1907, to the Yokosukua city assembly, becoming that body’s head in 1910. From 1908 he ran as a 
candidate of the Yūkōkai [㍎85善] and was elected 12 times in a row until 1942. After forming 
the anti-Seiyūkai Yūshinkai [弗范善], he  belonged to the Dōshikai [弁沒善], the Kenseikai [畧
膕善] and the Minseitō, of which he became an executive officer. From early on Koizumi had 
been an advocate of universal suffrage. Between 1924 and 1927 he served as Vice-president of 
the Diet [テ派杷共同組合憎] He served as Minister of Communications in the Hamaguchi and second 
Wakatsuki cabinet and in this position was assisted by Nakano who served as Vice-minister of 
Communications under him (the two men knew each other from before, Nakano had once 
presented Koizumi with a dog that he had brought home from Siberia). In 1934 he became mayor 
of Yokosuka city. In 1939, he became councilor to the cabinet. After the dissolution of the 
Minseitō he joined the IRAA [62⇨膕齠善] and served as its advisor. In 1944, he became advisor 
to the cabinet and, in 1945, he was appointed to the House of Peers. After the war, he was 
excluded from public office by the occupation forces. Koizumi was the grandfather of later Prime 
Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō. 
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Kojima Kazuo [幣戡 慎渣] (1865 - 1952), journalist, politician and Inukai Tsuyoshi’s 
right-hand man. Born in the Toyo-oka domain [ϕ慟M] (present-day Toyo-oka city in Hyōgo 
prefecture) into a samurai family, Kojima went to Tokyo at age 14 to study at the Kyōritsu Gakkō, 
the predecessor of today’s Kaisei Middle and High School [梅癩腎嶌貊刷㔾̌嶌貊] under 
Hamao Arata [Z寃鑄, 1849 -1925] and Sugiura Shigetake [鼕d紞鎖, 1855-1924]. From its 
inception in 1888 he worked at Miyake Setsurei’s magazine The Japanese [荳袿斥]. In 1898 he 
became editor-in-chief of the Kyūshū Nippō and in 1908 switched to the Yorazu Chōhō [R衲况]. 
Pushed by Inukai Tsuyoshi and Tōyama Mitsuru, he entered the political world in 1911 and was 
elected to the Diet a total of six times, belonging first to the Kokumintō, then to the Kakushin 
Club and lastly to the Seiyūkai. Although affiliated with different parties, he was throught closely 
associated with Inukai Tsuyoshi. When Inukai was made Minister of Communications in 1924, 
he served as Vice-minister under him. After failing to be re-elected in 1928, he was was 
nominated to the upper house in 1932 where he served until 1947. After WW2, Kojima was 
offered a seat in the Hidehara cabinet but declined for reasons of health, instead recommending 
Yoshida Shigeru. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 129-31, 152-55, 373-74, 396-402, 622 and 
639-40.) 
Komai Tokuzō [畔棲毫申 ] (1885 - 1961), central figure in the establishment of 
Manchūkuo. Born in Shiga prefecture, Komai graduated from the faculty of agriculture of 
Tōhoku University in 1911. After having been in charge of agricultural development at the 
Manchurian Railway, he joined the Foreign Ministry overseeing investments in China. Shortly 
after the Manchurian Incident of 1931, he became advisor to the Guandong Army and soon 
thereafter was made general manager of the newly established Guandong Army administrative 
department. After the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo, due to his knowledge, 
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Komai participated in the building of the young state and in the formation of its policies, but soon 
got into conflict with the military officers of the Guandong Army, which led to his resignation. 
From 1935, he dedicated himself to the education of youth from Japan and China. After the war 
Komai was purged from public office. According to Komai, he and Nakano knew each other from 
around the time of the Tanaka cabinet (late 1920s), when both lived within walking distance in 
Harajuku. Even though Komai at the time was not interested in politics, Nakano often confided in 
him concerning political matters, in particular in matters relating to fund-raising. When after the 
Manchurian Incident Japanese political circles debated whether or not to recognize the state of 
Manshūkoku, Nakano, advocating recognition, received Yen 100,000 from Komai to support his 
campaign financially. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 666-69, and vol. 2, p. 350 and Komai Tokuzō 
[畔棲毫申];  “A look behind the scenes of political fund raising” [膕齠∇ů貢鉤悋33], part of 
a special feature “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩惚畫康], in “Japan and the Japanese” 
[荳袿沸砿荳袿斥], January 1956, p. 18-21.) 
 
Komura Kin’ichi [恠襁饐慎] (1883 - 1930), diplomat and member of Nakano’s Tōhōkai 
think tank in the 1920s. Son of diplomat Komura Juntarō, Kin’ichi graduated from Tokyo 
Imperial University’s faculty of law in 1907 and in the same year entered the Foreign Service, 
being first posted to China and then in London. From 1911 until his death he was a member of 
the House of Peers. Komura served as Vice-minister of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs [禺鳩ÿ] 
in the Hamaguchi cabinet. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol, 1, p. 219, 235, and 746.) 
 
Kondō Hidezō [デI荳頓△] (1908 - 1979), cartoonist. Born in Nagano prefecture, 
Kondō spent his youth following middle school helping out at his parents’ store. At the age of 18 
he went to Tokyo where, after a series of different jobs, he became an apprentice of Okamoto 
Ippei [慟袿慎霸]. Before the WW2 he worked for the Kyūshū Nippō, the organ of the Genyōsha, 
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and developed a new non-political and nonsensical style of manga. In 1940, he co-founded the 
New Japan Manga Association [范荳袿煉逸表善] and became editor-in-chief of their organ, 
Manga [煉逸], which became known for its caricatures of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Chiang 
Kai-shek. After the war, he worked for the Yomiuri Shimbun. Kondō Hidezō interviewed Nakano 
in 1942, making fun of Nakano’s fascist demeanor.  
 
Koyama Shōju [恠愾觚徘] (1876 - 1959), politician, journalist and newspaper manager. 
Born in Aichi prefecture, Koyama followed a path similar to that of Nakano, first enrolling at the 
Tokyo Vocational School [覩静徨著嶌貊], the precursor of Waseda University, and then 
embarking on a career in journalism. After working for the Osaka Asahi, Koyama became head of 
the Asahi’s Nagoya office where in 1906 he bought the Chūkyō Shimbun [腎静范ⓥ] and 
renamed it Nagoya Shimbun [鞭幣悋范ⓥ]. Nagoya was also the place where he first entered 
politics, being elected to the city assembly in 1907. In 1915 he was elected to the lower house and 
subsequently re-elected 10 times. He entered the Kenseikai and from there the Minseitō, where he 
served as chief secretary. From May 1930, he served as vice-speaker of the lower house, and 
between July 1937 and December 1941 as speaker of the same house. After the war he 
participated in the foundation of the Japan Progressive Party [荳袿〕驩妬] but a deeper 
involvement in politics was forestalled when he was purged from public office. Koyama was the 
speaker of the Lower House when there was a motion calling for Nakano’s expulsion in early 
1939. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 380-87.) 
 
Kuhara Fusanosuke [睡譜蘯翠拍] (1869 - 1965), businessman and politician. Born in 
Yamaguchi prefecture, Kuhara studied at Keiō University, graduating in 1889. After working in 
the mining industry for some years, Kuhara started his own mining company, which prospered 
and, during WW1, expanded into fields as different as shipping, insurance, steel making, 
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ship-building, and petroleum. The post-war recession, however, greatly hurt his enterprises. 
While running his various companies, Kuhara entered politics around 1928, joining the Seiyukai 
and serving as Minister of Communications in the Tanaka cabinet. After the failure of the 
negotiations over the establishment of a coalition cabinet, Kuhara led his faction into an 
ever-closer relationship with the Army and right-wing circles, proposing a one-state-one-party 
government model. He supported financially some of the rebels of the February 26 Incident, 
which brought him into trouble. After the split of the Seiyūkai in 1939, Kuhara led the Real 
Seiyūkai [膕仏善驟橲╀]. He served as cabinet councilor in the Yonai and second Konoe 
cabinets. Purged from public office after WW2, he never reentered politics, restricting his 
activities to fostering good relations between China and Japan. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol, 1, p. 
394-97, 622-32, and vol. 2, p. 14, 57, 444-45.)  
 
Kurino Shin’ichirō [豸ǒ獺慎ア] (1851 - 1937), Fukuoka-born diplomat. Kurino was the 
son of a Fukuoka samurai (responsible for teaching the use of the pike) and studied at the 
domain’s Shūyūkan Middle School. On account of his academic promise, he was given a grant by 
the domain’s authorities to study at Harvard University. Upon his return, he entered the Foreign 
Service and represented Japan in the negotiations over the revision of the commercial treaty with 
the US in 1894, and later as ambassador to Italy, France and Russia. 
 
Kuroda Reiji [桛譓ぜ性] (1890 - 1943), journalist, German expert and translator of 
Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” who accompanied Nakano on his trip to Europe in 1937-8. Born in Kōchi 
prefecture, Kuroda was originally called Okanoe Morimichi [慟疹嶂ぐ] but changed his name to 
Kuroda Reiji in honor of Kropotkin and Lenin. He graduated from Tokyo Imperial University. In 
1923, he was sent to Berlin as a correspondent of the Asahi News. Kuroda translated various 
German books into Japanese. Around 1931 he became an ardent supporter of the Nazi movement, 
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translating Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” in 1940. He published his own view of developments in 
Germany under the title “Progress in Germany – a reader” [べㅴ⁛ㅺ ⺒ᧄ]. He was killed in 
1943 when the ship carrying him to Borneo was sunk. (See Miyake Masaki, “Hitler and Japan” 
[ࡅ࠶࠻࡜࡯ߣᣣᧄ], in History and People [ᱧผߣੱ‛], vol. 3, no.9 pp. 166-67 and Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 282.) 
 
Kurushima Tsuneki [᧪ፉᕡ༑] (1859 - 1889), member of the Genyōsha and the person 
who maimed Ōkuma Shigenobu through a bomb. Second son of a Samurai from Fukuoka-han, 
Kurushima studied at Takabe Osamu’s Ginseng-Field School and thus came into contact with the 
political radicals following? Tōyama Mitsuru. Following the Satsuma rebellion, Kurushima 
participated in the People’s Rights Movement, then entered the Genyōsha. In 1887, he succeeded 
Hakoda Rokusuke as manager of the Genyōsha. Opposing the revision of the unequal treaties, 
Kurushima threw a bomb at Ōkuma Shigenobu in 1889, then killed himself on the spot. Ōkuma 
lost a leg and the negotiations were interrupted. The bombing was in all likelihood carried out 
with the consent, if not the support, of the Genyōsha. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 47, 220, and 
426.)    
 
Kurusu Saburō [᧪ᩘਃ㇢] (1886 - 1954), diplomat who had been dispatched to 
Washington to support Ambassador Nomura’s negotiations efforts with the US in late 1941. Born 
in Yokohama, Kurusu was educated at the Tokyo Higher Commercial School (today Hitotsubashi 
University), then joined the Foreign Service. After serving at the embassy in Belgium, Kurusu 
served as ambassador to Germany and in that position opposed the conclusion of the Triple 
Alliance. His America-friendly views were the main reason Foreign Minister Tōgō chose him to 
support the last attempt at a negotiated peace with the US in late 1941. They were also the main 
reason Nakano criticized him repeatedly during the period leading up to Pearl Harbor. (See 
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Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 456 and 513.) 
 
Kuzū Yoshihisa [た﨟㋞睡] (1874 - 1958), nationalis and politician. Born in Chiba 
prefecture. Together with his elder brother Kuzū Tōsuke [た﨟覩赤] and Uchida Ryōhei, he 
participated in the foundation of the Kokuryūkai. In 1911, he traveled to China to support the 
revolutionary forces there. In 1931, he participated in the formation of the Greater Japan 
Production Party [哢荳袿﨟﨡妬] After the death of Uchida Ryōhei in 1937, he took over the 
presidency of the Kokuryūkai. Kuzū also served on the IRAA where, together with Nakano and 
others, he formed the party’s right wing. (See Nakano Seigō, vol. 1, p. 533.) 
 
Lin Chang-min [詒憎鴈] (1876 - 1925), politician of late imperial and early republican 
China. Born into the family of a bureaucrat, Lin showed promise in linguistics, mastering English 
and Japanese before working as a translator. He came to Japan in 1906 and earned a degree in 
political economy at Waseda University, where he befriended Nakano and Kazami Akira and 
socialized with Chinese and Japanese pan-Asianists. After graduating in 1909, he returned to 
China, working as a professor in Fujian province. In the aftermatch of the Chinese revolution of 
1911, he served as representative of Fujian at the new nationalist government in Nanking. After 
the inauguration of Republican China, he served in various positions in the Chinese government, 
as well as in the Ministry of the Interior, the Secretariat? of the Parliament, and the Ministry of 
Justice. After having spent a couple of years in Europe following WW1, he returned to China and 
served on the constitutional drafting committee. Lin died fighting against the northern warlord 
Chang Tsuo-lin in 1925. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 79-83, 110-11, 403-06, 580, 586 and 
644.)  
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Maeda Tomosuke [撚譓仏拍] (1887 - 1975), medical doctor who amputated Nakano’s leg 
in 1926. Born in Aichi prefecture, Maeda graduated from Tokyo Imperial University and later 
became a professor at Keiō University. In 1927, he opened the Maeda Surgical Clinic in Akasaka, 
Tokyo and in 1966 he became honorary president of the Association of Japanese Surgeons. (See 
Nakano Yasuo, vol.1, p. 17-18 and 424.) 
 
Makino Ryōzō [☂ǒY申] (1885 - 1961), lawyer and politician. Born in Gifu prefecture, 
Makino graduated from Tokyo Imperial University before becoming a lawyer. Elected to the Diet 
in 1920, he was re-elected 10 times. During the 1926 Diet session, following Nakano’s attack 
against Tanaka Gi’ichi, Makino accused Nakano of accepting bribes from representatives of the 
Soviet Union, but later admitted the accusation was wrong. In 1938, he opposed the National 
Mobilization Law as unconstitutional. He served as Minister of Justice in the post-war Hatoyama 
cabinet. (Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 428 and 440.) 
 
Masumoto Uhei [跚袿瀕霸] (1873 - 1931), shipbuilding engineer. Born in Miyazaki 
prefecture, Masumoto graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, then studied shipbuilding in 
the US and England for ten years. Upon his return, he worked for Mitsubishi Shipbuilding, 
serving as head of the Toba Shipyard. His selection by the government to represent Japan at the 
International Labor Conference in 1919 was strongly opposed by labor groups. Masumoto was a 
member of the Yūshin-sha founded by Nakano in 1922. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 339-41.)    
 
Matsumae Shigeyoshi [觚撚ĩコ] (1901 - ??), bureaucrat and politician. Born in 
Kumamoto prefecture, Matsumae graduated from the electrical engineering department of 
Tōhoku University in 1925, then entered the Ministry of Communications. In 1936, he received 
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his doctoral degree in engineering in Germany. He later developed an interest in education and, 
following the Nazi policy of emphasizing technical instruction, he founded a school for 
aeronautical engineering, which later became Tōkai University. While still working in the   
Communications Ministry, he briefly joined the IRAA but then withdrew in order to return to the 
ministry, heading its civil engineering department. It was in this capacity that he came to 
cooperate with Nakano in the Senior Statesmen scheme. For openly opposing Tōjō, Matsumae 
was drafted and sent off to the front in the Pacific in 1944. After the war he served as the first 
director of the Tōkai University. Purged from public office until 1952, he ran successfully for 
election in 1952 and was subsequently re-elected five times as a member of Socialist Party. In 
later years he made himself a name as an advocate of social democracy in Japan, and was active 
in improving relations between Japan and the Soviet Union and other Eastern European 
communist countries. Matsumae also served in leading positions for the International Jūdō 
League and the Japan Foreign Culture Association. He authored several books on engineering as 
well as an account of his experiences as a soldier. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 716, 736, 750, 
and 785.)  
 
Matsumoto Kenjirō [觚袿筑饅ア] (1870 - 1963), businessman. Born in Fukuoka as the 
second son of Genyōsha member and coal baron Yasukawa Kei’ichirō, he founded Yasukawa 
–Matsumoto Shōten in 1893, a company that engaged in the production and sale of coal. In 1919, 
he became president of the Meiji Mining company and later served in leading positions of various 
coal industry associations and as member of the upper house. Throughout his career, Matsumoto 
supported Nakano financially. Having studied in the US, Matsumoto spoke English well enough 
to serve as an interpreter to foreign observers during the Russo-Japanese War and in that capacity 
made the acquaintance of General MacArthur’s father. In the summer of 1943, Matsumoto 
delivered a lecture to the Emperor concerning economic controls in the coal industry, leading 
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Nakano to hope that he would use the opportunity to inform the Emperor of the disastrous 
situation of the Japanese wartime economy. Much to Nakano’s disappointment, the lecture was 
also attended by Minister of the Interior, Kido, who ensured that Matsumoto toned the critical 
content of his lecture down. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 191 and vol. 2, p. 498 and 746.)     
Matsunaga Yasuzaemon [觚鵑嶢攣ヤ著] (1875 - 1971), businessman, political rival and 
later financial backer of Nakano. Matsunaga was born in Nagazaki prefecture and educated at 
Keiō University. He left before graduating and worked for the Bank of Japan and in the coal 
industry before entering the electricity business. He ran for election in Fukuoka in 1920 but lost 
against Nakano. Afterward, he founded the electricity company Tōhō Electric [覩れ袞陪] 
(present-day Chūbu Electric [腎グ袞陪]) and in 1928 became that company’s president. During 
the 1930s, he was one of Nakano’s financial backers. He withdrew from business in 1941 but 
returned after the war as president of the committee for the restructuring of the Japanese electric 
utility sector. Instrumental in dividing the Japanese electricity market into nine different areas, he 
came to be known as the “Demon of Electricity” [袞鴪貢繃]. He remained actively involved in 
the Japanese power generation industry well into his eighties. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 
221-24, 230, 283-86, 556 and vol. 2, p. 102, 202, 267, and 498.) 
 
Matsutani Yojirō [觚〞紳性ア] (1880 - 1937), social activist and politician. Born in 
Ishikawa prefecture, Matsutani graduated from Meiji University and became a lawyer in 1914. In 
1921, he participated in the foundation of the Free Law Society [60譿┃蠎練], thereafter often 
acting as the legal representative of workers or farmers in court. In 1927, he participated in the 
foundation of the Japanese Workers’ and Farmers’ Party [荳袿迫コ妬] becoming one of the 
central members of the proletarian faction. In 1930, he was elected to the Diet as a representative 
of Tokyo. Immediately after the Manchurian Incident, Matsutani traveled to north-eastern China 
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and upon his return published a manifesto titled “The Matsutani Opinion Paper” [觚〞牀W蟷] in 
which he strongly supported aggressive war. The manifesto caused a great shock among the 
social activists of the All Japan Workers’ and Farmers’ Party [菟楼迫コ妬]. In 1932, he entered 
the National League [楼鴈弁ç] under the leadership of Adachi and in 1934 became the president 
of the Japanese Labor Party [帆迫荳袿妬]. 
 
Matsuyama Chūjirō [觚愾泗性ア] (1870 - 1942), journalist and newspaper manager. 
Born in Shiga prefecture, Matsuyama graduated from the precursor of Waseda University [覩静
徨著嶌貊]. In 1894, he entered the Tokyo Keizai Magazine. Three years later, he switched to the 
Osaka Asahi News and from there moved to the Tokyo Asahi, which he left in 1918. In 1920, he 
became president of the Yomiuri News. In 1931, he became president of the Manchurian Daily 
[噌攀荳况]. After the resignation of Ikebe Sanzan, he was Nakano’s boss until the latter’s 
withdrawal from the paper in 1916. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 142 and 153-54.) 
 
Matsuzaka Hiromasa [觚史杰膕] (1884 - 1960), lawyer and public prosecutor in charge 
of Nakano’s arrest in 1943. Born in Kyoto, Matsuzaka graduated from Tokyo Imperial University 
and then entered the Ministry of Justice, becoming Public Prosecutor in 1925 and chief Public 
Prosecutor in 1941. He served as Minister of Justice in the Koiso and Suzuki cabinets. After the 
war, Matsuzaka was arrested as wartime criminal but eventually released. (See Nakano Yasuo, 
vol, 2, p. 785-92, and 797.)  
 
Miki Bukichi [申袍驥便] (1884 - 1956), politician who cooperated with Nakano in the 
overthrow of Tōjō in 1942-3. Born in Kagawa Prefecture, Miki went to Tokyo Vocational School 
(present-day Waseda University). After graduation, he first worked in a legal office and, in 1917, 
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he was elected MP to the Diet. He first met Nakano after the latter’s return from the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919. In 1924, he became chief secretary of the Kenseikai (later Minseitō). 
Initially friends within the Kenseikai, Nakano and Miki grew apart when they joined different 
factions within the same party. In 1928, Miki was arrested on suspicion of having accepted bribes 
and subsequently sentenced to three months in prison. The affair left a stain on his political career 
that would haunt him into the post-war period. After his release from prison, he temporarily 
distanced himself from politics and worked for the Hōchi Shimbun [况ö范ⓥ], becoming its 
president in 1939. In 1942, he ran again for election and though he was not recommended by the 
government, he was successfully elected in the first district of Kagawa. Over the following year, 
he cooperated closely with Nakano’s attempts to overthrow Tōjō. In the postwar period, Miki 
participated in the founding of the Japanese Liberal Party but then was barred from public office 
by the occupation authorities. Miki returned to the political arena with the 1952 general election, 
supporting his erstwhile political enemy, Hatoyama Ichirō, against the Yoshida Shigeru 
government. (For Miki’s relationship with Nakano, see Miki Bukichi [申袍驥便], “Fight to the 
death against the Tōjō cabinet” [覩襭塔隆膏貢髞帰]; part of a special feature “Remembering 
Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩惚畫康], in “Japan and the Japanese” [荳袿沸砿荳袿斥], January 
1956, p. 10 – 16 and Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 31-2, and vol. 2, p. 709-10 and 726-32.)      
 
Mitamura Takeo [申譓襁驥啌] (1899 - 1964), politician. Born in Gifu Prefecture, 
Mitamura graduated from the Police Academy in 1927. He then worked at the police bureau of 
the Ministry of the Interior and later at the general affairs bureau of the Department of Overseas 
Affairs [禺鳩ÿ]. He left the Department of Overseas Affairs in opposition to the Kwantung 
Army’s seizure of police powers. He joined the Tōhōkai and worked there as Head of 
Organization [36トグ憎] and Head of Party Affairs [妬鳩グ憎] before becoming Nakano’s 
right-hand man After failing to be elected in 1936, he ran as a candidate of the Tōhōkai in 1937 
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and was successfully elected as a representative of Gifu. Although not recommended by the 
government in the 1942 election, he nevertheless managed to be elected as a candidate for the 
Tōhōkai. He actively participated in Nakano’s scheme against Tōjō and later was arrested and 
imprisoned for violation of the publishing law. After the war, he was banned from public office, 
but in 1952 he became active again by founding the Independent Freedom League [⁛┙⥄↱ㅪ
⋖]. In 1953 he joined the Hatoyama faction of the Liberal Party [⥄↱ౄ]. When Hatoyama 
returned to the Jiyūtō, Mitamura remained in Miki Bukichi’s Japan Liberal Party [ᣣᧄ⥄↱ౄ], 
eventually becoming the head of organization of the Japan Democratic Party [ᣣᧄ᳃ਥౄ]. In 
1955 he was elected to the Diet, where he joined the Kawano faction of the LPD [⥄᳃ౄ] and 
worked as their head of organization [⚵❱✚ዪ㐳]. Mitamura remained one of the most 
outspoken and uncritical fans of Nakano, often casting himself in the role of the manager of 
Nakano’s legacy, attacking and sometimes even threatening those who criticized Nakano. His 
writing is highly nostalgic for the Tōhōkai. On occasion he wrote things such as: “I wait for the 
flag of the Tōhōkai to fly again.” (See Mitamura Takeo [ਃ↰᧛ᱞᄦ]; “The spirit of eternal 
camaraderie”[หᔒ᳗ਭߩ㝬]; part of a special feature “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [ਛ㊁ᱜ೰
ࠍᙘ߁], in “Japan and the Japanese” [ᣣᧄ෸߮ᣣᧄੱ], January 1956, p. 21-24 . This text also 
contains Mitamura defending Nakano against the book by Koizumi. See also Nakano Yasuo, vol., 
2, 726-28, 738-40, and 749-50, 781, 787, and 806.)    
 
Mitsukawa Kametarō [ḩᎹ੉ᄥ㇢] (1888 - 1936), nationalist activist. Born in Osaka, 
Mitsukawa enrolled at Waseda University but withdrew before graduating and initially worked as 
a journalist for a military magazine called “Greater Japan”[ᄢᣣᧄ]. Together with Ōkawa 
Shūmei, he founded the Rōsōkai [⠧ჽળ] in 1918 and, one year later, with  Ōkawa Shūmei and 
Kita Ikki, the Yūzonsha in Shanghai. He also was a member of Nakano’s Tōhōkai think tank and 
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his Yūshin-sha in 1922. In 1932, he became a permanent secretary of the New Japan National 
League [范荳袿楼鴈弁ç]. Later he became a university professor, devoting himself to the 
education of his students. Mitsukawa was the person who established the contact between 
Nakano and Kita Ikki, both of whom belonged briefly to the Rōsōkai. 
 
Miura Torao [申④よ渣] (1883 - ?), politician and member of the Minseitō, Kokumin 
Dōmei and Tōhōkai. Born in Miyazaki prefecture, Miura studied politics at Kyōto University, 
graduating in 1908. He then served as an accountant in the military before entering politics in the 
1920s. As a member of the Kokumin Dōmei and Tōhōkai, he was elected to the Diet in 1932, 
1936 and 1937. (See Nagai Kazuo, “The Foundation of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U] in Journal 
of History [別詒], July 1978, vol. 61, no.4; p. 115, 130-34 and Nakano Yasuo, vol, 2, p. 245-47.)     
 
Miwa Jusō [申ね徘呎] (1894 - 1956), lawyer and politician. Born in Fukuoka prefecture, 
Miwa graduated from the same Shūyūkan as Nakano. He also shared Nakano’s interest in jūdō. 
Unlike Nakano, however, Miwa entered the faculty of law of Tokyo University. During his 
studies he entered the Shinjin-kai [范斥善] in 1919. Miwa first met Nakano in 1922, when Miwa 
organized a rally on the topic of recognizing Soviet Russia and invited Nakano to hold a speech. 
After graduation, Miwa worked briefly as an assistant in a law firm before representing workers 
and tenant farmers from 1921 onward. He served as the secretary of Workers’ and Farmers’ Party 
[迫朕コ鴈妬] in 1926; when that party broke up, he continued to serve as secretary in the Japan 
Workers’ and Farmers’ Party [荳袿迫鴈妬]. Through the various breakups and mergers of the 
left-wing parties, Miwa always maintained a mainstream position within the left wing. In 1932, 
he joined the Social Mass Party, acting as its accountant and later secretary. In 1937, he was one 
of the members of the Social Mass Party to be elected to the Diet. Miwa was also involved in the 
merger talks between the Social Mass Party and the Tōhōkai in 1939. After the war, Miwa was 
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prosecuted for his cooperation in the wartime system and purged from public office, which forced 
him to concentrate on practicing law (defending, among others, Kishi Nobusuke). After he was 
allowed to hold public office again, he joined the Japan Socialist Party [荳袿だ善妬] and when 
this broke apart, he followed its right wing, later founding the Social Democratic League [鴈厨だ
善厨コヾç]. Starting in 1952, Miwa was elected three times to the Diet. (See Miwa Jusō [申ね
徘呎], “Questions related to the merger of the Tōhōkai with the Social Mass Party” [覩苜善膏だ
哢妬貢遍弁黙主]; part of a special feature “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩惚畫康], in 
Japan and the Japanese [荳袿沸砿荳袿斥], January 1956, p. 28 - 30and Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 
370-78, and 386.) 
 
Miyagawa Ikkan [幟擺慎⎤] (1884 - 1944), politician, classmate and rival of Nakano in 
Fukuoka. Born into the family of Miyagawa Tai’ichirō [幟擺啣慎ア] (a former student of Takaba 
Osamu’s Ginseng Field School who was known for his strength at martial arts), Miyagawa 
repeatedly won against Nakano at jūdō. He lost, however, against Nakano in the 1920 election. 
Miyagawa ran again for office in 1928, this time successfully. He was re-elected twice (1930 and 
1932) but failed to get reelected in 1936 and thereafter retired from politics. (See Nakano Yasuo, 
vol. 1, p. 221-24, 375-81, 531, and 646.)  
 
Miyagawa Ta’ichirō [幟擺啣慎ア] (1847 - 1909), political activist and co-founder of the 
Genyōsha. Born into a samurai family in the service of the Kuroda-han, Miyagawa studied at the 
domain’s Bunpu-kan [艙驥丹] before entering Takaba Osamu’s Ginseng- Field School. Tall, stout 
and an accomplished practitioner of various martial arts, Miyagawa was a formidable foe in 
combat. He participated in the rebellions of Saga and Hagi and was subsequently imprisoned. 
After his release, he returned to Fukuoka and devoted himself to business, supporting the 
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Genyōsha financially but otherwise staying out of politics. (See See Kokuryūkai [桛a善] eds., 
Records from the South-West [O評ヒ然], (Tokyo: Hara Shobō [譜蟷蘯], 1969) and History of 
the Genyōsha [仼┠だだ別] edited by Genyōsha History Editorial Committee [仼┠だだ別Y㈡
善], Fukuoka, 1992) and Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 47.)  
 
Miyake Kaho [申嵶ゑ狼] (1968 - 1943), writer, poet and Nakano’s mother-in-law. Born  
Tanabe Ryūko [譓シa岌], Kaho studied Japanese poetry under Nakajima Kako [腎戡騁岌]. She 
established her fame as a writer through novels such as “The Nightingale in the Grove” [N貢幬]. 
(See Nakano Yasuo, vol, 1, p. 129, 188, 199, 214, 310, 452, 574, 712, 810 and 817 as well as vol. 
2, p. 23, and 73.) 
 
Miyake Setsurei [申嵶聶擅] (1860 - 1945), journalist, critic, philosopher, historian, and 
Nakano’s father-in-law. Born in Kanazawa-city of Kaga-han (present-day Ishikawa 
prefecture)  as a son of a Confucian doctor serving Kaga-domain, Miyake graduated from the 
Department of Philosophy of Tokyo University in 1883 and worked for the Ministry of Education 
until 1887. He later married the novelist and poet Tanabe Kaho. Together with Shiga Shigetaka 
[瀰緂紞霆], Sugiura Shigetake [襃④ĩ悩] and Inoue Enryō [棲疹塘凄], he founded a 
nationalist think tank called Seikyōsha (膕臙だ, lit. Society for Political Education) in 1888 and 
henceforth published the society’s organ, The Japanese [荳袿斥]. Opposing the government's 
drive toward Westernization, the society advocated a pure nationalism [楼0/3厨コ] and sought 
to educate the Japanese public on, and thus preserve the uniqueness of, Japanese culture and 
identity. In 1907, the society's organ took over the failing newspaper Japan [荳袿] and renamed it 
Japan and the Japanese [荳袿沸砿荳袿斥]. It was then that Miyake became its chief editor and 
it must have been around that time that Nakano, still a student, started writing for the 
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magazine. In 1923, Miyake left the Seikyō-sha and founded a new magazine, My View or Our 
View, [癪に] together with Nakano. Although Miyake never occupied a position of power in the 
government (he was once asked to serve as Minister of Education in the Hayashi cabinet but 
declined, a decision that earned him the respect of many people across the political spectrum), he 
commented frequently on political affairs. Critical of the wholesale import of Western culture into 
Japan, Miyake argued for Japan's uniqueness and its unique mission in Asia and the world. In 
addition to many articles published in his and other magazines, 
Miyake's main monographs include “Tetsugakukenteki” (1889) and “The Universe” [嶄已] (1909) 
and an autobiography [60然]. He also continued to write a detailed chronicle of modern history 
called “Dō jidai shi” [弁蕁千別] until the last year of his life. For his contribution to the 
understanding of Japanese culture, Miyake received the Order of Culture in 1943, two years 
before his death. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 125-129, 221-22, 304-10, 364-68, 571-75, and 
vol., 2, 82-83, 271-73, 371-76 and 715.)  
 
Miyazaki Ryūsuke [幟扣a赤] (1892 - 1971), social activist, member of the Tōhōkai and 
first-born son of Miyazaki Tōten. Born in Kumamoto prefecture, Miyazaki studied at Tokyo 
Imperial University and there was one of the founding members of the Shinjinkai [范斥善]. 
While still a student, Miyazaki became notoriously involved in an extra-marital love affair. After 
graduating he worked as a lawyer and later entered politics, first as a member of the Social Mass 
Party and, from 1939, as a member of the Tōhōkai. He ran as a candidate for the Tōhōkai in 1942 
but failed to be elected. In the post-war period, he became active in the movement to improve 
Sino-Japanese relations. (See Nagai, Kazuo; “The Development of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢̇悽] 
in Journal of History [別詒], January 1979, vol. 62, no.1; p. 101, 130-34 and Nakano Yasuo, vol. 
2, p. 257.) 
 
 521 
Miyazaki Yoshimasa [幟扣便膕] (1915 - ?), politician and political commentator. Born in 
Sapporo, Hokkaidō, Miyazaki studied political economy at Waseda University and joined the 
Tōhōkai, where he was put in charge of the party’s Youth organization. He later worked as 
journalist of the Yomiuri Shimbun, eventually rising to the position of editor. As a political 
commentator he published various books, including one on Satō Eisaku. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol, 
2, p. 426 and 519 as well as Miyazaki Yoshimasa [幟扣便膕], “When a Politician makes a 
Decision: Nakano Seigō’s Suicide” [膕齠广控麑苳溝鵠膏攻瑍腎ǒ驟悩貢60内], in Monthly 
New Liberty [蠻捺范60譿些碕斎], vol. 7, February, 1987, p. 60 – 70.) 
 
Mori Shōzō [迢驟24] (1900 - 1953), journalist. Mori was born in Saga Prefecture and 
graduated from the Russian language department of Tokyo Gaigodai [覩静咤楼テラ哢嶌] in 1924. 
In 1926, he entered the Osaka Mainichi Shumbun, working in Kyoto, Harbin and Moscow. He 
became a Russian expert after his return in 1940. Thereafter he occupied a number of 
high-ranking positions at the newspaper. Mori wrote a bestselling book entitled “20 Years in the 
Whirlwind” [茯城貢性筆朮] in which he gives an explanation for Tōjō’s clampdown on the 
Tōhōkai (See Ibid. p. 243-35).         
 
Mune Moritoshi [巛ã朮] (1824 - 1904), Nakano’s teacher at the Shūyūkan Middle 
School in Fukuoka. Born as the second son of Nakamura Sa-ichi [腎襁双斃], a samurai of the 
Fukuoka-han, Moritoshi was adopted into the Mune family. While attending the domain’s school, 
Shūyūkan, he developed a strong interest in the Chinese classics. After working as a lecturer and 
teacher at the Shūyūkan for many years, he taught at private academies and accepted students in 
his home. Nakano received instructions in the Chinese classics from Mune as a child. Mune is 
said to have economized on food and clothing in order to save money for books, eventually 
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accumulating a collection of several thousand volumes, which today are in the possession of the 
library of Kyūshū University.  
 
Nagai Ryūtarō [鵑棲讎啣ア] (1881 - 1944), politician. Born in Ishikawa prefecture, 
Nagai graduated from Waseda and then embarked on a career as a journalist, working as the 
editor-in-chief of the magazine New Japan [范荳袿]. In 1920, he was first elected to the Diet in 
1920 as a candidate for the Kenseikai. In the Diet Nagai advocated universal suffrage and soon 
became known as a skilled orator (he was often compared to Nakano). Both Nakano and Nagai 
belonged to the Adachi faction within the Minseitō, but when Adachi and Nakano left at the end 
of 1931 to form the Kokumin Dōmei, Nagai stayed behind and subsequently held a ministerial 
portfolio in the Saitō cabinet. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, 214-19, and vol. 2, p. 444-45 and 614.) 
 
Nagao Tamotsu [憎悃衄] (1899 - 1974), farmers’ movement activist. Born in Hyōgo 
prefecture, Nagao graduated from the Osaka School of Dentistry in 1918. Using his private 
money, in 1921 he founded two tenant unions that joined the Japan Farmers’ Union [荳コ] in 
1922. In 1924, he joined the Japan Communist Party. In 1927, he became head of organization at 
the Japan Farmers’ Union and, in that capacity, traveled throughout Japan. During the March 15, 
1928 Incident, Nagao was arrested and imprisoned until May 1933. Hoping to avoid further state 
represstion Nagao led his farmers’ union to join Nakano’s Tōhōkai in 1938. After the war, Nagao 
re-entered the Communist Party. (See Nagai, Kazuo; “The Development of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善
貢̇悽] in Journal of History [別詒], January 1979, vol. 62, no.1; p. 101 and Nakano Yasuo, vol., 
2, p. 425.)     
 
Nagasaki Eizō [憎扣ラ△] (1881 - 1953), businessman married to the second daughter of 
Katsura Tarō. Born in Hiroshima city, Nagasaki attended Tokyo Imperial University. After 
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graduating, he entered the Ministry of Finance. In 1913, he entered Suzuki Trading Company in 
Kobe, acting as the right-hand man of Kaneko Naokichi. Two years after his resignation from 
Suzuki Trading Company in 1925, the company almost failed in the 1927 Shōwa financial crisis. 
From 1942, he was the president of Showa Sekiyu Corp. a position he held until after the war. He 
was a member of Nakano’s Tōhōkai think tank in the 1920s.  
 
Nagata Masayoshi [鵑譓驟コ] (1911 - ), journalist, Tōhōkai member and Nakano’s 
secretary. Born in Kumamoto prefecture, Nagata came to Tokyo to study at Waseda. During that 
time he entered Nakano’s student dorm. After graduating, he first worked for the Asahi News but 
during the heyday of the Tōhōkai in 1940 he left the paper and joined the party, working as 
Nakano’s secretary. He became a leader of the Tōhōkai Youth Organization, attempting to model 
it on the Hitler Jugend. Following the failed attempt to overthrow the Tōjō cabinet, he and 
Nakano were imprisoned together. After the war, Nagata served as president of the 
Vietnam-Japan Association and as mayor of his hometown in Kumamoto prefecture. (See Nagata 
Masayoshi [鵑譓驟コ], “Remembering my beloved teacher” [灌杳惚畫康], in “Nakano Seigō is 
alive” [腎ǒ驟悩購﨟攻肱広鵠], edited by Seigō-kai [驟悩善], Tokyo, Akane-shobō [巷拘講蟷
蘯], 1954 as well as Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 663-64, and vol. 2, p. 425, 473, 504-05, and 784.)   
 
Naitō Kōnan [塔I曙評] (1866 - 1934), journalist and scholar of East Asian history. Born 
into a samurai family in Akita prefecture, Naitō was originally called Torajirō [よ饅ア]. He 
moved to Tokyo in 1887 and there wrote for various magazines and newspapers. In 1907, he was 
invited to Kyoto Imperial University, where he lectured on East Asian History and advanced to 
professor in 1909. He retired in 1926 and spent his last years reading. Naitō contributed to 
Tōhōjiron when it was run by Nakano. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol.1, p. 215, 235.)  
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Nakamura Matashichirō [腎襁弗晋ア] (1884 - ?), member of the Tōhōkai. Born in 
Niigata prefecture into a farming family, Nakamura studied political economy at Waseda 
University, graduating in 1907 (two years before Nakano). Entering local politics, he served as 
mayor of his native city in 1920 and later as a member of the provincial assembly before being 
elected to the Diet in 1942 as a Tōhōkai candidate. (See Nagai Kazuo, “The Foundation of the 
Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U] in Journal of History [別詒], July 1978, vol. 61, no.4; p. 130-34 and 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 425 and 729.) 
  
Nakamura Ryōzō [腎襁Y申] (1878 - 1945), navy officer. Born in Aomori prefecture, 
Nakamura graduated from the Navy War College. He served as military attaché in England, and 
as head of the Navy War College. He also maintained a close relationship with Prime Minister 
Yonai and was close to Nakano during the Tōhōkai years. It was through Nakamura that Nakano 
learned about Japan’s disastrous military situation in 1942-3. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 271, 
371, 534, 586, and 715.)  
 
Nakano Hideto [腎ǒ┵斥] (1898 - 1966), poet, painter, and Nakano’s youngest brother. 
Much more introverted than his elder brother Seigō, Hideto first followed Nakano’s footsteps and 
enrolled at Waseda University (studying political economy) but he withdrew before graduating. 
After a stint at the Kokumin Shimbun, he also worked for the Asahi, covering drama and literature. 
At the same time, he also started writing his own works, mostly poetry, published in the magazine 
DamDam [挫冴挫冴]. His “The Literature of the Fourth Class,” [¶裂湾6貢艙嶌] published in 
The World of Writing [艙d身鈐] in 1920, attracted much attention and was considered one of the 
pioneering works of proletarian literary criticism. Hideto went to Europe in 1927, spending time 
in London and Paris He returned four years later married. His wife, a Spanish woman, was famed 
for her beauty but the marriage did not last long. In 1940, he founded his own literary magazine - 
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Culture Organization [艙泌36ト] - with Nakano’s financial support. After the war, he continued 
his avant-garde work in the arts, participating in the modern poetry movement [﨑千㏘ぉ罰] and 
branching out into painting. His surviving works include novels, collections of poetry, tracts on 
literary criticism, and paintings. (See Washida Koyata [惋譓恠櫁啣], “67 Intellectuals of the 
Shōwa Period” [蓖北貢淞熾广琹瑄斥] (Tokyo, 2007), p. 305 and Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 19, 
45, 49, 76, 188, 191, 200, 660-63, 810 and vol. 2, p. 21, 26, 807-08.) 
 
Nakano Tasaburō [腎ǒ啣申ア] (1879 - 1941), Nakano’s cousin and a bureaucrat. 
Tasaburō was a member of the Genyōsha’s martial arts school, Meidō-kan [蕚ぐ丹]. After 
graduating from the faculty of law of Tokyo Imperial University, he served as secretary to Itō 
Hirobumi in Korea before becoming provincial governor of Pyongan province in northern Korea. 
Later he also served as director in the Eastern Development Company [覩┠禺鬟善だ]. 
 
Nakayama Yū [腎愾釘] (? - ?), Nakano’s follower. Nakayama was a journalist for the 
Asahi News in China in 1919 when Nakano returned from the Paris Peace Conference. They first 
met in Shanghai. Nakayama stayed in China until 1924, when he returned to Japan to live in 
Ikebukuro. He ran into Nakano there one day by chance. They talked about China, with both 
favoring Chinese unification and non-interference from Japan in Chinese affairs. (Nakayama later 
recalled these events in Nakayama Yū [腎愾釘]; “Remembering Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩惚畫
康]; in “Kyōtsū no hiroba” [努＊貢杰凅]; September 1952, pp. 45-50 and Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, 
p. 115-16, 352-53, 490, and 734.) 
 
Narahara Itaru [啼Y譜67] (1857 - 1917), political activist and co-founder of the 
Gentyōsha. Born into the family of Miyagawa Tetsu [幟擺ょ], Itaru was subsequently adopted 
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into the Narahara family. Having studied at the domain’s school, Bunpu-kan [艙驥丹], he entered 
Takaba Osamu’s Ginseng-Field School sometime after 1870. Like many of his fellow students, he 
participated in the Hagi revolt of 1876 and was subsequently imprisoned. Upon hearing the news 
of Okubo Toshimichi’s assassination, he and Tōyama visited Itagaki Taisuke, who convinced 
them both that open rebellion was no longer an option. Subsequently, Narahara became active in 
the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement. (See Kokuryūkai [桛a善] eds., Records from the 
South-West [O評ヒ然], Tokyo: Hara Shobō [譜蟷蘯], 1969 and History of the Genyōsha [仼┠
だだ別] edited by Genyōsha History Editorial Committee [仼┠だだ別Y㈡善], Fukuoka, 1992.)  
 
Ninagawa Arata [59擺范] (1873 - 1959), legal scholar. Born in Shizuoka prefecture, 
Ninagawa studied law at Tokyo Imperial University, and served as a legal advisor to the army 
during the Russo-Japanese War and later as an advisor to the Korean court. After studying in 
Paris, Ninagawa taught international law at Dōshisha and Komazawa universities. He was barred 
from public office after the war on account of his nationalistic pronouncements. Occasionally he 
published articles in Nakano’s magazine Gakan. 
 
Nishimura Tenshū [O襁啀烈] (1865 - 1924), journalist, critic and literary man of the 
Meiji and Taishō periods. Born in Kagshima prefecture, he studied at Tokyo Imperial University 
but withdrew without graduating. In 1890 (Meiji 23), he began working for the Osaka Asahi 
News, for which he wrote essays, reports and criticisms until his retirement in 1919. He became 
famous for works such as “War Diary,” [に皚荳ヒ] which described the Sino-Japanese war and 
his “London Reports” [a罰＊袋] from 1910. In 1912, he wrote a positive critique of Nakano’s 
“History of the Meiji Freedom and People’s Rights Movement”. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 
105, 142, 145, and 153-56.)  
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Nishio Suehiro [O悃袰杰] (1891 - 1981), politician and labor activist. Born in Kagawa 
prefecture, Nishio belonged to the right wing of the social democratic movement. He participated 
in the foundation of the Social Democratic Party in 1926. In March 1940, he was expelled from 
the Social Mass Party for opposing the decision to expel MP Saitō Takao, who had held a speech 
critical of the army’s holy war in China. From 1942 to 1943, he cooperated with Nakano in 
opposing Tōjō. After WW2 he founded the Japan Socialist Party and became its secretary, but he 
left in protest of the US-Japanese Peace Treaty. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 337-55.) 
 
Ochi Hikoshirō [〈虧檢裂ア] (1849 - 1877), samurai of the Fukuoka-han and leader of 
the Fukuoka uprising. Ochi studied at the domain’s school, Shūyūkan, before fighting and 
earning some glory in the Boshin War of 1868. He participated in the suppression of the Saga 
rebellion of 1874 (during a meeting with Ōkubo Toshimichi, he asked for outside mediation in 
the conflict but was refused). Inspired by the outbreak of the Satsuma rebellion, he and Takebe 
Koshirō led a force of 850 samurai against their domain’s castle. In the aftermath of the rebellion, 
he tried to secretly join the Army of Saigō, but was discovered and executed. (See See 
Kokuryūkai [桛a善] eds., Records from the South-West [O評ヒ然], Tokyo: Hara Shobō [譜蟷
蘯], 1969 and History of the Genyōsha [仼┠だだ別] edited by Genyōsha History Editorial 
Committee [仼┠だだ別Y㈡善], Fukuoka, 1992.) 
 
Ogata Taketora [I苜wよ] (1888 - 1956), journalist, statesman and life-long friend of 
Nakano’s. Born in Yamagata prefecture, Ogata was brought up in Fukuoka, where he became 
Nakano’s classmate at the Shūyūkan. Aiming for a career in business, he first enrolled at 
Hitotsubashi University but then was persuaded by Nakano to switch to Waseda. Ogata also 
followed Nakano into journalism, joining him at the Asahi News desk in 1911. When Nakano left 
the Asahi, however, to become a politician and invited Ogata to do the same, Ogata stayed in 
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journalism. Steadily rising through the ranks of the Asahi, he became managing director (1925) 
and editor-in-chief (1934). As a liberal, he confronted the rise of militarism in the 1930s. Ogata 
finally entered politics after Nakano’s death, first serving as state minister and head of the 
Information Bureau in the wartime Koiso Kuniaki cabinet, a position from which Ogata 
attempted to negotiate a separate peace with the Chiang Kai-shek government in China. 
Immediately after Japan’s surrender, he played a crucial role as state minister and chief cabinet 
secretary of Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko’s cabinet in arranging for the peaceful arrival of the 
Allied Occupation forces in Japan. After being barred from public activities by the U.S. 
Occupation forces, he was elected to the House of Representatives (1952) and served as deputy 
Prime Minister (1952-54). He became president of the Liberal Party [60譿妬] in 1954 and served 
as one of the four deputies of the newly formed (1955) Liberal Democratic Party [60譿鴈厨妬]. 
 
Ōishi Masaru [哢0哢] (1878 - 1966), politician, farmers’ activist and member of the 
Tōhōkai. Born in Kōchi prefecture, he studied at Kansai Law School [欄O┃歐嶌貊 ], 
(present-day Kansai University [欄O哢嶌]). First elected to the Diet in 1920 as a member of the 
Seiyūkai, he was subsequently re-elected five times, joining the Tōhōkai in 1937. In 1929, he 
founded the Tosa Farmers’ General Union [鷲双コ鴈G36遍], leading the movement against the 
system of price inspections [̶ı̊遲谺韮柤鮒徙ぉ罰]. Already a member of parliament, he 
joined the Tōhōkai in 1936 but failed to be returned to his seat in the 1937 and 1942 elections. 
During the war, he opposed the IRAA and after the war he joined the peace movement. (See 
Ōishi Masaru [哢0哢], “Eighty Years of Windy Springs and Rainy Autums – the Autobiography 
of Ōishi Masaru” [蒟城┽聳都筆朮 : 哢0哢60然], Tokyo 1964, p. 323 and Nagai Kazuo, “The 
Foundation of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U] in Journal of History [別詒], July 1978, vol. 61, 
no.4; p. 130-34 as well as Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 245-47, 360, 371, and 378-87.)  
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Okamoto Ippei [慟袿慎霸] (1886 - 1948), cartoonist and father of artist Okamoto Tarō. 
Born in Hokkaidō, Okamoto graduated from Tokyo Art School [覩静五ヘ嶌貊] and first went 
into theatre. In 1926, he began drawing comics for the Asahi News. He wrote a mildly satirical 
comment on Nakano’s virgin speech in the Diet in 1920. 
 
Okano Ryūi’ichi [慟ǒ瀹慎] (1893 -?), politician. Born in Hiroshima prefecture, he was a 
member of the Minseitō Adachi faction and then of the Kokumin Dōmei. He served later as 
member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. His wife was from Fukuoka. (See Nagai 
Kazuo, “The Foundation of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U] in Journal of History [別詒], July 
1978, vol. 61, no.4; p. 115 Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 421, 466, 531, and 642.)  
 
Okazaki Kunisuke [帶恬爇愙] (1854 - 1936), politician. Okazaki was born in 1854 into a 
high-ranking samurai family serving the Kishū-han. After the Meiji restoration, he followed his 
cousin Mutsu Munemitsu (1844 - 1897) to Tokyo, and also followed him to America (1888) 
when the latter was appointed ambassador to the U.S. Okazaki enrolled at the University of 
Michigan. After returning to Japan he was elected to the Diet in 1891, and then re-elected 
consecutively 10 times. Okazaki entered the Jiyūtō in 1897 and later the Seiyūkai. He served as 
minister of Agriculture and Forestry in the Katō cabinet of 1925 and, in 1928, he was made 
member of the House of Peers. Okazaki helped Nakano find a new house after the latter’s return 
from Europe in 1916. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 108, 128, 157, 195, 206, 217-19, 400-08, and 
507.) 
Omachi Keigetsu [弥ン藷鶇] (1869 - 1925) poet, essayist, and critic and Nakano’s boss 
at the Tokyo Daily News. Born in Kouchi prefecture as a son of a samurai, Omachi graduated 
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from the department of literature of Tokyo Imperial University in 1896 and first worked as a 
middle-school teacher in Shimane prefecture while making himself a name as a writer through 
publications in magazines such as Bungei Club [錮尣肝♡璡] and Sun [役猢]. To the end of his 
life, Omachi liked drinking sake and traveling. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 83-84.) 
Ōnishi Itsuki (or Sai) [哢O艤] (1887 - 1947), journalist. One year Nakano’s junior, 
Ōnishi was born in Fukuoka prefecture and also attended the Shūyūkan middle school, where he 
practiced jūdō at the Genyōsha’s dōjō and graduated in 1908. He then enrolled at the Tōa Dōbun 
Shoin [覩盛弁艙蟷派], a Japanese institution for higher learning in Shanghai, where he studied 
Chinese language. After graduating in 1911, he joined the Asahi News and there joined the 
faction of Yugeta, Nakano and Ogata. In 1917, he was posted to Shanghai and two years later to 
Beijing. After his return to Japan in 1924 he advanced to head the China section in 1925. In an 
editorial written days before the Manchurian Incident of 1931, Ōnishi approved of independent 
military action, which in retrospect has been seen as a first break with the hitherto anti-militaristic, 
pro-arms-limitation stance of the Asahi News. When the Tokyo Asahi under editor-in-chief Ogata 
Taketora established the East Asian Research Institute [覩盛黙主㌽谺善] in 1934, Ōnishi, 
known as an expert on Chinese affairs, was made its managing director. With several of this 
institute’s members, Ōnishi also joined Konoe Fumimaro’s Shōwa Research Institute [蓖北ｫ!
善] in 1936. He was promoted to vice-editor-in-chief in 1939 and left in April 1946. (See Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 85, 105-6, 216, and 666.)  
Ono Ken’ichi [婀𥿠ʔヘ] (1886 - 1963), politician and member of the Tōhōkai. Born in 
Aomori prefecture, Ono studied at Meiji University. He later worked as a journalist for the 
Hokushin Nippō [漆桗陞糞], as head of political affairs at the Yamato News [しか》鑄靜], and 
as editor-in-chief at the Pacific News Service [役桷ð毚革合名会社]. He ran unsuccessfully for election 
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affiliated with Nakano in 1936 but won in 1937. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 245 and Nagai 
Kazuo, “The Foundation of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U] in Journal of History [別詒], July 
1978, vol. 61, no.4; pp. 130-34.) 
Oshikawa Masayoshi [礬擺苜コ] (1852 - 1928), priest, educator and politician. Born in 
Ehime prefecture, Oshikawa studied English at the Shūbunkan in Yokohama, where he also 
converted to Christianity. Initially active as a Christian educator, he also ventured into business 
(coal and oil mining) but failed (1901) and then moved on to politics, serving twice as member of 
the Diet. Like Nakano, he belonged to the Mushozoku Club in the early 1920s. In the later part of 
his life, he moved away from Christianity and leaned toward Confucianism.  
Ōshima Hiroshi [弥恠g] (1886 - 1975), army officer and Foreign Service official who 
helped Nakano get an appointment with Hitler. Born in Gifu prefecture as the eldest son of a 
military family, Oshima graduated from the Army War College. Having established ties to later 
Nazi leaders during his first stay in Germany in the early twenties, he returned as military attaché 
in 1934 and after joining the reserve was made ambassador in Berlin. In that capacity, he was 
crucial in promoting the Tripartite Alliance signed in 1940. Ōshima was tried and sentenced to 
life-long imprisonment as a type-A war criminal after the war but was pardoned in 1955. (See 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 303-5, 394-97, 513-16, and 591.) 
Ōtake Kan’ichi [哢w⎤慎] (1860 - 1944), politician. Born in Niigata prefecture, Ōtake 
graduated from the Niigata School of English. As a member of the Niigata prefectural assembly, 
Ōtake built a strong electoral support base within the prefecture. In 1890, he became a co-founder 
of the Kokken-tō [楼闥妬] and in 1894 he was elected to the Diet for the first time of a total of 16 
times. During WW1, Ōtake advocated cuts in armament spending and universal suffrage. In the 
course of his career, he was a member of the Shinpo-tō, Yūkō-kai, Kennsei-kai, Kakushin Club, 
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Kakushin-tō, and the Kokumin Dōmei. He was appointed to the upper house in 1939 but resigned 
in 1940. The last article written by Ōtake was about Nakano. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 62 
and vol. 2, p. 271 and 371.)  
 
Ōya Sōichi [哢嵶呎慎] (1900 - 1970), commentator and critic. Born in Osaka, Ōya 
studied at Tokyo Imperial University but did not graduate. In 1926, he had his debut as a writer in 
Bungei magazine and after the war became a well-known commentator on political and social 
affairs. In an article in 1952, Ōya questioned whether Nakano should be seen as a hero just 
because he opposed Tōjō, and pointed out that Nakano too bore responsibility for Japan’s entry 
into the war. In 1965 he won the Kikuchi Prize. 
 
Ōyama Ikuo [哢愾か啌] (1880 - 1955), politician and socialist activist. Born in Hyōgo 
prefecture, Ōyama graduated from Waseda University. After teaching at the Waseda from 1915 to 
1917, he joined the Osaka Asahi News. A leader of the Taishō democracy movement, Ōyama later 
turned socialist and went into exile to the US during the WW2. After the war, he was active in the 
peace movement. He published in Nakano’s magazine Gakan during the early 1920s. (Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 364, and 472.)  
 
Ozaki Shirō [悃扣吩ア] (1898 - 1964), writer. Born in Aichi prefecture, Ozaki went to 
Waseda University but withdrew before graduating. Leaning toward the left in his younger years, 
Ozaki later became a popular mainstream author, becoming famous through his bestselling “The 
Human Theatre” [斥﨟牌凅].  He was deeply impressed by Nakano’s report from the Paris Peace 
Conference.  
 
Rai Sanyō [捨愾蔽] (1781 - 1832), Confucian scholar. Born in Osaka, Rai studied in Edo 
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and later served at Aki domain near Hiroshima. At the age of 21, he was punished with house 
arrest for trying to leave the domain. During his house arrest, he wrote a history of Japan [荳袿咤
別] that had great influence on the restoration activists of the bakumatsu years. He later opened a 
school in Kyōto, displaying talents as a poet and writer. Nakano used Rai’s History of Japan as a 
textbook in his lectures at the Tōhōkai academy in 1942-3. 
 
Saitō Takao [艤I吏啌] (1870 - 1949), politician. Born in Hyōgo prefecture, Saitō entered 
Tokyo Senmon Gakkō (today Waseda University) in 1884, majoring in political science. In 1895, 
he passed the law examination and worked as a lawyer, saving money to study at Yale University 
in the US. Due to illness he had to interrupt his studies at Yale and return to Japan. In 1912, he 
was elected to the Diet and was subsequently re-elected 13 times, serving as Member of 
Parliament until 1949, first in the Rikken Kokumintō and later in the Rikken Dōshikai, the 
Kenseikai and the Minseitō. Although promoted to head of general affairs of the 
Kenseikai/Minseitō in 1927, Saitō failed to build himself a power base or following. He was 
given the position of parliamentary Vice-minister of the Interior under the Hamaguchi cabinet and 
again under the Saitō cabinet, as well as the position of head of the law bureau in the second 
Wakatsuki cabinet, but never obtained a ministerial portfolio. Following the Manchurian Incident, 
the February 26, 1936 Incident and the China Incident, Saitō became an outspoken critic of the 
Army. This anti-militaristic attitude culminated in a famous speech Saitō held in the Diet in 
February 1940 that led to his expulsion from the lower house in March. Saitō was reelected to the 
Diet in the 1942 election. After WW2, he participated in the foundation of the Japan Progressive 
Party [荳袿〕驩妬] and served as minister in the first Yoshida Shigeru cabinet and the Katayama 
Tetsu cabinet. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, 170-77, 435-36, 40, and 461.)     
 
Sano Manabu [双ǒ嶌] (1892 - 1953), social activist and leader of the Japanese 
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Communist Party. Born in Ōita Prefecture, Sano graduated from the faculty of political science of 
Tokyo Imperial University in 1917. He continued his studies at Tōdai, concentrating in 
agricultural policy and there also became a member of the Shinjinkai. Following a brief 
employment with the Manchurian railway, he took up a position as lecturer at Waseda University, 
where he became a member/leader in various societies such as the Constructionist League [椥ル
70弁ç], the Enlightenment Society [蚋鴈善] and the Culture Society [艙泌善]. In July 1922, he 
joined the newly founded Japanese Communist Party and there became responsible for the 
creation of a Japanese Communist Youth organization. During that time he met with Nakano, 
who was actively campaigning for the speedy recognition of Soviet Russia. When many 
communists were arrested in June of the following year, Sano fled to Russia. Following his return 
he founded and wrote for the Proletarian News [㏍﨡70范ⓥ]. He was arrested in Shanghai in 
1929. In 1933, he recanted [ゞ圃] his communist views in court, opposing the Comintern and 
instead advocating a socialist system in one state. The tenkō of the JCP’s leader had a great 
impact on the base of the party and in its aftermath many communists recanted, following Sano’s 
example. After the war, Sano continued to oppose communist Russia and returned to lecture at 
Waseda. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 338, 354, 621, and 719.) 
 
Sasagawa Ryōichi [̂擺Y慎] (1899 - 1995), right-wing activist and politician. Born in 
Osaka, Sasakawa founded the National Mass Party [楼0/3哢テ妬] in 1931, serving as its president. 
He was elected to the Diet in 1942. Together with Nakano, Miki and Hatoyama, he opposed the 
Wartime Criminal Law introduced into the Diet in early 1943. After the war, he was arrested as a 
class-A wartime criminal but subsequently the charges were dropped. Following his release, he 
became president of the National Motorboat Racing League but continued to be involved in 
politics. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, 710-11.) 
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Satō Morio [双I嶂赶] (? - ?), member of the Tōhōkai and leader of the party’s youth 
organization. Born in Kurume-city in Fukuoka prefecture, Satō joined the Tōhōkai after being 
released from the Army on account of an injury received on the Chinese front. Within the party 
he was made vice-head of the youth organization under Nagata Masayoshi. He later wrote a 
biography of Nakano. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 425 and 473 as well as Satō Morio [双I嶂
赶], “Nakano Seigō” [腎ǒ驟悩], Tokyo: Kasumigaseki-shobō, 1951.) 
 
Shibata Fumishiro [讒譓艙傚] (1868 - 1953), scholar of Chinese classics and Nakano’s 
teacher. Born as the son of a village headman in Fukuoka, Shibata studied at the academy of 
Masaki Shōyō [驟袍萪蔽辧]. In 1988, he graduated from the Fukuoka-prefecture teachers’ 
school and subsequently worked as a primary school teacher, commuting to school on a white 
horse and teaching Nakano Seigō as well as Ogata Taketora. Shibata retired from his teaching 
position in 1907 and subsequently served in the prefectural assembly. Throughout his life, Shibata 
supported Nakano, for example by speaking on his behalf during election campaigns or acting as 
advisor to the Kyūshū Nippō while Nakano presided over the paper. (See Hamachi Masaemon [ぇ
丱膕瞥ヤ著], “The Patriot, Nakano Seigō” [珱楼貢吩刷腎ǒ驟悩], Fukuoka: Kaitōsha [⑬嘎だ], 
2010, p. 15-16.)    
 
Shiga Shigetaka [瀰緂紞霆] (1863 - 1927), intellectual, geographer and politician. Born 
as the son of a retainer in the service of the Okazaki domain, Shiga graduated from the Sapporo 
agricultural school in 1884. Having witnessed the impact of Western imperialism in Oceania, he 
came to take a hard line against the powers. Together with Miyake Setsurei he founded a 
nationalist society in 1887. He served in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and was twice 
elected as Member of Parliament. His “Views of Japan” [荳袿城蘆ルクス] (1894) became a 
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bestseller. 
 
Shigemitsu Mamoru [ĩ甜ゆ] (1887 - 1957), diplomat and politician. Born in Ōita 
prefecture, Shigemitsu graduated from Tokyo Imperial University’s faculty of law and then joined 
the Foreign Service. Appointed envoy to China in August 1931, he lived through the dramatic 
events surrounding the Manchurian Incident and later the Shanghai Incident. In a terrorist bomb 
attack carried out by a Korean independence fighter, he lost his leg. Between 1933 and 1936 he 
served as Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs under Hirota Kōki. In this capacity his main focus 
lay on Chinese policy, through which he attempted to push Western influence out of China while 
strengthening Japan’s position. In 1938, he was appointed ambassador to England, where he 
experienced the outbreak of WW2. Shigematsu opposed the escalation of the Chinese Incident of 
the Konoe cabinet as well as the decision to join the Triple Alliance, which he believed was based 
on over-estimating Germany’s military strength. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, he became 
ambassador to Japan’s puppet government in China under Wang Ching-wei. From April 1943, he 
served as Foreign Minister of the Tōjō and Koiso cabinets and then again in the post-war cabinet 
of Prince Higashikuni, in which capacity he became one of the signatories of the unconditional 
surrender on September 2, 1945. In 1946, Shigemitsu was put on trial as a wartime criminal, 
found guilty and purged from public office. After his release, he founded the Kaishintō, and later 
became Foreign Minister in the Hatoyama Ichirō cabinet of 1954. His works include: “The 
Disturbances of Shōwa” [蓖北貢𨳝頗], “Records of the Diplomacy of Shigemtsu Mamoru” [ĩ
甜ゆ咤誓憐熾ô] and “The Sugamo Diaries” [攜埵荳ヒ]. (See also Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 
347 and 748.) 
 
Shimomura Nobusada [真襁袋┖] (1899 - ?), diplomat. Born in Fukuoka prefecture, 
Shimomura went to Tokyo Imperial University to study political science, graduating in 1923. 
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After 1931, he worked in various positions in the administration of the state of Manshūkoku. He 
traveled to Europe with Nakano in 1937. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 282.) 
 
Shimonaka Yasaburō [真腎寨申ア] (1878 - 1961), publisher, educator and politician. 
Born in Hyōgo prefecture, he first worked as an elementary school teacher and in 1919 founded 
Japan’s first teachers’ union. In 1914, he founded Heibon-sha publishing and published an 
encyclopedia. Following the Manchurian Incident, Shimonaka moved to the right and became 
politically active, also participating in the establishment of the IRAA. In the post-war period, he 
joined the peace movement. Nakano had hoped that Shimonaka would join the Kokumin Dōmei 
in 1932, but instead Shimonaka preferred to found the National Socialist Party with Akamatsu 
Katsumaro. 
 
Shin Tê-kuang [慚毫杰] (1897 - 1945?), politician who boarded with Nakano’s family 
while a student in Tokyo. Shin was the son of a high-ranking Chinese politician, Shin Ch’un-ken 
[慚蒟爛]. After leaving Japan, he initially worked in an English think tank and then entered 
politics. Shin attended the Washington Conference of 1922 as a member of the Chinese 
delegation. He also served in the Japanese puppet government set up in China during the early 
1940s. It is not known what became of him after the surrender of Japan in 1945. (Nakano Yasuo, 
vol. 1, p. 80-81, 113, 580, and 659.)  
 
Shintō Kazuma [〕I慎㮈] (1904 - 1992), politician, right-wing activist and Nakano’s 
secretary during the 1930s. Shintō was born in Fukuoka-city as the fourth son of the Genyōsha 
member Shintō Kiheita [〕I陽霸啣]. After graduating from Waseda in 1926, he first worked as 
Nakano’s secretary (while Nakano worked at the Minister of Communications) and later got 
involved in the Kokumin Dōmei and the Tōhōkai. Shintō also worked as editor of Miyake 
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Setsurei’s Gakan magazine. In 1943, he became president of the Kyūshū Nippō (the Genyōsha 
organ that later merger with the Fukuoka Nichi-Nichi Shimbun to become the Nishi-Nihon 
Shimbun). Together with Nakano, he was arrested in 1943 for opposing the Tōjō government. In 
1944, Shintō became president of the Genyō-sha. After the war, he was prosecuted and 
imprisoned as a type A war criminal. After his release in 1952, he reorganized the former 
members of the Genyō-sha into a new association. In 1958, he was elected to the Diet as a 
representative of Fukuoka (affiliated with the LDP). He failed to be reelected in 1960 but won in 
1963 and in the following two elections. In 1972, he was elected mayor of Fukuoka-city, where 
he passionately embarked upon a policy of making Fukuoka green, becoming famous for saving a 
cherry tree from getting cut down as part of a road project. He was re-elected four times and 
retired from the mayorship only in 1986 due to his age, thereafter assuming the post of director of 
the Fukuoka art museum and the Genyōsha Memorial Hall [仼┠だヒ洸善丹]. (See Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 19, 403-4, 464, 573-4 and vol. 2, p. 28, 182, 186, 290, 472, 707, 753, and 784.) 
 
Shintō Kiheita [〕I友霸啣] (1850 - 1925), Genyōsha founder. Born into a samurai 
family in Fukuoka, Shintō studied at the domain’s school, Bunpu-kan [艙驥丹], before entering 
the Ginseng –Field School sometime after 1870. He joined the Hagi rebellion in 1876 and was 
subsequently imprisoned. After his release, he became active in the Freedom and People’s Rights 
Movement. Central to the foundation of the Genyōsha, he served as the society’s second president. 
Shintō actively promoted the development of Fukuoka Harbor and from 1905 served as the 
mayor of Fukuoka city. (See History of the Genyōsha [仼┠だだ別] edited by Genyōsha History 
Editorial Committee [仼┠だだ別Y㈡善], Fukuoka, 1992,  Seinan Kiden [O評ヒ然]; 1969 
but especially Nakano’s mourning address on the occasion of Shintō’s funeral, “Shintō Kiheita” 
reproduced in Ogata, p. 103-08.) 
 
 539 
Shiōden (also Shiōten) Nobutaka [裂侒啀椄峇] (1879 - 1962), army officer. Born in 
Saitama prefecture, Shioden graduated from the Army War College. During WW1, he served as a 
military observer in France and later rose through the ranks of the army’s air branch before 
serving as the Army’s representative at the League of Nations. He entered the Army reserve in 
1929 and became director of the Imperial Aeronautic Association [旱楼衰ネ表善]. In 1942 he 
was elected to the Diet. Shiōden gained notoriety for his “Jewish Thoughts and Movements,” [咲
挫榊  淞熾  沸  ぉ罰] published in 1941, in which he expressed strong anti-Semitic and 
anti-masonry ideas  
 
Shiozawa Masasada [ 剽鼈萪⎠] (1870 - 1945), economist. Born in Ibaragi Prefecture, 
Shizawa attended Waseda University and later studied in America and Germany. Then he 
returned to Waseda to teach economics – among others to Nakano – and eventually became the 
University’s president. Shiozawa was said to have been Ōkuma Shibenobu’s “Encyclopedia” [ö
漲2]. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 75, 235, 679, and 749,) 
Shirayanagi Shūko [28㍼〒ぷ] (1884 - 1950) novelist. Born in Shizuoka prefecture, 
Shirayanagi graduated from Waseda University. Influenced by the socialist movement, he 
initially wrote proletarian literature and history. He contributed articles to Nakano’s magazines in 
the 1920s. 
Shiratori Toshio [28兂酘約] (1887 - 1949), diplomat instrumental in negotiating the 
Triple Alliance. Born in Chiba prefecture, Shiratori graduated from Tokyo Imperial University 
before joining the Foreign Service, where he established a reputation for his hard-line views. 
After becoming ambassador to Italy in 1938, he promoted the Triple Alliance. He was elected to 
the Diet in 1942. After the war, he was sentenced to imprisonment for life as a class-A wartime 
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criminal. He died in prison. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, 616-19, 648-9, 666-70, 696 and vol. 2, p. 
396-7, and 418.)  
Song Jiaoren (Song Jiao Ren) [嶬臙析] (1882 - 1913), Chinese republican revolutionary 
and leader; founder of the Kuomintang. A follower of Huang Xing, Song fled to Japan in 1904 
where he studied Western political thought and made contacts with Japanese pan-Asianists 
including Inukai Tsuyoshi, Kita Ikki etc.. With Sun Yat-sen, he was instrumental in the foundation 
of the Tongmenghui, an organization aimed at overthrowing the Qing dynasty. Song returned to 
China around 1910, participating in the republican revolution of the following year. When in the 
aftermath of the revolution, Yuan Shikai set out to establish a monarchical system, Song opposed 
him. Under his leadership, the Kuomintang won the first general election and Song was 
considered the most likely candidate for the premiership. Song was assassinated in March 1913 
and it is suspected that the assassination was carried out on orders of Yuan Shikai. (See Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 112, and vol. 2, p. 140.) 
 
Sugimori Kōjirō [鼕扈咯尞玊] (1881 - 1968), scholar and social scientist. Born in 
Shizuoka prefecture, Sugimori graduated from Waseda University in 1906 and then stayed on to 
become a lecturer. Receiving a Mombushō scholarship, he traveled to Europe in 1913 and stayed 
there until 1919, studying first in Germany and then in England. Upon his return to Japan, he 
became professor of literature and political economy at Waseda. Close to Nakano after meeting 
him in London during WW1, Sugimori became Nakano’s friend and scientific advisor and often 
published articles in Nakano’s magazines. After Japan’s surrender, Sugimori was part of the 
Constitution Research Society [畧┃ｫ!善], which submitted a proposal for a new constitution 
to the U.S. occupation forces in late 1945. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 190-96, 271, 279, 183, 
364-65, 641-43, and vol. 2, p. 109-115.)  
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Sugiura Jūgō [襃④ĩ悩] (1855 - 1924), politician and educator. Born into a samurai 
family of the Zeze-domain (present-day Shiga prefecture), Sugirua went twice to England as a 
student on a government scholarship, studying natural sciences. Upon his return, he first taught at 
Tokyo Imperial University and then founded the Tokyo School of English [覩静ラ嶌貊] in 1885. 
In 1888, he and Miyake Setsurei founded the Seikyōsha, which published the magazine The 
Japanese [荳袿斥]. A year later he started the newspaper Japan [荳袿]. In his writings, Sugiura 
criticized that Japan’s wholesale import of Western culture was threatening to destroy its own 
unique culture. Elected to the Diet in 1990, he withdrew from his seat after the first session.  
 
Sugiura Takeo [襃④驥渣] (1890 - ?), member of the Kokumin Dōmei and Tōhōkai. Born 
in Aichi prefecture, Sugiura studied law at Tokyo Imperial University, graduating in 1916. After 
passing the civil service exam, he served in the colonial administration in Korea. Elected to the 
Diet in 1924, he was re-elected five times. Sugiura was a member of the Nakano faction within 
the Kokumin Dōmei and later the Tōhōkai (elected in 1936 and 1937). He failed to be re-elected 
in the recommended election of 1942. (See Nagai Kazuo, “The Foundation of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜
善貢癩U] in Journal of History [別詒], July 1978, vol. 61, no.4; p. 115, 127, 130-34 and 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 83 and 166.)  
 
Sumita Masao [創譓驟渣] (1878 - 1946), medical doctor who botched Nakano’s leg 
surgery in 1926. Born in Hyōgo prefecture, Sumita studied medicine at Tokyo Imperial 
University and then worked as assistant professor at Kyōto Imperial University and Kyūshū 
Imperial University hospitals before going to Germany to study further. His specialty was 
surgeries to treat inflammations of joints caused by tuberculosis and bone deformations. (See 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, 423-24, 331, 388, 583 and 801.)   
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Sun Hung-i [崕 ┲舛] (1872 - 1936), Chinese politician of the late imperial and early 
republican periods who met Nakano in 1918. After having been active as a businessman and 
educator in Tientsin, Sun served the government and Yuan Shi-kai until he resigned in opposition 
to the latter’s imperial aspirations. Thereafter he served in the republican government in Nanking, 
supporting Sun Yat-sen. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 257.) 
 
Suzuki Bunji [H袍艙齠] (1885 - 1946) labor activist. Born in Miyagi prefecture, Suzuki 
graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 1909. Suzuki co-founded the Yūaikai [仏犢善] in 
1912. Later he served as member of parliament for the Social Mass Party [だ善哢テ妬] and the 
Social Democratic Party [だ善鴈テ妬]. Suzuki headed the Communications Union before 
Nakano became its president in the early 1930s. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 471.) 
 
Suzuki Shōgo [H袍驟捧] (1890 - 1977), politician. Born in Aichi prefecture, Suzuki 
studied at Meiji University and then became a journalist, working, among others, for the Yomiuri 
News and as editor of the magazine Daikan [哢に]. A follower of Ozaki Yukio, he was first 
elected to the Diet in 1932. He was subsequently re-elected a total of seven times, serving as MP 
in the post-war period. Suzuki was a member of the Nakano faction in the Kokumin Dōmei and 
then later of the Tōhōkai. In 1942, he ran as a Tōhōkai candidate and was successfully elected. In 
1955, he became mayor of Toyokawa-city in Aichi prefecture. 
 
Tabuchi Toyokichi [譓翰ϕ便] (1882 - 1943), politician and member of the lower house. 
Born in 1882 in Wakayama prefecture, into a family of sake brewers and land owners, he entered 
Waseda University's department of political economy in 1905 (with Nakano). Between 1908 and 
1915 he studied politics, philosophy and economics abroad, first in Germany but after the 
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outbreak of WW1 also in England, France and America. He was first elected to the Diet in 
1920, advocating, among other issues, female participation in politics. During the early 1920s, he 
was often grouped together with Nakano and Nagai Ryarō under the label: “The Three Waseda 
Crows.” Following the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, he held a speech in the Diet condemning 
the atrocities committed against Korean nationals in the aftermath of the calamity. After the 
assassination of Chang Tsuo-lin he and Nakano held a number of speeches demanding the 
investigation of the incident and the army’s role in it. In 1929 he married at the age of 47, but his 
wife died just three years later. Not affiliated with any political party, Tabuchi continued to 
maintain an independent stance in the parliament. In 1941, he criticized Tōjō for his leadership in 
the Pacific War (interrupting Tōjō’s speech and leaving the floor in protest). (See Koyama Jinji 
[恠愾析と], Tabuchi Toyokichi and Nakano Seigō [譓欝ϕ便膏腎ǒ], in Asahi Journal [衲荳沙
堺察才作], April 7, 1972, p. 31 – 38.) 
 
Takabatake Motoyuki [㔾鋐Ⅳ翠] (1886 - 1928), social scientist and translator of the 
first full translation of Karl Marx’s “Das Kapital.” Born in Gumma Prefecture, he was baptized 
in 1899 and entered the school of theology of Dōshisha University in 1904 but withdrew after 
having doubts about Christianity. Imprisoned following the Red-Flag Incident, he used the prison 
term to start translating Marx’s “Das Kapital.” He did not complete all three parts until 1924. In 
the early 1920s, Takabatake was a member of the Rōsōkai, to which Nakano also belonged. In the 
second half of the 1920s, he came to embrace National Socialism [楼广だ善厨コ]. After the 
introduction of universal suffrage, he tried to organize a New National Socialist Party that would 
have brought together social democrats, nationalists, and military leaders. He failed to see its 
realization as he died of cancer. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 777.) 
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Takagi Masatoshi ['03麌橫桿] (1857 - 1934), politician. Born in Tokyo, Takagi had been 
a member of the Diet since its opening in 1890. He lost his eyesight in 1896 but continued to be 
active in politics, advocating universal suffrage and citizens’ rights for women. He also actively 
sought to support the integration of blind people into society. Takagi and Nakano were both 
members of the Mushozoku Club in the Diet in the early 1920s.   
 
Takagi Rikurō [㔾袍憤ア] (? - ?), businessman. Little is known about Takagi. Starting off 
as a journalist, Takagi at one point he worked for Tōa Tsūshō [覩盛＊盲] and at another point as 
the Beijing correspondent of the Jiji News [蕁征范ⓥ]. Thereafter he continued to have an 
interest in Chinese affairs. From around 1917, he worked for the Mitsui Zaibatsu, procuring 
financial support for Nakano in that year’s general election. He later facilitated a loan on behalf 
of Nakano with which the latter bought his first house in Harajuku. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 
219, 235, 281, 314, 459, 607 and vol. 2, p. 95 and 499.) 
 
Takahashi Jutarō [㔾隱徘啣ア] (1879 - ?), politician and member of the Nakano faction 
within the Kokumin Dōmei. Born in Iwate prefecture, Takahashi graduated from the Navy War 
College and then served in various positions in the Japanese Navy before entering the reserve and 
running successfully for election in 1928. 
 
Takao Heibei [㔾悃霸度ヤ] (1895 - 1923), social activist. Born into a Nagasaki merchant 
family, Takao first worked in the pastry business before being attracted by anarchist and socialist 
thought. In the years after WW1, he was sentenced to several short prison terms (among others 
for printing a work of Kropotkin). It was during that time that he also joined the Rōsōkai and 
Nakano’s Yūshin-sha, where he made Nakano’s acquaintance. In 1922, Takao travelled to Russia 
and met with Lenin. Upon his return, he joined the Japanese Communist Party but he left it soon 
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thereafter. He was shot by an anti-socialist activist the following year. After his death, Nakano 
wrote a piece arguing about the futility of trying to suppress communist thought by force, in 
which he also described their first encounters. (See Nakano Seigō, Editorial, Tōhōjiron August 
1923 and Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 364-66.) 
 
Takayama Hikokurō [㔾愾檢枢ア] (1747 - 1793), political activist of the Edo period. 
Takayama was a samurai from Kōzuke domain and is best known for his eccentric character and 
political activities. An early activist for the cause of imperial restoration during the Tokugawa 
period, Takayama traveled through Japan preaching loyalty to the Emperor. Eventually, he was 
put under arrest by the bakufu in Kurume Kyūshū, where he committed suicide. In an article 
written after Nakano’s death, Tōyama compared Nakano’s suicide to that of Takayama. 
 
Takebe Koshirō [驥グ恠裂ア] (1846 - 1877), saumurai (shishi) and political radical of 
the Fukuoka-han. With the outbreak of the Satsuma rebellion, Takebe and Ochi Hikoshirō led a 
force of 850 samurai against the domain’s castle. Following the defeat of the Fukuoka uprising, 
he went into hiding, but was found and executed. (See See Kokuryūkai [桛a善] eds., Records 
from the South-West [O評ヒ然], Tokyo: Hara Shobō [譜蟷蘯], 1969 and History of the 
Genyōsha [仼┠だだ別] edited by Genyōsha History Editorial Committee [仼┠だだ別Y㈡善], 
Fukuoka, 1992) as well as Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 35, 46, 47 and 52.) 
 
Tanabe Osamu [譓シ10/11] (1902 - 1980), farmers’ movement activist and, from 1938, 
member of the Tōhōkai. Born in Osaka, Tanabe served as permanent secretary in the Izumi 
League of the Japan Farmers’ Union [荳袿コ鴈36遍北龜(広甲壕)ヾ遍善]. After its breakup, he 
served as director of the Osaka chapter of the All-Japan Famers Union [菟楼コ鴈36遍哢史枴ヾ
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遍善]. A member of the Social Mass Party, he withdrew in 1938 and joined Nakano’s Tōhōkai. 
He travelled to Vietnam (French Indochina) and afterward published a report (See Tanabe Osamu, 
“French Indochina on the Eve of the Occupation: Research and Travel Report” [〕半撚哦貢碩今
貧柤腑り : ㌽谺况胞膏7/10ネ], Tokyo, 1941). In 1942, he ran as a candidate of the Tōhōkai but 
lost. After the war, he continued to be active in the farmers’ movement and the socialist party. 
(See Nagai, Kazuo: “The Development of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢̇悽] in Journal of History 
[別詒], January 1979, vol. 62, no.1; p. 101, p. 130-34 and Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 425.) 
 
Tanaka Kiyotatsu [譓腎掃け] (1885 - ?), doctor and politician. Born in Shiga prefecture 
Tanaka as the second-born son of Imamura Eijirō, Kiyotatsu was later adopted into the Tanaka 
family. Kiyotatsu first worked as a gynecologist before entering politics. He was elected five 
times to the Diet but also served on the provincial assembly of Shiga prefecture. He was a 
member of the Minseitō, the Kokumin Dōmei and later the Tōhōkai, and was elected in 1936 and 
1937 but not in 1942. (See Nagai Kazuo, “The Foundation of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U] in 
Journal of History [別詒], July 1978, vol. 61, no.4; p. 115, 130-34 and Nakano Yasuo, vol. p. 103, 
245, 378079, and 387.) 
 
Tanaka Kōtarō [譓腎85啣ア] (1890 - 1974), legal scholar and high-ranking judge. 
Born as son to a judge in Kagoshima, Tanaka attended the Shūyūkan in Fukuoka and later studied 
law at Tokyo Imperial University, graduating at the top of his class in 1915. After working for the 
Ministry of the Interior for a year and a half, he withdrew and returned to teach law at Tokyo 
Imperial University. Around this time, he also came under the influence of Christianity. After 
studying in Europe, he returned to teach commercial law at Tokyo Imperial University in 1924. 
He was baptized a catholic by the head of Sophia University in 1926. In 1929, he earned his 
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doctorate in law and in 1937 he was made head of the law department of Tokyo Imperial 
University. After the war, Tanaka served as Minister of Education in the first Yoshida Cabinet, as 
a member of parliament, and from 1950 onward as judge on various high-ranking courts. 
 
Ting Chien-hsiu (Ding Jian Xiu) [振褐黛] (1886 - 1944), politician and educator. Like 
Nakano, Ting studied political science and economics at Waseda and, according to his own 
recollection, relied heavily on Nakano’s help in his studies. Upon returning to China, he worked 
in various government positions before teaching at the Chinese military and police academy. A 
member of the Japan-friendly faction within the Chinese government, he cooperated with the 
Japanese army after the assassination of Chang Tsuo-lin in 1928 and especially after the 
Manchurian Incident of 1931, which earned him the position of Minister of Transport in the 
administration of the Japanese puppet state of Manshūkoku. Ting and Nakano met during 
Nakano’s frequent visits to China. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, 665-68, and 760.) 
 
Toda Yumi [盡譓譿五] (1886 - ?), politician and member of the Nakano faction within the 
Kokumin Dōmei. Born in Nagano prefecture, Toda graduated from Keiō University in 1910, 
majoring in finance. As a member of the Minseitō, he was elected to the Diet and served as 
secretary to Hamaguchi during the latter’s premiership. After resigning from that position he 
worked for the Daily News [鯱荳范ⓥ]. (See Nagai Kazuo, “The Foundation of the Tōhōkai” [覩
苜善貢癩U] in Journal of History [別詒], July 1978, vol. 61, no.4; p. 123-25.)     
 
Tokutomi Sohō [毫廬え戍] (1863 - 1957), journalist, and friend of Nakano’s. Born in 
Kumamoto prefecture, Tokutomi became Christian as a youth and studied at the Dōshisha [弁沒
だ]. After returning to his native province, he joined the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement. 
He opened a private school in 1882 but closed it in 1886 and went to Tokyo, devoting himself to 
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writing. His early publications made him very popular among the Meiji youth. In 1890, he 
founded the Kokumin Shimbun [楼鴈范ⓥ], targeting a mass audience. Around the outbreak of 
the first Sino-Japanese war of 1895, he took a hard-line stance on foreign policy issues, an 
attitude that was confirmed and hardened during a trip to Europe in 1897. Aligning himself 
closely to Katsura Tarō in the late Meiji and early Taishō periods, he and his paper became the 
target of multiple attacks (the paper’s offices were twice burned down). After Katsura’s death, 
Tokutomi increasingly preached the centrality of the Imperial Household. He left the management 
of the Kokumin Shimbun in 1929 because of financial difficulties and henceforth worked for the 
Osaka Mainichi News. Tokutomi first met Nakano while the latter was in Korea as a 
correspondent of the Asahi in 1913-4 and immediately liked him as a person, though he did not 
always agree with Nakano politically. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 19, 84, 108, 142 and vol. 2, p. 
71, 271, 282, 283, 335, 371-76, and 508.)  
 
Tokutomi Roka [毫廬うゑ] (1868 - 1927), novelist and younger brother of Tokutomi Sohō. 
Roka met Nakano while the latter was posted in Korea in 1913-4. Born in Kumamoto prefecture, 
Tokutomi was educated at Dōshisha English School, where he also received his Christian baptism. 
He became famous through novels such as “Nature and Man” [60®膏斥﨟] (1900), and 
“Footprints in the Snow,” which was translated by Kenneth Strong (1970). (See Nakano Yasuo, 
vol. 1, 142, and vol. 2, p. 101, 140, and 191.)  
 
Tomita Kōjirō [廬譓杁饅ア] (1897 - 1938), journalist and politician. Born in Kōchi 
Prefecture, Tomita studied art and later worked as a journalist for newspapers in Shikoku. In 1907, 
he ran for election for the first time, won a seat in the Diet and was subsequently reelected nine 
times. Tomita was a co-founder of the Rikken Dōshikai and a member of the Adachi faction 
within the Minseitō, where he served as director. Enjoying the trust of both the bureaucrat and 
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party-politician factions of the party, Tomita often acted as a go-between or bridge between these 
two groups. Following the failure of the Minseito-Seiyukai coalition cabinet, Tomita briefly left 
the Minseitō but re-joined in 1933. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 554 and 623-38.)  
 
Tomita Yūtarō [廬譓畑啣ア] (1883 - 1946), higher-ranking bureaucrat in the Ministry of 
Finance and banker. Like Nakano, Tomita was born into a samurai family of the Fukuoka 
domain and attended the Shūyūkan. From there, however, he went on to study at Tokyo Imperial 
University, graduating in 1908 and going on to work at the Ministry of Finance. Between 1924 
and 1934, he served as head of the Treasury and in that position had to deal with the major crises 
of the time -the Shōwa financial crisis and Japan’s abandonment of the Gold Standard. Though 
Tomita was seen by many as one of the rising stars within the Ministry, he was barred from 
becoming a minister because of his refusal to align himself with the Kurada faction within the 
ministry. In 1936, he left the ministry taking up a leading position with the Manchurian 
Development Bank [噌攀85釡‘ネ]. After the war, he briefly returned to work for the Ministry 
of Finance in an advisory position. Tomita was a member of Nakano’s Tōhōkai think tank in the 
early 1920s. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 235.)  
  
Tōyama Mitsuru [姿愾噌] (1855 - 1944), right-wing political leader, advocate of 
Japanese expansion on the Asian continent and a founder of such ultra-nationalist groups as the 
Genyōsha. Born in Fukuoka city as the son of Tsutsui Kamesaku [æ棲瀬ø ], he was 
subsequently adopted into the Tōyama family. He enrolled in Takaba Osamu’s Ginseng-Field 
School at the age of 17. Tōyama supported SaigōTakamori’s Satsuma rebellion, participated in 
the Hagi Revolt of 1876 and was subsequently imprisoned. After being released from prison, 
Tōyama visited Itagaki Taisuke and joined the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement. In 1879, 
together with Hiraoka Kōtarō [霸慟⑥啣ア] and Hakoda Rokusuke [è譓砥ず], he founded the 
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Kōyōsha [圃蔽だ], a society supporting the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement. In 1881, 
the Kōyōsha changed its name to Genyōsha and initially was headed by Tōyama’s friend Hiraoka 
Kōtarō. This society started off pro-people’s rights, but with the passing of time it became more 
right wing. It promoted the cause of Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland and interfered 
violently in the 1892 general election on behalf of the government. Implicated in the attempted 
assassination of Foreign Minister Okuma Shigenobu in 1889, Tōyama was known and feared as a 
behind-the-scenes manipulator in Japanese politics. He strongly favored establishment of 
Japanese control over Manchuria; in this connection, he supported the formation of the 
Kokuryūkai [Amur River Society] by Uchida Ryōhei in 1901 and also became a member of the 
anti-Russian Tairo Dōshikai [徙顳弁沒善] when it was formed in 1903. He gave support to Sun 
Yat-sen and when the revolution of 1911 occurred, he traveled to China as an advisor to the 
government. Following the Chinese revolution, Tōyama came to have great influence as a 
behind-the-scenes manipulator of Japan’s Asia policy and domestic politics. Although Tōyama 
was in retirement during WW2, he maintained his standing as the grand old man of Japanese 
nationalism, reigning over right-wing groups such as the Genyōsha and the Amur River Society, 
which he helped bring into existence. Though he never was in any official position of power, he 
had always great influence while remaining beyond the reach of the government. Tōyama 
supported, and at times harbored, many foreign exiles (Sun Yat-sen, Ras Bihari Bose, etc.) as well 
as Japanese who were presecuted by their government. (See History of the Genyōsha [仼┠だだ
別] edited by Genyōsha History Editorial Committee [仼┠だだ別Y㈡善], Fukuoka, 1992 and 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1 p. 19-20, 44-62, 111-13, 152-55, 166, 219-22, 722-26, and vol. 2, p. 381-83 
and 412-13.) 
 
Tsuda Shingo [┭譓袋捧] (1881 - 1948), businessman and financial supporter of 
Nakano’s. Born in Aichi prefecture, Tsuda graduated from Keiō University. In 1930, he became 
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president of Kanegafuchi Spinning Company and was later president of the Greater Japan 
Spinning Association. (See Nakano Yasuo vol. 2, p. 267, 282, 498, and 963.) 
 
Tsukui Tatsuo [┭睡棲a渣]: (1901 - 1989), right-wing political activist. Born in 
Ibaragi-ken as the first son of Tsukui Hikojirō, Tsukui enrolled in the faculty of literature of 
Waseda University but withdrew before graduating. He then entered the Osaka Kon’nichi 
Shimbun [哢史責荳范ⓥ] in 1924, where he met and became a student of Takabatake Motoyuki 
[㔾鋐Ⅳ翠],  originally a leftist thinker who after WW1 turned right. Later Tsukui worked as 
reporter for the Nihon Shimbun [荳袿范ⓥ] and the Yomiuri Shimbun [ファラド呟范ⓥ]. Following the 
recommendation of Takabatake, he became secretary general of the National Construction 
Society [椥楼善] in 1926. After the death of Takabatake in 1928, he distanced himself from the 
society and founded the Radical Patriotic Workers League [淺〕犢楼迫朕70Gヾç] and the 
Radical Patriotic Party [淺〕犢楼妬]. In 1931, he participated in the foundation of the All-Japan 
Association for the Common Struggle of Patriots [菟荳袿犢楼70努弁帰勢表共同組合善] (organ: 
Kōmin Shimbun [85鴈范ⓥ]). Later he founded, with Akamatsu Katsumaro, the People’s 
Association [楼鴈表善] and published the monthly magazine Popular Movement [楼鴈ぉ罰]. 
Starting from 1937, he worked on the editorial staff of the Yamato Shimbun. In 1943, he was 
elected for the first time into the Tokyo city parliament. After WW2 he was prosecuted but he was 
released in 1951. Thereafter he published the magazine National Opinion [楼ルクス]. (See Nakano 
Yasuo, vol, 1, p. 548.)    
 
Tsurumi Yūsuke [庾Wぼず] (1885 - 1973), politician. Born in Okayama prefecture, 
Tsurumi studied at Tokyo Imperial University and was adopted into the family of Gotō Shimpei. 
After serving in the Ministry of Railways, he was elected to the Diet in 1928 (and subsequently 
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re-elected three times), belonging initially to the Minseitō. After the war, he belonged to the 
Japan Progressive Party, the Kaishintō and the Liberal Democratic Party. He served as Minister of 
Health and Welfare in the first Hatoyama cabinet. During the 1920s, he contributed articles to 
Nakano’s magazines. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 354.) 
 
Uchida Ryōhei [塔譓Y霸] (1874 - 1937), ultranationalist leader. Born in Fukuoka 
Prefecture, Uchida entered the Genyōsha as a youth and soon became the leading disciple of 
Tōyama Mitsuru. When the Tonghak Rebellion broke out in Korea in 1894, Uchida went to help 
the rebels. In 1901, he founded an ultranationalist organization, the Amur River Society, to press 
the government to adopt a strong policy toward Russia. In 1903, he joined the Tairo Dōshikai, a 
political association formed to advocate war with Russia. Following the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-5, Uchida called for the annexation of Korea. During the Taishō and early Shōwa periods, 
he turned his attention to attacking liberal currents at home. He was arrested in 1925 on suspicion 
of plotting to assassinate Prime Minister Katō Kōmei but was found innocent. In the 1924 general 
election, he ran against Nakano but withdrew and was succeeded by Miyagawa Ikkan, Nakano’s 
rival. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 375-81 and vol. 2, p. 205.) 
  
Ukita Kazutami (or Watami?) [⑨譓北鴈] (1860 - 1946), professor of Nakano’s at Waseda 
University. Born as the son of a samurai of Kumamoto-han, Ukita was baptized and raised 
Christian. After studying philosophy and theology at Dōshisha [弁沒だ], he taught history, 
political science and constitutional law at that same school over the next 11 years. During that 
time he also spent two years at Yale University studying history, politics and sociology. He left 
Dōshisha in 1897 and took up a position at Waseda University (then still named Tokyo Senmon 
Gakkō), where in the course of the next 44 years he taught history and political science and was 
instrumental in laying the groundwork for the university's political science department. 
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Advocating human rights, liberal democracy, constitutionalism, parliamentary representation, 
universal suffrage, and women’s emancipation, he contributed to and eventually edited the liberal 
democratic magazine “Sun” [啣蔽] between 1909 and 1919. Counted among the pioneers of 
Taishō Democracy, he is sometimes even credited with being the first Japanese to advocate 
democracy [鴈厨厨コ], influencing Yoshino Sakuzō and others. His major writings include 
“Logical Imperialism” [淡弴ª旱楼厨コ], “Outline of Political Science” [膕齠嶌鉐ルクス], and 
“Against War between Japan and America” [荳̶延皚ルクス]. Even after Nakano’s graduation from 
Waseda, Ukita continued to support Nakano’s journalistic work, writing prefaces and 
introductions to the latter’s books and recommending new topics. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 
75, 85-86, 104, 195, 388, 464, 686, and 714.) 
 
Ushijima Tokutarō [⬆搖毫啣ア] (1951? - ?), right-wing activist of the post-WW2 period. 
Born in Fukuoka prefecture, Ushijima graduated first from the West Japan Junior College before 
going on to Waseda University’s department of politics and economics and then starting a 
doctorate in the history of modern Japanese political thought. He tried to enter Mishima Yukio’s 
Tate-no-kai [釼貢善] but was rejected for physical reasons. Working as editor of “Jasco” [沙堺瑳
唆], the organ of a racist student organization by the name “Japan Student Conference” [荳袿嶌
﨟善共同組合], Ushijima came to embrace German Nazism and Italian Fascism. During trips to 
Germany, he came into contact with the “conservative revolution” school of thought around 
Armin Mohler (1920-2003) and developed a keen interest in the left wing of the Nazi party (he 
never showed any interest in the neo-Nazis.) In the 1970s, Ushijima became a prominent critic of 
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. With the support and backing of Shintō Kazuma (Nakano’s 
former secretary, later president of the Genyōsha and mayor of Fukuoka-city), Ushijima 
relaunched the Tōhōkai’s Tōtairiku magazine. 
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Uzaki Rojō [婣扣愔傚] (1873 - 1934), journalist and critic also known under his actual 
first name, Kumakichi [ⅶ便]. Born in Hyōgo prefecture, Uzaki attended Waseda University and 
subsequently worked for the Tokyo Daily News [覩静荳荳范ⓥ], covering military affairs and 
politics. In 1910, he joined Inukai’s Kokumintō and became known for his critical articles 
published in magazines such as Japan and the Japanese, Chūō Kōron, and Tōhōjiron. He also 
wrote a biography of Inukai Tsuyoshi. Uzaki occasionally contributed to Nakano’s magazine 
Tōhōjiron.  
Wakugami Rōjin [蝕疹Ⓟ斥] (1888 - 1966), activist and politician. Born in Okinama 
prefecture, Wakugami lost much of his hearing as a child. While a student at Waseda University, 
he was greatly attracted to the socialist thought of Abe Isoo. Wakugami withdrew from university 
and joined the socialist movement. In 1931, he founded Okinawa Dōjin Hospital [黯た弁析+派]. 
Running as a non-endorsed candidate for the Tōhōkai in 1942, he was elected to the Diet. (See 
Nagai Kazuo, “The Foundation of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U] in Journal of History [別詒], 
July 1978, vol. 61, no.4; p. 130-35 and Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 466)  
Wang Yang-ming (侒柔蕚 , 1472 - 1529), Ming Chinese idealist, Neo-Confucian 
philosopher, educator, General, and bureaucrat. Born in Yuyao, Zhejiang Province, Wang 
followed the career of his father, passing the Chinese bureaucratic examinations and serving the 
government until he was driven out of office in 1506. Later he was reinstated, serving as 
governor of Jiangxi, a position that earned him a reputation as able military leader in the 
suppression of a number of rebellions. Marginalized during his lifetime for his opposition to the 
orthodox teachings of Zhu Xi, Wang’s philosophy was appreciated fully only after his death. Two 
ideas stand out from his teachings. First, Wang presupposed that by nature man was morally good 
and had innate knowledge of good and evil. Accordingly, moral understanding could not be found 
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in the outside world, but rather through meditative introspection and following one’s intuition. 
Second, Wang rejected the existence of moral understanding without action. His concept of the 
unity of knowledge and action [öネ慎68] held that knowledge was gained, even perfected, in 
the process of action. In making the individual master of his or her moral judgment, Wang’s first 
idea is emancipatory and egalitarian. The second idea implies a rebellious, at times  
revolutionary, drive in that it bestows not only the right but  the duty for action independent of 
and against outside authority. 
 
Wang Ching-wei [鸛店ﬁ] (1883 - 1944), Chinese politician. Born in Canton, Wang 
studied at Hōsei University in Japan. There he entered the Chinese revolutionary league and met 
with Sun Yat-sen. After the foundation of the Nationalist party, he became one of its leading 
members. Initially a member of the party’s left wing, he took a pro-Japanese and anti-communist 
position after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict in 1937. After fleeing from Chungking, 
he founded a Japan-friendly (puppet) government in Nanking in March 1940. He died of a lung 
disease in Nagoya in 1943. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 480-81, and vol. 2, p. 89-92, 263, 353, 
384, 388, 407, and 693.)   
 
Washizawa Yoshiji [惋鼈紳裂性] (1883 - ?), politician and member of the Nakano faction 
within the Kokumin Dōmei. Born in Nagano prefecture, Washizawa graduated from Keiō 
University majoring in political science, then became a reporter for the Jiji News [蕁征范况]. As 
a correspondent of that paper, he was sent to Beijing, where he founded his own newspaper. He 
later worked as a businessman and an advisor on Chinese affairs. After leaving the Kokumin 
Dōmei together with Nakano, he joined the Tōhōkai. Washizawa ran ran as a candidate of the 
Tōhōkai in 1942 but lost. (See Nagai Kazuo, “The Foundation of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U] 
in Journal of History [別詒], July 1978, vol. 61, no.4; p. 125 note 8, 130-34, and Nakano Yasuo, 
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vol. 1, p. 738-39.) 
 
Watanabe Tadao [喰シ泗渣] (1898 - 2005), banker and member of the Tōhōkai think tank. 
Born in Hokkaidō, Watanabe studied at Tokyo Imperial University before entering the Bank of 
Japan. After the war, he switched to Mitsuwa Bank, becoming its director in 1947 and president 
in 1960. Under the slogan “People’s Bank,” he tried to turn the bank into one that catered to mass 
consumers. 
 
Watanabe Yasukuni [喰シ┘れ] (1891 - ?), politician and member of the Tōhōkai. Born 
in Hokkaidō, Watanabe studied political economy at Waseda University. He traveled to Europe, 
America and China. He was a member of parliament and later a member of the Imperial Rule 
Assistance Central Cooperation Society [哢膕62⇨善腎啅表陪善]. Watanabe ran successfully as 
a Tōhōkai candidate in the 1936 and 1937 elections. (See Nagai Kazuo, “The Foundation of the 
Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U] in Journal of History [別詒], July 1978, vol. 61, no.4; p. 130-35 and 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 187 and 245.) 
 
Yamaji (also Yamamichi) Jō’ichi [愾ぐd慎] (1882 - 1941), journalist and politician. 
Born in Hiroshima prefecture, Yamaji‘s career was similar to Nakano’s. After graduating from 
Waseda University in 1906, he initially worked for a couple of provincial newspapers and then 
entered politics, being elected MP with the Kenseikai (later Minseitō) in 1912. Within the party, 
he joined the Adachi faction. He served a parliamentary Vice-minister of Education in the Katō 
and the first Wakatsuki cabinets, and as parliamentary Vice-minister of Railways in the 
Hamaguchi cabinet. During the movement for a coalition cabinet, Yamaji initially took a passive 
attitude, not following Adachi and after the scheme failed he worked hard to have Adachi return 
to the Minseitō. When this failed, Yamaji finally also joined the Kokumin Dōmei and there 
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became leader of the faction opposing Nakano. In 1935, Yamaji returned to the Minseitō. (See 
Nagai Kazuo, “The Foundation of the Tōhōkai” [覩苜善貢癩U] in Journal of History [別詒], 
July 1978, vol. 61, no.4; p. 123-25.) 
 
Yamashita Kamesaburō [愾真瀬申ア] (1867 - 1944), businessman and financial backer 
of Nakano’s. Born in Aichi prefecture in 1867, Yamashita went to Meiji Law School [蕚齠┃歐
嶌貊], predecessor of today’s Meiji University, but he did not graduate. In 1913, he founded 
Yamashita Shipping, which expanded greatly during WW1 and formed the foundation for the 
Yamashita Zaibatsu. In 1943, he served as advisor to the Tōjō cabinet. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, 
p. 576 and 607 and vol. 2, p. 267, 498, and 693.) 
 
Yasukawa Daigorō [嚏擡ゔ阿玊] (1886 - 1976), businessman; friend and financial 
backer of Nakano’s. The fifth son of Fukuoka Coal Baron Yasukawa Kei’ichirō, young Daigorō 
went to the same Shūyūkan middle school as Nakano and Ogata Taketora, where the three 
became friends. Unlike the latter two, he went on to study engineering at the Tokyo Imperial 
University and then took a job with Hitachi Manufacturing. Following an internship at 
Westinghouse in the U.S., he founded - together with his father and brother - Yasukawa Electric 
Corporation in 1915, becoming the company’s president in 1936. In the post-war period, 
Yasukawa actively promoted the civilian use of nuclear power in Japan and served as president of 
Kyūshū Electric Power as well as on the committee of the Tokyo Olympics. (See Nakano Yasuo, 
vol. 1, p. 57, 61, 69, and 154 as well as vol. 2, p. 498.) 
Yasukawa Kei’ichirō [嚏擡釿ヘ玊] (1849 - 1934), businessman and father of Nakano’s 
high school classmate, Yasukawa Daigorō. Born as the fourth son into a samurai family of the 
Kuroda-han in Fukuoka, he was adopted into the Yasukawa family at the age of 16. After 
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studying in Kyōto and Shizuoka, Yasukawa returned to Fukuoka in 1871 after his one of his 
brothers was implicated in counterfeiting money for the domain and forced to commit seppuku. 
In the same year, he returned to Tokyo and entered Keiō University. After receiving news that 
another of his brothers had fallen in the Saga rebellion of 1874, he returned to Fukuoka for good 
and took over the management of the latter’s coal mine. With the help of Hiraoka Kōtarō, he later 
developed the Akaike coal mine. As a manager, Yasukawa was known for investing in areas 
outside the narrow confines of coal mining, such as Yasukawa Seisakusho, Kyūshū Steel [Н抬ウ
舼 later taken over by Yawata Steel], Yasukawa Electric Corporation [嚏擡綂▊], and the 
Yasukawa Steel works, laying the foundation for the Yasukawa Zaibatsu. In 1907, he founded the 
Meiji Vocational School located in northern Fukuoka, which later became Kyūshū Engineering 
University. Awarded the title of Baron in 1920, Yasukawa retired from business in 1920. (See 
Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 153-5, 168-69, 191, 206, 219-21, and 235.)  
Yoshida Isokichi [ 状ヨカップ状 ] (1867 - 1936), businessman from Chikuzen (present-day 
Fukuoka prefecture) who made a fortune in the coal business and later became a 
politician. Elected to the Diet in 1915, he held his seat until 1932. Yoshida acted as advisor to the 
Kyūshū Nippō when Nakano took over the management of the paper in 1928. (See Nakano Yasuo, 
vol. 1, p. 464 and 489.) 
 
Yoshida Minoru [便譓帑] (1910 - 1982), politician and Tōhōkai member. Born in Toyama 
prefecture, Yoshida studied agriculture at Kyūshū and Tokyo Imperial University and joined the 
Tōhōkai. After the war, he served as mayor of his native Ōshima-city and then served four terms 
as provincial governor. In 1969 and 1974, he was elected to the Diet as a member of the LDP. 
 
Yugeta Sei’ichi [楙年譓5/11慎] (1869? - 1937), journalist and Nakano’s mentor at the 
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Asahi News. Born in Gunma prefecture into the family of a Confucian scholar, Yugeta studied at 
Dōshisha University [弁沒だ哢嶌]. He entered the Asahi News in 1896 and gained some 
journalistic fame for reporting from the front lines during the Russo-Japanese war. He left the 
Asahi in 1915 and thereafter became an independent author. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 86, 
103-116, 154-55, 206, 383, and 554.)  
 
Yusa Kōhei [え双杁霸] (1883 - 1966) army officer, accomplished horseback rider and 
Nakano’s riding instructor. Born in Miyasaki prefecture, Yusa graduated from the Army Academy. 
As a cavalry officer, Yusa traveled to France to study horsemanship and later represented Japan 
five times at the Olympics. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 79 and p. 103, 202, 528, and 806.) 
 
Yutani Yoshiharu [譿〞コ齠] (1888 - 1958), politician and honorary citizen of Tottori 
city. Born in Tottori city, Yutani came from a wealthy property-owning family, but already in 
middle school became an ardent reader of the weekly Common People’s Newspaper [霸鴈范ⓥ]. 
After graduating from high school, he enrolled at Waseda University but withdrew in 1907 before 
graduating and returned to Tottori, where he managed a transport/delivery service. During WW1, 
he became the leader of the Tottori-city Youth Love of the City Association [嘎焚斃⻗朮犢斃練] 
(later the Tottori Constitutional Youth Association [嘎焚U畧⻗朮善 ]), which advocated 
universal suffrage and city management of electricity. After sitting in the city and provincial 
assembly, he was elected to the lower house in 1924 for the first time (initially affiliated with the 
Kenseikai). Including the election for the IRAA he was elected a total of six times to the Lower 
House. After the Kenseikai merged with the Seiyū-Hontō in 1927 to form the Minseitō, Yutani 
(like Nakano) belonged to the Adachi faction. He left the Minseitō with Adachi and Nakano to 
form the National League. When in 1935-6 Nakano left the National League [楼鴈弁ç] to form 
the Tōhōkai, Yutani followed. He was successfully elected in 1936 and 1937. He left the Tōhōkai 
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after the failed merger with the Social Mass Party in 1939. During the war, he was elected to the 
Diet as an officially recommended IRAA candidate. After the war, he participated in the 
foundation of the Japan Progressive Party [荳袿〕驩妬] before being banned from public life by 
occupation forces in 1946. After the ban was lifted, he supported the Communist Party. Even 
though in the course of his life he went from extreme right to extreme left, a common thread 
seems to be his desire for social justice. (See Nagai Kazuo, “The Foundation of the Tōhōkai” [覩
苜善貢癩U] in Journal of History [別詒], July 1978, vol. 61, no.4; p. 115, 130-34 and Nakano 
Yasuo, vol. 2, p. 245, and 370-86). 
 
Zhang Bing-lin [d⇧敧] (1869 - 1936), thinker and politician of the late imperial and 
early republican China. He was first imprisoned in China for spreading revolutionary thought 
and later fled to Japan, were he became the publisher of the Mimpō. After the revolution of 1911, 
he briefly served in the republican government. (See Nakano Yasuo, vol. 1, p. 112 and 721.) 
 
Zheng Xiao-xu [ビ峇㋐] (1860 - 1938), Chinese statesman and diplomat whom Nakano 
met while traveling through China in 1918. Born in Suzhou, Jiangsu, Zheng obtained the 
intermediate degree in the imperial examinations. Between 1891 and the outbreak of the 
Sino-Japanese war of 1894-05, he served as a diplomat in Tokyo, Osaka and Kobe, meeting 
influential politicians such as Ito Hirobumi. Zheng continued to serve in the Qing administration 
until the Chinese revolution of 1911. Remaining loyal to the Qing, he withdrew from public life 
and continued to criticize the Chinese nationalist government. In the 1920s, Zheng cooperated 
with the Genyōsha-affiliated Kokuryūkai to have the last Qing emperor, Puyi, restored in 
Manchuria. After the Manchurian Incident, Zheng was instrumental in establishing the Japanese 
puppet state and was rewarded with the position of Prime Minister of that state. As Prime 
Minister, Zheng soon ran into conflict with the Japanese military authorities, causing him to 
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resign from his office in 1935. He died under mysterious circumstances in 1938. 
